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Abstract 
 
Changes in the spatial organisation of capitalist production internationally over the last 
four decades have had profound impacts in the clothing industry. The strategies adopted by 
entrepreneurs to face economic instability and stagnation have systematically affected 
workers, mostly by a deep labour flexibilisation. In several cities, a return to the 
widespread use of the sweatshop system can be witnessed; in some others, such systems 
have indeed emerged. Today, sweatshops are a structural feature of the industry.  
 
This research aims at analysing the changes that the fashion industry has undergone during 
the last four decades and its consequences over working conditions. In addition, I address 
the question of what does the return of the sweatshop tell us about neoliberalism. Two 
main types of sweatshops are identified: ‘international sweatshops’ (mostly large factories 
located in Export Economic Zones, also called ‘maquilas’) and ‘local sweatshops’ (small 
inner-city workshops located in proximity to the markets). Only the second type is 
emphasised in here, and two case studies were conducted: the City Buenos Aires and the 
Province of Prato (Tuscany). The results reveal that in both cities informal economy, 
human trafficking, and child and forced labour are counterparts of the glamorous fashion 
businesses.  
 
The role of the state in regulating political economic shifts that have led to the sweatshop 
crisis, is addressed as well. Against the belief of its ‘demise’ I argue that the state has had a 
major role in engineering the mechanisms allowing a fierce redistribution of wealth away 
from labour, which encompasses state terrorism as well. 
 
In sum, the shift in the balance of power between capital and labour, and the changes 
operated in the role of the state during the latest four decades, are found to be major causes 
for ‘the return of the sweatshop’. In the clothing industry, these changes have led to a 
situation which portrays with clarity the inequalities to which Neoliberalism has led – 
albeit to varied extents and through different mechanisms according to the spatio-temporal 
contexts – all around the world.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction:  
What do sweatshops tell us about neoliberalism? 
 
1. Sweatshops today 
 
Story 1: It is a September Tuesday in Rome’s Piazza Spagna. I walk along the 
streets of this world-renowned exclusive fashion district. Smart, beautiful, 
extravagant clothes and astonishing prices, populate the windows of the high-
end fashion houses. Surprisingly I feel confident enough to get in, ignore the 
guards’ derogatory look (I am certainly wearing a very cheap pair of tennis 
shoes) and check prices and labels. In a few stores, only visible ‘Made in Italy’ 
and ‘Made in France’ labels can be seen. In others, those labels can be found as 
well, but some of the more standardised garments (like men’s suits) only have 
a rather hidden label establishing the ID of the subcontractor. In these, no 
origin is stated.  
 
Story 2: It is 30th March of 2006. I am having lunch at home while watching 
the news. My lunch is suddenly interrupted by the news of a fire in a medium-
sized garment workshop in Viale Street, in the middle-class neighbourhood of 
Caballito, Buenos Aires. The report states that six people died in the fire; they 
could not escape the place because the doors were locked and the windows 
were blocked. About 60 people, all of them Bolivian citizens, used to live in 
the place, sewing, packing and ironing garment for small and large clothing 
brands for up to 17 hours a day, and not being able to leave. Four of the six 
people who died were the children of the workers; one of them was three years 
old. The tragedy triggered the discovery of thousands of sweatshops in the city, 
managed by Bolivian citizens and working for small, medium and large local 
and international brands. 
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The majority of the consumers in the stores of Piazza Spagna would probably assume that 
Channel or Gucci have nothing to do with sweatshops. In the unlikely case that they bother 
to think about how those garments were made, they may imagine large factories, here and 
there, with thousands of workers sewing, assembling, ironing garments under more or less 
acceptable conditions, but forced and child labour and human trafficking would hardly be a 
possibility. Other consumers, perhaps better informed, could consider this possibility if a 
label states ‘made in Bangladesh’, while the ‘made in Italy’ label would be taken as 
guarantee of sweatshop-free garments.  
 
Today, these assumptions can be questioned. First of all, as we shall see later on in this 
thesis (see Chapter 6) the European Union has no legislation on rules of origin for clothing, 
despite the efforts of Italian authorities and entrepreneurs. Therefore what the label states 
might quite often be false.1 Secondly, sweatshops sewing and assembling garment and non-
apparel fashion goods (typically handbags) for these brands have been found and 
denunciated.2 Thirdly, some of these sweatshops have been found in Tuscany and in Paris. 
Finally, sweatshops working for other, less exclusive brands and retail chains, have been 
found in Los Angeles (The New York Times, 5/8/95), Manchester (BBC, 2/8/07), and 
Barcelona (El País, 23/6/09). In peripheral countries, McGrath (2010) reports the existence 
of sweatshops in Sao Paulo, whereas Skinner and Valodia (2001) analyse the rise of 
sweatshops in South Africa and Lesotho. The story in Viale Street in Buenos Aires 
(henceforth Viale) reveals the existence of sweatshops in Buenos Aires. 
 
Reports on the existence of sweatshops in both core and peripheral countries are numerous. 
In the late 1990s, several campaigns were organised by students across the United States to 
report the sweatshop practices by well-known sport-apparel brands, helping to raise public 
awareness about the proliferation of sweatshops in peripheral economies. Likewise, since 
the late 1980s, academic contributions by historians, sociologists, economists and 
                                                 
1 I had access – through the Department of Economic Development in the Tuscany Region – to a document 
presented by Italian authorities to a meeting of the Textiles and Clothing Commission of the EU in May 
2008. In it, they ask the European Commission to “promote the definition and the experimentation of a 
process aimed at a guaranteed traceability of the [textile and clothing] products destined for consumption”; 
and they also ask the member states to “commit themselves to adopt a European Guideline concerning the 
introduction of a mandatory origin label at least for [textile and clothing] products imported in the internal 
market” (translated from Italian). However, many of my interviewees in Tuscany assured that their proposal 
has been left aside once and again, and as asserted by an interviewee from the Department of Economic 
Development of Tuscany Region (Simone, interviewed on 9/6/2008), “it will never be approved” owing to 
the interests of Northern retailers in keeping the rules of origin out of agenda. The issue is further developed 
in Chapter 6. 
2 See www.nosweat.org.uk/category/companies-and-brands 
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geographers have addressed the ‘return of the sweatshop’ to large cities in the 
industrialised world. Already in the second half of the 1980s a collaborative work 
(Morokvasic, Phizacklea and Rudolph, 1986) addressed the existence of sweatshops in 
London and in Paris. Besides, during the last two decades, five influencing books focusing 
on the existence of sweatshops in London, Paris, New York and Los Angeles have been 
published (Phizacklea, 1990; A. Ross, 1997; Green, 1997; Bonacich and Appelbaum, 
2000; R. Ross, 2004). The majority of the authors agree with the return of the sweatshop to 
these cities. According to R. Ross (2004: 26), “as early as 1979 the first reports on the 
‘new sweatshops’ were in the New York press.” In the words of Bonacich and Appelbaum 
(2000: 2), “sweatshops have indeed returned to the United States. A phenomenon of the 
apparel industry considered long past is back, not as a minor aberration, but as a prominent 
way of doing business.” Also for the case of the US, R. Ross (2004: 10) assures that 
“sweatshops are back, and they are right here.” In sum, while being largely left at the 
margins of the industry during Fordism, sweatshops are now back in several cities of the 
industrialised countries, and they have emerged in cities were they had never existed, like 
Buenos Aires and Prato.  
 
2. Defining the matter: national and international sweatshops  
 
At times, the generalisation of the use of a term undermines our understanding of the 
problems related to it. The term ‘sweatshop’ is a clear example. Indeed, the proper 
definition of what I will consider as a sweatshop in here is important in political terms.  
 
It is my feeling that the view of sweatshops that several anti-sweatshop movements have 
promoted is that of large or medium factories located in export-led zones in peripheral 
countries, generally working as contractors of foreign companies, in which labour 
conditions are poor, often encompassing poor toilet facilities, poor health and safety 
conditions, toiling, 10 to 12 hours journeys, low pay (and unpaid overtime), flexible 
contracts, the banning of labour organising, and other labour abuses, of which women’s 
harassment by male bosses, as well as firings in case of pregnancy, have been widely 
reported. This is the vision that seems to enjoy a broad acceptance among Northern 
consumers when the issue of sweatshops is evoked.  
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However, such an idea is based on a partial understanding of the sweatshop problem. 
Though unintentionally, this view hides the existence of sweatshops in core capitalistic 
countries, which have been subject to study in recent years (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 
2000; Green, 1997; Morokvasic, 1986; Morokvasic et al, 1987; A. Ross, 1997; R. J. Ross, 
2004). In fact, the very term ‘sweating system’ was first coined by a special commission of 
the Houses of Commons (1889) in the late 19th century to refer to the system of 
subcontracting to small workshops and to homeworkers in London and other cities in core 
countries, where labour was paid on a piece rate and they toiled and “sweat their lives 
away” for a pittance. These kinds of sweatshops exist today as well, and they involve even 
further ‘levels of oppressiveness’ than what is witnessed in large sweatshops in export-led 
zones in peripheral countries. However, what I want to highlight is that there exist two 
kinds of sweatshops, differentiated by: (a) their location; (b) the kind of garment they 
produce; and (c) the characteristics of the working conditions.  
 
To avoid the confusions that the mixture of these two kinds of sweatshops has created in 
sweatshop studies, I propose to differentiate between ‘international sweatshops’ (known as 
maquilas in Spanish) and ‘national sweatshops’. In this research I call ‘international 
sweatshops’ those medium or large factories located in export-led zones in peripheral 
countries. They are ‘international’ precisely because they produce (in mass) for foreign 
contractors and their production is export-led, meaning that they are part of an international 
production chain. On the other hand, ‘national sweatshops’ are located in large cities both 
in the core and in the periphery.3 I call them ‘national’ because their products are sold 
mostly in the cities and countries where there are located.4 In this thesis I address solely 
working conditions in ‘national sweatshops’, although I certainly refer to international 
ones. 
 
A detailed definition of national sweatshops needs to include details of their working 
conditions. In light of their research on sweatshops in Los Angeles, Bonacich and 
Appelbaum (2000: 4) provide a definition that includes 
 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that they are located only in large cities, i.e. in proximity to large markets, so that the 
sweating system can really reach the dimensions and the modus operandi of a system, with several 
subcontractors competing against each other. This pushes costs down and allows prices low enough to 
compete against other garment producers in the country. As explained below, proximity to the markets is also 
due to the tight time schedules that govern the industry.  
4 They may also be exported to neighbouring countries, as is the case of Prato.  
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factories that fail to pay a ‘living wage’, meaning a wage that enables a family to support itself 
at a socially defined, decent standard of living. We include in the concept of a living wage the 
idea that people should be able to afford decent housing, given the local housing market, and 
that a family should be covered by health insurance. 
 
However, this definition is restricted to the quantitative aspect –that is, the pay. Indeed, all-
too-often the average pay in the industry does not reach the poverty-level income for a 
typical family. These same authors note that in the US, “in 1990, according to the United 
States Census, the average garment worker in Los Angeles made only $7,200, less than 
three-quarters of the poverty-level income for a family of three in that year” (:4). 
Unregistered labour, i.e. the denial of the most basic workers’ right, is also rife. To broaden 
up this definition it is worth looking at the definition proposed by the US Congress’ 
General Accounting Office (GAO) in their 1998 influential report:   
 
we define a sweatshop as a business that regularly violates both wage or child labour and 
safety or health laws. As synonyms we used the terms ‘chronic labour law violation’ and 
‘multiple labour law violator’ (quoted in Ross, 2004: 27). 
 
Labour and health and safety violations are amongst those that we find in international 
sweatshops, all of which are certainly common in the sweatshops in Buenos Aires and in 
Prato. I would add to these definitions an element which is somehow implied in the GAO’s 
definition: the existence of vulnerable labour, which is a common element to the large 
majority of national sweatshops. Workers find themselves in an extremely poor economic 
situation, and often are forced to work as a form of debt payback to their bosses.5 Indeed, 
in this research I will refer to cases in which workers are immigrants trafficked into the 
sweatshops by a network of traffickers: they are approached in their countries and offered a 
job under certain (generally acceptable) working and pay conditions, but once they arrive 
to the destination they find that they must work for more than 12 hours, without any pay 
for a long period in order to either pay back for the transportation (like in the case of 
Buenos Aires) or for the whole trafficking operation (which is the case of Prato). They live 
in the sweatshops and in many cases they are locked, that is, they are under control 24/7.  
 
Borrowing elements from the referred definitions, for the purposes of this research I will 
call a ‘national sweatshop’ a small or medium inner-city garment workshop employing 
vulnerable labour – be it due to its irregular immigration status or its desperate economic 
                                                 
5 In the introduction to their book “Spaces of Work”, Castree et al (2004) point out four short stories of 
workers around the world. One of these is the case of Ruben Chação, a Brazilian child working in the 
sweatshop of an Adidas subcontractor in a favela in Rio de Janeiro. He was compelled to work to pay off a 
debt that his father had with the sweatshop owner. 
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situation- and which systematically fails to pay a living wage and to comply with labour 
and health and safety legislation. These sweatshops often involve child, forced and/or 
trafficked labour, and subjection to servitude, while mechanisms of coercion – be it 
physical or emotional – are also widespread. 
 
3. Why is the sweatshop back? 
 
Recent trends in the fashion industry worldwide have fostered a return to the widespread 
use of subcontracting. Two main aspects explain this trend: the need for more flexibility in 
the production stages and the necessity to cut costs to meet increasing international 
competition. Both are a consequence of the high instability of demand in this industry, 
which is as the same time affected by the general instability of the current highly 
financialised global economy (see chapters 2 and 3). 
 
The economic stagnation of the mid-1970s strongly affected fashion businesses. 
Morokvasic et al (1986) quote statistics for Germany, France and England stating that the 
share of clothing in personal total consumption budget went roughly from 10 to 7 percent 
(measured in constant prices). Indeed, during the late 1970 brands engaged in a growing 
competition over prices. To survive growing competition, the companies needed to create 
new markets, cut costs and reduce risks. For these purposes they adopted strategies to 
achieve greater flexibility and cheaper prices. This certainly created renewed pressures 
over the alleged rigidity of the labour market and over costs, particularly labour costs. The 
spatial reorganization of production was at the centre of these strategies. In this sense, the 
closure of factories and the subcontracting of labour-intensive phases (sewing, ironing, 
packing and sometimes cutting) to both contractors in the periphery and domestically, 
allowed companies to reduce risks and costs, and to flexibilise their labour force. The 
proliferation of sweatshops, combined with a number of other developments addressed 
below (notably a shift in the role of the state and a decreasing labour power in most parts 
of the world) is partly a result of this strategy.  
 
The subcontracting of garment production to peripheral countries, and the consequent 
reduction in prices, led to an intensification of competition in the clothing industry 
internationally. Northern corporations producing in the North quickly lost competitiveness 
as cheaper garment – much of which was produced and imported by competitors based in 
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the North itself – started to ‘invade’ the markets. The closure of factories started to spread 
around the North, and workers started to experience the daily threat of the closure, an 
element actively used by firms to cut costs and flexibilise their workforce (Chomsky, 
1999). The consequences for workers were dreadful: at present, they are among the lowest 
paid in the whole of the manufacturing industries, with an average salary which, for 
instance in the US, does not allow a family of three to reach the poverty line (R. Ross, 
2004).  
 
However, not all garments are subcontracted to producers in the South. During recent 
decades, time has come to be a key variable in the production and sell of garment that is 
‘fashion-sensitive’ (as opposed to ‘basics’ or standardised garment like jeans, men’s suites, 
underwear and the like); producing far away from the stores and waiting for the items to 
arrive does not fit with the current time-regime in this segment of the market. Owing to the 
constantly changing styles and colours imposed by fashion, the lifetime of certain items is 
very short (generally an item that is ‘in’ at the beginning of a season is ‘out’ by the end of 
it). As I will argue later on in light of the findings of this research, retailers do not stock up 
as they used to do during the more or less stable times of Fordism; instead, they demand 
small batches from subcontractors according to the day-by-day success – or failure – of 
specific items.6 In short, as explained by an official of the Unione Industriale Pratese 
(Mario, interviewed on 10/07/08), 
 
times have been compressed to such an extent in certain segments of textiles and clothing that 
there is a problem of incoherence between the time-scales of producing in China and the need 
to feed the stores under this new ‘philosophy of times.’ [Some retailers] change their windows 
every 15 days! So, to feed such a business model with goods produced in China is particularly 
complex, and hence there is the need to produce at least some of the goods domestically to 
provide the stores in Europe with the goods they need, in the times they need.7 
 
This temporality which dominates the production and sale of fashionwear for young 
women (the most dynamic segment of the market) undermines the advantages of 
contractors in the periphery in favour of domestic inner-city workshops that provide the 
necessary flexibility in record times and cheap prices that ever-changing fashion demands. 
Besides, several of the entrepreneurs interviewed for this research stressed the necessity to 
‘have one foot in the local area’ in case they need anything be done (like fixing mistakes of 
                                                 
6 This aspect is further developed in chapter 6, and it explains partly the success of the sweating system in 
both Buenos Aires and Prato. 
7 Translated from Italian. 
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the garment sewn abroad, completing a run or producing a small batch of temporarily 
successful garments in the midst of the season).  
 
Faced with stagnated demand and increasing competition, the industry allocated immense 
financial resources to fashion propaganda and fostered the shortening of fashion trends to 
stimulate continuous demand. As explained by a Prato-based manufacturer I interviewed 
for this research (Gianfranco, interviewed on 29/7/08), this growing fashion advertising 
(which includes a multiplicity of fashion events, magazines and even ad hoc TV channels) 
reached other consumers than those rich consumers of high-end fashion, creating a 
growing demand for fashionable clothing but at accessible prices (i.e. a mass market). In 
both the cases of Buenos Aires and Prato, in the early 1980s some fashion brands saw this 
‘niche’ and started producing for this segment, generally copying the designs of the largest 
brands but using cheaper fabric and cutting costs in various ways. This was precisely the 
origin of the clothing that is sold in large retail chains and in high street shops around the 
world nowadays.  
 
From its very origin, this apparel is mostly produced by ‘national workshops’ working as 
subcontractors of either commercial or industrial companies. Due to its fashion component, 
this garment is subject to higher volatility in demand that that which characterises ‘basics’ 
(the latter being a human need, as opposed to the banality of fashion-sensitive clothing). To 
avoid shouldering the risks of this ‘niche’, firms subcontract production. These small 
informal workshops and piece-rate pay allow companies to contract only the labour they 
actually need, being the near-perfect solution for an industry with a highly unstable 
demand. In only a few years the growth of consumption of this clothing has led to the 
further development of the long subcontracting chain in order to cover the increasing 
demand. Sweating systems emerged in the proximities of large markets as the availability 
of thousands of subcontractors surpassed the demand, and prices paid to them started a 
pronounced downslide. As a result, the sweating systems provide the brands and retailers 
with an immense pool of cheap unregulated and vulnerable labour, contrary to the 
unionised workforce in factories, and allow them to shift the burden of the risks to the 
workers.  
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This restructuring of the industry largely in line with the interests of capital, could have 
only taken place in a context where the power of labour has been weakened, coupled with 
reduced state control over corporate practices.  
 
4. Purposes and organisation of this research 
 
This research is aimed at understanding why sweating systems have emerged in several 
large cities around the world during recent decades. For such purpose I address the cases of 
the City of Buenos Aires and the Province of Prato, in Tuscany. In the analysis of the 
changes that the industry has experienced recently worldwide, and in particular in 
Argentina and in Italy, and in looking at the effects of these changes over working 
conditions, I adopt Jessop’s (1993: 13) suggestion for “an integral economic viewpoint, 
with its explicit focus on the structural coupling and contingent co-evolution of 
accumulation regimes and modes of social regulation.” Thus, following Marxist and 
Marxian accounts (Castree et al, 2004; Jessop, 1993, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2007; Harvey, 
1989, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, Theodore and 
Brenner, 2010) I explore the shifts in state politics and in the balance of power between 
capital and labour from Fordism to Post-Fordism, broadly considering these changes as a 
shift towards neoliberalism.  
 
Assuming that sweatshops are new economic spaces, in this thesis I argue, following 
Massey (1985), that the reappearance or the surge of sweatshops reveals changes in the 
social relations of the industry. The argument here is that the spread of sweatshops in 
Buenos Aires and Prato reveals changes in the social relations within the garment industry, 
both at the local and at the international levels. In other words, the discovery (or 
identification) of thousands of sweatshops in Buenos Aires after the tragedy in Viale Street 
revealed not only changes in the organisation of the garment industry, but also decisive 
shifts in the power relations governing it. Indeed, Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000: 7) 
assert that the return of the sweatshop is ultimately a consequence of the shift in the power 
balance between capital and labour during the last decades. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 aim at setting the context in which national sweatshops have arisen in 
Europe and in Latin America during recent decades. This will help respond the question of 
whether national sweatshops are now back due to the neoliberal shifts in political economy 
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worldwide during the last four decades, or if instead they constitute a mainstream way of 
producing clothing that has always existed under capitalism. Chapter 2 sets the general 
political economic context and addresses the consequences of recent shifts over working 
conditions and the distribution of wealth. In chapter 3 I focus on the impacts of the 
developments referred to in chapter 2 over clothing production. Also, I address certain 
processes taking place in this industry that are precursors of the shifts in industrial and 
commercial capital’s reorganisation during recent decades (like subcontracting and the 
deconstruction of the formal workers’ sector; and the shift from producer-driven to buyer-
driven chains). 
 
The return of the sweatshop takes place in a post-Fordist context marked by a weakened 
labour movement and by a shift in state priorities around the world. These two trends 
characterise what is known as ‘neoliberalism’, described by Harvey as “a class project that 
coalesced in the crisis of the 1970s” and that 
 
masked by a lot of rhetoric about individual freedom, liberty, personal responsibility and the 
virtues of privatisation, the free market and free trade, it legitimised draconian policies 
designed to restore and consolidate capitalist class power (2010a: 10). 
 
In chapter 2 I follow Harvey (1989, 2005, 2006, 2010a) and Merrifield (2000) to address 
the increasing financialisation of the world economy and its negative consequences over 
large capital investments. Both authors show that the short term planning that drives 
financial businesses and its high instability have strongly affected productive (industrial) 
investments by encouraging “pure gambling” in already existing assets in financial 
markets. Combined with the end of the Bretton Woods order in 1972 – which granted 
certain stability to the international economy during the post-war – this trend has made the 
economy far more vulnerable to the whims of the (highly deregulated) financial markets. 
Certainly, as noted by Harvey (1989: 141-42) this permanently unstable economic 
environment has made the previous “accords” that tied up “big labour, big capital, and big 
government” less and less functional for capital accumulation. A thorough reorganisation 
of production in line with mechanisms of subcontracting and delocalisation was promoted 
by industrial capital. This led to an increasing deconstruction of the ‘mainstream’ formal 
labourers and the consequent demand for labour flexibilisation plans. 
 
These shifts had consequences over state-politics, and were in turn enabled by an active 
role of states over economic planning, labour movements’ control and labour market’s 
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reform. Towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, hand in hand with 
the increasing dissemination of neoliberal ideas into the state arena, state economic and 
social planning shifted from securing an appropriate level of demand for industrial goods – 
meaning chiefly full employment and strong social protection – towards favouring the 
independence of the private sector, in the belief that the market mechanisms would allocate 
resources more efficiently (Jessop, 2000). In this sense, the deregulation of financial 
markets and of capital activities in general (notably the relaxation of controls over the 
respect of labour rights, like factory inspections), and the application of legislation 
furthering labour flexibility, were main elements allowing a violent re-distribution of 
wealth away from labour. The extreme of these shifts is the return to a widespread use of 
slave trade and sweatshop-like production, as mechanisms to ensure high corporate 
profitability. As I argue in chapters 5 and 6, the processes are enabled by either passive or 
active state politics.  
 
In chapter 4 I describe in detail the methodology used for this 4-year long research. The 
first year was devoted to the planning of the case studies and to the development of the 
general context by means of a thorough literature search. Besides, this research is strongly 
based upon empirical data collected during the whole of the second year (fieldwork). This 
included two case studies: one in the City of Buenos Aires (carried out from October 2007 
to March 2008) and another one in the Province of Prato, Tuscany (April to September 
2008). Fieldwork included: (a) literature and statistical and journalistic data collection, and 
(b) 97 semi-structured interviews with key informants. The information and data collected 
was processed during the first half of the third year. Finally, some of the difficulties I had 
to face during fieldwork, and the way in which I have attempted to overcome them, are 
presented. Certainly, the study of economic processes based precisely in ‘as much 
informality as possible’ implies major challenges for the researcher.  
 
In chapters 5 and 6 I present the main findings of my empirical research. Chapter 5 focuses 
on the case of Buenos Aires, whereas in chapter 6 the case of Prato is addressed. Both 
chapters aim at describing the present situation concerning the rise of the sweatshop in 
both places, and at understanding the organisation of the sweating systems and when and 
why they emerged. The role of capital and the state are thoroughly addressed. A brief 
presentation of shifts in the political economy of Argentina and Italy is also presented in 
order to identify the consequences that these have had over the labour markets and labour 
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organisation, and in setting the context for growing informality that allowed – and that was 
partly a consequence of – the rise of the sweatshop. 
 
In chapter 7 I return to the analysis of the international political economy trends during 
recent decades, adding to the context set in chapters 2 and 3 the analysis of the main 
findings of my empirical research. The main aim of the chapter is to explore the links 
between the rise of the sweatshop and the shift towards neoliberal policies worldwide. The 
link is found to be strong: the deconstruction of the formal labour sector and the rise of 
informality – mostly in Argentina – and of flexible and precarious jobs – mostly in Italy – 
in the clothing industry and in the economy in general is a consequence of the strategies 
followed by the main corporations of the sector during the last decades. Also, it is a 
consequence of the increasing economic domination of state policy-making and weakened 
labour power. Focusing on the debate on sweatshops in particular, I identify three main 
arguments that have so far helped clothing brands and retailers to manage the strong 
opposition affecting their image. Firstly, the defenders of sweatshops have argued 
repeatedly that sweatshop work can be very bad but still it provides better jobs than those 
normally available to its workers. In the words of Krugman (1997), sweatshops can help 
people in peripheral countries move “from abject poverty to something still awful but 
nonetheless significantly better.” My argument in here is that such statement diverts the 
attention from the real problem, which is the redistribution of wealth within the industry. 
Regarding the other two arguments, in virtue of their falsity I identify them as ‘the myths 
about sweatshops’. The first of these is summarised as follows: “working conditions in 
(national) sweatshops are a cultural feature of the immigrant communities within which 
these systems are organised;” under such idea, the immigrant status of workers is 
emphasised to the detriment of the class divisions taking place within these communities, 
while the local entrepreneurs are released from any ethical responsibilities towards the 
workers producing their goods. Finally, the second myth is that of the belief that 
“corporations cannot control working conditions in the long subcontracting chain.” The 
latter has been a key argument of clothing firms to avoid what in many parts of the world 
(e.g. Argentina) is precisely a key of the struggle against the sweatshop: corporate 
accountability. These myths and arguments help explain the health of many renowned 
brands, and represent some of the pillars over which the neoliberal ideology is based 
(notably depicting workers as passive actors whose only possibility is to wait for job 
opportunities to be created by capital [Castree et al, 2004]). 
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Towards the end of chapter 7 I also address the role of the unions in these matters and their 
incapacity to develop proactive responses to the strategies of capital and to state policies. 
The rise of informality and precarious jobs poses major limitations to traditional union 
organising, who have proved to be incapable of re-designing their strategies (notably their 
approach to workers who due to their immigration status or to their informal employment 
are not entitled to ‘belong’ or to make part of their “citizenship” [Gordon, 2009]) in order 
to face the strong challenge that a closer relationship between state and capital means to 
clothing workers around the world.  
 
The latter issue is further developed in chapter 8. This last chapter is written in a more 
policy-advocacy fashion, in the search for understanding possible future developments in 
the struggles against the sweatshop. The clothing industry is currently considered by many 
as exploitative in its core, since all-too-often human trafficking and child and forced labour 
are the counterpart to the most chic catwalks and fashion districts. But this industry has 
also seen strong union mobilisation in the early 20th century, and the adoption of minimum 
labour and factory health and safety standards in national laws in the US have been 
amongst the results of these struggles. In other words, while the garment industry is 
considered a precursor of some of the developments that have driven the international 
political economy towards neoliberal paths, it may also be an industry at the vanguard of 
politically progressive shifts in the organisation of industrial production. The potential of 
existing and future struggles against the sweatshop resides precisely in the possibility of 
furthering structural changes that strengthen labour power, and in pushing their adoption in 
other economic sectors.  
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Chapter 2 
Working in a neoliberal world 
 
What would happen if tomorrow the government of Mozambique announces the 
legalisation of slavery? Most probably, the world markets would soon be invaded with 
Mozambique’s products. 
(Zunini, 2007) 
 
Karl Marx and David Houston would insist that the plight of sweatshop workers must 
be seen in the context of the pervasive poverty and gaping inequality of the global 
economy. That economy connects us not just with sweatshop workers but with 
oppressed workers outside the factory gates as well.  
(Miller, 2009: 363) 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The return of the sweatshop takes place in a post-Fordist context marked by a weakened 
labour movement and significant changes in the modes of social regulation of the 
economy, entailing most notably a shift in state priorities and capabilities. These two 
trends are the major changes that characterise the passage from Fordism to what has been 
termed ‘neoliberalism’.  
 
This chapter aims at setting the general political economic context in which national 
sweatshops were established in Europe and in Latin America (and specifically in Italy and 
in Argentina) during recent decades. In so doing, I will use historical materialist accounts 
on international political economy. Providing this context will help respond to the question 
of whether the re-emergence of national sweatshops in recent years is due to neoliberal 
shifts in political economy worldwide during the last four decades, or if instead they 
constitute a mainstream way of producing clothing that has been in existence since the 
introduction of the sewing machine in 1856.  
 
In setting the context, no analysis of the broader trends in political economy worldwide can 
avoid focusing, at least partially, on the increasing financialisation of the world economy. 
Merrifield (2000) analyses this financialisation and has labelled it as “the inviolable 
bourgeois obsession.” Both Merrifield and Harvey (2005, 2006) show that this process has 
strongly affected productive (industrial) investments by encouraging “pure gambling” in 
already existing assets in financial markets. Combined with the end of the Bretton Woods 
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order in 1972, which set the framework of stable exchange rates during the post-war, this 
trend has made the economy far more vulnerable to the whims of the (highly deregulated) 
financial markets. As a consequence, and as noted by Harvey (1989: 141-42), this 
permanently unstable economic environment made the previous “accords” that tied up “big 
labour, big capital, and big government” less and less functional for capital accumulation.  
 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the contradictions intrinsic to the capitalist mode of 
production (notably the crisis of over-accumulation) which could not be solved by the 
Fordist model of accumulation, exploded, leading to a fierce competition between various 
political projects – broadly conservative or liberal - in a context marked by rising labour 
power. As postulated by Harvey (2005), the result of those struggles was the rise of the 
neoliberal model of accumulation. This model implied two main shifts in the post-Fordist 
era: (a) deregulation of the labour markets; and (b) the growing influence of capital’s 
interests into state’s politics. The first shift both manifested and was mobilised through 
fierce repression of the labour movement in several parts of the world, via the 
incorporation of (deregulated and non-unionised) women and ethnic minorities into labour 
markets, and through a spatial reorganisation of production (i.e. increasing subcontracting 
and delocalisation arrangements). The second shift took place by means of the progressive 
seizure of political apparatuses by corporate representatives, the ascendance of the 
Republican Party of the US and the Conservative Party in the UK being the clearest 
examples. Both trends are analysed in depth in this chapter.  
 
Further to the trends identified above, the increasing economic domination of state politics 
has reached a level in which the state allows the systematic violation of workers’ rights to 
take place. Indeed the rising occurrence of human trafficking and forced labour is often 
happening in the sight of the states, notably in both the cases addressed in this thesis, but 
also in other countries (like in the US and in Spain, as well as in several peripheral 
countries). In this chapter I seek to question whether states are combating human 
trafficking and the enslavement of women and migrant workers in their own territories 
with all their strength. Following this I hypothesise that in some countries the state actually 
has a vested interest in allowing these processes to take place, in order to facilitate 
opportunities for capital accumulation in view of the failure of neoliberal policies to ensure 
the high levels of corporate profitability and high rates of economic growth that 
characterised the Fordist era. 
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I conclude that the neoliberal policies have had dire consequences for workers all around 
the world – albeit by way of varied strategies and context-specific arrangements between 
capital, labour and state (see below). As the starkest example of this trend, the growth of 
informality in peripheral countries and of labour flexibilisation in the core economies, have 
led to a decreasing participation of wages in the GDP in several countries.  
 
2. One or several neoliberalism/s? 
 
As briefly discussed in chapter 1, since the early 1980s national sweatshops are a 
widespread feature of garment production in several cities and countries. Addressing this 
problem from a long term perspective, several authors coincide in pointing out a ‘return of 
the sweatshop’ in cities like London and New York (see Chapter 3). Indeed, evidence 
provided by these authors shows that towards the mid-20th century, the sweatshops that 
had been scattered all around big cities had, at the very least, been left to the margins of the 
industry, whereas factory production had increased notably. However, reports on the ‘new 
sweatshops’ were already in the media towards the end of the 1970s. This long term 
approach suggests that broad shifts in international political economy may be playing a 
fundamental role in the current mushrooming of national sweatshops world-wide. In other 
words, the neoliberal turn appears as a key element of these developments, for which a 
brief presentation of debates about its nature seem fundamental.  
 
Several researchers of neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner, Peck and 
Theodore, 2010; Duménil and Lévy, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 2002) assert 
that it originated as a highly ideological project – somehow a utopian project – during the 
1940s, to be revived in the early 1970s in the wake of what they consider as the crisis of 
Fordism. Neoliberal advocates (Friedman, 1944, 1949; Hayek, 1951) emphasise the 
benefits of individual freedom, free market and free trade. In the words of Harvey (2006), 
 
neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices which proposes 
that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms 
within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, 
free markets and free trade (:145). 
 
For such project to come to practice, the Welfare State - or the ‘Nanny State’ – was a 
major obstacle, and it was indeed partly blamed of causing rising inflation through its 
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inefficient market interventionism. Instead of the Keynesian approach of a demand-side 
regulation of the economy, neoliberalism calls for a supply-side form of regulation. 
Henceforth, states must foster private initiatives and ensure good businesses environments, 
because, if helped by restricted but appropriate state policies, the market will ensure an 
efficient – and fair – allocation of economic benefits.  
 
These neoliberal ideas came to political practice during the 1970s. According to Harvey 
(2005), they were firstly applied in Chile from 1973, under the rule of Pinochet’s 
dictatorial regime. Other authors (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner, Peck and 
Theodore, 2010) assert that it was only towards the late 1970s, after proof and trial of some 
of its features, that neoliberalism finally acquired the form of a concrete political project, 
with president Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. While these two 
countries adopted “particularly aggressive programmes of neoliberal restructuring during 
the 1980s, more moderate forms of a neoliberal politics were also mobilised during this 
same period in traditionally social democratic or Christian democratic states such as 
Canada, New Zealand, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy and even Sweden” 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 350).  
 
Beyond specific national contexts, scholars supportive of historical materialist accounts 
agree in pointing out the existence of certain “processes of neoliberalisation” (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002) taking place globally, albeit to varied degrees and through context-specific 
means. Indeed, Peck (2004) goes as far as to assert that “the process of neoliberalisation 
has been a transnational one from the start” (:399). These structuralist scholars emphasise 
the mid and long-term developments in a broad scale, understanding neoliberalism as a 
restructuration or an “evolutionary change” in the capitalist economy (Duménil and Lévy, 
2004). Borrowing ideas from Crotty (2003) and Duménil and Lévy (2001), Brenner, Peck 
and Theodore (2010) describe this approach with the following words: 
 
Historical materialist approaches to international political economy have theorized the 
worldwide parameters of market-driven regulatory restructuring. Here, neoliberalism is 
understood as a global regime of growth that has emerged following the destabilization of 
earlier, Keynesian-welfarist and national-developmentalist regulatory arrangements during the 
post-1970s period (:190). 
 
The rising power of supra-national (e.g. the European Central Bank) and international 
institutions (e.g. World Bank, IMF and GATT/WTO) is identified as a fundamental shift 
helping financial capital and multinational corporations to shape state policies 
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internationally. “Globally constituted forces and interests, institutionalized in the form of 
various multilateral apparatuses, impose strict market discipline on national states” 
(Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010: 194; emphasis in original). This is why these authors 
refer to a process of upside-down “parameterisation” that is “implemented, consolidated 
and reproduced through a complex of world-scale, multilateral and supranational juridical-
institutional rearrangements that impose new, relatively circumscribed parameters – in 
effect, an encompassing ‘rule regime’ (Peck 2002) – for regulatory experimentation across 
subordinate places, territories and scales (Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010: 194). 
 
Due to their methodological approach, according to which they emphasise the international 
scope of neoliberalism, structuralist approaches lead to explanations that may result more 
accurate to certain cases than to others. Indeed,  
  
in these accounts of neoliberalism, for all their geographical and scalar diversity, little attention 
is paid to the different variants of neoliberalism, to the hybrid nature of contemporary policies 
and programmes, or to the multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques, 
and subjects (Larner, 2003: 509). 
  
Instead of a ‘bulldozer neoliberalisation’ originated in core countries and encompassing all 
countries within one single neoliberal project, Larner (2003) rightly points out the need to 
understand the complexity and contradictions of the processes of neoliberalisation: 
“Although neoliberalism may have a clear intellectual genesis, it arrives in different places 
in different ways, articulates with other political projects, takes multiple material forms, 
and can give rise to unexpected outcomes” (2003: 511).  
 
In a similar vein, poststructural accounts and governmentality studies (Ong and Collier, 
2005; Ong 2006, 2007; Rose, 1999) raise their concerns about what they call 
“neoliberalism with a big ‘N’”, which sees neoliberalism as “an economic tsunami that is 
gathering force across the planet, pummelling each country in its path and sweeping away 
old structures of power” (Ong, 2006: 3). Instead, according to these authors there is the 
need to view neoliberalism “not as a system but [as] a migratory set of practices”, for 
which “we would have to take into account how its flows articulate diverse situations and 
participate in mutating configurations of possibility” (Ong, 2007: 4). Focusing on “what 
Deleuze has called ‘little lines of mutation’ (i.e. minor histories that address themselves to 
the ‘big’ questions of globalizations in a careful and limited manner)”, Ong and Collier 
(2005: 15) are supportive of “a form of inquiry that stays close to practices”, because, in 
their view, “[the] neoliberal logic is best conceptualized not as a standardized universal 
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apparatus, but [as] a migratory technology of governing that interacts with situated sets of 
elements and circumstances” (Ong, 2007: 5). For them, “global forms are articulated in 
specific situations”, i.e. in contextually specific “global assemblages” (Ong and Collier, 
2005: 4) where “global forms interact with other elements, occupying a common field in 
contingent, uneasy, unstable interrelationships” (:12). In this sense, “the assemblage is not 
a ‘locality’ to which broader forces are counterposed,” as historical materialist accounts 
would suggest. Rather, “the term ‘global assemblage’ suggests inherent tensions: global 
implies broadly encompassing, seamless, and mobile; assemblage implies heterogeneous, 
contingent, unstable, partial, and situated” (:12). In other words, because in these ‘global 
assemblages’ “promiscuous entanglements of global and local logics” take place (Ong 
2006: 14), the effects of neoliberalism are much more complex, contradictory and 
unpredictable that what structuralist accounts put forward. 
 
Taking issue with these governmentality studies, Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010) point 
out – in an excellent review of studies on neoliberalisation – that these approaches “are 
inadequately equipped to grasp the churning patterns and frames of regulatory uneven 
development that lie at the heart of contemporary forms of neoliberalisation” (:201; 
emphasis in original). Indeed,  
 
their purposively disruptive notions of context-drenched, haphazardly mobile, radically fluid 
and infinitely mutable neoliberalisation are derived from a caricature of structuralist 
approaches, which are claimed to conceive market-oriented regulatory restructuring as being 
functionally predetermined, universalizing, territorially immobilized and rigid. Some 
limitations of the governmentality approach to neoliberalisation follow, in fact, from this 
exaggerated antagonism to more structuralist, macropolitical perspectives (Brenner, Peck and 
Theodore, 2010: 201).  
 
Although “the governmentality analytic usefully draws attention to the contextually 
embedded character of market-oriented forms of regulatory restructuring”, several scholars 
supportive of historical materialist approaches to international political economy have also 
insisted on the existence of ‘varieties of neoliberalism’ derived from the necessarily 
contextual embeddedness of processes of neoliberalisation. Despite their intellectual focus 
on generalisation and their consequent methodological approach – which necessarily 
means to leave aside complex and contradictory cases in the first instance – these authors, 
especially those in the Regulationist approach (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner, 
Peck and Theodore, 2010; Peck, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Tickell and Peck, 2003), 
have argued that “neoliberal programs of capitalist restructuring are rarely, if ever, 
imposed in a pure form, for they are always introduced within politico-institutional 
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contexts that have been molded significantly by earlier regulatory arrangements, 
institutionalized practices, and political compromises” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 361; 
emphasis added). In other words, 
 
the neoliberal script suggestively encompasses a wide range of proactive state strategies 
designed to refashion state-economy relations around a new constellation of elite, managerial 
and financial interests. The outcome is not one of simple convergence towards a neoliberal 
monoculture, comprising a series of unified and fully integrated market orientated polities, but 
rather a range of institutionally mediated local, national and glocal ‘neoliberalisations’, 
between which there are telling interconnections and family resemblances (Peck, 2004: 396-
97). 
 
Indeed, this call for attention to the contextually specific forms that neoliberalism acquires 
in diverse countries, regions and cities, has been particularly widespread in studies of 
neoliberal nature by authors subscribing to the regulationist approach (McCarthy, 2005; 
McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). In this line, McCarthy and Prudham (2004: 279) argue that 
“only specific case studies can unpack the complex interplay between neoliberal projects, 
environmental politics, and environmental change”, partly because “the high variability of 
biophysical nature in space and time only intensifies the need for careful attention to 
context and scale.” 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will follow this historical materialist approaches, taking 
into account the necessity to consider variability, mutation and contradictory developments 
in the ongoing neoliberalisation at diverse scales. In this sense, I will use Duménil and 
Lévy’s (2004) and Harvey’s (2010b) definition of neoliberalism. For Harvey, 
neoliberalism is 
 
a class project that coalesced in the crisis of the 1970s (…) Masked by a lot of rhetoric about 
individual freedom, liberty, personal responsibility and the virtues of privatisation, the free 
market and free trade, it legitimised draconian policies designed to restore and consolidate 
capitalist class power (2010a: 10). 
 
In this context, two particular outcomes of neoliberalisation that are indeed witnessed in 
both case studies in this thesis are of particular relevance: the neoliberalisation of state 
politics (i.e. the increasing economic domination of state policies) and the systematic 
attack to labour power and organisation.  
 
As pointed out by Larner (2006), this broad definition of neoliberalism as a class project 
requires careful attention to the issue of “who is it that ‘benefits from [it]’”, or, in other 
words, who are the ‘rich people’ and the ‘dominating classes’ which Harvey (2005, 2010b) 
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and Duménil and Lévy (2004) refer to. The response to this question requires case specific 
research. Consequently, to respond to this question and to take into account the accurate 
caveats rose by poststructuralist and governmentality studies about the contextually 
specific workings and outcomes of neoliberalism, I start both cases in this thesis by 
introducing a historical account of political economic change and labour rights in both 
Argentina and Italy since the mid-1970s.  
 
3. From Fordism to Neoliberalism 
 
Although Margaret Thatcher was never right to claim that “there is no alternative” to 
the neoliberal vision of a free economy and a minimalist state, two decades later the 
global hegemony of this mode of political rationality means that the burden of proof has 
shifted: neoliberalism is no longer a dream of Chicago economists or a nightmare in the 
imaginations of leftist conspiracy theorists; it has become a commonsense of the times. 
(Peck and Tickell, 2002: 381) 
 
Towards the late 1960s the full employment, high corporate profitability and productivity 
rates, and economic stability that characterised the ‘golden era’ of the post-war started to 
show signs of weakness. According to Harvey (2005), in retrospect it is possible to see 
such changes as the beginning of thorough economic and political transformations 
signifying the passage from one regime of accumulation (Fordism) to another 
(neoliberalism). This transition period was characterised by a climate of crisis (high 
unemployment and inflation, followed by the 1973-1975 deflation), economic and even 
political instability (with strong workers’ organisations and even successful revolutionary 
movements in part of the periphery), stagnated corporate profitability, and increasing 
international competition. In the words of Harvey (1989),  
 
the period from 1965 to 1973 was one in which the inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to 
contain the inherent contradictions of capitalism became more and more apparent. On the 
surface, these difficulties could be best captured by one word: rigidity. There were problems 
with the rigidity of long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments in mass-production 
systems that precluded much flexibility of design and presumed stable growth in invariant 
consumer markets. There were problems of rigidities in labour markets, labour allocation, and 
in labour contracts (…) Behind all these specific rigidities lay a rather unwieldy and seemingly 
fixed configuration of political power and reciprocal relations that bound big labour, big 
capital, and big government into what increasingly appeared as a dysfunctional embrace of 
such narrowly defined vested interests as to undermine rather than secure capital accumulation 
(:141-42, my emphasis). 
 
Subsequently against this backdrop, the international economic order of the post-war 
period was unilaterally abandoned by the US through the dismantling of the Bretton 
Woods agreements in 1972. The provisions of these institutional arrangements (notably the 
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control of exchange rates by the IMF) had posed major ‘rigidities’ to countries seeking to 
adapt to the changes that the international economy was undergoing.  
 
Financial deregulation began in the United States in the early 1970s as a forced response to the 
stagflation then occurring internally and to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of 
international trade and exchange (…) What really happened here was a shift from one global 
system (hierarchically organised and largely controlled by the United States) to another global 
system that was more decentralised and coordinated through the market, making the financial 
conditions of capitalism far more volatile and far more unstable (Harvey, 1995: 8). 
 
3.1. Financial deregulation: the “inviolable bourgeois obsession” 
 
The financial deregulation that followed the end of Bretton Woods entailed a major shift in 
the international economic scenario. After decades of fixed exchange rates bound to the 
Dollar (itself tied to the gold standard), today a system persists in which 
 
financial deregulation is the inviolable bourgeois obsession. Mechanisms once controlling 
speculation, access to credit and money, competitive pressures, inflows and outflows of capital 
– things that offered a certain stability to the world’s financial markets and to trade and 
currency exchanges – have all but gone, are all but hazy memories of a seemingly bygone 
capitalist age. The New World Order is a Deregulated World Order; a world where labour is 
evermore controlled within and across national boundaries, but where capital and corporations 
are ever more footloose and uncontrolled (…) Gone [with the end of Bretton Woods] was 
currency stability, which was supplanted by extreme volatility. Soon currencies floated freely 
against one another and a new international market for speculation spawned (Merrifield, 2000: 
23, emphasis in original). 
 
The trend towards increasing financialisation of the economy discourages large capital 
investments and fosters financial speculation. In this context, long-term capital investments 
are not only discouraged but are also subjected to the whims of financial speculators.8 
 
Nowadays, the financial sector plays a much less enabling role for productive capital: stock 
exchanges, for example, are really billion-dollar markets for speculation on already existing 
stocks and shares (…) Frequently, there is more money to be made in pure gambling, in 
mergers and takeovers and corporate buyouts or in the stock market game. Why invest long-
term when you can deal short-term? There is money to be had here, fast and clean money 
(Merrifield, 2000: 22). 
 
A stark indicator of this is that today 46 out of the 50 largest companies in the world9 
belong to the sectors of banks, financial services and insurance companies (information 
based on Financial Times, 28/05/10).10  
                                                 
8 Indeed, Harvey (2005) shows how induced financial crises are a mechanism to overcome the recurrent 
crises of over-accumulation that characterise capitalism. Summarising his complex arguments, he asserts that 
“valuable assets are thrown out of circulation and devalued. They lay fallow and dormant until surplus capital 
seizes upon them to breath new life into capital accumulation” (:151). 
9 Measured by total assets. 
10 See FT500: www.ft.com/reports/ft500-2010  
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Apart from often being more profitable than long-term capital investments, financial 
speculation and the high volatility of the markets increase the vulnerability of long-term 
investments. As a consequence, the unavoidable collective response of manufacturing 
companies to these shifts was decreasing industrial production in core capitalist countries. 
Annual industrial output in the G7 countries grew as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Industrial output growth
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The chart shows not only a falling industrial output in OECD countries, but also the high instability to which 
industrial production is subjected. 
Source: UNCTAD, 2010 
 
As a result of outsourcing strategies mobilised by transnational corporations, industrial 
production shifted en mass to Southeast Asia during the last decades, a fact shown by the 
rapid rise of this region’s share of total world trade in the last 60 years.11 Owing to both 
outsourcing to the periphery and growing labour productivity, hundreds of thousands of 
jobs have been lost in the core economies in a phenomenon known as ‘de-
industrialisation’. Indeed, in a report prepared for the IMF (1997) examining 23 
industrialised countries, Rowthorn and Ramaswamy note that between 1970 and 1994 the 
employment share of manufacturing in the advanced economies as a whole fell by 8.7 
percent.  
 
This de-industrialisation not only affected core economies. Indeed, it was more marked in 
regions like Latin America, which did not benefit from productive FDI12 - as in turn did the 
                                                 
11 It went from 13.6 percent in 1948 to 27.7 in 2008 (WTO, 2009). 
12 Inward FDI in Latin America during the 1990s was mainly directed to services, being the privatisation of 
state companies a major source of it, while greenland investments were rather marginal. 
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five ‘tigers’ of Southeast Asia. Instead, within Latin America industrial output experienced 
a drop during the neoliberal decades which contributed to the rise in unemployment largely 
caused by the privatisation of state enterprises. The decreasing industrial output coupled 
with the rise of the services sector and the re-primarisation of the economy (increasing 
share of primary goods production in the total GDP) led to a smaller share of industrial 
production in these countries’ economies. 
 
To fight its way out of the late 1960s and early 1970s’ crisis, industrial capital needed to 
cope with these changes and restructure and rationalise production accordingly.  
 
3.2. A flexible workforce: subcontracting as a centrepiece of capital’s 
strategies 
 
These changing economic conditions meant that large capital investments and large 
workforces in their own factories became heavy burdens for industrial capital; burdens that 
were not compatible with the instability that financial markets imposed to the economy. 
The rigidity of labour markets at a time when “corporations found themselves with a lot of 
unusable excess capacity” (Harvey, 1989: 145) was dysfunctional to the need of 
rationalising the production process in the face of intensifying international competition. 
As Harvey (1989: 150) puts it,  
 
the labour market has (…) undergone a radical restructuring. Faced with strong market 
volatility, heightened competition, and narrowing profit margins, employers have taken 
advantage of weakened union power and the pools of surplus (unemployed or underemployed) 
labourers to push for much more flexible work regimes and labour contracts. 
 
Harvey himself quotes statistics that confirm the trend towards flexible employment 
regimes: in the UK between 1981 and 1985 the relative amount of ‘flexible workers’ 
increased by 16 percent, while permanent jobs decreased 6 percent (quoting Financial 
Times, 27/2/1987). At the same time, in the US The New York Times (17/5/1988, quoted 
in Harvey, 1989) estimated that about one third of the 10 million jobs created were 
‘temporary’ jobs. 
 
An analysis of the purported shift from a system of Fordism to one of post-Fordist flexible 
accumulation can help us gain an appreciation of the shifting relative power of capital and 
labour and how the disruption of the labour markets implied a “move away from regular 
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employment towards increasing reliance upon part-time, temporary or sub-contracted work 
arrangements” (Harvey, 1989: 150). In addition, as noted by Gallin, moves to flexible 
accumulation also led to a growing informality in labour markets in several regions of the 
world (most notably in Latin America). Harvey describes this process in the quote below: 
 
The transformation in labour market structure has been paralleled by equally important shifts in 
industrial organisation. Organised sub-contracting, for example, opens up opportunities for 
small businesses formation, and in some instances permits older systems of domestic, artisanal, 
familiar (patriarchal), and paternalistic (‘god father, ‘guv’nor’ or even mafia-like) labour 
systems to revive and flourish as centrepieces rather than as appendages of the production 
system (2001: 150). 
 
At the very centre of this restructuring is the increasing trend towards the use of smaller 
scale, ‘flexible’ firms. As stated by Rainnie (1985: 223) “there is no doubt that the move 
towards small scale is just one trend amongst many exhibited by capital in its attempts to 
fight its way out of the crisis” (see also Harrison, 1994). The competitive advantages that 
small firms have in essentially labour-intensive industries like apparel are partly based on 
the widespread use of informal labour, as evidenced by this research (see chapter 7). 
Indeed, this reorganisation of production in large capitalistic companies is part of a broader 
process of subcontracting, which Harvey (1989) and Gallin (2001), among others, identify 
as a key feature of neoliberal economic trends. According to these authors, the rise of 
subcontracting is a key factor in the growth of informal employment worldwide. In 
Gallin’s words,  
 
by cutting down on the hard core of permanent full-time workers, by decentralizing and 
subcontracting all but the indispensable core activities, and by relying wherever possible on 
unstable forms of labour (…) management deregulates the labour market, not only to reduce 
the labour costs but to shift responsibility of income, benefits and conditions onto the 
individual workers. The outer circle of this system is the informal sector: the virtually invisible 
world of microenterprises and home-based workers (2001: 535). 
 
In concretely political terms, the advantages of small enterprises were summarised with 
astonishing clarity by a member of the Conservative Party in his address to the annual 
conference in 1975. In it, Mr. Du Cann explained that small businesses are “the seed corn 
of future prosperity, lively, ingenious, self-reliant, the anti-Marxist barrier, Conservatism 
in practice, and the true picture of free enterprise, honourable, patriotic and acceptable” 
(quoted in Rainnie, 1985). 
 
In sum, both subcontracting and the informal economy are central elements of 
flexibilisation in the apparel industry. Indeed, Harvey (1989: 152) also associates the 
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emergence of sweatshops in this context: “the revival of ‘sweatshop’ forms of production 
in cities such as New York and Los Angeles, Paris and London, became a matter of 
commentary in the mid-1970s and has proliferated rather than shrunk during the 1980s.” 
The thesis argues that the clothing industry, as “a mass production industry without mass 
production methods” (Green, 1997: 4), is a paradigmatic example of these shifts; indeed, 
“its highly flexible production system is the most advanced of any industry” (Bonacich and 
Appelbaum, 2000: 14). Changes in the organisation of production, distribution and 
marketing illustrate with clarity the shifts that neoliberalism has brought to employment 
relations and, ultimately, to the workers’ lives. Furthermore, as I will state in chapter 7, 
these trends in employment relationships have strongly affected workers’ unions, 
constituting a main element driving to the loss of relative power that labour has 
experienced alongside these neoliberal times. 
 
4. Flexibility in the North, Informality in the South: Inequality 
Everywhere 
 
In its World of Work Report 2008 the ILO analyses income inequality in 73 countries from 
all regions, and finds that the growth in non-standard forms of employment occurs via 
different mechanisms in the core and in the periphery. While in the former part-time and 
fixed term contracts have contributed to the rising labour flexibility, in the latter informal 
employment13 is the main pattern towards labour deregulation: 
 
in the majority of countries with available data, there has been a shift – in some cases structural 
– towards non-standard forms of employment. This has meant more part-time and temporary 
employment in Advanced Economies and more informal employment in developing countries 
(:124). 
 
As I will show later on in this thesis, this geographically uneven trend towards labour 
flexibility can be seen in both the case studies conducted for this research. On the one 
hand, in Italy labour flexibility is a fast-growing phenomenon which has been fostered 
through thorough changes in labour legislation. Though it is behind the EU media of 14.4 
percent and that of the OECD of 15.5 percent (OECD, 2009), part-time jobs in the case of 
                                                 
13 According to the definition of the international network WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment 
Globalizing and Organizing), informal sector includes “self-employed (in own account activities and family 
businesses), paid workers in informal enterprises, unpaid workers in family businesses, casual workers 
without fixed employer, sub-contract workers linked to informal enterprises, sub-contract workers linked to 
formal enterprises” (Gallin, 2001). 
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Italy reach 13.1 percent (IRPET, 2008: 2). Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 6, today 
more than half of those who enter the labour market in Italy do so under precarious 
contracts (IRPET, 2008: 2) with no guarantees of job stability and with lower pay, given 
that in European countries, fixed-term employment pays much less than permanent 
employment (ILO, 2008). In Prato, one of the interviewees for this thesis (Manuele, a 
lawyer of an independent trade union, interviewed on 29/9/08) commented that that the 
main trend in labour legislation in Italy is that towards the flexibilisation of labour 
relationships. Two of landmarks of this trend were the Treu Law (or ‘Treu Package’) of 
1997 and the controversial Biaggi Law of 2003, which introduced 32 types of labour 
contracts with “virtually infinite sub-types of contracts”.14 “Today – Manuele asserts – 
employers have enormous advantages to hire people on precarious contracts.”15  
 
On the other hand, in Argentina a more decisive trend towards increasing informality 
occurred in the 1990s, in the midst of a high level of unemployment that put pressure on 
labour standards (see chapter 5, especially section 2, in which I show statistics illustrating 
the co-evolution of unemployment and informal labour). As I will outline in chapter 5, 
both trends undermined labour rights up to the point in which (as said by the union leaders 
interviewed in Buenos Aires) keeping jobs was among the first priorities of the unions,16 
sometimes at very high costs (e.g. allowing factory-based contracts to set lower standards 
than those of the bargaining contracts). This move is coupled with the lack of state control 
over companies, particularly over employers’ compliance of the labour legislation, thus 
worsening informality. To illustrate this point, the current Minister of Labour stressed that 
when he arrived to his position 5 years ago, the number of factory inspectors was 
insufficient to meet needs of the Ministry (Página/12, 24/8/08). According to official 
statistics (most probably underestimated)17 informality has fallen down since 2005, 
following – though with a certain delay – the fall in unemployment rates. Still, as shown by 
the statistics, and as assured by José (interviewed on 19/10/09) employment stability is 
                                                 
14 The reader may remember the demonstrations of millions of people in Italy in the spring of 2002 against 
the introduction of this Law. 
15 Even if the growing labour flexibility is being introduced by legal means, Italy has the particularity of 
having a significant informal sector, which is not common in the EU15 countries, and much less amongst the 
G8 countries. I further develop this issue in chapter 6. 
16 According to one of my interviewees in Buenos Aires (José, a labour lawyer of the Asociación Obrera 
Textil, interviewed on 19/10/09), it still is the first priority, despite the high level of growth of the 
Argentinean economy since 2003.  
17 Unfortunately, during recent years there has been manipulation of official statistics by the executive. See 
Noriega, G (2008) “Indek: Historia de una estafa”. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana. 
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threatened by the high level of informal employment. In here, the current relevance of 
Marx’s labour army reserve is astoundingly clear. 
 
These developments are common to the large majority of peripheral economies, where 
informal employment is on the rise. According to the ILO, “Contrary to many predictions, 
the informal sector is not diminishing. It is increasing everywhere. Globalisation and the 
associated search for lower labour costs is one significant factor in this; privatisation and 
the contracting out of services and activities are others” (ILO-ACTRAV, 1999; quoted in 
Bonner and Spooner, 2010). In the case of Latin America, broad trends of privatisation of 
state enterprises and deindustrialisation have caused mounting unemployment and poverty, 
worsening informality. The report World of Work mentioned above (ILO, 2008) examines 
indicators of informal employment for 11 Latin American countries, including the richest 
ones. Statistics show that in 2005 informal employment constituted more than half of the 
labour market in Latin America, while  
 
there is also evidence (…) that informal jobs pay significantly less than formal ones not only in 
the informal sector but also within the formal sector, where workers who have informal 
arrangements are paid less than their permanent counterparts. The wage gap between the two is 
found to be statistically significant (:121). 
 
Summarising, these trends of industrial restructuring and the passage from Fordism to 
Neoliberalism implied severe changes in the institutional arrangements that ruled social 
and political life thus far. This could only be done by means of a thorough transformation 
in the role of the state, which indeed implied the end of the “Keynesian Welfare National 
State” (Jessop, 2002). Besides, as analysed below, all these shifts took place in a context 
marked by a shift in the balance of power between capital and labour, leading to the spread 
of market logics into state politics and a relegation of social policies in the state’s selective 
priorities.  
 
5. Capital and labour in neoliberal times 
 
The disruption of labour markets invoked the necessity to abandon the “class compromise 
between capital and labour [that] was generally advocated as the key guarantor of domestic 
peace and tranquillity” during Fordism (Harvey, 2005: 10, italics in original). According to 
Harvey, while the economy was expanding and corporate profitability and productivity 
were high enough, capital accepted the need for a balanced compromise with labour in 
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order to secure the peaceful functioning of the economy. True, Dicken’s (2003) warning 
that Fordism was not a ‘golden era’ for everyone must be considered, since it did operate 
through a socially and spatially selective process (see Brenner, 2004; Hudson and 
Williams, 1995), and it played “a part in the state’s general task of organising the balance 
of forces in favour of the expanded reproduction of capital” (Poulantzas, 1975, quoted in 
Jessop, 2000: 10). However, Fordism did see some effort to redistribute wealth, because 
the workers were seen as a consumer as well. Problematically, things changed when in the 
1970s and the following decades industrial profitability and GDP growth stagnated or even 
decreased. In contrast to the 1960s, average profit rates decreased in European 
manufacturing, from 16.4 percent in the period 1963-71 to 12.7 between 1972 and 1980, 
and to 13.4 percent for the period 1981 to 1990 (Armstrong et al, 1991; quoted in 
Merrifield, 2000: 20). Merrifield (2000: 20) also quotes statistics from UNIDO (1997) to 
show that, as a percentage of immediate input, between 1980 and 1994 the US experienced 
a decline in manufacturing profitability from 61 to 53 percent, while between 1975 and 
1990 profitability increased slightly in the G7 countries, from 14.1 to 15.3 percent on 
average. Likewise, annual GDP growth per person employed remained stable (stagnated) 
or even decreased in core economies. In the US, between 1979 and 1988 it fell from 2.6 to 
0.9 percent. This trend was mirrored in the major European economies with decreases in 
Germany (4.2 to 1.9 percent), Great Britain (2.7 to 2.6 percent), and France (4.9 to 2.4 
percent).  
 
According to Harvey (1995, 2005), the poor performance of the economy led the elites to 
engage in medium-term plans to set in motion a radical shift in the relationship with 
labour. With decreasing profitability and high unemployment accompanied with social 
discontent (Harvey reminds us of “the strike waves and labour disruptions of the period 
1968-72”), it was acknowledged that severe transformations had to take place if the elites 
were to restore their – now threatened – class power and keep a bigger piece of the 
(stagnated or even shrinking) cake. Thinking with Duménil and Lévy Harvey (2005) 
argues that “neoliberalisation was from the very beginning a project to achieve the 
restoration of class power” by the elites (:16). In Harvey’s words,  
 
neoliberalisation has not been very effective in revitalising global capital accumulation, but it 
has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China) 
creating, the power of an economic elite.  
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Essentially the main political transformation towards neoliberalism was characterised by 
the decisive shift of the relative balance of power between capital and labour, certainly in 
favour of the former. This shift explains partially how it is possible that in recent decades, 
employment productivity increased at a higher pace than average real wages. In the US, 
labour productivity18 grew at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent between 1987 and 1995, 
and at 1.9 percent between 1987 and 2008. Similar cases are those of France (2.2 and 1.1 
percent); Germany (2.1 and 1.0 percent); UK (2.0 in both periods); Japan (3.2 and 1.3 
percent); Canada (1.1 percent in both periods); and Belgium (2.2 and 1.1 percent) (ILO, 
2009). Remarkably, despite this growth in productivity, salaries grew at a slower pace, as 
shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Average annual growth rates of real wages (percentage). OECD countries 
 
 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Italy -0.7 0.8 0.3 
EU15 1.1 1.2 0.8 
US 1 2.9 0.4 
Japan 1.3 0.5 0.3 
TOTAL OECD 
countries 
1.3 1.9 0.7 
Source: On the basis of OECD, 2009. 
 
The trends evident above coupled with the growth of informality and of flexibility, 
resulting in increasing inequalities between the workers and the managers and stake 
holders. The ILO’s 2008 Report is again useful, and shows that between 1990 and 2005 
“income inequality rose in more than two thirds of the countries for which data are 
available” (:10-11). The Report concludes that the rise in non-standard forms of 
employment19, both in the core and in the periphery, is a key cause for the increasing 
inequalities. The diminishing share of salaries in the GDP of numerous countries illustrates 
this point further: 
 
[there has been] a redistribution of income away from labour. In 51 out of 73 countries for 
which data are available, the share of wages in total income declined over the past two decades. 
The largest decline in the share of wages in GDP took place in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (-13 points), followed by Asia and the Pacific (-10 points) and the Advanced 
Economies (-9 points). […]  [Between 1990 and 2005] the income gap between the top and 
bottom 10 percent of wage earners increased in 70 percent of the countries for which data are 
available (:1). 
 
                                                 
18 Measured per person engaged. 
19 By non-standard forms of employment it must be understood, on the one hand, flexibility through part-
time, fixed-term, job on call, seasonal and other, and, on the other hand, informality. 
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6. State and capital: of myths and bonds 
 
Even in the most liberal economies, states are actively involved in shaping economic 
life. There is no absolute institutional separation between the political (the domain of 
the state) and the economic (the domain of the market). The market economy is also 
embedded in an ensemble of extra-economic institutions and practices that are essential 
for its operation. The state plays a key role here not only in securing the general 
institutional framework for profit-oriented, market mediated economic activities but 
also in shaping their specific forms, organisation, and overall dynamic. 
(Jessop, 2003: 32-3) 
 
The radical changes described in this chapter so far shaped and were shaped by shifts in the 
regulation of the economic and the extra-economic, and in the articulation between both. In 
this sense, changes in the role and functions of the state are at the centre of the scene in the 
transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, and in the analysis of the capital-labour 
relationship. This is why analysing the strategic selectivities of the state, and its 
relationship to capital and labour in neoliberal times, is essential to understand its role in 
determining trends in the labour markets in general, and its role in the sweatshop 
economies in particular. A manifestation of the changing dynamic between state, labour 
and capital is the direct engagement of affluent individuals into politics over the last two 
decades (at least). Berlusconi in Italy – who owns a massive mass media corporation – is a 
prime example of this. Also some of the largest Latin American countries, like Chile and 
Mexico, are (or have recently been) under the rule of presidents who were formerly (or are) 
entrepreneurs.20 The case of the Bush administration in the US was one of the most 
emblematic: in 2002, the US-based Center for Public integrity presented a report about the 
patrimony of the top officials of the administration. The members of the cabinet were all 
rich, whereas 34 per cent of the top 100 officials of the government were working for large 
corporations before entering the government (Wetherell, 2002).21 
 
Analysing changes in the role of the state becomes even more essential against the 
backdrop of claims about the ‘demise of the national state’ in a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae, 
1990) in popular and academic debates. These claims can be read as the ‘calling cards’ of 
the neoliberal doctrine and underpin contemporary discourses on globalisation. Deemed as 
myths by several authors (Weiss, 1997; Castree et al, 2004, Swyngedouw, 2000), such 
discourses are aimed at attacking the welfare state (considered by pundits of neoliberalism 
                                                 
20 Mexico’s Fox had been president for Latin America of Coca-Cola Co. before governing the country, while 
Chile’s current president, Sebastián Piñera, is one of the major shareholders of Lan Chile, the national airline. 
21 The report includes a detailed list of the officials who had significant investments in corporations that 
“lobbied their Departments” and of those who had worked for corporations that lobbied or had businesses 
with the state. The list can be seen in www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/399/  
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as an interventionist or ‘nanny’ state) and to assign a different role to it in line with a 
thorough reorganisation of ‘stateness’ (Painter, 2007). The neoliberal agenda (promoted by 
think-tanks in policy-making, mass media and other arenas) assigns a decisively different 
role to the state. According to it, state intervention in the economy has to be kept to a bare 
minimum, because only markets can allocate resources in the most effective way. The 
state, henceforth, is geared towards the good and harmonic functioning of the markets by 
way of creating good business opportunities – which includes creating markets where they 
do not exist (like privatisation of state enterprises) (Harvey, 1995, 2005). The idea 
underpinning these arguments, expressed with clarity by the “neoliberal utopians” (Harvey, 
2005), is that markets are self-sufficient, since the laws of demand and offer suffice for the 
self-regulation of the economy.  
 
Such claims have been countered by Poulantzas, Jessop, and other Marxist scholars writing 
about on the role of the state (see Harvey, 2001: 267-83) who have contested “the myth of 
the powerless state” (Weiss, 1997) on which the neoliberal orthodoxy rests, and who insist 
on the ‘utopian’ character of a stateless world economy. In line with these accounts, and 
following Offe (1972) and Muller and Neususs (1975), Jessop (2002: 42-3) assures that 
“state intervention is not only a secondary activity aimed at modifying the effects of a self-
sufficient market but is absolutely essential to capitalist production and market relations.” 
This is partly because  
 
individual capitals compete for profit, act self-interestedly and try to avoid limits on their 
freedom of action. Competition discourages individual capitals from undertaking activities 
necessary for economic and social reproduction that are unprofitable from their individual 
viewpoint and it may also lead them into activities that undermine the general conditions for 
economic and social reproduction. 
 
The necessity of the state for capitalist accumulation to take place should be highlighted 
(as Jessop has repeatedly done). Highlighting the role of the state is not to completely 
disregard the changes that the state has certainly suffered after Fordism. Indeed, Jessop 
himself points to an actual “de-nationalisation of the state” which is “reflected empirically 
in the ‘hollowing out’ of the national state apparatus with old and new state capacities 
being reorganized territorially and functionally on subnational, national, supra-national, 
and trans-local levels” (2000: 12; see next section). However, despite this ‘hollowing out’ 
the state continues to be essential for securing and facilitating capital accumulation through 
the regulation of both the economic and the extra-economic. In this sense, “two general 
functions are particularly important: first, helping to secure the conditions for the 
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valorisation of capital; and, second, helping to secure the conditions for the reproduction of 
labour-power” (Jessop, 1993: 8). In the same vein, Moody (2004: 153) puts it in his own 
style, pointing out that “the corporations need the state for social damage control, to step 
up repression of resistance, to negotiate further ‘liberalization’ and to pump tax dollars into 
corporate coffers as well as, indirectly, the stock and bond markets of the world.” 
 
Indeed, despite the “neoliberal utopians’” project of a stateless world economy, changes in 
the role of the state during neoliberal times illustrate that capital needs the state to keep 
capitalism safe from the intrinsic destructive forces of the logics of capitalist accumulation:  
 
the constitution and extension of competitive forces is married with aggressive forms of state 
downsizing, austerity financing, and public-service ‘reform.’ And while rhetorically antistatist, 
neoliberals have proved adept at the (mis)use of state power in the pursuit of these goals (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002: 381). 
 
Having challenged myths about the demise of the national state, for the purposes of this 
thesis it is important to acknowledge changes in the forms of economic and social 
regulation of the state from Fordism to neoliberal times. In this sense, following previous 
work by Jessop (2002), I stress two main elements important to the re-organisation of 
stateness.22 Firstly, there has been a re-scaling of the functions and attributes of the national 
state, i.e. an “interjurisdictional policy transfer” (Peck and Tickell, 2002) both upwards (to 
supra-national institutions) and downwards (to regional and local governments).23 In 
Jessop’s words, “new state powers have been allocated to scales other than the national.” 
Secondly, there has been a profound change in the capital-state relationship, leading to 
increasing economic domination of the former by the latter, and therefore to shifts in the 
priorities of the state. These two elements co-evolved and shaped each other alongside the 
neoliberal times, and due to their relevance for understanding the role of the state and its 
policies towards greater labour flexibility, they deserve special attention.  
 
                                                 
22 Jessop distinguishes between Fordism and Post-Fordism, and identifies Neo-liberalism as one of the 
patterns towards economic reorganisation. However, in line with Harvey (2005) in this research I will call 
Neoliberalism what Jessop calls “Post-Fordism”. 
23 Jessop also identified the increasing transfer of functions and capabilities of the state “outwards”, this is, to 
non traditional institutions like NGOs and other arrangements. In this sense, he identifies an increasing “de-
statisation of the political system” that is “reflected in a shift from government to governance on various 
territorial scales and across various functional domains.” (2000: 12). 
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6.1. Rescaling of stateness: transferring state-power upwards, 
downwards and ‘capitalwards’24 
 
Rather than simply withering away or being entirely superseded by non-territorial forms 
of organising political power (e.g., a series of global or international regimes addressed 
to specific functional problems), the evidence points to continuing attempts to redesign 
and/or rescale territorial statehood in response to current challenges. 
(Jessop, 2003: 31) 
 
While during Fordism the key decisions of economic and social regulation relied in the 
national state, today the re-articulation of the economic and the political takes place in a 
context of complex re-distributions of the national state’s functions and attributions. Put 
simply, “the contemporary round of globalization has radically reconfigured the scalar 
organization of territorialisation processes under capitalism, relativising the significance of 
the national scale” (Brenner, 1999: 52). In this sense, the changes operated at the scale of 
the national state during the neoliberal years make it essential to seek for new 
conceptualisations to help understand these nascent processes. A new “gestalt of scale” 
(Swyngedouw, 2000) is emerging, and a multiplicity of processes of rescaling occur that 
challenge the capacity of “traditional ‘state theory’… to deal with the formation of the new 
scaled forms of relationships between governance and civil society” (Swyngedouw, 2000: 
70). Consequently, and as I stress in the next section, this is why Jessop (2003: 36) asserts 
that the current modes of regulation entail a “post-national regime”.  
 
In explaining the engineering of the re-scaling of state power, Jessop (1993, 2000, 2002) 
and Peck (2002) coincide in stressing that there has been a triple movement: 
 
[The national state] remains crucial as an institutional site and discursive framework for 
political struggles (…) [but] its capacities to project power even within its own national 
borders are becoming ever more limited due to a complex triple displacement of powers 
upward, downward, and, to some extent, outward. Thus some state capacities are transferred to 
pan-regional, pluri-national, or international bodies; others are devolved to the regional or local 
level inside the national state; and yet others are assumed by emerging horizontal networks of 
power - regional and/or local - which by-pass central states and link regions or localities in 
several societies (Jessop, 1993: 11). 
 
Swyngedouw (2000) also agrees in identifying a triple scalar movement, but prefers to 
refer to the third movement (outwards) as the transfer of power to private capital rather 
than to “emerging horizontal networks of power.” Emphasising the political character of 
re-scaling processes and its importance for political mobilisation, he points out that 
                                                 
24 For some excellent summaries of the politics of scale perspective see: González, S. (2005) “La geografía 
escalar del Capitalismo”, in Scripta Nova 9(189); and Peck, J. (2002) “Political economies of scale: fast-
policy, interscalar relations, and neoliberal workfare”, in Economic Geography 78 (pp. 331-360). 
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this rescaling of governance often takes place through disturbingly undemocratic procedures by 
an increasingly authoritarian state apparatus. The double rearticulation of political scales 
(downward to the regional or local level; upward to the EU, NAFTA, GATT, etc; and outwards 
to private capital) leads to political exclusion, a narrowing of democratic control, and, 
consequently, a redefinition (or rather a limitation) of citizenship rights and power 
(Swyngedouw, 2000: 70). 
 
As identified by N. Smith (1992, 1993, 2000) and Swyngedouw (1997, 2000), these 
processes of re-scaling respond to complex political interests and constitute an essential 
feature of the rolling-back of the Welfare State. To summarise the political consequences 
that the new scalar configuration of stateness is having, I look to two overall consequences 
that Peck and Tickell (2002) explain as follows: 
 
in the asymmetrical scale politics of neoliberalism, local institutions and actors were being 
given responsibility without power, while international institutions and actors were gaining 
power without responsibility: a form of regulatory dumping was occurring at the local scale, 
while macrorule regimes were being remade in regressive and marketized ways (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002: 386). 
 
These process have helped and shaped the increasing domination of the economic over the 
political, and have in turn constituted both a means and a consequence of their re-
articulation. 
 
6.2. Economic domination 
 
Just as capitalist markets cannot reproduce without the state, the state cannot be 
independent from capital (and from labour). Poulantzas’ early path-breaking approach of 
the national state as a social relation is particularly useful to understand the articulations 
between state and capital, for he saw the state as “a form-determined condensation of a 
changing balance of class forces” (1978; cited in Jessop, 2000: 9). “This implies that the 
state does not have its own independent power which can either be fused with that of 
capital (…) or eliminated due to the growing counter-power of global capital” (Poulantzas, 
1978; quoted in Jessop, 2000). Although rejecting the absolute economic determination of 
the modes of social regulation (which is common in orthodox Marxism), Jessop (2002: 23) 
acknowledges that “economic domination” is one of the key elements that contributes to 
the “bourgeois societalisation” encompassing “the relative subordination of an entire social 
order to the logic and reproduction requirements of capital accumulation.” Indeed, 
Poulantzas assured that “class-bias is always inscribed in the state's own institutional form 
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and its insertion into the capitalist mode of production” (quoted in Jessop, 2002: 7). 
However, according to Jessop (2000) Poulantzas also recognised that  
 
[state] powers (in the plural) are never exercised (or, due to 'non-decision making', not 
exercised) by state managers in isolation. They are always activated in a determinate but 
variable conjuncture of class struggles within, over, and at a distance from the state. And these 
struggles inevitably affect the manner in which the particular and global functions of the state 
are exercised (:7). 
 
In this sense, the distinct balance of power between capital and labour during Fordist and 
Neoliberal eras explains to a large extent – as well as it is explained by – the changes in the 
role and in the priorities and functions of the state. 
 
As already stated, during Fordism the state actively intervened in the economy granting 
workers with the benefits of the Welfare State and ensuring a certain redistribution of 
wealth which (although unequal) was fairer than in previous stages of capitalism. 
Following Poulantzas, Jessop (2000: 10) summarises the articulation of the economic and 
the political in the Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS) as follows: 
 
Economically, the KWNS aimed to secure full employment in relatively closed national 
economies mainly through demand-side management and regulation of collective bargaining. 
And, socially, it aimed to promote forms of collective consumption that supported a Fordist 
growth dynamic and to generalise norms of mass consumption. This in turn would enable all 
citizens to share the fruits of economic growth and thereby contribute to effective domestic 
demand within the national economy. 
 
However, as also argued, the neoliberal agenda implied decisive shifts in the articulation 
between the economic and the political. Under this new logic capital has managed to 
progressively impose the logics of capital accumulation into the state activities, a fact that 
implies a further economic domination over the political (Jessop, 2002). Already in the 
early stages of neoliberalism, Poulantzas (1975, 1978; cited in Jessop, 2000: 7-8) noted 
that “the state’s political and ideological functions have themselves gained direct economic 
significance for the reproduction of the relations of production. Thus it has become 
increasingly difficult for the state to reconcile its responses to ever more insistent 
economic imperatives with the more general demands of securing political class 
domination and social cohesion.” In the words of Jessop (2003: 41), 
 
the expanded definition of the economic at the expense of the extra-economic clearly involves 
a key role for states (on whatever scale) in redefining their relations, steering the 
(re)commodification of social relations, and dealing with the repercussions of the increasing 
dominance of economic logic in the wider society. 
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Jessop (2002: 29) notes three different ways in which this economic domination can 
express itself. Firstly, “capital can use its ‘strike’, ‘sabotage’ and ‘flight’ powers to secure 
the compliance of other systems (such as the state) with its specific reproduction 
requirements.” Secondly, “as capital searches for new sources of valorisation, commodity 
relations can be extended into spheres not currently subject to the logics of capital 
accumulation.” And thirdly, “capital can seek to impose an economising, profit-seeking 
logic on other systems.” The first of these ways can be seen in the imperatives of 
‘adapting’ to the new competitive environment in an open economy to which cities and 
regions must ascribe if they are to ‘survive’ to increasing international competition. The 
recipe on how to survive dictates the need to create businesses-friendly environments 
(including tax exemptions and other financial support, low-wages, deregulation, flexible 
labour markets, and so on) so as to attract Foreign Direct Investment which would create 
jobs (see Harvey, 1989; Ohmae, 1990; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2000). What 
Jessop (2000: 11) assures for Atlantic Fordism is also pertinent to developments in several 
peripheral countries as well: “the social wage is now more and more seen as an 
international cost of production rather than a source of domestic demand. This leads to 
attempts to reduce social expenditure where it is not directly related to enhanced flexibility 
and competitiveness within the circuits of capital.” 
 
Meanwhile, the second and third kinds of manifestation of economic domination can be 
witnessed in the increasing prominence of efficiency and profitability in state management, 
which in Argentina and other Latin American countries (notably Mexico) actually paved 
the way for the privatisation of almost all state enterprises and services during the 1990s, 
and resulted in thousands of ‘redundancies’.  
 
These three forms of economic domination are strikingly present, and even spoken out, in 
the trade disciplines pushed forward by means of the WTO (e.g. those included in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] and in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS]) and in the current generation of free trade 
agreements that have emerged since NAFTA and launched notably by the US. The 
documents prepared by the White House for the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) illustrate to a large extent what economic domination means: “the 
appropriate role of government is not to create jobs but to create the conditions that 
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promote job creation by the private sector” (Maisto, 2005). The agenda of these 
agreements entails the liberalisation and marketization of government procurement, 
services, agriculture, investment and subsidies, plus the protection of property rights, 
leading to the alignment of the production of medicines and creative industries with profit-
oriented precepts. These agreements outline both a transfer of key decisions on economic, 
environmental and social policy to supra-national arrangements, and the marketization of 
vast areas of social policy. The NAFTA even has a clause which bans its use by 
governments to sue privates (the private-to-state clause in Chapter 11 of the treaty), 
entailing thus a virtual entrepreneurial constitution to which national parliaments adhere. 
Ad hoc arbitrations rule over national legislations following texts which, according to 
Chomsky (1998), are written on boardrooms by corporate managers in close collaboration 
with public officials. These facts lead Chomsky to assure that “the so-called 'free trade 
agreements' (...) are designed to transfer decision-making about people's lives and 
aspirations into the hands of private tyrannies that operate in secret and without public 
supervision or control” (Chomsky, 1998).25 
 
This increasing adoption of economic logics into the management of state agencies 
responds to the necessity of capital to find constantly new arenas of accumulation, in order 
to avoid – or to overcome – the successive crisis of over-accumulation that characterise it. 
“Capitalism is constantly oriented, under the pressure of competition, to new opportunities 
of profit” (Jessop, 2002: 19). The stronger link between state and capital is both cause and 
consequence of the shift from a demand-side to a supply-side approach of the state to the 
social regulation of the economy. The argument that states must foster good businesses 
opportunities and help the private sector accumulate capital, so that more wealth can be 
created and then redistributed, has been taken to such an extreme that the resurgence – or 
better said the rapid expansion – of human trafficking and forced labour around the world 
is happening at the sight of states. As the empirical enquiry of this thesis illustrates, states 
are not addressing the problem with the strength that would correspond to the health that 
the rhetoric of human rights enjoys in our days. The evidence from this research suggests 
that these processes that lie behind the glossy fashion businesses are allowed by the ruling 
political parties in both cases, a fact that I will further develop in chapter 7. 
 
                                                 
25 Two of the most ambitious proposals, the mentioned above FTAA and the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI), triggered fierce popular demonstrations, and indeed failed owing to strong opposition 
from grass-roots as well as from progressive politicians and fractions of the bourgeoisies of the countries 
involved (see Montero, 2006, 2009). 
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Finally, it remains to say that in Chapter 7 I explore the differences between changes in the 
role of the state in Argentina and in Italy. By now the reader should bear in mind the above 
discussion of approaches to the study of neoliberalism (see point 2 in this chapter), from 
which I have concluded that despite the continuation of the capitalist mode of production 
world-wide, the developments referred to above do not take place equally in every place. 
 
However ‘global’ some social relationships have become, place difference, uneven 
geographical development and local specificity persist. ‘Global capitalism’ is really a multitude 
of ‘local capitalisms’ that are connected by flows of people, goods and information. These 
flows are by no means uniform and they have different implications in different geographic 
contexts. So by the term ‘global capitalism’ we mean to refer to the fact that capitalism is today 
the ‘normal’ economic system worldwide without implying that is globalised in the sense of 
embroiling all places and countries equally and uniformly” (Castree et al, 2004: 17; italics in 
original).  
 
7. Neoliberalism and the return of human trafficking and forced 
labour 
 
In its search for new opportunities of profit, capital has increasingly absorbed women and 
ethnic minorities into its labour force; a process which is greatly illustrated by recent 
developments in clothing production. Gallin (2001) and Glassman (2009) note that this 
process has contributed to the destabilisation of the mainstream labour force. Indeed, the 
informal sector, which according to Gallin is growing in importance, is mainly made up of 
women and ethnic minorities, and the availability of such a pool of deregulated and non-
unionised labour concomitantly pushes wages down for formal workers as well. As 
demonstrated in a growing body of literature detailing the rise of forced labour and slavery 
(Bales, 1999; ILO, 2005), it is not uncommon that these labourers are absorbed into the 
main capital’s circuit26 through the mechanisms of human trafficking. As I will note in 
chapter 7, since these phenomena are exemplified in national sweatshops, they are 
precisely a new opportunity for profit for the winners of the fashion industry (i.e. brands 
and retailers).  
 
As noted by McGrath (2008), the current resurgence – or better said the rapid expansion – 
of human trafficking and forced labour has moved some scholars (Anderson, 2000; 
Anderson and O’Connell, 2002; Bales, 1999, 2005) and institutions (CEPAL/ECLAC, 
2003; ILO, 2005; IOM, 2003) to highlight and tackle the issue. For example, the United 
                                                 
26 This is said notwithstanding the importance of unpaid housework by millions of women around the world. 
As Glassman (2009: 96) notes, “extra-economic accumulation based in the household played a crucial role in 
the process of expanded reproduction.” 
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Nations’ “Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially 
women and children”, known as the Palermo Protocol, was signed by the UN countries in 
2000 in the city of Palermo, Sicily. This Protocol defines ‘trafficking in persons’ as  
 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose 
of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (Article 3, subparagraph [a]). 
 
Trafficking in persons takes place, in the overwhelming majority of the cases, for purposes 
of labour or sexual exploitation. According to the UNODC (2009) it affects mostly women 
subjected to sexual exploitation.27 In addition, while internal trafficking may be under-
detected (owing to diverse descriptions of trafficking in national legislations, and to the 
greater visibility of foreigners) the majority of the victims of trafficking are trans-national 
migrants. On the whole, the US Department of State (2010: 7) calculates that about 12.3 
million people in the world are victims of trafficking.  
 
Human trafficking generally implies forced labour once migrants arrive at their destination. 
In terms of its definition, while the Palermo Protocol refers to “slavery” and “practices 
similar to slavery”, it does not explicitly use the term ‘slavery’; instead, the use of the term 
‘forced labour’ is more common. The ILO (2005: 5) defines forced labour as “the work or 
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which 
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” Throughout this research I adopt the 
definition of forced labour proposed by McGrath (2008: 1). This author argues that “in 
many cases of forced labour today the choice to enter the work is at least putatively ‘free’”, 
for which reason her definition differs from that of the ILO. In her view, forced labour are 
seen as those “employment relationships defined by the effective inability of the worker to 
leave (i.e., the worker can neither seek other employment nor exit the labour force 
entirely).” While evidence collected in this research suggests that forced labour is common 
in sweatshops in both case studies, there also exist situations of “slavery” and “practices 
similar to slavery”. With forced labour I will then refer to the situation in which a 
sweatshop worker lives, which is in many cases marked by doors locked, 24/7 control, 
journeys of as many hours as the boss requires, and debt-bondage. Some workers in 
                                                 
27 79 percent of the cases reported by the UN countries which have adopted legislations according to the 
Protocol corresponded to these characteristics. 
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sweatshops are not allowed to leave the workplace, while in many other cases they are told 
not to leave under the threat of being fired or deported by the police due to their ‘illegal’ 
immigration status.28 
 
It is not without caveats that I will use the term slavery here. Following McGrath’s advice 
(2008), it is important not to use the term ‘slavery’ to refer to an old practice that is bound 
to disappear, or to a practice that is beyond the logics of capitalism. Indeed towards the end 
of this thesis I raise my deep concerns about the possibility of the expansion of these 
practices in the near future (within the capitalist accumulation logics), and argue that as 
long as capitalism is not defeated, practices of slavery and the like will either exist or be 
latent.  
 
In summary, human trafficking and forced labour affect thousands of garment workers 
worldwide. In both the case studies addressed in this thesis, the constant supply of labour is 
partially provided by the organisation of international networks of human trafficking, while 
the working and living conditions found in these workplaces correspond to the definition 
of forced labour stated above. Workers are approached in their home countries or regions 
and offered a job elsewhere under conditions which differ greatly from what is originally 
arranged. Unofficial statistics estimate that only in Prato and BA there are almost 40,000 
undocumented immigrant workers in sweatshops, an important portion of which is most 
likely to have been subject to deception and even to debt-bondage and/or menaces. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
It can be observed that while the shift from Fordism to neoliberalism has not enabled 
companies to reach the high levels of growth that characterised the ‘Golden Era’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1994) of the post-war it has helped the elites to achieve a redistribution of 
wealth. As Harvey notes this is perhaps the primary objective of the neoliberal project: 
 
Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy (…) have concluded that neoliberalisation was from the 
very beginning a project to achieve the restoration of class power (Harvey, 2005: 16). 
 
                                                 
28 There is actually a sense of property in some of the cases, since owing to the debt-bondage and the 
menaces under which workers are, they are forced to work for their bosses until paying back for their 
freedom. This is more common in Prato, where according to interviewees a few sweatshop lords call some 
workers “my clandestines” (see chapter 6).  
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Neoliberalism has had dreadful consequences for the majority of the workers around the 
world. Subcontracting (i.e. lean production), delocalisation, and the massive incorporation 
of unorganised migrant and female labour into their workforce, are strategies that have 
helped large corporations (and other smaller companies later on) to systematically 
dismantle the formal, strongly unionised labourers. Coupled with state deregulation of the 
labour markets and the legalisation of flexibilisation and non-standard jobs, these trends 
have led to a general pauperisation of labour standards. For example, despite the growth in 
labour productivity, average real salaries have grown at a much slower pace.  
 
As this chapter has shown, the increasing financialisation of the world economy 
encouraged speculative investments to the detriment of long-term investments and 
planning. In this context of permanent economic instability and high investment risks 
(which are a highly profitable financial products and opportunities), the presence of large 
factories and numerous direct workers is today a hindrance for corporate profitability. 
Instead, capital is rather invested in “gambling” in already existing assets, having a much 
lesser enabling role for productive activities (Merrifield, 2000).  
 
As stated above, for such developments to take place, deregulating the labour markets to 
break up its rigidities was a necessity for capital: no more full employment, no more long-
term contracts, and no more relatively high salaries. The president of the International 
Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (Biller, 2005; quoted in Coe, Johns and 
Ward, 2007: 503) put it starkly: 
 
Globalisation means competition, and competition means productivity, and 
productivity means using labour as efficiently as possible—the right worker in 
the right job at the right time. 
 
Translated into concrete labour-market policy, this led to the rise of precarious and 
informal employment. As noted by one of the interviewees for this thesis in Prato 
(Manuele, interviewed on 29/9/08), this rise of informality and casualisation, hand in hand 
with the deregulation of the labour markets, has permeated labour standards in the formal 
sector, with the provisions included in flexible contracts being applied to ‘mainstream’ 
workers.  
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For these developments to take shape, a thorough reorganisation of the modes of social 
regulation also had to take place. Indeed, the fact that this radical redistribution of wealth 
away from labour did not end up in endless social uprisings and spots of revolutionary 
struggles in different parts of the world, is partly because of the work done by the state 
apparatuses in their respective territories. In this sense, neoliberal ideas that had been put 
forward since the 1930s and that were further developed during the 1970s within think-
tanks, gained increasing terrain in policy-making in the midst of the stagflation of the 
1970s. In turn, the macroeconomic conditions of crisis laid the ground for the actual 
application of the hitherto highly theoretical and abstract ideas of neoliberalists into state-
politics, until becoming its mainstream backdrop. Considered as major causes of the crisis, 
state interventionism and strong union power were “unambiguously blamed” for the crisis 
(Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2010).  
 
In addition, as part of the shift from Fordism to neoliberalism a further economic 
domination of social regulation modes has taken place, evidenced by the increasing 
participation of businessmen into politics in many countries around the world since the 
1990s. Due to these developments, state ‘interventionism’ is kept to the minimum and 
aimed at creating good businesses environments29, for which purpose the hitherto strong 
union power – considered as an obstacle to the proper functioning of markets – was 
specially targeted. As Harvey has repeatedly stated (1995, 2005), the administrations that 
embodied the neoliberal project (notably Pinochet, Thatcher and Reagan) applied strong 
anti-union policies; the allocation of anti-union officials to the US Department of Labor 
during Reagan’s administration and the open repression of miners strikes in the UK under 
Thatcher in 1984, were understood as nothing less than a necessary political measure to 
help the harmonic and good functioning of the markets. One of the more striking examples 
of this is state terrorism in Latin America, where thousands of union leaders and left-wing 
activists were tortured and killed by dictatorships supported and even financed by the 
Department of State and by multinational corporations (see chapter 5).  
 
These facts all serve to contest the alleged retreat of the state on which discourses of 
globalisation and neoliberalism lie. As noted by Harvey (2001: 14) 
 
the nation state remains the absolutely fundamental regulator of labour. The idea that it is 
dwindling or disappearing as a centre of authority in the age of globalisation is a silly notion. 
                                                 
29 Including the sale of public enterprises, notwithstanding the thousands of job losses that that could carry. 
44 
 
 
In fact, it distracts attention from the fact that the nation state is now more dedicated than ever 
to creating a good business climate for investment, which means precisely controlling and 
repressing labour movements in all kinds of purposively new ways: cutting back the social 
wage, fine-tuning migrant flows, and so on. The state is tremendously active in the domain of 
capital-labour relations. 
 
The current economic crisis provides useful context to understand the trends described in 
this chapter. The recent bail-out of banks with public money is an unbeatable 
demonstration of the active role of the state, as well as it uncovers the lack of own 
strategies by state administrators, and their defence of capital (especially financial capital) 
as their first and utmost priority, even if it leads to the application of highly unpopular 
policies like thousands of ‘redundancies’ in state agencies, the extension of the age of 
retirement and the cutting of budget for health and education, among others. 
 
The rise of human trafficking and extreme exploitation of migrants and women around the 
world takes place in this context of “pervasive naturalisation of market logics” (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002: 394). With only weak labour organisation, this naturalisation is everyday 
more and more embedded into state politics and has led states to allow human rights’ 
violations, in the hope that the development of these activities – which allow accumulation 
rates that can hardly be met by other economic activities – will help create the base of 
capital accumulation necessary to overcome the recurrent crisis experienced under the 
capitalist mode of production. Be it in neoliberal times, in the “prehistory of capital” or in 
peripheral countries (e.g. peasants constantly being expelled from their land in Colombia 
and India), workers and peasants live under the constant threat of being subjected to the 
worst human rights’ violations under the rule of capital. 
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Chapter 3 
Neoliberal fashion (or the return of the sweatshop) 
 
We believe that the apparel industry, as presently constituted, is exploitative at its core. 
(Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000: 22) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 1890 the Select Committee of the Houses of Lords on the Sweating System was formed 
in London. In the report the Committee exposed the existence of hundreds of small inner-
city workshops in which workers – mainly women - worked for long days, toiling in 
“hellholes” with insufficient toilet facilities and ventilation, producing garment for larger 
manufacturers. The commission stressed the widespread use of subcontracting to these 
workshops and deemed it to be a “sweating system”. According to Green (1997), since the 
introduction of the sewing machine, the use of subcontracting – mostly to homeworkers – 
has been quite routine in clothing production. This is explained by certain characteristics of 
its production process, like the division of the stages that it allows (basically design, 
cutting of the fabric, sewing, stitching, ironing and packaging), the low initial investment 
that it needs, and the possibility of production to take place virtually anywhere (since 
unlike other industrial activities it does not need special installations). Besides, the 
widespread use of subcontracting has historically led to cutthroat competition between 
small and medium workshops, driving prices – and hence working standards – down.   
 
Following some of the main texts on sweatshops published in the last 20 years (Bonacich 
and Appelbaum, 2000; Morokvasic, 1986; Morokvasic et al, 1987; Phizacklea, 1990; A. 
Ross, 1997; R. Ross, 2004), in this chapter I argue that recent trends in the fashion industry 
worldwide have fostered a return to the widespread use of subcontracting. Besides, in a 
context of weakened labour power and a relaxation of corporate control by the states, this 
has led to the resurgence of sweatshops in cities like New York and Paris, and to their 
emergence in cities where they had never existed. In this sense, the economic stagnation of 
the mid-1970s did affect fashion businesses strongly. Morokvasic et al (1986: 401) quote 
statistics for Germany, France and England stating that in those years the share of clothing 
in personal consumption decreased roughly from 10 to 7 percent. Indeed, during the late 
1970s the brands engaged in a growing competition over prices. These events coupled with 
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the high instability of demand – itself resulting from the permanent economic instability 
that the increasing financialisation produces – creating a particularly difficult environment 
for fashion businesses which led apparel companies to develop strategies to survive. In this 
sense, the firms needed to create markets, cut costs and reduce risks. For these purposes 
they adopted strategies that focused on the achievement of a greater flexibility and cheaper 
prices. This created renewed pressures over the rigidity of the labour markets and over 
costs, particularly labour costs, which in clothing production have historically represented 
a larger share of the total costs than in other industries. The spatial reorganization of 
production was at the centre of these strategies. In this sense, the leading companies closed 
down their factories and started subcontracting the labour-intensive phases to domestic 
contractors. Furthermore, the availability of proper logistics technology and the advances 
in transportation, allowed them to subcontract production to contractors in the periphery, 
henceforth pitting local and international producers – and their respective workers – 
against each other. This strategy allowed companies to reduce risks and costs, and to 
access to a more flexible workforce.30  
 
Likewise, to foster consumption the industry engaged in a strong campaign for advertising 
fashion. The subcontracting of production allowed individual companies to allocate 
significant resources to marketing (design, image and brand building). This strategy proved 
highly successful for those companies that managed to adopt it, so that during the 1990s 
they managed to not only grow at a fast pace, but also to absorb a number of competitors. 
Several mergers and acquisitions took place and in only ten years an industry that had 
always been characterised by the atomisation of providers (for which reason it had been 
considered the epitome of competitive markets) shifted to a strongly concentrated market, 
largely managed by a handful of companies in the EU and in the US (Collins, 2003). As 
noted by Gereffi (1994) this trend had substantial impacts over the organisation of the 
industry. In his view, the growth of large retail chains and branded manufacturers led to a 
shift from producer-driven to buyer-driven chain. This means that while until these events 
took place the big manufacturers controlled the market selling their products to a large 
number of relatively small and medium stores, today it is big retail chains and brands who 
control the market, imposing their own rules on a myriad of small and medium 
manufacturers. Besides, as I stress in this chapter – by drawing on the sweatshop literature 
highlighted below – the rules that they impose on actors further down in the production 
                                                 
30 It is worth noting, though, that subcontracting was always present along the 20th century in the garment 
trades (see Green, 1997: 146-55).  
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chain are driven by the demand of rapidity, flexibility and extremely low costs, because of 
the growing shortening of fashion trends and increasing competition over prices (in the 
context of the end of the Multifibre Agreement [MFA]). With their large pool of cheap and 
flexible labour, sweatshops are, in the view of Green (1997), Morokvasic (1986) and 
Phizacklea (1990), particularly well positioned to cover the demands of the ‘buyers’.  
 
Following Massey (1984), and assuming that sweatshops are in a way new economic 
spaces, in this chapter I argue that the reappearance or the surge of sweatshops reveals 
changes in the social relations of the industry. Certainly, the increasing use of 
subcontracting, coupled with weakened labour power and with a relaxation of the state’s 
corporate control led to the re-emergence of small inner-city workshops that rely on the use 
of trafficked and forced labour to provide the industry with its needs. Indeed, Bonacich and 
Appelbaum (2000) assert that the return of the sweatshop is ultimately a consequence of 
the shift in the power balance between capital and labour during the last decades (:7). It is 
in this context that sweating systems arose in Buenos Aires and in Prato during the 1990s. 
 
2. A brief history of sweatshops 
 
Until the “democratisation of clothing” towards the mid-eighteenth century there were no 
clothing stores. Indeed, as Green notes, the way in which people used to get their garments 
depended heavily on their class belonging: 
 
Clothing was made at home by and for the poor, while skilled tailors and seamstresses fitted 
out the rich. But not all clothing was ‘made’. Second-hand clothing was the first mode of 
purchasing prefabricated garments – ‘off the cart’, so to speak. At the same time, clothing 
circulated between the classes, as aristocrats shed last year’s models, benefiting their servants 
(Green, 1997: 21). 
 
According to Green (1997), during the 19th century there was a progressive 
democratisation of clothing – which was facilitated by the social revolutions occurred in 
Europe. This process had a fundamental impact on the organisation of production, as it led 
to “the rise of standardisation in opposition to individually tailored clothes,” what at the 
same time signalled the beginning of the mass production of ‘ready-to-wear’ garment 
(Green, 1997: 21). In other words, garment started to be made mostly in factories. Working 
and workplace conditions in the first large apparel factories in history were extremely poor, 
as hitherto denounced by workers through several strikes, and as revealed by the sadly 
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famous fire in the Triangle Shirtwaist factory in lower Manhattan, in March 1911.  This 
fire was described by Miller (2003: 198) as “the worst industrial accident in the history of 
the United States.” In it, workers had gone on strike (the first women’s strike in US’ 
history) in demand for better working conditions and healthier and safer working places. It 
was 20 years before that the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the Sweated Trades had 
revealed the dreadful working and living conditions of thousands of homeworkers in 
London. R. Ross (2004) uses the following quotes to summarise working conditions in 
sweatshops (in this case in New York) by then: 
 
New York state license superintendent Daniel O’Leary in 1890 expressed his horror at 
‘workers toiling in dark, humid stuffy basements on Division Street, children of eight years, 
and women, many of them far from well, sweating their lives away in these hellholes (:19, 
quoted in Howard, 1997: 152). 
 
At the turn of the century, the Frenchman Emile Levasseur, like many social investigators 
before and since, climbed the dark, dank hallway of a New York tenement in order to examine 
a garment workshop first-hand: (…) ‘They were situated in the South-East portion of the city, 
in dilapidated-looking buildings; the wooden steps shook, narrow and nauseating toilets were 
in the stairway, middle-sized rooms were some twenty workers worked like demons, cutting, 
placing buttons, ironing, each according to his specialty (…) the spectacle of such feverish 
activity, of all of those hands following the movement of the machines made me think of one 
of the circles of hell in Dante” (Green, 1997: 137). 
 
However, after the fire in the Triangle factory, workers’ organisations’ and officials’ 
concern rose quickly regarding these conditions. During the following years union 
organisations pushed for a progressive improvement in policies regulating working 
conditions and factory health and safety in the garment industry. According to Miller 
(2003):  
 
the Triangle fire led to a burst of city, state, and federal laws regulating the garment industry 
and dealing with workers' safety (…) Following another burst of union organizing during the 
Great Depression, the legislation-reform movement culminated in 1938 with the passage of the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act under the Roosevelt administration. That act established the 
national minimum wage, required premium pay for overtime, and limited child labour (Miller, 
2003: 96). 
 
Bad working conditions still continued to affect homeworkers. However, the mass-
production of standardised uniforms during World War II made factory production 
increase to the detriment of more craft-like (labour intensive) garment, typically women’s 
fashionwear, which were generally produced at home. In 1942 improvements in the official 
regulation reached these workers when the Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, banned 
homework from most branches of the garment industry, limiting it to only special permits 
(like that of handicapped workers). According to Green (1997), previous legal attempts to 
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limit homeworking failed to enhance working conditions. However, the statistics show that 
the drastic measure adopted in 1942 had significant consequences: “it was estimated 
between 1935 and 1955 the number of homeworkers in New York State had dropped from 
500,000 (in all fields) to less than 5,000” (Green, 1997: 64).  
 
However, Green (1997) warns about the necessity to understand that homeworking has 
never disappeared. Similarly, Annie Phizacklea (1990) stresses that it has remained a main 
production feature since the Post-war, to become more evident once again during the 
1970s. Her argument in here is that of the development of a “duality” in the industry. In 
her words,   
 
my feeling is that while there was some shift from sweatshop to factory production, the latter 
never replaced the former (…) What in fact developed between 1911 and the Second World 
War was ‘dualism’ in the industry. The development of the ‘modern’ factory-based firm 
located outside London using increasing sectionalised methods of assembly alongside with the 
traditional sweatshop sector with its retinue of homework workers based in the inner cities. 
This dualism persisted and became more clear-cut with post-war immigration (:30-31). 
 
Later on in this chapter I will explain how and why this dualism intensified since the 1970s 
and how it is linked to the contemporary return of the sweatshop. So far, it is necessary to 
stress that sweatshops did not disappear completely during the post-war period. In the view 
of A. Ross (1997:11), “severely restricted in its zone of operations, the sweatshop dropped 
out of view, and lived on in the underground economy.”  
 
Apart from leading to the emergence of the Fair Labor Standards Act and to the banning of 
homework, union power also allowed unions to force contractors to subcontract only to 
unionised workshops. According to Ross (2004), in the view of the International Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union – the main garment and textile workers’ union in the US until 
1995 (henceforth ILGWU) – this was the very crucial step of the victory over the 
sweatshop. Besides, the banning of homework also contributed to improvements in 
working conditions in the sector, since, as noted once again by R. Ross (2004), “with 
unregulated homeworkers disappearing as a low wage alternative to workshop labour, it is 
fair to infer that conditions in the New York apparel industry had improved by the 1950s” 
(:95).  
 
Albeit certain unimportant differences with regards to the extent of the victory, the 
majority of the scholars working on the issue agree that sweatshops were progressively left 
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at the margins of the industry, and “by the end of World War II, even union leaders and 
commentators began to refer to sweatshops in the past tense” (R. Ross, 2004: 87). The 
Union’s view can be summarised by a statement made by Shlesinger in a report prepared 
for the ILGWU in 1951: “the sweatshops have been wiped out; the days of their existence 
are among the most shameful pages of recorded history” (:90, quoted in R. Ross, 2004: 
87). Nevertheless, Green (1997: 155-60) seems sceptical of this vision, which she actually 
sees as somehow the mainstream vision in sweatshop studies. In this sense, she wonders 
whether today’s sweatshops symbolise ‘the return of the sweatshop’ or a continuity with 
the late 19th Century ones. She refers to Waldinger and Lapp’s (1993) argument that the 
view of the return is overstated, and agrees with them in asserting that the union’s 
“triumphalist” view “has been repeated over and again without apparent verification.” 
Indeed, Green suggests that beyond certain improvements in working conditions in general 
over time, “contracting and many of its evils have also remained stubbornly present” 
(1997). However, the section she dedicates to questioning the union’s view is poorly 
developed and documented, even if the book overall is a very well documented and 
admirable piece of work. Indeed, the only statistics she quotes favour the union’s 
“triumphalist” view.31 If “home, workshop and factory have coexisted as varied loci of 
production” and “all three have persisted over the century”, this does not challenge the 
view that sweatshops remained rather marginal during Fordism, as shown by the statistics 
referred to above. In sum, following the union’s view, Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) 
assert that “a combination of government protection and strong apparel unions helped to 
relegate garment sweatshops to the margins of the industry until the 1970s, when they 
began to reappear” (:3) Following Green (1997), to these causes I would add the raise of 
factory production to supply the need for soldiers’ uniforms and other standardised 
garment, which brought many workers from home to the factories.  
 
The improvements in working conditions in the apparel industry towards the Post-War 
period and the almost disappearance of sweatshops for about three decades in New York 
proves the importance of the wider economic, social and political context in determining 
changes within a certain economic activity. In the words of Massey (1984) “what is often 
thought of as the ‘economic’ level of society is itself formed and shaped through social 
processes, and economic behaviour is influenced by wider social characteristics” (:28). In 
the case of the victory against the sweatshop, a general environment of social unrest was 
                                                 
31 In here she cites a 1979-1982 report by Senator Leichter stating that there were 3,000 sweatshops in New 
York employing about 5,000 workers, “up from less than 200 garment sweatshops” a decade earlier.  
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emerging that was both the cause and consequence of increasing unionisation (see Engel-
Di Mauro, 2008; Walker, 2008). These factors for social unrest included the Great 
Depression (in the context of rising union power), the turn towards the Welfare State, and 
World War II. These were all events that escaped the boundaries of the garment factories 
and this ended up having a fundamental impact over the industry. 
 
3. Retailers and branded manufacturers: the increasing power of 
the few 
 
We are no longer a production-oriented company. Today, we are a company 
with a strong emphasis on creativity and design, marketing and logistics. 
(Chairman of Hugo Boss, quoted in Dicken, 2003: 344) 
 
As already stated, the economic crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s challenged the 
survival of thousands of clothing firms. Unemployment and stagnated or even diminishing 
real salaries strongly affected fashion sales. Accordingly, firms needed to stimulate 
demand collectively, and they did so by increasing fashion propaganda and progressively 
shortening fashion trends. Individually, they engaged in a fierce competition which in the 
UK was deemed as “the high street price war of 1979” (Phizacklea, 1990: 18).  
 
The strategy followed by the most successful firms consisted of creating recognisable 
labels to increase their competitiveness: “the most important strategy for creating a sense 
of distinctiveness, and for targeting highly specific consumer niches, is the branding of 
merchandise” (Collins, 2001: 182). They did so by shutting down their factories to 
subcontract the assembly of garment and by allocating immense financial resources to the 
development of brand building and marketing strategies. Today they are known as branded 
manufacturers, but since they do not produce, I will simply call them ‘brands’.32 These 
companies only design and model garments, place the orders to subcontractors and 
distribute the finished garment to the seller. Some of them cut the cloth, since this stage is 
done with sophisticated technology and implies a high risk (a bad cut can easily mean 
thousands of pounds lost in a mere minute). In short, while these firms used to manufacture 
garment, by the end of the 1970s they shifted their activities from manufacturing to the 
creation of a marketing product.  
 
                                                 
32 Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) recognise this contradiction but they prefer to use the term “branded 
manufacturers”, as it is used by actors involved in the business.  
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After establishing the ‘soul’ of their corporations, the superbrand companies have gone on to 
rid themselves of their cumbersome bodies, and there is nothing that seems more cumbersome, 
more loathsomely corporeal, than the factories that produce their products. The reason for this 
shift is simple: building a superbrand is an extraordinarily costly project, needing constant 
managing, tending and replenishing (Klein, 2000: 239). 
 
Klein (2000) and Merrifield (2000) provide several examples of companies that have shut 
down their factories in their home countries to subcontract to low-wage countries. Klein 
(2000; see chapter 9) quotes the examples of outsourcing plans by Hugo Boss, Adidas, 
Levi’s and others. She quotes Adidas’ spokesperson announcing that “[they] closed down 
everything”, and recalls the words of the president of Levi’s Strauss Americas Division 
announcing plans to shift production facilities from the US and Canada to low-wage 
countries, leading to 13,000 jobs lost in North America between November 1997 and 
February 1999.33  
 
International subcontracting – mainly from core to peripheral countries - is not exclusive to 
the apparel industry. This “functional integration between internationally dispersed 
activities” (Dicken, 1998; quoted in Gereffi et al, 2001: 1) has been widespread in sectors 
like electronics, automobile, finance and logistics, among others, and is illustrated by the 
fact that today “an important part of global trade is conducted within multinational 
enterprises or through systems of governance that link firms together in a variety of 
sourcing and contracting arrangements” (Gereffi et al, 2001: 1). In the mid-1980s the rise 
of these complex organisational networks gave birth to the theoretical analysis of Global 
Value Chains, Global Commodity Chains and/or Global Production Chains (see Cattaneo, 
Gereffi and Staritz, 2010; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Kaplinsky, 2001; Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2001; Gereffi et al, 2001; Memedovic and Gereffi, 2003).34 This trend has had 
significant consequences for workers and for regional and local development in both 
Western countries (and Japan) and in those hosting the new investments, and since the late 
1990s the analysis of these consequences has been a major concern in economic geography 
(Hess and Yeung, 2006; see also Coe et al 2004, 2010; Coe, Dicken and Hess, 2008; 
                                                 
33 In the same vein, although the source is not quite reliable, Merrifield (2000: 30) quotes information from 
www.dogeatdogfilms.com stating that “between 1981 and 1990, Levi’s downsized in the USA, closing 58 
plants and putting 10,400 people out of work. Then, handily, they subcontracted 600 subsidiaries in places 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Guatemala, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, all of which 
payed [sic] a tenth of the wage of their American counterparts.” 
34 Gereffi et al (2001) explain that the concept used by scholars depends mostly on the emphasis made in 
specific aspects of the analysis of global networks. In this sense, “global supply chains” is preferred amongst 
those who focus on the “input-output structure of value-adding activities”; “global commodity chains” 
emphasise “the internal governance structure of supply chains”; and “global value chains” highlight “the 
relative value of those activities that are required to bring a product or service from conception” to the market 
and its final disposal. 
53 
 
 
Dicken, 2003; Hassler, 2003; Henderson et al, 2003; Hess and Coe, 2006; Sturgeon, 
Briesebroeck and Gereffi, 2008).  
 
The increasing internationalisation of the garment industry has been the focus of 
widespread analysis from the global commodity chains perspective (Blair and Gereffi, 
2003; Frederick and Gereffi, 2010; Gereffi, 1994; Hassler, 2003; Memedovic and Gereffi, 
2003; McCormick and Schmitz, 2001). The emphasis has been put on governance, which 
is a key concept for this analytical tradition and has been defined as the capacity to carry 
“non-market coordination of economic activity” (Gereffi et al, 2001: 4). According to 
Gereffi et al (2001), “the starting point of interest in global value chains analysis is the fact 
that some firms directly or indirectly influence the organisation of global production, 
logistics and marketing systems” (:4). This aspect is particularly relevant for the study of 
international trends in the clothing industry. 
 
As previously mentioned, the apparel industry is the paramount example of what Gereffi 
(1994) identifies as the shift from producer-driven to buyer-driven production chains. In 
his view, while formerly the chain was a typically producer-driven chain, meaning that it 
was controlled by manufacturers who used to sell their products to innumerable buyers 
(small, medium and even some large clothing retailers), it has now shifted towards a buyer-
driven type of chain, meaning that large retail companies and brands are those who set up 
the rules to be followed by everyone downwards the production chain. Hassler (2003), 
nevertheless, discusses this idea stating that there exist more complex organisational 
networks than just producer-driven or buyer-driven chains: “The emphasis on the dualistic 
governance of commodity chains, of either producer-driven or buyer-driven structures, 
simplifies the richness and varying spectrum of intra-sectoral power relations and 
interconnections between firms” (:517). There exists a broad complexity of products 
according to their quality and price, as well as to the markets for which they are produced. 
This variety also “[has] impacts on the production processes within each fashion standard 
in characteristic ways” (Hassler, 2003: 516).  
 
Both Hassler (2003) and Gereffi (1994), however, agree in that – broadly speaking – a 
limited number of large retailers and branded manufacturers play the most significant role 
in dictating “what is to be produced, how, and by whom (Gereffi et al, 2001). The main 
consequence of this trend is that “since they do not own the factories, multinationals have 
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more power over production” (Klein, 2000: 272). This is the case of the high-end fashion 
houses and, mostly, of large retail chains, which during the last decades have become the 
most favoured actors in the fashion industry. The latter offer a broad variety of clothing 
and related accessories at highly competitive prices in large stores, and do not own any 
factories. Their growth intensified competition to a point in which thousands of small and 
medium stores have gone out of business. Mergers and acquisitions during the last 15 years 
have pushed forward further concentration of the market: today, the largest 4 retail chains 
in the US account for about 80 percent of the total sales (Ross, 2004). This has had 
significant impacts in the apparel production chain, since the pressure from fewer and 
fewer buyers intensifies the search for lower costs by direct producers. In the beginning of 
the sweating system, cutthroat competition between thousands of contractors drives prices 
down.  
 
This is certainly a key aspect of the changes operated in the clothing industry during the 
last decades. Already in 1985 Rainnie assured that “it is impossible to understand the 
structure of the clothing industry today – the myriad small firms, the relative technological 
backwardness and reliance on cheap female labour – without recognising the importance 
that the large retailer and small producer relationship pays in effectively stifling the 
possibilities of growth” (:217). In this sense, Merrifield (2000: 29-30) notes that 
 
research has shown that stock prices of downsized firms frequently go up. Stock prices of 17 of 
the 22 firms studied by the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies, for example, either 
rose or stayed the same the day a company announced labour cuts (Anderson and Cavanagh, 
1998). Furthermore, because a growing proportion of CEO rewards have been in the form of 
stock options, when stock prices rise in the wake of job layoffs and outsourcing overseas, the 
value of the stock held by corporate bosses rises. So, in short, CEOs of job-cutting firms reap 
windfall gains. Thus, inequality between CEO remuneration and the value of workers’ labour 
power increases. 
 
Closing the quote with a clear-cut sentence, the author stresses that 
 
fat cats grow fatter, workers, at home and abroad, grow fewer and thinner: globalisation as 
class war (my emphasis). 
 
In virtue of these developments, the fact that brands and retailers are usually not legally 
accountable for the working conditions of those sewing their articles is an invaluable state 
support of the private sector, and it works as a permanent subsidy from the state to the 
firms (since the fact that producers do not pay taxes is translated into lower prices, or 
simply into higher profits for the brands). Some entrepreneurs interviewed for this research 
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argue that the abandonment of the factory shifts the kind of relationship between capital 
and labour from a labour to a commercial type of relationship (thus ruled not by labour 
legislation but by the rules of the market, i.e. leaving the worker unprotected). However, 
making brands and retailers accountable for the working conditions in the whole chain is 
absolutely necessary in the view of campaigners against sweatshops. Indeed in Argentina, 
as we will see further on (chapter 5), both the Homeworking Law and the Labour Contract 
Law establish that the relationship between contractor and subcontractor is not commercial 
but of a labour type. This is the main element used by anti-sweatshops movements in 
Buenos Aires to stop sweatshops.  
 
4. The spatial strategies of the globalised apparel industry: 
Subcontracting is the key to success 
 
As I have already stressed, subcontracting has been a major feature of apparel production 
since the emergence of ready-to-wear clothing during the nineteenth century. Indeed, 
originally the term ‘sweating system’ was adopted in the late nineteenth century to refer to 
the system of contracting out of the labour-intensive phases of production, generally to 
homeworkers. Since then, the ‘sweating system’ has provided the industry with a pool of 
unregulated and non unionised labour. Homeworkers and workers in workshops have 
always received a very low pay and on a piece rate, which has driven them to self-
exploitation in search for a decent earning.  
 
The high instability of demand that has always characterised the industry also explains the 
use of the subcontracting system as a way to achieve high levels of flexibility and to 
diffuse risks along the production chain. In this sense, there exist two kinds of phenomena 
affecting the stability of garment demand: the quick changes in fashion tendencies, and the 
high elasticity of the demand (which makes it highly vulnerable to economic downturns). 
To these we must add one other major endemic preoccupation of garment manufacturers: 
seasonality. The high volatility of demand discourages large investments and has 
historically meant a major inconvenience for manufacturers. When subcontracting takes 
place, the fixed costs are paid by the contractors, who in turn do not get any long or even 
mid-term commitments from the manufacturers. In this sense, Bonacich and Appelbaum 
(2000) explain why the system of subcontracting helps manufacturers shift the risks to 
actors upward in the chain: 
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The virtue of the contracting system for the manufacturers is that they do not need to invest a 
cent in the factories that actually sew their clothes. Manufacturers engage in arm’s-length 
transactions with their contractors, enabling them to avoid any long-term commitment to a 
particular contractor or location. The formal commitment lasts only as long as the particular 
job order (…) The picture is not quite so rosy from the other side. Contractors, who in the 
United States and other advanced industrial countries, are often immigrants, must scramble to 
maintain steady work. And rather than employ a stable workforce, they pass the problems 
created by flexible production on to their workers (:12). 
  
This trend takes place worldwide, and it holds true for both the cases addresses in this 
research. Just to quote one more example, in a case study on clothing production in 
Durban, Skinner and Valodia (2001: 2) note that  
 
firms are increasingly reconfiguring their use of labour by subcontracting production. We 
argue, however, that firm responses are largely pernicious – aimed at by-passing and 
undermining labour legislation – without in any manner really changing relationships at the 
workplace. We suggest that these developments have the potential to seriously undermine the 
collective bargaining system in South Africa.  
 
Reducing costs is a second reason for companies to subcontract production. In the 
interviews conducted during this research, none of the 26 manufacturers and industry 
representatives interviewed included labour costs among their main current 
preoccupations.35 In the case of Buenos Aires, indeed, several entrepreneurs assured that 
labour costs are ‘delayed’ with respect to inflation affecting other costs. One can easily 
imagine a manufacturer from the mid twentieth century being astonished by such 
statements, since labour costs and dealing with labour organisation more generally have 
always been central concerns for garment manufacturers. According to Phizacklea (1990), 
the availability of a sweating system (or of this ‘secondary sector’) has discouraged the 
search for technology to increase labour productivity. Instead, labour productivity is 
achieved by the extraction of higher surplus value by means of the over exploitation of 
labour. Indeed, according to Morokvasic et al (1986) “improvements in productivity in the 
developed countries account for a greater proportion of job losses than can be attributed to 
low cost producer import penetration” (:400, quoting Cable, 1982). 
 
Historically, not all kinds of garment are sent to contractors. From the point of view of the 
production process, two main types of garment can be identified. On the one hand there 
exists the garment considered as ‘commodity garment’ or ‘basics’, those that are 
standardised and thus their design does not change significantly in the short run and can 
                                                 
35 It should be noted that all of them subcontract all or part of the physical production of their products. 
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thus be stocked up. Typically these are men’s shirts, T-shirts and sweatpants, denim jeans, 
underwear and so on. On the other hand there is the garment which is more fashion-
sensitive, for which reason they are subject to more or less sudden fluctuations in demand. 
This segment of the market (the most dynamic one) consists of women’s ready-to-wear 
garment, comprising skirts, tops, dresses and the like. While the former can be mass-
produced and sold whenever they reach the stores, the latter must be produced in small 
batches and must be readily available to the seller, in order to respond to quick fashion 
changes and to avoid stocking up garments which will not be sold. This is what Phizacklea 
(1990) calls the “duality” of the clothing industry. In the words of Morokvasic et al (1986: 
404),  
 
where stability of products and longer series predominate, the production process is organised 
in larger units and the implementation of new technology has been profitable and therefore 
more frequent (Hoffman and Rush 1983). In contrast, where rapid fashion changes 
predominate and short runs are an imperative - and that has been more the case in women’s 
wear than in other sectors of clothing - the production process needs to remain very flexible.  
 
This differentiation has historically entailed a spatial differentiation: while the former have 
been generally produced in factories, the latter have been subcontracted to homeworkers 
and small inner-city workshops. The predominance of mass-production during Fordism 
somehow hided this duality given to the strong predominance of factory production. 
However, as already said in point 2 in this chapter, “while there is little doubt that the 
volume of factory production increased in the interwar period, the unpredictable nature of 
fashionwear production has always necessitated a flexible workforce and homeworkers 
constitute the almost-perfect solution to that need” (Phizacklea, 1990: 30). 
 
From a geographical point of view, the subcontracting strategies of the largest companies 
(mainly the branded manufacturers) were different for basics than for women’s ready-to-
wear garment. On the one hand, they subcontract basics to low-wage countries in order to 
reduce costs of production significantly to increase their competitiveness (and to allocating 
part of the cost-saving from manufacturing to their brand-building strategies, what in the 
end results naturally in strengthened competitiveness). On the other hand, women’s 
fashionwear production is subcontracted to the several small inner-city workshops run by 
minorities, a large portion of which are of the type we have defined as sweatshops. The 
spatial organisation of duality is explained by Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) with 
clarity: 
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Offshore production usually requires longer waiting times, thereby increasing the risk in 
making time-sensitive garments. Basics can be planned months in advance without much risk 
that the garments will go out of fashion. In the United States apparel industry, the production 
of basics has moved steadily offshore, and highly fashionable apparel is more likely to be made 
domestically (:11). 
 
In the words of Annie Phizacklea (1990), 
 
Producers in developing countries have a comparative advantage over those in developed 
countries if competitiveness is measured exclusively by price in the production of standardised 
garments i.e. garments like men’s shirts, the basic design of which changes little from year to 
year (…) But when it comes to the short runs and speed of delivery demanded by fashion 
retailers, coupled with accessibility to domestic cheap-labour sources, then any advantage that 
developing countries have over countries like Britain seems less clear cut. (:37) 
 
The next sections are divided according to this crucial difference.  
 
4.1. Workers of the world, compete! When subcontracting reaches the 
global  
 
This is a painful but necessary decision… There is no question that we must move away 
from owned and operated plants in the US to remain competitive in our industry. The 
company plans to outsource much more production to its overseas contractors. 
(Levi’s CEO, quoted in Dicken, 2003: 343) 
 
As an industry in which labour costs are highly significant, clothing companies have 
always actively searched for trimming down these costs, and they systematically failed to 
do so through the development of labour-saving technology. This is the reason why the 
possibility to delocalise the labour-intensive stages of production to low-wage countries 
was followed early by clothing firms. Indeed, according to Bonacich and Appelbaum 
(2000) “global production is certainly expanding in other industries, but apparel is the most 
globalised industry of all” (:9). 
 
The first big push towards offshore delocalisation by Western European, Japanese and 
American companies took place as early as in the late 1950s. The main destination was 
South East Asia (and Eastern Europe in the case of the hitherto Western Germany). 
According to Dicken (2003) “it was Japanese firms that initiated the extensive use of 
international subcontracting in garments” while “already by the 1970s, around 70 percent 
of all (the then West) German garments firms, including some quite small ones, were 
involved in some kind of offshore production” (:342-43; no source is quoted). Meanwhile, 
Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) assert that US firms began to move production offshore 
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as early as in the 1950s. As noted by A. Ross (1997), this trend was followed, in the US, by 
legislation encouraging delocalisation: “from 1963, manufacturers could take advantage of 
a special provision (item 807) in the US Tariff Schedule which allowed cut garments to be 
exported for assembly and re-imported into the US Duties were paid only on the value 
added to the garment through low-cost assembly” (A. Ross, 1997: 22).  
 
The costs-savings that outsourcing to low-wage countries allowed led to a plummeting of 
garments prices, intensifying international competition as these cheaper garments produced 
in the periphery started to account for an increasing portion of the Northern markets, and 
started threatening domestic production in the industrialised countries. Herod (2001) states 
that in the US between 1973 and 1983 imports rose from 21 to 55 percent of the total 
clothing sells (:54, quoting Lochhead, 1987). Meanwhile, Ross (2004: 9) quotes statistics 
from the American Apparel Manufacturers Association stating that already in 1990 
imported garments represented more than a 60 percent of the total sales in the US. Only in 
the year 2000, the US deficit in garments trade reached USD 60 billion (Dicken, 2003: 
324).36  
 
The intensified international competition put renewed pressure on the companies to 
rationalise their costs structure. This encouraged corporations to shut down their factories 
in the North to move production to contractors in the South and concentrate in the logistics 
and in the management of the brands. Certainly, the generalisation of this practice allowed 
companies to exercise tremendous pressure over labour in the core by way of pitting the 
workers throughout the world against each other. As explained by A. Ross (1997: 25)  
 
[offshore delocalisation is] the result of programmes designed to make US apparel companies 
competitive, and if [it has] succeeded in filling the pockets of corporate executives and 
stockholders, [it has] done little to help American workers, forced into a downward wage spiral 
of jobs through competition with their maquila counterparts or with immigrant workers in the 
core centres. Pitting First World against Third World workers has been a highly serviceable 
corporate strategy. It drives wages down on both sides, and allows business to portray labour 
right advocates as domestic protectionists bent on depriving maquila workers of their industrial 
wage ticket out of poverty. 
 
Lipietz (1987: 77) also explains the consequences of this strategy by stating that  
 
                                                 
36 The main provider of the largest markets is China, accounting for 16 percent of total imports of the US 
(followed by Mexico, 12 percent) and 20 percent of the EU’s (followed by Turkey, 12 percent) (WTO, 
2003). 
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although this model helps to restore the profitability of the contractors in the centre (and to 
increase working-class purchasing power without increasing wages), it rises other problems for 
central Fordism. The relocation of certain branches of production (…) may lead to (not very) 
well paid workers in the centre being replaced by women workers who receive minimal wages. 
In a branch like textiles, this is a zero-sum game in which the loser is employment in the 
centre. 
 
The statistics show with astonishing clarity the extent to which workers in the core and 
partly in the periphery (were domestic markets have also been ‘invaded’ by cheap imports) 
were affected.  In 1979, 45,000 jobs were lost in Europe and in the US (Kernaghan, 1998, 
quoted in Klein, 2000: 241). In the US, “ILGWU membership decreased from 457,517 in 
1969 (when 70 to 80 percent of New York factories were union shops) to less than 200,000 
by the time of its 1995 merger with the [ACTWU]. With its employment peak of 1.45 
million in 1973, domestic apparel jobs had fallen to 846,000 by 1995”, meaning more than 
a 40 percent fall (A. Ross, 1997: 30). 
 
Bringing these trends to the cases addressed in this thesis, both in Argentina and in Italy 
they are highly present. On the one hand, in Argentina the impact of cheap imported 
garments and textiles was deepened by a complete liberalisation and a high exchange rate 
which made real prices even cheaper. Textiles and clothing were surely amongst the most 
affected sectors by the trade policy of the Menem administration (1989-1999). According 
to the Argentinean Industrial Chamber of Clothing, between 1990 and 2000 more than half 
of the clothing firms shut down (quoted in Monzón, 2001).37 Big factories with hundreds 
of workers (and even two factories with more than a thousand employees) disappeared in 
just a few years. Concomitantly, registered employment suffered from a pronounced fall. 
The Buenos Aires-based Union of Clothing Cutting Workers (UCI) lost a 59 percent of its 
membership between 1991 and 2002 (UCI, 2008), and the main garment workers union 
(the SOIVA) was close to go into bankruptcy, also due to unemployment and loss of 
membership. Similarly, in the case of Italy 385,000 jobs were lost in both the textiles and 
clothing industries between 1970 and 2002 (Dunford, 2006: 33; based on OECD, 2003). 
 
Outsourcing was a centrepiece in the strategies to achieve greater flexibility in the labour 
markets, both in the periphery and in the core economies. In industrialised nations the 
constant threat of relocalisation, coupled with rising unemployment and the consequent 
weaker unions’ power, leads workers to accept salaries and labour standards that they 
would have not accepted before. Today, all around the world, garment workers are among 
                                                 
37 By the year 2000, 4,000 out of the 7,500 companies that existed in 1990 had shut down. 
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the lowest paid in the manufacturing industries. “Studies by the Bureau of Labour Statistics 
show that with the exception of the last fast food industry’s burger flippers (at $11,920), 
and apparel and accessory store employees (at $13,971), apparel and textile workers in the 
legal sector earn the lowest average annual wage among US industries, at $19,225” (A 
Ross, 1997: 13). In Los Angeles, today widely considered ‘the sweatshop capital’ of the 
US, in 2000 only a third of the registered garment factories complied with the Federal 
minimum wage and overtime law (Department of Labor, cited in Collins, 2003: 2).  
Furthermore, “nationwide between 40 percent and 60 percent of the establishments violate 
wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act” (Collins, 2003). These 
trends have been deemed by Chomsky (1995) as the “thirldworldisation of the First 
World”, meaning that labour standards of the South are progressively reaching the North. 
Indeed, Chomsky (1995) goes further on in asserting that sometimes outsourcing is not the 
cheapest option for companies, but still they choose it over keeping domestic production 
because of the political effect that the threat of closure has over workers who conserve 
their jobs in the North. 
 
These trends also have taken place in the periphery, but the causes are slightly different. In 
this regard we can divide the periphery into those countries which are subject to neither 
inward nor outward investments, and those receiving Foreign Direct Investments from 
Northern corporations. In the first group (among which is Argentina), delocalisation to 
other countries is insignificant given the limited extension of their internal markets. 
Instead, the impacts of the restructuring of the industry internationally influenced these 
countries by means of the importation of cheap garments, leading to plummeting prices. 
The informalisation of the workforce (and indeed, the rise of sweatshops) was partly a 
consequence of the pressures created by this international trend. To bring an example from 
this research, in Argentina, even if there exists a high demand for workers in registered 
factories, the wage set in the collective bargaining agreement is the lowest in the 
manufacturing industries.  
 
On the other hand, beyond the philanthropic rhetoric that accompanies Foreign Direct 
Investment, working conditions in countries hosting investments in garment production are 
known to be dreadful: the volatility of the investments pits workers within the South 
against each other; in several regions (mostly in the infamous ‘Export Promotion Zones’) 
unionisation is banned de facto, and it is punished with repression and sometimes 
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delocalisation. Klein (2000) and Merrifield (2000) refer to working conditions in these 
places where thousands of young women escaping from rural poverty make up the 
majority of the workforce. In what I term ‘international sweatshops’ (see chapter 1), they 
suffer daily from long hours, limited and controlled visit to the toilets, beatings and even 
sacking if they get pregnant.38 As Klein (2000) reports, some of them were brought to the 
manufacturing areas by being cheated (i.e. they have been victims of internal human 
trafficking).  
 
4.1.1. A peculiar industry: the Multifibre Agreement and the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing 
 
Already in the late 1950s the American and British markets were being increasingly 
penetrated by cheap imported garments (Dicken, 2003). The power of manufacturers and 
unions altogether, and the high political sensibility of such a labour-intensive industry, led 
the US to launch numerous attempts to protect its domestic market. Bilateral agreements 
with Japan, Hong Kong and some other Asian countries were the first attempts, and in 
1962 the multilateral Long-Term Agreement regulating international trade in cotton 
textiles was signed. However, the crisis of production in developed countries continued. 
Finally, in 1973 trade in textiles and clothing was excluded from the GATT through the 
signature of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA), which naturally included the EU and other 
countries. Despite the possibility of negotiating individual quotas within it, the Agreement 
was highly protectionist, and it was renegotiated or extended four other times (in 1977, 
1982, 1986 and 1991). Indeed, “over time, the MFA became more, rather than less, 
restrictive. Both the EU and the United States negotiated much tighter import quotas on a 
bilateral basis with most of the leading developing country exporters, and in several cases 
also invoked anti-dumping procedures” (Dicken, 2003: 338).  
 
However, during the Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986-1994) the rules changed and a 
new agreement was signed. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was aimed at 
progressively eliminating protection in T&C in three stages (1995 to 1998; 1999 to 2001; 
2002 to 2004) until its complete liberalisation by 1 January 2005.  
                                                 
38 For more information, including first-hand accounts, see Chapter 9 in Klein, N (2000) No Logo, London: 
Flamingo. Reports from the US National Labour Committee (NLC) - according to A. Ross “the group most 
identified publicly with the exposure of offshore sweatshop conditions” – may also be helpful (see 
www.nlc.org).  
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Table 3.1. Integration of textiles and clothing into the GATT 
 
DATE 
Minimum volume 
integrated (percent) 
Accumulated volume 
integrated (percent) 
Remaining quota 
growth rate 
01/01/1995 16 16 16 
01/01/1998 17 33 25 
01/01/2002 18 51 27 
01/01/2005 49 100 Full integration 
SOURCE: WTO, 2001; quoted in Nordas, H. K. (2004) The global textile and clothing industry post the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
 
According to A. Ross (1997), the phasing out of the Multifibre Agreement was a victory 
for the “developing world” in the negotiations of the multilateral trade regime. It is in such 
arguments that it can be witnessed that the free trade discourse has strongly permeated 
liberal policy-making: the belief that limiting imports from peripheral countries condemns 
Southern people to misery has become a doctrine. However, the large majority of clothing 
production for export in peripheral economies is controlled by American and European 
companies, and five years after the end of the MFA the job opportunities they offer have 
not improved significantly, as shown by the fires in the Garib & Garib factory and in the 
Hameem factory, both in Bangladesh, in February and December, 2010. Both factories 
were working for two of the largest retailers in the world: H&M, in the case of the former, 
and The Gap, in the case of the latter. In the former, 21 workers were killed, while in the 
latter it was 28 workers who died as a consequence of poor health and safety.39 In other 
words, what liberalisation brought about was a new wave of cheaper prices, intensifying 
once again international competition and putting even more pressure over labour costs. The 
winners of this move are the handful of increasingly powerful retailers whose capacity to 
lobby negotiators overcame that of the manufacturers and unions. For example in the EU 
the winners of the liberalisation were indeed the large retail chains (because they can buy 
cheap clothes wherever they come from) and the high-end fashion houses Gucci, Prada and 
the like (which saw markets opening throughout the world, with China and Russia as large 
pulling markets). Meanwhile, entire cities’ economies dependent on manufactures that are 
increasingly substituted by imports from low-wage countries (like Prato’s) enter into deep 
crisis and mounting unemployment owing to the counterpart of such benefits enjoyed by 
commercial firms. 
 
                                                 
39 For more information see www.nosweat.org.uk 
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The end of the MFA embodies the victory of the corporate lobby of the services sector 
over manufacturers. Liberalisation has nothing to do with the needs of the poor in the 
South. Instead, it is a consequence of the increasing power of the few in apparel 
production, and it is one more element putting pressure over labour costs. The following 
quote from Collins (2006: 15) illustrates this point:  
 
The United States Association of Importers of Textile and Apparel is far more powerful today 
than the older American Apparel Manufacturers Association. Big apparel firms of the 1990s 
lobbied, not for protectionism (which has been the traditional demand of firms in the industry), 
but for the easing of import restrictions. This reflects the changing interests, and the 
increasingly global scope, of apparel firms. 
 
4.2. Sweatshops, a direct consequence of fashion? 
 
Fashion is thus not just fantasy or social-signifier. It is a specific production problem (of 
‘hyper-innovation’ as economist Bernard Smith has called it), an extreme example of 
the more general problem of fluctuating demand. The challenge to the ready-made 
industry has been to mass-produce imitation while promoting differentiation and 
‘distinction’. The production of fashion has led to a complex system of contracting and 
subcontracting.  
(Green, 1997: 20) 
 
The outsourcing of garment production to low-wage countries and the increasing import 
penetration of cheap garments from South East Asia has not meant the end of domestic 
production in the core and in part of the periphery. A significant proportion of garments – 
notably women’s ready-to-wear outfits – are still being produced locally. The proliferation 
of sweatshops is precisely a sign of this. Herod (2001) cites statistics which show that in 
New York, while “between 1970 and 1984 city-wide registered employment in garment 
manufacturing fell 42 percent”, inner-city workshops grew (according to unofficial 
estimations) from 200 to 3,000. By the mid-1980s there were 50,000 workers in 
sweatshops in the city (:54, quoting Sassen, 1988). A. Ross (1997: 12) quotes further 
statistics in this line: “a recent [General Accounting Office of the US Congress] report 
estimates that over a third of New York’s 6,500 shops are sweated, as are 4,500 of [Los 
Angeles’] 5,000 shops, 400 out of 500 in Miami, and many others in Portland, New 
Orleans, Chicago, San Antonio and Philadelphia” (:12). The case of the UK is not 
different. Already in 1990 Phizacklea (1990) asserted that  
 
while there have been closures and redundancies in the sector, international competition and 
recession have by no means devastated the sector. Thus in some areas such as the West 
Midlands the women’s wear industry has mushroomed and provides the necessary flexibility in 
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a sector that survives on the rapid production of unstardardised garments at prices that compete 
with the low-wage developing countries (:35, my emphasis).40  
 
As I will stress in chapter 7, the proliferation of sweatshops in large cities all round the 
world is partly a consequence of the strategy of increasing fashion sensibility and 
shortening the fashion trends to incentive continuous consumption followed by large 
clothing firms since the late 1970s. “Product proliferation and faster ‘cycles’ of fashion are 
clearly major issues for the clothing industry. The average successful clothing trend lasted 
for only 6-12 weeks in 1999. The number of new products introduced to the market each 
year is approaching 50,000” (Martin, 2000; quoted in Collins, 2001). On the one hand, 
ever-changing fashion increases the necessity for cheap garments, since as noted by 
Simmel (1957) “the more an article becomes subject to rapid changes of fashion, the 
greater the demand for cheap products of its kind” (:556, emphasis in original), a fact that 
increases costs-reduction efforts. On the other hand, the fact that time has come to be more 
important than ever before has increased the need for domestic production, strengthening 
the companies’ spatial tie with the domestic market. In the highly fashionable sector, one 
single day counts. For instance, if a subcontractor fails to finish an order by the agreed 
date, important fines apply (according to interviewees, in Buenos Aires they imply 
generally a 50 percent of the pay). For top-end fashion houses everything has to be ready 
on time to exhibit the whole collection41 in the indicated day. As one of the interviewees 
for this thesis stressed,  
 
everything has to be done now now now! It’s very stressing. When you have to exhibit the 
collection at the beginning of the season, you must run around to put together all of the 
accessories comprised in the collection. If you fail to meet the date, other companies may get 
your customers and even if fines to subcontractors apply, our loss is much more significant, 
because we’d also loose a customer. Indeed, firms are tending to exhibit their collections 
earlier and earlier, and this means that you need to plan very carefully the very date of the 
exhibition (Agustina, fashion designer of a medium-to-high quality fashion firm in Buenos 
Aires, interviewed on 7/3/08). 
 
This is why “the industry needs to be especially sensitive to changes in consumer taste, to 
respond quickly to these shifts, and to cease production of dying trends in a timely 
manner” (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000: 9-10). What this means is that production 
cannot take place in distant places like South-East Asian countries, or in Mexico for US 
                                                 
40 Although this quote is from an old research, as said in the introduction to this research sweatshops working 
for retail chains like Primark have been recently discovered by the BBC in Manchester, what shows that 
sweatshops do still exist in the UK. 
41 The collection is “a coordinated mix of garments that go together to provide a particular ‘look’” (Bonacich 
and Appelbaum, 2000). 
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markets or Tunisia for EU’s markets.  This is because by the time the orders reach the 
market (between 20 to 30 days after they were placed, for the case of China to the US and 
to the EU) the season might be finished or the fashion might have changed, and this would 
imply having large remainings, an thus a significant loss (indeed for a small company, 
even if this happens only once, this can lead to bankruptcy). According to Dunford (2006: 
51) “10 percent to 15 percent of clothing costs are the costs of unsold stock.” For some 
large retailers the garments sold-out at the end of the seasons can account for up to 20 
percent of their total sales (Televisión Española, 13/01/09). 
 
One of the largest clothing companies in the world (the Spanish Inditex, with its brand 
‘Zara’) provides an excellent example of these trends. The commercial model of Zara (that 
in virtue of its originality and its importance I call the ‘Zara model’) is based on permanent 
rotation of designs and models, and in cheap prices. The idea of this strategy is that ‘what 
you see today in a Zara store will not be there tomorrow’ because they only have very few 
items of the same models and designs, so ‘if you like something, buy it now!’ This 
commercial model is translated into the demand of small batches and permanent and quick 
replenishment of the stores to subcontractors. These demands make production highly anti-
economic, since these garments are not mass-produced and thus the unitary cost is high, 
but a third demand complicates this matter: Zara needs to offer low prices to remain 
competitive, and this of course means low pay to its subcontractors. In chapter 6 I will 
come back to this argument to show that these demands can only be met by sweatshops, 
i.e. hyper-flexible workshops producing in record times and at very low prices. Indeed, 
reliable sources (an officer in the Labour Inspectorate in the first case, and members of La 
Alameda in the second case) confirmed to me the existence of sweatshops sewing Zara’s 
garments in both Prato and Buenos Aires. H&M, as well as a handful of new Pratese 
fashion firms, are expanding by following this model. With these data, it seems fair to 
surmise that in the clothing industry no firm will get to the top without producing in 
sweatshops. 
 
In sum, the strategies of clothing retailers and brands have led to the necessity of counting 
with a large pool of subcontractors that can provide them with short runs of cheap 
garments produced in record times. Large factories are not functional to these demands. 
Instead, it is the large subcontracting system constituted by thousands of inner-city 
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workshops, generally managed by immigrants, which provides the necessary flexibility at 
very low costs. 
 
It is out of such a system of contracting out that the sweatshop is born. What provides 
wonderful flexibility for the manufacturer provides unstable work, impoverishment, and often 
abusive conditions for the workers (…) In sum, flexible production, at least in the apparel 
industry, has created a much more effective engine for exploiting workers than existed before 
the new era of global capitalism (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000: 13). 
 
5. Why sweatshops are mostly run by immigrants? 
 
National sweatshops are overwhelmingly managed by immigrant entrepreneurs, and their 
workforce is also mainly made up of immigrants. Indeed, some of the academic literature 
on sweatshops is focused on this particular aspect (Green, 1997; Morokvasic, 1986; 
Morokvasic et al, 1987). In her study on sweatshops in London published in 1990, 
Phizacklea assures that the eight cut-trim-and-make subcontractors she interviewed were 
“ethnic minority entrepreneurs”, whereas Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) assert that in 
their research on sweatshops in Los Angeles the workers where almost exclusively Latinos 
and the intermediaries were in the large majority of the cases Korean.  Green (1997) also 
notes the prominence of immigrant workers in sweatshops, and referring to the way they 
cover their needs for labourers she asserts that “the apparel industry is an important 
example of immigrant networks in action” (:7). Besides, when newspapers report the 
existence of sweatshops the large majority of the workers are invariably immigrants (see 
sources quoted in chapter 1). As already mentioned, the great majority of sweatshops’ 
owners in Buenos Aires are from Bolivia, while in the case of Prato they are Chinese 
entrepreneurs. 
 
There exist many reasons why immigrants take in their hands the production of garments, 
be it as entrepreneurs or as workers. Ethnic entrepreneurs “are usually persons who have 
already been in the country for some time and for whom access to mainstream, stable 
employment is difficult because of lack of appropriate skills and qualifications, lack of 
language proficiency, etc” (Morokvasic, 1986: 443). However, sometimes it is not lack of 
skills but rather discrimination and non-recognition of their skills that keeps immigrants 
away from the mainstream public or private labour market, and pushes them towards self-
employment.  
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Ethnic entrepreneurship is as crucial as ever, with Asian and Latino immigrants, often 
undocumented, denied access to the mainstream labour economy through racial labour 
segmentation, thereby forced into ethnic enclaves where all labour laws are routinely 
neglected” (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000: 13). 
 
The characteristics of garment production make this trade particularly attractive for the 
self-employed. Since the introduction of the sewing machine in 1861, sewing has been a 
relatively easy way to start up a business, given that the initial investment and the skills 
required to start with it are low, and it does not require more than a relatively small space, 
which can indeed be anywhere since no electric and other installations are needed. Besides, 
members of immigrant communities have the important advantage of having an easy and 
constant access to a labour force which is also keen to work in low pay conditions owing to 
the referred discrimination to which they are subject. When the pool of these workers does 
not cover the demand for labour, the contacts with their home country are activated. 
 
According to Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000), one of the reasons why sweatshops have 
re-emerged is precisely the availability of immigrant contractors and workers. The industry 
makes use of them since these entrepreneurs provide not only a large pool of cheap labour 
but also an extraordinary flexibility that allows the fashion industry, with strong 
fluctuations on demand, fast-changing fashion and two seasons of low activity, to reduce 
risks and rationalise their costs. The small structure of their business, the lack of 
registration of it and of their workers (that is, the very low fixed costs they have) allow 
them to use both their workers and their machines only when required by the contractors. 
Morokvasic (1987: 443) summarises these issues in a few sentences:  
 
for reasons pertaining to the structure of certain economic sectors and it’s congruence with 
immigrants’ predisposition, with their economic and other expectations, some immigrants tend 
to set up their businesses in those economic sectors where they are most likely to fill in a niche 
since the barriers to entry are low. Garments trade provides such an opportunity. 
 
The fact that workers in sweatshops are immigrants is a key aspect to understand the 
dynamics of a sweating system. The vulnerability of these workers in terms of the 
difficulties they have to access formal jobs, the urgency to keep working in order to make a 
living, and generally their lack of knowledge regarding the labour legislation that protects 
them (despite the informal relationship with their bosses, and sometimes despite their 
irregular migration status) is used by their bosses to push the pay and the working 
standards down. This situation is worse for those who are just arrived. “The insecurity of 
immigrant status among clothing workers is a crucial factor in keeping the whole sub-
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contracting system flexible as long as there are new waves of immigrants who have to start 
from scratch” (Morokvasic et al, 1987: 409). The way in which many of the workers arrive 
to the trade corresponds to what is known as ‘trafficking in humans’ (see chapter 2).  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Recent trends in the garment industry are highly pedagogical when it comes to analyse the 
ethics of Capitalism. Slaves from peripheral economies are sewing clothes for consumers 
in rich countries, both in their home countries or in ‘black holes’ in glamorous cities as 
Florence, Paris or New York. Scholars addressing sweatshops have repeatedly stated that 
“the apparel industry, as presently constituted, is exploitative at its core” (Bonacich and 
Appelbaum, 2000: 22). Furthermore, “in economic terms the apparel industry is amongst 
the world’s largest manufacturing industries and is among those very few industries where 
the extreme exploitation of vulnerable labour is central to the labour process and to the 
chain of profit making” (Ross, 2004: 12).  
 
The industry is at the forefront of the numerous changes experienced by the world-
economy since the 1970s. The response of its major players to international competitive 
pressures and to plummeting sales consisted mostly in transferring the risks and the costs 
to the workers through subcontracting, and in fostering a type of fashion business that, 
coupled with several other events (see below), ended up triggering the return of the 
sweatshop and the emergence of international sweatshops. In this sense, the spread of 
fashion marketing gave birth to a number of large clothing retailers that today base their 
businesses in an extremely flexible and cheap workforce. 
 
The apparel industry has managed to combine the latest ideas and technology for the rapid 
production and distribution of a highly diverse and continually changing product with the 
oppressive working conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, now 
coordinated in a global space (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000:14). 
 
Indeed, as I will argue in the next chapters in light of the findings of this research, the 
demands currently placed by fashion retailers to manufacturers can only be met by 
sweatshops. Certainly, without the availability of a large pool of completely flexible and 
cheap workers, the temporality that the commercial activity of retailers imposes on the 
physical production of clothing could never exist under such low prices. This is why 
commercial models like the ‘Zara model’ produce and reproduce sweatshops. 
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All these trends are possible because of the relaxation of state-control over the compliance 
of workers’ rights and to the lobby that these companies have carried over the design of 
international trade disciplines. On the one hand, after a period of protection of the domestic 
industrial firms in Europe and the US, the strategy was delocalisation to low-wage 
countries (of which in the view of Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye [1980] the German clothing 
firms were the precursors). On the other hand, the follow-up liberalisation aimed at 
increasing multinational retail and high-end fashion companies’ profits and power. But 
industrial production, mostly its workers, paid the price by either running out of business, 
by unemployment or by accepting lower labour standards. 
 
As a result of these developments, the redistribution of wealth within the production chain 
makes this industry surely the most unequal of all. In one of the corners successful CEOs 
announce delocalisation plans and rich stake-holders benefit by the use of forced labour in 
their companies. In the other corner, the reality is quite less rosy than the boardrooms of 
multinational companies driving the industry would suggest: according to the UK-based 
anti-sweatshop organisation Behind the Label, “of the $1,831 the average US family of 
four spent on apparel in 1999, only about $55 went to apparel production workers” (Pollin 
et al, 2001; cited in Behind the Label [no date]). 
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Chapter 4 
 
Methodology: Understanding neoliberalism through the 
study of sweatshops 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The methodology underpinning this research has been influenced by a number of important 
considerations. One key aspect is an explicit radical political ideology relating to a desire 
to make the research action-orientated and ‘do something’ about the contexts that I studied. 
Another objective was to further theoretical knowledge about sweatshops, and help 
understand the more structural mechanisms leading to their re-emergence in several 
countries. As such, the research drew on two key methods. The first is primary empirical 
research in the form of 98 semi-structured interviews drawn from two case studies: the 
City of Buenos Aires (Argentina) and the Province of Prato (Tuscany, Italy). The second 
method was desktop research including literature review, documentary analysis, media 
content and statistical data searches and analysis. It is the primary empirical data that 
constitutes the most important basis for the findings and conclusions developed in this 
thesis. Yet the combination of these two methods, for example, by threading key 
statements made by interviewees together with secondary sources, was also essential to 
understand the origin of the sweating systems in both Buenos Aires and Prato. In this 
sense, the information collected and analysed provided good quality material to respond to 
the research questions which formed the basis of this project:  
 
(a) how has clothing industry changed in Argentina and in Italy since 1980 in relation to 
investment, trade, production processes and employment?;  
 
(b) how have these changes affected workers?; 
 
(c) what are the main institutional influences on the shifts of the clothing industry as 
revealed by local realities (regional/local, national, supranational or international)? 
 
(d) What does the return of the sweatshop tell us about the workings of neoliberalism? 
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This chapter contains the description of my research methods while also exploring the 
analytical issues addressed in previous chapters. I start by discussing the political evolution 
of the project, referring to both my own personal history and context from which the 
research emerged. Next, I discuss my use of a case study approach, the ways in which I 
selected the cases and the case studies themselves. Following from this, I present the three 
key methods which produced the data for the research: qualitative interviews, secondary 
data desk research, and fieldwork. A description of the ways in which the data was 
analysed follows, and finally, I consider some of the limitations of the methodology used.  
 
2. Political methodology: arriving at the topic 
 
To begin with, it is important to be explicit that my own political stances and my personal 
background played a major role in the selection of both the topic of study itself and the 
cases selected. My interest in addressing the concrete problems faced by large groups of 
workers in order to try to explain the causes of their situation was a result of my personal 
history and political orientation. I was marked at an early age by my parents’ radical 
activism and by the experience of their (and mine) exile in Venezuela during the years of 
the dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983). The working-class status of my family surely 
fostered my own radicalism. This was partly because this status was largely caused by 
political events: my father’s undergraduate courses were suddenly interrupted when he had 
to leave the country under the threat of assassination by right-wing activists and police 
forces. For this reason he did not become an engineer as he had hoped, but instead 
remained a technician, posing major limitations to my family’s living standards. On the 
other hand, my parents overcame the fear that the generals and their supporters 
successfully installed in society in general, and – though without impositions – they 
fostered values in me which led me to engage in activism since my last years in high 
school (17 and 18 years old). The experience of the suffering of the exile that my parents 
transferred to me translated into political commitments towards not only resisting a return 
to open state violence, but also towards improving peoples’ life (including mine).  
 
In the early years of my undergraduate studies (1998-2002), Argentina underwent a 
political situation marked by a deep socio-economic crisis and by a level of grassroots 
mobilisation quite unusual for the years following the dictatorship. The university was hit 
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strongly by budget cuts and by repeated attempts to introduce tuition fees and to attack 
universities’ autonomy from the national government. University students made a big part 
of the popular unrest which had its zenith in 19th and 20th December, 2001, when the 
president was forced to resign by street demonstrations. In those years I was involved in 
University occupations and activism in defence of free education. In addition, it was also in 
those years that a continent-wide free trade agreement proposed by the US (the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas [FTAA]) started to be targeted by social movements and NGOs all 
around Latin America, who considered it as an imperialist project. My interest in these 
mobilisations led me to engage in the study of the FTAA. In those years I presented a 
number of papers on the issue in conferences, and together with a professor I gave talks in 
schools, street demonstrations, university occupations and SME organisations about it. 
This experience made me understand in concrete terms the importance of academic 
knowledge as a tool for political activism.  
 
When designing my PhD proposal, all these experiences marked my choice of questions 
and the problems I wanted to address. I was inclined to choose concrete social problems 
directly affecting disadvantaged people. Additionally, my study of the FTAA had led me to 
engage in the analysis of the trade disciplines of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
this became an important area of interest. Three year PhD research offered a good 
opportunity to finally develop an empirically informed analysis of structural influences 
over local and regional economies. As a result, the original plan of my PhD research was to 
assess (comparatively) the impact of the trade disciplines of the WTO over regional 
economies in peripheral and in core countries.  
 
During the first few months of my PhD I spent several weeks searching for a group of 
workers being negatively affected by processes and decisions taken in places beyond their 
localities, and whose case could be directly linked to policies launched by the WTO. 
However, a set of other actors and interests always ‘interfered’ between the local and the 
international – notably the national state. For example, the appalling situation of workers in 
the manufacturing plants in the harbour of Mar del Plata (Argentina) could be linked to the 
liberalisation of trade and the terms of the trade relationship with the European Union. 
However, the role of local entrepreneurs, as well as the role of the state in facilitating the 
participation of foreign companies in the local businesses, appeared as elements perhaps 
equally as important as the liberalisation of trade for understanding poor working 
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conditions in the factories. This is precisely when I came across a key methodological 
issue in geographical research, recently described by Peck and Theodore (2010) as follows: 
 
Since geographers, too, tend to privilege place-specific and context-rich accounts of 
local labour-market restructuring, their work necessarily raises the methodological 
question of how, most appropriately, to ‘read out’ from local circumstances to more 
general understandings of structural conditions and tendential processes. 
Understanding labour markets from the bottom up, in this sense, must extend beyond 
idiographic storytelling, to explore ways of placing local labour markets, both 
conceptually and politically. Local labour market and constitutive scales of labour 
regulation do not simply exist, as it were, ‘out there’: they are social constructions, 
made and remade by contending social forces and agents (:88; italics in original). 
 
This is to say that in the same way that local events cannot be understood solely as a direct 
result of international forces, cities should not be studied as bounded and closed. Instead, 
as Ward (2008: 407) has argued in the case of comparative urban research, “cities have to 
be theorised as open, embedded, and relational.” This means rejecting the uniqueness of 
place as the main focus for geographical research, and bearing in mind what Neil Smith 
(1987) has called “the dangers of the empirical turn.” Smith saw this turn in the late 1980s 
as a reaction against the overly structuralist Marxist accounts that dominated the discipline 
during the late 1970s and the early 1980s (“the stick is to be bent back” [Smith 1987: 60]). 
In his words, “as part of this methodological turn, research on restructuring has moved 
from a primary focus on the theoretical to an overwhelming concern for empirical research 
in hopes of gaining a much more detailed and sophisticated view of social, economic and 
geographical change” [Smith 1987: 60]). Focusing his critique on a specific ESRC-funded 
research project on the effects of economic and social restructuring in seven localities in 
England (the Changing Urban and Regional Systems project [CURS]), he pointed out that 
“the researchers are reluctant to generalise at all about the experience of restructuring, 
resulting in the impression that the project is primarily about the localities in and for 
themselves rather than an attempt to understand the dimensions of contemporary 
restructuring as revealed by the experience of these localities” (1987: 62). Rejecting the 
way in which this approach could be easily taken to the extreme of “empirical excesses”, 
he called for,  
 
an historical theory of geographical scale that will help us to order what at first glance may 
seem like irreconcilable empirical complexity. Such a theory of scale may allow us to alter our 
perspective ever so slightly and to see the pieces fall into place. This could make the difference 
between whether we interpret the empirical results of locality studies as evidence of uniqueness 
and complexity or whether the profiles of change in East Liverpool and Swindon, for example, 
should be interpreted explicitly in terms of the changing regionalisation of Britain or, and I 
suspect more accurately, the changing regionalisation of Europe (1987: 65). 
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When I became familiar with these ideas and with the subsequent development of the 
politics of scale literature (see Brenner, 1999; Peck, 2002; N. Smith, 1987, 1992, 
1993; Swyngedouw, 1997, 2000, 2010), my research project underwent major revisions. 
This challenging and interesting literature made me discard the study of the impacts of the 
WTO over local and regional economies, for this approach brings the attention of 
geographers and social scientists to the misdirected approach of studying a local or 
regional economy in light of the policies launched by one single institution acting at a 
specific geographical scale (in my case, the WTO). Instead, in the ‘politics of scale’ 
literature the adoption of a determinate scale as the locus of regional and local performance 
is rejected: “scale (at whatever level) is not and can never be the starting point for 
sociospatial theory (…) The theoretical and political priority never resides in a particular 
geographical scale, but rather in the process through which particular scales become 
(re)constituted” (Swyngedouw, 1997: 141). In this sense, these authors bring attention to 
the necessity of understanding how scales are constructed, i.e. to think about how and why 
the responsibility for certain political decisions relies on institutions and actors operating at 
different scales. Political decisions, interests and strategies are necessarily scaled, and there 
are reasons why they rely on, for example, the national state rather than in international, 
supranational or local/regional institutions – or vice versa. The multiple interconnected 
processes determining these events are dynamic, constantly shifting and deeply political. 
Addressing the processes themselves is what brings light into identifying each actor’s 
interests and responsibilities, as well as their respective strategies. In Neil Smith’s words, 
this approach helps to locate “[the] power that needs to be talked back to, challenged, or 
transformed” (2005: 894).  
 
3. Case study research 
 
Everything is unique, but that really does not tell us very much. 
(N. Smith, 1987: 67) 
 
The literature described above shaped to a great extent the methodological approach of this 
research, particularly in choosing to use a case study approach, but also in the selection of 
the specific cases. According to Yin (1984: 23; quoted in McGrath, 2010: 67) a case study 
is “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
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and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” For this research, influenced by a 
desire to engage in political research, the priority was to look for “place-specific and 
context-rich accounts of labour market restructuring” (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 88).  
 
3.1. Selection of case studies 
 
In order to address the research questions, two case studies have been examined: the City 
of Buenos Aires (Argentina) and the Province of Prato (Tuscany, Italy).  For the selection 
of the case studies I followed a number of criteria. Firstly, I sought to examine situations in 
which a significant number of workers were subject to dire working conditions and in 
which the research could make a political intervention. I planned to use the research as an 
opportunity to help to stop such abuses by developing explanations, resources and training 
not generally available to workers and their organisations. Secondly, it was my intention to 
look for cases where explanations required – at least at first sight – looking at processes 
and mechanisms with multiscalar implications and with a high relevance for the workings 
of neoliberalism. This was in order to understand the myriad processes, regulations and 
interests that determine the situation seen by the fieldworker. This was also in order to 
avoid falling into a thorough empirical description that would not be useful beyond these 
particular realities. In order to ask myself “what contextual factors matter most” 
(McFarlane, 2010), it was essential to look for “context-rich” cases (Peck and Theodore, 
2010: 88). In other words, my objective here was to further theoretical knowledge about 
sweatshops, and help understand the more structural mechanisms that are leading to their 
re-emergence in several countries. The case studies therefore had to suit these purposes. 
 
The first case that arose as a potentially adequate study was that of the existence of 
thousands of sweatshops in Buenos Aires, in which thousands of Bolivian citizens are 
subjected to extreme labour violations. On the one hand, the fire in a sweatshop in Buenos 
Aires in March 2006 (see chapter 1) had remained in my thoughts as a possible case study 
precisely due to my will to ‘do something about it.’ The selection of a second case study in 
a core economy was “information oriented” (Flyvbjerg, 2006; quoted in McGrath, 2010: 
70). The first priority when looking at a potential case study was to find a case which 
would allow a comparison with the sweating system in Argentina; indeed, I actively 
searched for sweatshops in Europe. The second priority was to find a “context-rich” case, 
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in terms of its multiscalar implications. Through consultation with an Italian geographer42 I 
came to know the case of Prato, one of the largest Industrial Districts of the ‘Third Italy’, 
in which the textile industry was – is – being strongly affected by trade liberalisation. Prato 
was witnessing, at the same time, the development of a sweating system, largely taking 
place, as in the case of Buenos Aires, within a large migrant community. Combined with 
the accessibility of the language (Italian is similar to my mother tongue – Spanish), the 
case of the sweating system in Prato suited my interest in developing a comparative 
research. This case appeared as a suitable one for the comparative approach I was seeking 
to adopt. The lack of previous academic research in both locations encouraged me to take 
on these cases, as it increased the relevance of my own work. 
 
3.2. How and why this is a comparative research? 
 
This research analysis one single phenomenon (the emergence of sweating systems) in two 
locations and in the context of an ongoing neoliberalisation in international political 
economy. The variables studied in both cases are similar: the problems affecting local 
entrepreneurs, the role of the institutional arrangements related to these matters, the 
responses from the workers (or the lack of these), and so on. As stated below, the same 
interview questionnaire was used in both cases.  
 
The decision to carry out a second case study was linked to the potentialities of comparing 
economic phenomena between a peripheral country and a core country. In line with the 
need for finding a balance between, on the one hand, the complexities and specificities of 
the local and, on the other hand, the theoretical relevance of my empirical inquiry, the 
comparative analysis of this research is intended to “learn from experiences in different 
kinds of places” (Robinson, 2006; quoted in McFarlane, 2010: 4). In this sense, my 
concern was similar to Neil Smith’s advice regarding the “dangers” of the CURS project 
referred to above: “if the comparability of results between the different localities is not 
stressed, the danger is that the CURS project will do little more than repeat the empiricist 
locality studies of an earlier generation which deliberately examined individual places for 
their own sake, and not attempt to draw out theoretical or historical conclusions” (1987: 
62). Quite the contrary, my interest in adopting a comparative approach was to understand 
comparison as “a mode of thought”, as “a strategy firstly for revealing the assumptions, 
                                                 
42 Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro. 
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limits and distinctiveness of particular theoretical or empirical claims, and secondly for 
formulating new lines of inquiry and more situated accounts” (McFarlane, 2010: 2).  
 
Ragin (1987, quoted in Ward, 2008: 473) states that “virtually all empirical social research 
involves comparison of some sort”, at least because the comparison of what the researcher 
witnesses in the field and what s/he has in mind as ‘the way it should be’ occurs almost 
automatically. In this research I make this comparative dimension explicit in the search for 
providing a stronger contribution to the methodological, practical and typological 
dimensions of comparison (McFarlane, 2010: 6). 
 
As pointed out by McFarlane (2010: 6), comparative research “is driven by research 
objectives and deployed for a variety of reasons: in order to fill a gap in understanding; to 
reveal the distinctiveness of a case; to place a case in a broader context; or to reveal the 
generality or particularity of a process or theme.” The latter of these objectives, i.e. the 
relationship between distinctiveness and similarities among cases, lies at the heart of this 
research, and is a key issue in the literature on comparative research in social sciences 
(Ward, 2008). Starting from these varied relationships between observation and theory, 
Tilly (1984: 81-2) developed an influential typology of comparative research, identifying 
four main types of comparison: individualising, universalising, variation-finding and 
encompassing. The first two are at the opposite extremes: whereas a “pure individualising 
comparison treats each case as unique (…) minimising its common properties with other 
instances” as “a means of grasping the peculiarities of each case, a “pure universalising 
comparison (…) identifies common properties among all instances of a phenomenon”, 
aiming at “[establishing] that every instance of a phenomenon follows essentially the same 
rule” (Tilly, 1984: 81-2). Within these two extremes lie the other two types: variation-
finding and encompassing comparisons. The former aims to finding “a principle of 
variation in the character or intensity of a phenomenon by examining systematic 
differences among instances”. The later, instead, “places instances at various locations 
within the same system, on the way of explaining their characteristics as a function of their 
varying relationships to the system as a whole.”  
 
It is rather a universalising type of comparison that underpins this research. The intention 
here was to “explain commonalities across contexts” (McFarlane, 2010: 7) in order to 
understand the restructuring of clothing production globally and its consequences over 
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workers. However, the four types of comparison outlined by Tilly are not mutually 
exclusive, and this research has also drawn on encompassing comparisons, for sweatshops 
in Buenos Aires and Prato (“instances at various locations”) analysed in the context of an 
ongoing neoliberalisation (the “system”) are a result of the varied ways in which Argentina 
and Italy have been affected by (and have responded to) neoliberalism. Paying attention to 
these matters is necessary in order to avoid “the methodological dangers of 
overgeneralising from one or a few examples” (Amin and Graham, 1997; quoted in 
McFarlane, 2010: 5). In other words, “comparison-as-learning” (McFarlane, 2010: 7) was 
essential to understand the restructuring of clothing production and to assess the scope and 
adequacies – or inadequacies – of the generalisations at which I arrived.  
 
One interesting way of looking at the adequacy of a certain methodological approach is to 
imagine what would the results of the research be had a different methodology been used. 
This strategy renders more evident the fact that conducting only one thoroughly detailed 
case study would have not provided enough and good quality material to respond to the 
questions of this research. For example, the case of Prato helped improve and better 
contextualise the findings in Buenos Aires: the strategies of doing fashion businesses 
adopted by Argentinean clothing companies in the early 1990s (which fostered to a large 
extent the development of the sweating system) are those actually developed by Italian 
fashion firms in the late 1970s. Henceforth, while the impact of cheap imports from SE 
Asian countries in Argentina’s clothing market (which led companies to cut labour costs) 
was pointed out by many interviewees as the main reason for the expansion of the sweating 
system, the case of Prato revealed the importance of time and proximity of the 
manufacturing places to the markets, which affects the competitiveness of imports in 
relation to the availability of cheap local subcontractors. Because the importance of 
producing locally is more evident in Italy, this helped to see the limits to cheap imports as 
the main reason for the emergence of sweatshops in Argentina. Meanwhile, because in 
Buenos Aires I had better access to workers themselves and to former sweatshop workers, 
the findings there helped understand the reasons why workers stay in the sweatshops 
despite the dire working and living conditions. This contributed to see similar 
developments in Prato – as revealed in interviews with labour inspectors – and 
compensated for the lack of access to sweatshop workers in this case.  
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More broadly, the comparative approach helped confirm that the forms of state regulation 
of working conditions are different in a European than in a Latin American country. The 
same goes for the policies towards domestic industrial production. Besides, the different 
trade partners and the level of dependence on exports in one country and the other can be 
expected to be different; the comparison helped to assess the importance of the foreign 
sector for the restructuration of the clothing industry in each place.  
 
This said, the similarities found in both cases (e.g. the state’s attitude of ‘letting it happen’, 
the widespread use of subcontracting, and the lack of involvement of workers’ unions in 
the struggle against sweatshops) are very important, and illustrate the strong links between 
neoliberalism and the emergence – or re-emergence in some cities – of sweating systems. 
Indeed, this is in itself revealing, and would have not been amongst the findings of this 
research had I not adopted a comparative methodology. 
 
 
4. Selection of Methods 
 
4.1. Qualitative interviews 
 
In recent decades geographical research has moved towards an increasing use of 
ethnographic methods – typical in anthropological research – to the detriment of the 
quantitative methods generally used in sociology (Crang, 2005: 228). Geographers use 
“more plural practices of qualitative methods” than both anthropologists and sociologists 
(Crang, 2005: 228). Within my research, I discarded both the use of participant observation 
and quantitative approaches. The level of detail that participant observation would have 
provided was not necessary – and therefore not worthwhile – for understanding the effects 
of recent changes in the organisation of production of clothing, the political environment 
and the social regulation of the labour markets. On the other hand, it was very unlikely (if 
not impossible) to gain access to living in a sweatshop or at least to work in one of these 
for a long period. Here my positionality played a major role: if I were a Bolivian citizen in 
Buenos Aires, or a Chinese citizen in Prato, I could have attempted to work in a sweatshop 
(though hiding my real interest to my employee, which would rise ethical concerns) with at 
least some degree of success.  
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Far from seeking to develop a description of how clothing production is organised 
worldwide, or at changes in, for example, the origin and destiny of clothing trade flows 
before and after the liberalisation of trade, the research project and questions intended to 
address the daily experience of entrepreneurs and workers, in order to develop a more in 
depth view. According to Peck and Theodore (2010: 89), this is a usual “take on the labour 
markets” in geographical research: “the kinds of questions geographers pose tend to be 
concerned with the daily grind – the lived experience of labour markets”. Certainly, to 
know how workers have seen their working standards change, or how entrepreneurs faced 
particular problems and why they did so in the way they did, I needed to engage with them. 
The importance of this was compounded further still when faced with the limited literature 
on the issue. In the same vein, since these issues involve political developments in the 
regulatory arenas, it was also necessary to talk to officials. It is true that changing labour 
legislation can be tracked in official sources. However, my objective was to understand the 
political reasons for these changes, in order to provide explanations about how the events 
identified in the field (or even through media contents) are linked to certain political or 
economic decisions. Besides, institutional influences can adopt several forms (ranging 
from the most subtle to the most explicit) and are exercised and enforced beyond the 
papers; these issues must be searched for in the ground. In the same fashion as Okely 
(1994: 26) has argued, “my analysis was intended to demonstrate the underlying principles 
rather than any quantitative information”, and for that I needed to “[talk] to people” (Cloke 
et al, 2004). 
 
As a result of this need to engage with actors in the field and understand their particular 
experiences and perspectives, combined with the inappropriateness of participant 
observation, qualitative interviewing offered the best method of enquiry. Interviews can be 
considered as “conversation(s) with a purpose” (Webb and Webb, 1932; quoted in Cloke et 
al 2004: 149), and they are essential to have “an authentic insight into people’s 
experiences” (Silverman, 1993: 91; quoted in Cloke et al 2004: 149) (see discussion 
below).  
 
4.2. Literature and data search  
 
In addition to qualitative interviews and in order to supplement them, I also undertook a 
wide reaching literature and data search, using a broad range of sources. Firstly, Durham 
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University’s Library has been my main source of academic literature, including its 
subscription to academic journals and international catalogues like Worldcat, which have 
been helpful in identifying useful material. Also, some books borrowed from the British 
Library, the Library of the Congress in Buenos Aires, and the National Library in Florence 
were very important. In doing so, I ensured that the literature was not only drawn from one 
area, context or language. Secondly, the internet was a main source of all kinds of 
information, mostly for media contents, but including as well statistical information from 
the websites of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United 
Nations Development Program, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and the International Labor Organization. Finally, statistical data was also 
collected in visits to the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) in Argentina, 
and the Istituto per la Programmazione Ecconomica Toscana (IRPET) in Florence.  
 
The research literature review and other documentary research comprised mostly five 
broad categories: (a) writings on neoliberalism (both critics and think-tanks); (b) academic 
literature on sweatshops and the transformations suffered by the garment industry during 
recent decades worldwide; (c) material on the recent economic history of Argentina and 
Italy; (d) literature on each of the case studies; and (e) literature on qualitative research in 
Social Sciences. These are analysed below. 
 
(a) For the preparation of the broader international political economic context (chapter 2), I 
have relied chiefly upon Marxian approaches to political economy (using Harvey, 1989, 
2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2010a, 2010b; Jessop, 1993, 2002, 2003; Merrifield, 2000; Peck 
and Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw, 1997, 2000; and others). The class struggle analysis also 
facilitated the comparison between both cases (chapter 7) since it is my understanding that 
the main issue connecting both cases is the exploitation of labour by entrepreneurs. In 
addition, the historical materialist approach was very helpful in framing the results of the 
case studies into the adequate historical and geographical contexts, and in helping to 
understand the importance of the inputs of this research in terms of the broader debates on 
sweatshops, neoliberalism and capitalism (chapters 7 and 8).  
 
(b) The arguments put forward in the chapter dedicated to the analysis of the garment 
industry (chapter 3) are mostly based on the writings of Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000); 
Green (1997); Morokvasic (1986); Morokvasic, Phizacklea and Rudolph (1987); 
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Phizacklea (1990); Andrew Ross (1997); and Robert Ross (2004). All of these writings 
deal with the issue of clothing sweatshops and migrant labour.  
 
(c) For the purposes of setting the temporal and spatial context in which sweatshops 
develop in both the cases addressed in here, I have used writings on the most important 
shifts in political economy in Argentina and in Italy since the 1970s, focusing especially in 
the impacts that these changes have had for the well being of the working classes 
(Basualdo and Arceo, 2006; Ginsborg, 1994; Moroni and Balestrini, 1988). 
 
(d) Academic work on sweatshops in Buenos Aires and Prato is scarce, perhaps owing to 
the illegal and obscure mechanisms that characterise it, which may have kept it away from 
academic research and kept researchers at a distance. Only a few reports involving no more 
than two months of fieldwork have been written in both cases. I have contacted the authors 
of some of these reports to gain access to further information, and to discuss the issue –and 
my research – with them. In the case of Buenos Aires, a short book “Esclavos” (Slaves, in 
the masculine) about the sweating system in Buenos Aires was recently published 
(Lieutier, 2010). I have interviewed the author twice, and I have stayed in contact with him 
throughout the preparation of this thesis. There is also limited literature relating to the 
Prato case. There is only one book and two long reports on Chinese immigration into the 
Province of Prato (Ceccagno, 2003, 2007; Monash University, 2008) and a recent book 
about the sweating system, edited by the economics newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore (the 
newspaper of the national industrial confederation Confindustria) and supported by the 
Unione Industriale Pratese (Pieraccini, 2008). I have interviewed both authors. 
 
(e) Literature on qualitative research in Social Sciences was mostly for preparation of the 
research plan and also in the latest stages of the writing, to reflect on the methodology and 
fieldwork experiences. This literature was fundamental to understand the strengths and 
limitations of the diverse methodological options available and to balance them in the 
process of selecting the methodology. Retrospectively assessing the findings, using this 
literature, also helped to identify both the findings and the limitations of my research, and 
their connections to the methods used (see discussion below).  
 
The search for media content was similar for each case study. In both cases I used the 
search engine of the main national newspapers (introducing words similar to ‘sweatshop’). 
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In Argentina, La Nación, Clarín and Página/12 were the most used, whereas in Italy I used 
mostly Corriere della Sera, La Nazione and La Repubblica. In the case of Buenos Aires I 
also used the newspaper archive (in hard copies) of La Alameda. For the preparation of the 
broader thesis I used search engines such as Google, checking the links of those relevant 
sources like major newspapers, magazines and TV channels (e.g. Business Week, Financial 
Times, The Economist, The New York Times, Der Spiegel, RAI, BBC) and saving the most 
relevant notes and articles (such as those on labour reforms, international political 
economy analysis, economic crises, sweatshops and other labour abuses in general, etc.). 
Since access to the sweatshops themselves is difficult, this kind of information was very 
helpful for the empirical research – notably for the case of Prato – particularly to 
understand the role that sweatshops fulfil in the chain, their activities and the working and 
living conditions that constitute them. In the case of Buenos Aires, media reports were also 
of great help; for example, newspapers provided information on the potential informants to 
be targeted for the interviews. However, access to sweatshops’ owners and to former 
sweatshop workers was gained only in the case of Buenos Aires, through contacts provided 
by La Alameda and the National Institute of Industrial Technology. 
 
A challenge in undertaking the literature review and data search was the fact that this 
research is based on the study of phenomena that is organised under a principle of 
maintaining the majority of the activities in clandestine conditions. This affects the 
availability of good quality statistics. Mostly official information, while not necessarily of 
good quality, was used, and, where indicated, counter checked with other – mostly 
informal – sources. 
 
4.3. Fieldwork 
 
One year of fieldwork was conducted with six months spent in each location: October 2007 
to March 2008 in Buenos Aires, and April to September 2008 in Prato. Fieldwork was 
fully carried in the language of both locations, which means that this research involved 
three languages for its preparation (English, Spanish and Italian).  
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Source: CIA World Factbook, 2010 
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In total, 91 semi-structured interviews with key actors and 7 other interviews with 
academics were conducted during fieldwork: 56 of them in Buenos Aires, 40 in Prato, 1 in 
the UK (the latter being an academic in Durham University working on human trafficking 
issues) and 1 in Spain (a shareholder and manager of Inditex/Zara). In addition to 
government officials, people from all levels and areas of the industry were interviewed: 
manufacturers; retailers; intermediary agencies; sweatshop’s owners; small shoppers; 
designers and heads of apparel design schools; registered workers; former sweatshop 
workers; and union leaders. As is shown in Table 1 below, I organised the interviewees 
into five categories depending on their role: officials; entrepreneurs; union leaders; 
workers; and workshop’s owners. All interviewees have been anonymised (see Appendix I 
for a list of interviewees). 
 
Table 4.1. Interviewees by category in each case study 
 
CATEGORY BUENOS AIRES PRATO OTHER TOTAL 
Officials 17 11 - 28 
Entrepreneurs 13 13 1 27 
Union representatives 9 8 - 17 
Workers 12 3 - 15 
Workshop’s owners 4 - - 4 
Academics 1 5 1 7 
TOTAL 56 40 2 98 
 
 
The number of interviews conducted resulted from the balance between the time 
constraints and the advantages that could be gained by continuing with them. In the last 
interviews with entrepreneurs in Buenos Aires, responses began to be repeated (for 
example, the issue of the impact of cheap imported garment into the domestic market, the 
lack of state support to SMEs, and the allegedly ‘cultural’ character of sweatshop labour 
arose almost invariably). The same happened with officials from the City Council and the 
Tuscany Region (in this case, the allegedly cultural nature of sweatshop labour, and the 
mafia-like modus operandi of sweatshop entrepreneurs, were constantly pointed out by 
these officials). Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that I did not succeed in interviewing 
officials in the national ministries of Labour and Economy in Italy, mostly due to time 
constraints (it necessitated travelling to Rome and arranging a number of interviews in one 
or two days, for which there was neither time nor financial resources). 
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Interviewees were contacted through the technique of snowballing, which is “a method of 
gathering data from a small sample population” (Bridges, 2008), and is as well a very 
simple, economical, efficient, effective and informal way of drawing on relevant 
respondents to address research questions (Davies, 2007; cited in Bridges, 2008). This is 
particularly effective when working in areas of sensitive research and particularly areas of 
social life that are somewhat ‘underground’. Workers were contacted by means of trade 
unions and, in Buenos Aires, through La Alameda, which provided invaluable other 
contacts and information. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs were mainly contacted by means of 
the entrepreneurial associations and public officials. However, snowballing was not the 
only technique used to contact interviewees: some entrepreneurs were chosen from lists 
found on the internet and contacted directly, and officials in general were directly 
contacted having found their contact details in public offices.  
 
Interviews were between 30 and 60 minutes long, and were semi-structured. Apart from 
the interviews with academics, for which I prepared specific questions, a semi-structured 
questionnaire with a fixed set of questions was used. One questionnaire adapted for each 
respective category was used, using the same questionnaire both in Buenos Aires and in 
Prato to enable comparisons (see appendix II for sample questionnaires). These questions 
were not closed, and were rather aimed at framing the conversation, leaving space for 
issues that I had not previously identified as important to be developed as the interview 
flowed. It is interesting to recall here the “types of social situation commonly encountered 
in human geography” when conducting qualitative research, identified by Cloke et al 
(2004: 127). One of these is precisely the “interactive relationships”, typical of semi-
structured face-to-face questionnaires like those I conducted. In these,  
 
data are co-constructed as interviewer and interviewee work their way through questions that 
begin as the ‘property’ of the researcher but which become co-owned and co-shaped in the 
unfolding interactivity of questioning, answering, listening and conversing. Here, the original 
scheme of intended data construction can be diverted or even subverted by both the researcher 
and the researched… (Cloke et al 2004: 129).  
 
When conducting the interviews, interviewing skills played a crucial role. It was necessary 
to “ask follow-up questions in such a way as both to encourage and to critically question 
the stories told” (Cook and Crang, 1995: 43). However, Cook and Crang (1995: 37) also 
advise the interviewer that it is important to “[ask] questions which you believe are 
important to your project, but which may prove difficult, awkward or embarrassing to your 
interviewees, in a manner which [does] not offend them.” I certainly encountered such 
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situations, perhaps the clearest example of which was the interview with the head of the 
clothing chamber in Buenos Aires. In the interview I had to ask him about the 
generalisation of the use of sweatshops as a main production practice by companies. In 
order to avoid offending him and not to create a situation which would somehow ruin the 
fluid conversation, I contrasted his viewpoint with statements made by other interviewees, 
like members of La Alameda. The same strategy was used for union representatives: when 
a member of the Unión de Cortadores de la Indumentaria in Buenos Aires (Esteban, 
23/1/08) assured me that entrepreneurs are unnecessarily tough in the negotiations on the 
bargaining contracts, I reminded him of the fact that they usually quote the cheap imports 
from China as a reason to keep salaries low. Another example arose when a member of La 
Alameda told me that their public campaigns against brands for the use of sweatshops were 
seriously affecting them, and I quoted an entrepreneur as saying that “nothing happens 
with those campaigns, after a couple of days people forget and it all goes on as usual” 
(Natalia, interviewed on 6/2/08). This allowed the member of La Alameda to recognise that 
the struggle against sweatshops is a long and hard process, full of difficulties, which 
depends on the general political environment as well and which “may require a whole 
generation” (interview with Gustavo, 8/10/08). 
 
The large majority of the interviews were not recorded. This was due to ethical and 
practical concerns relating to the widespread nature of illegal practices in the sector. If a 
recording device had been used, it may have been difficult to get relevant information from 
the interviewees who would have been suspicious of recording devices. A few interviews 
were recorded, including the first five interviews in Italy and those with interviewees with 
whom I had enough confidence to speak freely (such as some union leaders). Statements 
copied from these recordings are duly indicated as ‘sic’. Conversely, in the case of the 
interviews not recorded I made long notes during the interviews, recording immediately 
afterwards what I heard, including certain details such as expressions or tones of voice, 
which I had highlighted in my notes and which I found (immediately or potentially) 
revealing. No relevant information is likely to be missing from these records, although if a 
few details are missing, the gains by making the interviewee feel more confident without a 
recording device largely outweigh any possible missing information.43 
 
                                                 
43 It happened several times that before making some statements interviewees asked me to make sure I did 
not quote them, mainly when they talked about others. Furthermore, four interviewees asked several times 
whether I was recording, despite the fact that I had made clear I was not recording. This reflects the level of 
concern that interviewees felt. 
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5. Data analysis 
 
In her description of her research methods on the study of gypsies, Okely (1994) compares 
the typically quantitative research methods used in sociology with the qualitative methods 
used by anthropologists. She points out that the organisation and analysis of qualitative 
data differs to a great extent from the processing of large amounts of quantitative 
information. The very process of organising and interpreting the several sources and types 
of information that account for the pool of data collected by the ethnographer is “a creative 
experience” (Okely, 1994: 32). She states that “after fieldwork, the material found in 
notebooks, in transcripts and even in contemporary written sources is only a guide and 
trigger” (Okely, 1994: 21). From there on, the researcher does not organise the results of 
his fieldwork in the form of coded statements or numbers under pre-set categories. Rather, 
these categories or dominant themes emerge through a holistic process of organisation and 
interpretation of the material, as well as during the writing process. Indeed, the stages of 
organisation and interpretation of material, and the writing process, cannot be clearly 
separated: “writing and analysis comprise a movement between the tangible and intangible, 
between the cerebral and sensual, between the visible and invisible. Interpretation moves 
from evidence to ideas and theory, then back again” (Okely 1994: 32). As the researcher 
progresses with the reading of secondary sources and with the transcription of his or her 
interviews, clues, ideas and evidence emerge in an uncontrolled way, and since those ideas 
need to take a specific shape and be adequately supported by evidence in the final text, 
they change or are discarded during the writing. For example, in my case I did have a pre-
set number of questions for the interviews and certain broadly conceived and preliminary 
headings, but the final dominant themes of each chapter arose as I was transcribing the 
interviews and then writing, emerging from the data itself. Okely summarises these 
experiences commonly faced by the ethnographer: 
 
Both during the fieldwork and after, themes gradually emerge. Patterns and priorities impose 
themselves upon the ethnographer. Voices and ideas are neither muffled nor dismissed. To the 
professional positivist this seems like a chaos. The voices and material lead the researcher in 
unpredictable, uncontrollable direction. This is indeed not a controlled experiment. The 
fieldworker cannot separate the act of gathering material from that of its continuing 
interpretation. Ideas and hunches emerge during the encounter and are explored or eventually 
discarded as fieldwork progresses. Writing up involves a similar experience (1994: 20-1). 
 
For the research presented here, the information from each of the case studies has been 
organised into two separate chapters. All of the information from the interviews was 
transcribed to Word documents. The preliminary criteria to categorise this information was 
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based on the original questions of my research plan (see chapter 1). Once dominant themes 
took a certain shape, the statements were coded under these specific categories. Table 2 
shows the categories for each of the case studies.  
 
Table 4.2. Categories of the information from the interviews 
 
Buenos Aires Prato 
Origin of the sweating system Origin of the sweating system 
Context and reasons for the emergence of a sweating 
system in Buenos Aires 
Context and reasons for the emergence of a sweating 
system in Prato 
Working standards in the formal sector  Working standards in the formal sector 
Characteristics of the sweating system Characteristics of the sweating system 
Issues concerning the Bolivian community and 
human trafficking 
Issues concerning the Chinese community and 
human trafficking 
Who benefits from this phenomenon? Who benefits from this phenomenon? 
Who loses with this phenomenon? Who loses with this phenomenon? 
Quotes illustrating the point of view of each category 
of actors 
Quotes illustrating the point of view of each category 
of actors 
Responsibilities for the sweatshop crisis Responsibilities for the sweatshop crisis 
What to do? What to do? 
 Causes for the crisis of the district 
 
 
During the coding process, I identified the most relevant statements of my interviewees 
and sorted them by quotes under the appropriate dominant themes as highlighted in Table 
2. Similarly, I organised the information from the literature review, newspapers and 
official reports according to these categories as well. Next, under each category or 
dominant theme, and through a careful selection process, I have drawn together in a Word 
file the key material from interviews with participants, the literature review, newspapers, 
official reports and other documentation as appropriate to help with either the 
contextualisation of the case studies or with the analysis of empirical data. The careful 
organisation of the information along these lines simplified the writing process and helped 
to ensure that answers to address the original research questions have been represented. 
 
6. Key limitations, and how they were handled 
 
Studying an economic activity that is mostly carried out beyond the law has major 
consequences for the researcher; for example it is particularly difficult to contact actors 
such as workers and sweatshop entrepreneurs. This is even more the case when it comes to 
analysing circuits managed by a handful of powerful individuals that often have strong ties 
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to state officials and prominent entrepreneurs. As noted by Rainnie in his study of clothing 
SMEs in the North East of England, “gaining access to small firms is intensely difficult at 
the best of times” (1985: 217).  
 
Conducting fieldwork for the study of illegal activities like sweatshop economies cannot be 
expected to be as smooth and controlled as the researcher may desire. Beyond the 
problems I faced on the ground, the way in which the political context shaped my research 
has deeply political implications. In Buenos Aires, the existence of an active social 
movement with experienced activists and with a thorough ground-work helped me gain 
access to background information on some of the illegal mechanisms that lay behind the 
functioning of the sweating system. This contributed to a better understanding of the role 
of the state in the ground, i.e. the everyday practices of the state. Conversely, this was not 
the case of Prato, where regrettably I have to acknowledge that the information that I 
collected is of a poor quality to analyse whether state representatives (and/or political 
parties) have an interest in ‘letting the sweating system grow.’ Put simply, I did not have 
enough confidence with my interviewees to ask them whether there exist officers who are 
involved in the business of the sweating system. This speaks of the importance of active 
political mobilisation for enhancing the understanding of the researcher: if academic work 
can contribute to struggles for social justice, the existence of groups of activists resisting in 
the ground is an important tool that the researcher should not discard under unnecessarily 
extreme ethical concerns. If the critical spirit of academic research is respected when 
analysing the adequacy of material provided by activists, and if the compromises of the 
researcher are duly indicated to interviewees and funding institutions, there is no conflict in 
having informal meetings with activists and in participating in their informative activities 
beyond work time. Indeed, the argument here is that this contributes to the fieldworker’s 
experience in ways that differ from solely interviewing. 
 
The intense difficulties of engaging in the study of economies largely based on small 
companies and on strategies that avoid the legal channels, may explain for the most part 
the lack of academic research for the case studies prior to the undertaking of this thesis. As 
stated above, in addition to engagement and involvement in social movements around 
sweatshops, media reports and secondary data sources have been very useful to overcome 
these difficulties. They provided valuable information to understand the logics of the 
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sweating system today, the strategies of the actors involved, and how they work and for 
whom.  
 
No researcher is exempted from complications of this nature. Indeed, they “must, like a 
surrealist, be disponible (cf. Breton, 1973), and open to object trouvés, after arriving in the 
field” (Okely, 1994: 19; italics in original). My experience is that in the case of Prato I had 
to face a series of limitations which I did not expect. On the one hand, a media report on 
sweatshops in the city was broadcasted in national TV the day after I arrived into the city.44 
This led sweatshop entrepreneurs and institutions possibly linked to the sweatshop 
economy to decline to give interviews. I contacted one Italian-Chinese commerce 
organisation and four Chinese citizens whom I had been told were clothing entrepreneurs, 
but the five of them refused to participate in an interview. The limited help provided by 
entrepreneurial associations to contact their associates was another key constraint; they all 
contributed with long interviews and contacted me with a few Italian associates, but none 
of them contacted me with their Chinese associates.45 As a result I did not have access to 
any sweatshop owners and workers.46 
 
The different political context in which I carried out my fieldwork also had major 
implications for the results of this research. In Buenos Aires the existence of a strong social 
movement combating sweatshops – which itself resulted from the political unrest in the 
early 2000s – helped me gain a better understanding of the workings of the sweating 
system and the role of the state. On the contrary, escalating racist discourses in Italy made 
it difficult to get thoroughly analytical material from a few interviewees who pretended to 
justify their viewpoints simply by blaming “the Chinese” in a broad sense (notably union 
representatives).  
 
The limitations that either arose after arriving in the field or those imposed by the general 
context in which I had to carry out my empirical research, greatly shaped the results 
presented here. Yet it is worth noting that despite these constraints, this is the first 
academic research involving significant levels of fieldwork and access into the issue. In 
                                                 
44 It was the second report in four months. This time, it had had a stronger repercussion in other national 
media. 
45 Indeed one of them assured me that they did not have any Chinese associates, but one interviewee 
(Antonella, interviewed on 29/9/08) revealed to me that both the artisan associations have between 30 and 70 
of them. 
46 The trade unions assured me that they had neither sweatshop nor Chinese workers. 
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this sense, I hope this research entails a first step towards understanding sweatshops in 
Italy – particularly in Prato – and in Argentina as well as its wider processes and 
consequences in distant places across the world.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have stressed the importance that my political background had in the 
selection of the topic, the methods and the case studies themselves. The methodology for 
this project was acutely shaped by an interest in addressing realities which could have 
relevance beyond their specific empirical, limited detail. In this sense, I hope that this 
research on sweatshops in Europe and Latin America can throw light on workers’ 
anticapitalist struggles, and to broader academic debates on labour market restructuring. 
Indeed, as Castree (2007, 2010) has noted, further empirical and theoretical inquiry on 
informal labour and on the forms of state regulation of labour markets are needed for the 
“work in progress” that constitute labour geographies.  
 
The methodology detailed in this chapter proved highly adequate for its purposes, 
producing a large body of new empirical data. Many of the main findings can be directly 
linked to the data collected during the empirical research. In addition, the desktop search 
was fundamental for understanding the causes of the sweatshop crisis that lie beyond 
institutions, entrepreneurs and workers acting in the local and/or national in Buenos Aires 
and in Prato, as well as it helps to situate the empirical findings in the context of broader 
political economic trends, and in the context of theoretical debates on sweatshops and the 
shifting spatial divisions of labour of the clothing industry. 
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Chapter 5 
Sweatshops in Buenos Aires: 
The tango of garment workers 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Clothing and textiles production is the third largest manufacturing sector in the City of 
Buenos Aires, representing 15.5 percent of total production (CEDEM, 2007). In Argentina, 
clothing production is overwhelmingly situated in the Province and in the City of Buenos 
Aires; in 1993, they together represented 80 percent of the total number of firms nation-
wide (INDEC, 1994). The majority of these firms are informal; official statistics from the 
Minister of Labour (2008) state that informality in clothing manufacture accounts for 75 
percent of total production, a fact acknowledged by the main clothing chamber (CIAI). 
Indeed, a large portion of the garment sold in the country is produced in sweatshops 
managed by a handful of Bolivian citizens working for domestic and international brands. 
In 2006 the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) recognised this reality: 
“the accident in a clandestine workshop in [Viale] where six undocumented Bolivian 
workers died and who were not paid social security or pension benefits, unveiled a 
clandestine chain of workshops that worked for renowned brands and employed more than 
30,000 people, who generally lived and ate in bad conditions” (:320).  
 
The declarations from workers quoted by Lieutier (2010) in his book on slavery in Buenos 
Aires, as well as the cases of the four former sweatshop workers that I interviewed, 
indicate that whilst the working and living conditions vary from one sweatshop to another, 
the most typical situation can be described as follows: as I will explain later, the 
mechanism starts when workers are approached in Bolivia and offered a job in Buenos 
Aires; they are paid the bus ticket and everything is arranged for them to travel. Once they 
arrive in the city, they live in the sweatshops, in cramped conditions with improper 
ventilation and a complete lack of health and safety provisions. They work from 8 am until 
midnight (16 hours) from Monday to Friday, and half day on Saturday and they are given 
two meals a day. They are not paid until the third or fourth month (supposedly, they are 
told, as repayment for their bus ticket), and they earn between A$800 and A$1000 a month 
(£130 to £170), that is, between 45 and 55 percent of the legal minimum wage for the 
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sector.47 As health and safety provisions are completely absent, hundreds of cases of 
tuberculosis have been treated in neighbouring hospitals. Some workers (generally the 
newcomers) cannot leave the place (be it because the doors are locked –more often – or 
because they are threatened), and in some sweatshops the doors are locked all day long. As 
one of the declarations from a former worker to the Public Defender states (quoted in 
Lieutier, 2010: 37), 
 
[I was paid] a salary of $A250 [around 25 percent the minimum bargain salary] (…) In that 
workshop there were 14 people working, doors were locked constantly, and we were allowed 
to leave only accompanied by the bosses. 
 
When she left the sweatshop, she heard on a radio station for the Bolivian community 
about another sweatshop that was searching for a cook. When she went there she found 
herself in an even worse situation: 
 
I used to work from 8 am to 1 am as a cooker assistant. My pay was $A300 [less than 40 
percent of the minimum salary as for 2006]. I slept in the sweatshop in a garden with wooden 
walls that separated one ‘room’ from the other, but without roof (…) We all worked from 8 am 
to 1 am. Meals were breakfast, lunch and dinner. Breakfast was at 8 am and consisted of tea or 
coffee, and bread; lunch was at midday and it was spaghetti soup; and dinner was at 9 pm and 
it consisted of soup (Lieutier, 2010: 37).  
 
Lieutier adds that “when she was fired, she did not get any severance pay and they owed 
her the salary of the last month” (Lieutier, 2010: 37).  
 
The situation, then, includes human trafficking, subjection to servitude, deprivation of 
liberty, unregistered labour, violation of immigration rules, and sometimes child labour. 
Regarding the latter, Armando (formerly Deputy Secretary of Labour of the City, 
interviewed on 5/10/07) told me about some cases in which the workers only got food for 
themselves “because their children did not work”, and hence workers had to make their 
children work so they would be given food. The case of Dionisio is sufficiently illustrative:  
 
I was living in the sweatshop with my wife and our two children (8 and 10 years old). We 
worked from 7 am to 12 am from Monday to Saturday. We had two mattresses on the floor and 
four plates of food a day for the four of us. We lived with 20 other families, separated from one 
another by a bed sheet. Doors were always locked, and we were allowed to get out only on 
Sundays, but during the week I was not even able to go to the hospital. Our children were 
forced to help us when we had a rush order; they were rarely allowed to go to school and they 
finally lost the regularity. We earned A$1000 a month for the whole family [less than 40 
                                                 
47 £1 = A$6. The legal minimum wage is A$1,800 a month. These figures are valid for September 2010. To 
give a further notion, this pay is not enough to rent a two roomed flat in a working-class neighbourhood in 
the city, which is about A$1,300 a month. 
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percent of the minimum salary for each of them, as for late 2007]. We asked the sweatshop 
owner for better conditions but he replied by firing us. That was when we finally denounced 
him.48 
 
In this chapter I aim to analyse the links between the rise of the sweatshop and that of 
neoliberal policies in Argentina, in light of the findings of my empirical research in Buenos 
Aires. The emergence of a sweating system in Buenos Aires takes place within a context of 
growth in informal employment and a general pauperisation of working conditions. In this 
chapter I start by addressing the changes in the mode of accumulation and in the mode of 
social regulation that the country experienced since the late 1970s, when the dictatorship 
took over to rule the country until 1983. In those years the state favoured financial 
businesses to the detriment of industrial production, which had dreadful consequences for 
the formal and highly unionised industrial labourers. A plan to discipline the labour 
movement by the torturing and killing of about 30,000 activists was applied by the 
generals (Videla, Agosti and Massera) in close collaboration with large domestic and 
foreign firms. In addition, the return to democracy did not stop  the process of violent 
redistribution away from labour, as witnessed by the fact that the share of salaries in the 
GDP did not stop its sharp drop from the mid-1970s to the present day: 48.5 percent in 
1975 and 32.1 percent in 2001 (Arceo et al, 2008: 58). 
 
After outlining this context I focus on the description of the sweating system, emphasising 
its origins, the modus operandi of the actors involved and who they work for. Both illegal 
outdoor markets, as well as the whole spectrum of brands (from small to large), are found 
to benefit from the existence of thousands of cheap hyper-flexible workshops competing 
against each other for their orders. In this sense, I address the role of the entrepreneurs, the 
demands they put on the state and the strategies by which they justify the widespread use 
of sweatshops. Fostering the fear of ‘a flooding of Chinese imports’ that could affect 
domestic production as it did during the 1990s, and blaming workshops themselves for the 
high level of informality are two of the main argumentative strategies adopted by the three 
chambers of the sector.  
 
Despite the fact that the legal framework includes provisions for the control of sweatshops 
(notably the existence of a law stating corporate accountability) its enforcement is 
                                                 
48 The sweatshop was a former clandestine detention centre during the latest dictatorship (1976-1983). This 
astonishing coincidence made his case appear on the front page of an important newspaper (Página/12, 
31/3/07). 
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extremely poor. This is why, following on from the description of the legal framework, I 
address the role of the state, and that of the governing party in particular, in the current 
development of the system and of the (growing) phenomenon of human trafficking and 
forced labour in general. The state is found to rather tolerate the existence of such 
practices, and indeed there exist indications pointing to an active participation of the 
governing party in these businesses. 
 
Finally, despite the appalling working conditions in the sector, the struggle against the 
sweatshop has made several steps forward to, at the very least, stop the attack over labour 
rights and in creating a more beneficial environment for the legal control over clothing 
brands. In this sense, the social movement La Alameda, based in a neighbourhood in which 
sweatshops are rife, is leading the efforts with a number of innovative approaches, and is  
challenging traditional unionism by way of the genuine defence of the rights of informal 
and immigrant workers. The organisation of a workers’ cooperative (which is also linked 
to a cooperative in Thailand in the frame of the slave-free brand ‘No-Chains’); the 
denunciation in conjunction with state agencies of sweatshop practices by brands; and the 
lobby to stop the corporations’ attempts to release themselves from corporate 
accountability, are amongst the most important steps achieved by this social movement. In 
light of this, La Alameda’s example is drawn on repeatedly throughout this thesis. 
 
2. Neoliberalising Argentina 
 
2.1. Producing industrial goods in Latin America 
 
One of the most revealing and critical statements forthcoming from the interviews for this 
research came from Natalia, the co-owner of an ‘agencia’ (agency of finished product)49 in 
Buenos Aires (interviewed on 6/2/08). She is a third generation textile entrepreneur. In 
1998 (in a context of crisis) she decided to sell her family’s textile factory and shift to the 
commercialisation of garments imported from China. In the interview she explained to me 
that she took such a decision because “to produce is never a good business in this country 
(…) If you are one of those who have the machines and produce, you will never be a big 
industrial entrepreneur, you know (…) You must move with the wind, be wise, have 
                                                 
49 A company that offers garments to brands and stores and produces them at order (see 6.2 in this chapter). 
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commercial tact to adapt your businesses according to the most profitable economic 
opportunities that each period offers.” The fashion industry in Argentina is the paramount 
example of ‘moving with the wind’, i.e. investing money according to what provides a 
quicker and higher return in a specific period.  
 
Certainly, this was not always the case in Argentina. Equally as in Mexico, Chile and 
Brazil, the imports substitution process reached a significant development, covering 
production of the whole spectrum of industrial goods (from manufactured goods to 
chemicals and petrochemicals). In its second period (1963-1974), industrial GDP grew at 
6.7 percent annually (Kosacoff and Azpiazu, 1989; quoted in Basualdo, 2006a). Likewise, 
while in 1960 industrial exports had a relative contribution to total exports of 3 percent, in 
1975 they reached 24 percent (Schorr, 2005). However, in 1976 the military dictatorship 
(1976-1983) took power and imposed “a new social regime of accumulation based on 
financial valorisation” (Basualdo, 2006a: 138), thereby interrupting the industrialisation 
based on the substitution of imports. According to Schorr (2005: 15), this process is 
signalled by the fact that “industry stopped being the pillar of economic activity and the 
sector with the highest profit rates (…), and it was replaced by financial valorisation.”50 In 
these years, the industrial thread became “weaker and less articulated than in the imports 
substitution process.” Finally, all this took place “in a context of growing concentration 
and centralisation of capital, and of a strong deterioration of the wage and employment 
relationship for workers” (Schorr, 2005: 15).51 
 
Soon after the dictatorship took over, on 24 March 1976, the minister of economy Martínez 
de Hoz – who is deemed to have been ‘the civilian face of the dictatorship’ and who 
currently faces accusations for the kidnapping of two local entrepreneurs during those 
years – outlined the main backbone of his economic programme in a famous statement:  
 
gentlemen, a new period for the Argentinean economic history is starting. We have turned 
round the interventionist statism that oppressed the economy, to give way to the liberalisation 
of the productive forces (quoted in Lieutier, 2010: 72).52 
 
The Argentinean economist E. Basualdo (2006a) describes the regime of accumulation 
imposed by the dictatorship (which in his view lasted until 2001) with the following words: 
                                                 
50 The example of the auto industry is one of the clearest in this sense: while in 1974 its workforce was 
57,400 strong, in 2003 the industry had only 12,050 workers (Abeceb.com; quoted in Página/12, 1/10/06). 
51 Translated from Spanish. 
52 Translated from Spanish. 
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the social regime of accumulation imposed by the military dictatorship – which interrupted 
industrialisation based on substitution of imports – constituted a particular case of the new 
functioning of the world economy. Perhaps it was the deepest and most socially exclusionary 
in Latin America in relative terms (…) In the Argentinean society a plan in which financial 
valorisation became the underpinning principle in the regulation of economic relationships was 
imposed. Naturally, this was not only related to the pre-eminence that the financial sector 
acquired in terms of the appropriation and distribution of capital, but also to a broader process 
that revolutionised the microeconomic behaviour of the large oligopolic firms, as well as the 
economy as a whole (:129-30).53 
 
The particularities to which Basualdo (2006a) refers are related to the nature of the 
financial businesses triggered by the economic policies of the dictatorship and its polemic 
minister of economy. These businesses were boosted by the high liquidity of international 
banks resulting from the oil crisis, and to the low interest rates at which they offered 
money. During the years of the dictatorship, the interest rate in the internal market was 
systematically higher than that of the international banks. Consequently, dominant 
capitalistic groups (foreign and domestic) contracted foreign debt to invest these resources 
in their valorisation in Argentina by means of financial instruments such as bonds. Later 
on, they saved their earnings in foreign banks (Basualdo, 2006a: 130-31). Certainly, this 
could not be achieved by a non-interventionist state, despite the words of the minister of 
economy. Basualdo (2006a) stresses that the active role that the state played in allowing 
this mechanism was based on three main tasks. Firstly, the state continuously borrowed 
money in the internal market, becoming the largest borrower and thereby contributing to 
elevating the interest rate at a higher level than that of the international banks. Secondly, 
by borrowing from international banks the state provided the internal market with the 
foreign currency that the dominant capitalistic groups continuously leaked towards foreign 
banks. And last, but by no means least, the state became subordinated to the new logics of 
capital accumulation adopted by the domestic elite, through mechanisms which even 
included the transfer of private debt to the state in certain periods. 
 
These shifts were not a consequence of the collapse of the previous mode of accumulation, 
since GDP per capita was growing at 6 percent a year (Basualdo, 2006a: 124) and when 
the measures adopted by the dictatorship were set in motion GDP had only been stagnant 
for two years (1974-1976). Instead, the dictatorship represented a systematic plan to 
discipline labour and to consolidate highly regressive state policies (Azpiazu and Schorr, 
2010). When the dictatorship started, powerful external and domestic groups were 
                                                 
53 Translated from Spanish. 
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interested in breaking up the alliance between strong unions and industrial entrepreneurs 
who based their businesses within the internal market (Basualdo, 2006a). Geopolitically 
speaking, Chile was already under Pinochet, and the Brazilian, Bolivian and Uruguayan 
dictatorships had taken over when the generals arrived at the ‘Pink House’. Several 
scholars have written about the support of the US State Department for the dictatorship 
(Basualdo, 2006a; Chomsky and Dieterich, 1995; Harvey, 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer, 
2003; Schorr, 2005). Indeed, the declassification of certain CIA files in 2002 revealed 
meetings between officers from the American embassy with the dictators, and their interest 
in controlling specific labour unions, as well as showing the systematic information flow 
between factories where workers were kidnapped and the American Embassy (Página/12, 
18/8/02 and 26/2/06). There also exist several examples of private sector involvement in 
the repression of workers. One of the most striking of these is that of Mercedes Benz, 
which had an internal rule establishing that 1 percent of each car it sold in the country 
would be allocated to the Antiterrorist Fund to finance the dictatorship in Argentina 
(Pereira, 1988). Furthermore, following the end of the dictatorship a group of former union 
delegates of the Ford Motors Co factory in Argentina denounced that they had been 
kidnapped and tortured by the security members of the factory a few days after the coup, 
and they even asserted that within the very premises of the factory there operated a 
clandestine detention centre (Página/12, 26/2/06).54 
 
In 1976 the minister of economy applied a fierce plan of ‘repression of salaries’ which 
included the freezing of salaries, elimination of the mechanisms to control prices, and 
devaluation, leading to mounting inflation. In that year the average real salary dropped by 
at least 33 percent relative to the previous year (Schorr, 2005: 20-21). “Thereafter, a 
markedly lower minimum wage limit was established. Real salaries have subsequently 
remained around this level, yet always following a downward tendency” (Schorr, 2005: 
21).55 Inclusive of the devaluation carried out by the previous authoritarian administrations 
(1974-1976), the average salary in the largest industrial district (Greater Buenos Aires) had 
fallen more than 30 percent by the end of the dictatorship, and the relative contribution of 
wages to the GDP had fallen from 48.4 percent in 1974 to 26 percent in 1983.  
 
                                                 
54 Basualdo (2006) explains that since financial valorisation did not create wealth, the resources that the 
powerful groups systematically sent out of the country were provided by the violent redistribution of wealth 
away from labour, entailing, in his view, a direct redirection of wealth from Argentinean workers to the 
international banks. 
55 Translated from Spanish. 
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With the return to democracy in 1983 “the model imposed by the military dictatorship was 
not substantially changed. On the contrary, it tended to be consolidated with regards to 
deindustrialisation, concentration and centralisation of capital, and regressive redistribution 
of wealth” (Schorr, 2005: 23-4)56. Indeed, during the first democratic administration 
(Alfonsín, 1983-1989) while GDP dropped 5 percent, the actual volume of manufacturing 
production dropped to 73.7 percent (1980-1990), whereas employment in the sector fell to 
71.3 percent (Arceo et al, 2008: 29). Combined with the high level of inflation throughout 
the period, and with weakened labour power after the dictatorship, this led to a plummeting 
of the real salaries in the industry: according to Schorr (2005: 25) the average industrial 
salary fell almost 20 percent between 1983 and 1989. In sum, 
 
during the 1980s the labour market was marked by a reduction in real salaries, stagnation of 
employment levels and a growing labour casualisation, which resulted in a sharp drop in the 
people’s living standards (Arceo et al, 2008: 30).57 
 
Once the first democratic government finished, in the midst of a period of ‘hyper-inflation’ 
in 1989, Carlos Menem, today the most visible face of the neoliberal policies in Argentina, 
took power. According to Basualdo (2006a) the high foreign debt of Argentina – as was 
the case in most Latin American countries – constituted a main mechanism for 
international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to push forward their policies of 
low state social expenditure and Structural Adjustment Plans (respectively).58 Under the 
pressure of the World Bank, the major state-owned enterprises were privatised, partly 
under the argument of using those resources to pay back part of the debt. As a result, 
between 1985 and 1998, total employment in the state-owned companies of the sectors of 
telecom, post services, airlines, water, electricity, railways and gas dropped from 243,354 
to 75,770 employees (Duarte, 2006). 
 
A strong exchange rate and a fierce agenda of trade liberalisation gave a new impulse to 
the policies of deindustrialisation.59 In addition, some industries were relocated to areas 
                                                 
56 Translated from Spanish. 
57 Translated from Spanish. 
58 In virtue of the financial businesses of both foreign and domestic groups, by the end of the dictatorship the 
Argentinean foreign debt had multiplied by five. Besides, the nature of this debt was radically different to 
that of the period of imports substitution, when foreign and domestic firms used to borrow money to invest it 
in the acquisition of capital goods in order to expand their production and increase their labour productivity. 
This time, instead, the money had been used to simply keep it circulating within the banks. No real capital 
had been created, and this made it impossible for both private groups and the state to pay back when the 
interest rate of international banks was suddenly lifted in 1982. 
59 The extreme to which trade liberalisation was taken in Argentina is illustrated by the fact that the Ministry 
of Economy refrained from including any exceptions to full liberalisation from the GATT during the 
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distant from the traditional industrial districts (Buenos Aires, Rosario and Córdoba), where 
salaries and unionisation are lower (Basualdo, 2006a). These trends continued dismantling 
and disarticulating the previously strongly unionised industrial workforce.  
 
These trends happened hand in hand with the increasing oligopolisation and strangerisation 
of the economy in all economic sectors, leading to rising unemployment and economic 
concentration. Regarding oligopolies, while in 1993 the 500 largest companies of the 
country contributed 60 percent of total GDP, in 2000 their contribution had risen to 79.4 
percent (INDEC, 2002). Similarly, the Economic Commission for Latin America of the 
UN (1999; quoted in La Nación, 9/5/99) indicates that while in 1990 foreign capital 
contributed to 33 percent of industrial production, only five years later (1995) it was 
producing 50 percent of it. Taken together, both processes led to increasing 
unemployment, since their labour productivity is higher. Studying the largest 500 non-
financial companies, the INDEC (2002) shows that firms controlled by foreign capital 
increased their labour productivity at a much higher pace than local firms (30.9 percent 
against 19.5 percent). The same study shows that despite the fact that their revenues 
increased 40.3 percent (1993-2000), these firms reduced their workforce by almost 10 
percent, which in absolute terms means that 50,000 jobs were lost. Schorr (2000: 156) 
points out that during the 1990s 
 
two of the main structural features that characterised and conditioned the performance of the 
[industry] during the last quarter of the century seem to have consolidated: increasing 
concentration of industrial production in a markedly reduced group of oligopolies, in the 
context of an increasingly unequal and regressive path of redistribution of wealth.60 
 
The increasing competition with both cheap imports and foreign firms in the internal 
market led thousands of domestic SMEs to bankruptcy and constituted a major disincentive 
for industrial investment by domestic groups. This contributed to the dismantling of the 
string of industrial local SMEs that had developed during the period of imports 
substitution, which had accounted for a large relative share of industrial workforce. In the 
whole, between 1993 and 2001 GDP grew 16 percent, but manufacturing GDP decreased 6 
percent (Schorr, 2005: 27). As a result, the relative contribution of the industry to GDP in 
2001 had fallen to 15 percent, whereas in 1974 it had accounted for 30 percent (Schorr, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Uruguay Round. When asked about why this was the case, Matías (an officer at the Ministry of Economy 
who participated in the negotiations, interviewed on 11/3/08) stated that the minister did not want to send any 
contradictory signals to foreign investors and to international financial institutions. 
60 Translated from Spanish. 
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2005: 27). This deindustrialisation is illustrated most starkly by the employment indicators: 
“in absolute numbers, in 2001 there existed only one third (33.8 percent) of industrial jobs 
than those in 1976” (Arceo et al, 2006: 59).61  
 
This deindustrialisation, the concentration into competitive companies with a high labour 
productivity (with its consequent displacement of thousands of domestic SMEs), and the 
privatisation of state enterprises, led to an unprecedented level of unemployment, which 
grew from 6.5 in 1991 to 21.5 in 2002 (INDEC, 2010). Precarious employment grew 
accordingly, from 8.3 to 18.3 in the same period. 
 
As a further consequence of these trends, the high level of unemployment led to higher 
informality. In the words of José (a labour lawyer of the Asociación Obrera Textil, 
interviewed on 19/10/09), “in Argentina labour informality is a direct consequence of 
unemployment.” According to the current minister of labour, “the historical level [of 
informal employment] in Argentina is 25 percent, and today we are at 37 percent. The 
existence of informal employment is an obstacle for the redistribution of wealth, because 
the active policies we apply do not reach informal workers” (interview with Página/12, 
24/8/08). The rise of unemployment and informality in a context of strongly regressive 
social policies led once again to a plummeting of wages as a share of GDP. Salaries 
dropped from 48.5 percent of the GDP in 1975, to just 32.1 percent in 2001. 
 
This deconstruction of the formal labourers and the growth of informality during recent 
decades, with its negative consequences over working standards and salaries, can be 
witnessed with stark clarity in the garment factories. The statements by my interviewees 
quoted in the next section may depict the personal story of thousands of industrial workers. 
 
2.2 Working conditions in the clothing industry 
 
Before the economic crisis of the late 1980s the main portion of apparel production in 
Buenos Aires took place in large factories with dozens or hundreds of workers.62 Some of 
the workers interviewed for this research had been working in factories in the past, and all 
of them maintain that conditions were very good; they not only had a good salary along 
                                                 
61 Translated from Spanish. 
62 Indeed, there existed two factories with one thousand workers each (interview with Ramiro from SOIVA, 
15/02/08). 
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with all the corresponding benefits, such as national insurance contributions, workplace 
insurance, holidays and so on, but they also had several premiums (for productivity, 
attendance, extra payment at the end of the year, etc), plus dining halls with accessible 
prices, a doctor and a nurse, and even psychological assistance in some cases. 
 
This situation changed drastically during the 1980s. By the end of that decade, several 
factories had closed down, and in those which continued operating (some are still running 
nowadays) the majority of the benefits had ended.63 Medical assistance in the factory and 
dining rooms were eliminated; later on, bonuses were also scrapped. Today, premium for 
productivity is extremely rare (even if it is included in the collective bargaining contract), 
several of the workers are not fully registered (with the consequent impact on their social 
benefits), and the minimum salary stipulated on the collective bargaining contract is the 
lowest in the whole manufacturing industry (interviews with Susana [18/1/08], Marisa 
[8/3/08] and Carlos [3/2/08]). The situation continued to deteriorate over the years, despite 
the economic recovery of the post 2001-2002 crisis which strongly favoured firms of this 
sector. One of the first questions of the interview questionnaire for workers was aimed 
precisely at allowing interviewees to establish a clear comparison between working 
conditions when they started to work on the sector and those of today. Despite the 
statement by Alberto from SOIVA (the official union, interviewed on 21/01/08) that 
conditions are now better than in the 1980s, all of the interviewed workers stated that in the 
past their situation was better or even “much better”. However, since the number of 
interviews is not representative, what is more revealing is the scale of the change.  
 
Carlos (53) has worked in the sector since 1973 and he is now a worker in the Cooperativa 
18 de Diciembre (formerly Brukman), one of nearly 170 ‘fábricas recuperadas’ (factories 
recovered by workers, i.e. factories which were about to shut down and were instead taken 
over and continued by the workers). During the 1980s he was working in Brukman (which 
was a big factory). They used to work for 45 hours a week, the pay was very good, there 
was the productivity premium and workers were fully registered: “We had a much better 
life, it was really another story; bosses were more conscious of the workers’ rights, and 
actually our productivity was much higher, because we had more incentives. But from then 
until now there has been a 180 degrees shift.” The story of Susana (59) is similar. She has 
been working in the sector since 1968. On being asked about working conditions since the 
                                                 
63 Today the largest factory in the City (Agrest) has 250 workers.  
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1980s, she refers to her job at a big factory from 1983 until 1996: conditions were “very 
good”, she was fully registered, worked for 40 hours a week and she had a high salary and 
important productivity premiums. She said that “it was another life”. By the mid-1990s 
productivity premiums were eliminated, and some months later she was fired due to 
‘redundancy plans’: “When I started in the factory there were 430 workers, but when I left 
there were only 220”. She immediately got a job at another factory, but thereafter kept 
changing workplace due to the conditions she found in each of these. In late 2003 she 
made the attempt to work at home as a contractor for a small company but, as she pointed 
out, “it is horrible to work at home, because you find yourself working for up to 11 hours a 
day without really seeing a significant economic reward.” After only four months she 
decided to look for a stable job, and she was hired by a big factory the day after. In this 
factory (producing mainly export-oriented garments) she used to work 55 hours per week 
and the pay was just enough to live (including over-time). In October 2007 she was fired 
because in the words of her bosses “you complain too much”. At the time of the interview, 
she was unemployed and making a claim against the company to recoup her severance pay.  
 
Apart from being instructive in understanding how working conditions have  worsened 
since the 1980s until the present day, this primary source information reveals some other 
interesting issues. One of these is the fact that mobility between workplaces is very 
common and straightforward in the sector, even nowadays. In the words of Susana, “I will 
rest during this week and I will get back to work somewhere next week, it won’t be 
difficult”. The demand for labour is high, and in this context, the fact that labour conditions 
continue to deteriorate is difficult to understand. 
 
The explanation lays in the strategies used by capital. All the union leaders I interviewed 
said that entrepreneurs are extremely obstinate in the negotiations. One of them (Esteban, 
from the Unión de Cortadores de Indumentaria, interviewed on 23/1/08) pointed out four 
reasons for this. Firstly, when the economic recovery started in late 2002, the entrepreneurs 
had been through a very deep crisis (1998-2001) which in many cases had challenged their 
businesses (indeed some of them had also hardly survived the late 1980s crisis). In virtue 
of this they are now less likely to concede higher minimum standards. Secondly, there has 
been a generational shift in the entrepreneurial arena; until the 1980s, entrepreneurs 
considered that it was necessary to maintain a certain level of benefits for the workers to 
increase their productivity. According to Esteban, they had a different conception of what a 
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worker is, since they understood that every worker had a family to feed and other long 
term compromises. However, “that generation lost the battle, and a new one has come.” 
This new generation is, in Esteban’s view, a generation of bureaucrats, a group of 
economic technicians that only think of the numbers: “they come to the negotiations with a 
calculator, and if the numbers are not those they expect, they simply disagree.” As Carlos 
affirmed, Jacobo was never a tough boss, the real problem was his sons and daughters: 
they belong to a generation of neoliberal managers perhaps lacking the ‘on-the-ground’ 
experience and insight to the production process itself, with a distant relationship with 
workers,64 which translated into a more managerial and less human relationship. Even if he 
did not refer to it, Esteban would most probably agree to point to this generational shift as 
the embodiment of the broader shift in political economy worldwide; in other words, 
neoliberal bosses (better said ‘managers’) that can treat workers as numbers (despite rare 
moments of unrest), have replaced Fordist bosses which had to cope with strongly 
mobilised workers. 
 
In the third place, Esteban pointed out that entrepreneurs bring the ‘Chinese threat’ into the 
negotiations, i.e. the threat of the internal market being flooded with imported garments 
(from China, but also from Brazil) in case their costs rise ‘too much’. Finally, companies 
use the remarkable availability of informal workshops as a concrete threat to push labour 
standards down. Certainly, all of the union leaders I interviewed stated that entrepreneurs 
openly say that “if the cost of labour goes up, we will then subcontract to the Bolivian 
workshops.” In this context, it is worth recalling that none of the 13 entrepreneurs I 
interviewed mentioned salaries amongst their main concerns (not even the chambers), and 
indeed two of them recognised that salaries are at a rather low level. 
 
In sum, as noted by José (a labour lawyer of the Asociación Obrera Textil, quoted above), 
the general pauperisation of the working conditions in the formal economy generates a 
high level of tolerance of the informal economy. In turn, the fact that informality is so 
widespread drives down working standards in the formal sector, in the same way that it 
makes it difficult for the state to enforce labour rights. Authorities believe that they cannot 
suddenly enforce the law over enterprises because they would shut down, and certainly no 
administration wants to deal with the financial and political costs of unemployment. The 
relaxation of controls over the compliance of labour legislation resulting from such an 
                                                 
64 According to Esteban, some new managers may have never been to the factories themselves, since they 
work in offices which sometimes are away from the production places. 
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approach has had dreadful consequences for workers. The human rights violations taking 
place in the sweatshops of the clothing industry entail the most extreme expression of this 
reality. 
 
3. The sweating system in Buenos Aires: its origin and causes 
 
As outlined above, the garment industry was one of the sectors most affected by the 
deindustrialisation of the Argentinean economy. During the economic crisis of the late 
1980s, which resulted in unprecedented levels of inflation, the apparel consumption 
experienced a strong retraction, and many enterprises, having increasing costs and 
assuming impossible levels of debt, were forced to shut down. However, it was not until 
the following decade, with fierce trade liberalisation and a strong currency, that the rules of 
the business changed and really started affecting local companies: according to CIAI, 
4,000 out of the 7,000 companies that existed in 1990 had shut down by 2000 (quoted in 
Monzón, 2001). The legacy of such a dreadful decade was also perceptible as an 
undercurrent of fear in the interviews with both entrepreneurs and union leaders.  
Consequently, this fear of a return to crisis is used by entrepreneurs in their bargaining 
rhetoric as a reason for the continued suppression of salaries. 
 
The economic instability created by the recurrent crises is amongst the main 
preoccupations of all the entrepreneurs interviewed in Buenos Aires for this research. As 
pointed out by Gloria (a Professor at the Department of Design in the Universidad de 
Buenos Aires, who also owns a consultancy firm for textile and clothing companies; 
interviewed on 5/2/08 and 11/3/08), “with the strong economic downturns affecting our 
economy, those who have a big structure [i.e. large capital investments] finally go 
bankrupt.” During the 1990s, the context of crisis for the manufacturers of clothing in an 
increasingly unstable macroeconomic environment (remember the recurrent crises of the 
1990s) paved the way for the development of an informal sector, which, even today, 
comprises the largest part of the industry. In short, the large pool of small sewing 
workshops developed as a direct consequence of the crisis of the late 1980s.  
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3.1. The origin of the sweating system (1985 to 2002)65 
 
The information from the interviews suggests that not all of the companies that went out of 
business during the 1990s really left the clothing industry for good. During the first half of 
the 1990s many firms closed their factories and chose between two different strategies. 
Firstly, similarly to the case of Natalia (the said owner of an agencia), some took 
advantage of the strong national currency and shifted to commercial activity, importing 
products and re-selling them to small or middle-sized retail companies (there were no large 
retail clothing chains at that time). Indeed, Lieutier (2010: 48) points out that “imports (…) 
imposed [low] top-up prices in the internal market, so many companies decided to shut 
down their production lines and focus on commercialisation; many times they operated as 
importers.”66 Beto (one of the managers of the chamber CAIByN, interviewed on 14/3/08) 
confirmed this, and added that “in Argentina you must have commercial nous to survive.” 
 
Secondly, other companies shifted to branded clothing, fuelling the surge of this 
international trend in Argentina, and achieving rapid success. Studying the latter strategy 
provides some of the key insights for understanding the burgeoning of the sweating system 
in Buenos Aires. 
 
As a consequence of the closure of several factories, thousands of workers lost their jobs: 
from 1984 to 1993 employment experienced a drop of 72 percent (Ministerio de Trabajo, 
2006). Esteban (the union leader quoted above) asserted that a significant number of the 
workers fired from the factories were given machines by their former bosses, thereby 
replacing or compensating their severance pay. These workers continued to work for the 
companies from home.67 This implied a shift to an even more unequal and a highly 
unstable labour relation. In other words, the firms not only transferred the risk to the 
workers, but they also started taking part of the workers’ pay systematically: by paying 
them per unit (which is only legal for the calculation of bonuses), companies avoid paying 
salaries during the slack season. In the whole, by these means companies take from the 
workers between three and four months of their salaries every year. This adds up to the 
difference between the low pay workers receive and the minimum salary, and implies 
                                                 
65 Owing to the lack of bibliography and statistics addressing this issue, in this section my arguments are 
based upon statements from the interviews.  
66 Translated from Spanish. 
67 Indeed, two of the companies I interviewed (Caro Cuore and Taverniti) had followed this strategy in the 
early 1990s.  
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several millions of Pesos that the companies plainly steal from the workers. Esteban 
identifies this trend as ‘the explosion of workshops’ and the beginning of the sweating 
system.  
 
Marcelo, a Bolivian immigrant who now owns a sweatshop (interviewed on 9/2/08) stated 
in the interview that since the mid-1980s there were already several workshops in Buenos 
Aires in which working conditions were not worse than those which could be found in any 
other unregistered activity. In the mid-1980s his wife bought a sewing machine (with an 
accessible loan offered by the state-owned Banco Nación) and started to sew at home for 
brands to compensate for Marcelo’s stagnated salary. Indeed, in the wake of the growth of 
unemployment several women started sewing at home for contractors in order to increase 
the family income. During the first half of the 1990s, the economic recovery had a positive 
effect on garment sales, but since the statistics do not show any increase in employment or 
in labour productivity in the sector, it can be deduced that the demand for workers was 
covered by unregistered homeworkers and workshops. Marcelo and another sweatshop 
owner who lives in the 1-11-14 shantytown (Ana, interviewed on 26/1/08), pointed out that 
during the first half of the 1990s the pay from the brands was fair enough, and it allowed 
them to save money and buy some more machines to bring people home to work for them. 
The low investment that starting with this trade requires began to play a major role in here. 
This is how Marcelo started offering jobs in Buenos Aires to his relatives and friends in 
Bolivia.68  
 
By the mid 1990s the phenomenon of workshops had escalated considerably; hundreds 
(perhaps already thousands) of small workshops with up to 40 employees69 invaded the 
city, and were mostly concentrated in four working class neighbourhoods: Caballito, 
Flores, Bajo Flores and Once. However, when the first signs of recession appeared in 1994 
(the ‘Tequila Effect’), apparel production started to experience problems (with a drop of 
about 5 percent in a year). Despite the timid recovery in 1996, by 2002 sales were down to 
less than half (43 percent) (CEP, 2008). Such a sudden contraction had a devastating effect 
on registered workers: from 1997 to 2003 formal employment in the sector fell to 57 
                                                 
68 Instead, Ana is Argentinean and had no contacts in Bolivia, so the first workers she brought home were 
Argentinean, but today they are Bolivian because, as she states, “Argentineans do not want to work.” 
69 According to Lieutier (2010), workshops generally have between 4 and 20 employees.  
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percent; likewise, between 1993 and 2003 real salaries fell 24.6 percent, reaching a 39.2 
percent decrease at the depth of crisis (2002) (Ministry of Economy, 2005).70  
 
The effects were also significant for the economic performance of the workshops: finally 
the supply had met the demand, and when the supply overtook demand in the midst of the 
crisis, fierce competition between the sweatshop owners (hereafter talleristas) broke out. 
This gave the brands absolute control to set contracting prices. Indeed, since the quality of 
the garment is not particularly relevant for their businesses, brands prioritise low prices; 
thence they award the orders to those talleristas who offer the lowest price and who meet 
the deadlines, without any further consideration. Consequently, talleristas found 
themselves increasingly in a ‘take it or leave it’ situation. The downward spiral of prices 
had started. In only a few years, a strategy (subcontracting) adopted by some firms to face 
a deep economic crisis had created a whole production system. Mario (a lawyer at the 
city’s Public Defender’s Office, interviewed on 9/10/07) reminded me that the first 
denunciations of the existence of sweatshops in Buenos Aires – “in which we found 
conditions of servitude” – took place in 2000, and they were even published on the front 
page of the best selling newspaper (Clarín, 27/2/99). The sweatshop economy was born. 
 
4. Human trafficking in Argentina: Human rights? 
 
Since its beginning, the sweating system in Buenos Aires has been organised by members 
of the Bolivian community. Marcelo – the said tallerista – had access to relatives, friends, 
and friends of friends in Bolivia who were keen to come to Argentina and work, in spite of 
the unfair conditions, for remuneration that, in virtue of the relative strength of the 
Argentinean currency, allowed them to send money back home. Collins (2003: 7) explains 
that immigrant communities are often in an especially beneficial position to cover this 
demand owing to their community networks: “entrepreneurs wishing to set up an apparel 
factory have needed only to rent a space and buy sewing machines (…) This has made the 
industry especially attractive for immigrant entrepreneurs, who could get started with only 
small loans and tap kin and community networks to recruit workers.”  
 
                                                 
70 As another source of statistics, it is interesting to note that one of the two workers’ unions (Unión de 
Cortadores de la Indumentaria) lost 19 percent of its unionised workers during the crisis (1997-2002), 
accumulating a loss of 59 percent since 1991. 
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From time to time, high levels of unemployment and poverty in Bolivia – and Paraguay – 
have triggered emigration towards countries such as Chile, Argentina and Brazil. Bolivian 
migration to Argentina became significant in the 1960s. However, since 1991 the strength 
of the currency, which allowed migrants to send remittances to their families back home, 
attracted a new wave of migration from Bolivia and Paraguay.. While the 1991 Census 
revealed the presence of 143,735 Bolivian citizens, ten years later that number reached 
233,464 people, representing an increase of 55.5 percent, as Argentina became the main 
destination for Bolivian emigrants (INDEC, 2003). At present, citizens from Bolivia and 
Paraguay engage in four main activities: construction, prostitution, agriculture and sewing 
sweatshops (predominantly, Paraguayans engage in the former two and Bolivians in the 
latter two). No official statistics exist about how many migrant workers are victims of 
human trafficking, but unofficial estimates suggest a figure of 130,000 including both 
Bolivian and Paraguayan citizens (Fundación El Otro, 2007).  
 
Assuming that Marcelo’s story is the story of many (there are no reasons to believe it is 
not, and there are no hypotheses to contradict it in the scare academic literature on the 
subject), I would suggest that Bolivian immigrants who were already settled in Buenos 
Aires and its metropolitan area, jumped scales and gradually created an international 
network to provide labour for the garment industry in Buenos Aires. Many of them owned 
a few sewing machines and were working for contractors who demanded more of them 
than they could produce. They called friends and relatives back home to come and work 
for them. Little by little, thousands of Bolivian workers crossed the borders to work in 
these unregistered workshops. Today, during an economic recovery period, this 
phenomenon continues to take place. 
 
The recruitment works as follows: in some cases, workers get the information through 
advertisements on radios or in newspapers, mainly in poor neighbourhoods in La Paz. 
They then call the phone number advertised and they meet the trafficker.71 In other cases, 
workers are approached directly by an employee of the sweatshop owner, or by the 
tallerista himself, as happened to José (25/1/08).72 Lieutier (2010) quotes declarations 
from other former sweatshop workers in the office of the Public Defender confirming these 
two modus operandi, and showing that when workers approach the ‘agencies’ or are 
                                                 
71 This was the case of two of the four former sweatshop workers I interviewed (Dionisio – 18/1/08 – and 
Susana – 18/1/08). 
72 Indeed, in April this year one of the largest talleristas was caught in a Northern province bringing 7 people 
from Bolivia in his own car (a kangoo-style car) (Pagina/12, 25/3/10). 
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approached directly, they are offered a stable job in Buenos Aires for a £140 monthly 
salary (£200 ‘if you are skilled’), including housing and meals.73 Their transportation is 
paid by the tallerista, and once they reach Buenos Aires’ bus station they are taken to the 
sweatshops. At times their passports are retained, and they are told not to leave the 
workplace, as the police would deport them. Armando (the said former officer in the City’s 
Deputy-Secretariat of Labour) explains that the mechanism implies the complicity of: (a) 
those media companies which publish the announcements; (b) those bus companies that 
allegedly take extra pay from traffickers to secure the transport of the workers; and (c) 
officials at the National Office of Migration, both in the borders with Bolivia and 
Paraguay, and in Buenos Aires. Indeed, Armando, Mario (the lawyer at the City’s Public 
Defender referred to above) and Gustavo from La Alameda even blame the Home 
Ministry, of which the National Office of Migration depends. Certainly, as I will address 
later on, the existence of more than 100,000 victims of human trafficking in the country 
raises concerns about the possible complicitous involvement of senior officials in the 
national government.  
 
5. Why do workers stay in the sweatshops? 
 
During this research I was asked this question several times. The interviews with former 
sweatshop workers and with activists from La Alameda (see 10.1 in this chapter) provided 
valuable information in response to this question. It is worth noting as a first caveat that 
workers do not stay for long in the same sweatshops. As I will elaborate in chapter 7, 
workers do seek better working conditions, but the fact that they are migrants is a crucial 
disincentive for their engagement in collective attempts to improve them. Instead, the 
majority of them keep changing from one place to another in the hope of finding better 
conditions, although they very rarely succeed in leaving the sweating system and entering 
the sector as formal workers. Discrimination and non-recognition of their skills form part 
of the explanation. However, as I will stress further on, many workers do not want to work 
in the formal sector, as this implies fixed hours in a low paid activity, and difficulties to 
make extra (fresh) money and to have a flexible working schedule (see chapter 7). 
 
The explanation as to why workers stay in the sweatshops is to be found in a complex web 
of multiple and interrelated issues. First of all it is necessary to consider those sweatshops 
                                                 
73 The minimum salary in the sector is £300 (December 2010). 
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in which workers are actually locked; as Dionisio told me in the interview, “doors were 
always chained, always!” In other cases, some workers may find themselves in a situation 
which they perceive to be better than their previous life in their home countries, and they 
might refrain from complaining for this reason. It may be the case, as happened to 
Dionisio, that a boss tells his or her workers that no one will pay them more than him or 
her, and that if they work hard they will receive a better pay. In Dionisio’s words, “the 
tallerista used to tell me that he would give me the pay I merited once I had finished  
paying back for the transport, and that the situation in other workshops was much worse 
because no one was as nice as him with his workers.” In this way, many workers enter into 
an everyday logic that makes them focus on working as hard as possible so as to 
accumulate some capital to leave the place as soon as possible, to rent a house and, in the 
case of those who plan to stay in the country long-term, to buy their own machines and 
become their own bosses. Sometimes, they may also pursue a career as talleristas 
themselves, but previous academic literature on other case studies shows that only a few of 
them make it (see Morokvasic [1987: 143-44], who quotes an estimate from the French 
1982 Population Census stating that “about 5 percent of those (migrants) active in the 
labour force… are self-employed”). In other cases, the talleristas may prefer more coercive 
mechanisms like openly violent threats and firings to those who complain.  
 
However, the most general explanation can be found in the characteristics of the human 
trafficking mechanisms. Worldwide, traffickers take advantage of the vulnerable status of 
workers to over-exploit them and force them to stay in the workplace, isolated from the 
‘outside there’ (see Bonacich and Applebaum, 2000). Their status as illegal migrants 
means they refrain from raising any claims, and those who are locked in the sweatshop 
may fear to leave the place, as they do not know anyone and have nothing to do outside of 
the workplace. Moreover, since workers live and get their meals in the sweatshops, and 
since they usually do not have money, they may even be forced to stay in the place, by 
virtue of the fact that they are not aware of the assistance they are entitled to from the 
City’s government or from La Alameda. Hence, they run the real risk of not having a place 
to stay and not having food, which, in the case of those workers who came with their 
children is even worse. Indeed, during the months following the tragedy in Viale Street 
several workshops were shut down by the Office of Supervision and Control of the City of 
Buenos Aires (see below). Workers were thus sent out of the sweatshops and ran out of 
food and shelter. During those days it was common to hear in the media of migrant 
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workers claiming for their jobs, assuring that even if the working conditions were not those 
which they deserved, they needed their job. The first reaction of the workers, mostly led by 
talleristas, was to blame La Alameda and to organise demonstrations against it. There was 
even an attempt to set La Alameda’s headquarters on fire in one incident (see 10.1 in this 
chapter). 
 
In virtue of the significant similarities with the case of Prato, I will come back to these 
issues in chapter 7, to provide a fuller explanation.  
 
6. The present situation 
 
I had a terrible time. I don’t want to work and live like that anymore. 
(Dionisio, a former worker in a sweatshop) 
 
After the crisis of 2001-2002 – one of the worst in Argentinean history – rapid economic 
recovery favoured locally-based garment production again, and the 2003-06 period 
witnessed a real boom in apparel production. Between 2002 and 2006 garment production 
grew 70 percent, while in Buenos Aires between 2002 and 2005 it grew 58.8 percent 
(CEDEM, 2007: 69). For the same period, consumption almost doubled (+94.4 percent). 
With the devaluation of the Argentinean Peso in January 2002 the national currency lost 40 
percent of its value relative to the US Dollar. This led to a sudden halt on imports, which 
provoked – for those who were importing at the time – the urgent necessity to find local 
producers that could cover this demand. But it was mostly the sharp increase in 
consumption since the second half of 2002 that increased the demand for producers, and 
between 2002 and 2005 registered employment grew 62.7 percent (Ministerio de Trabajo, 
2006). Natalia (the owner of an agencia, mentioned above) said that before the devaluation 
she was importing goods from China, but then she had to completely re-design her 
business; she asserts that finding workshops that could produce for her became a very hard 
task, and she even had to offer quick payment in cash to the subcontractors. Fernanda (a 
fashion designer working at the Metropolitan Centre for Design of the City [henceforth 
CMD], interviewed on 11/2/08) stated that Natalia’s case is actually quite common. Even 
for large factories it was difficult to cover their demand for labour, since many of the 
former workers had left the sector, shifting to other activities. This high demand for 
workers triggered once again the trafficking network. Henceforth, the sweating system 
experienced an even stronger impulse, as the prices paid to talleristas remained extremely 
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low. According to Gustavo from La Alameda, this was the real explosion of the sweating 
system. Today, unofficial estimations state that there exist about 5,000 sweatshops in the 
City of Buenos Aires (Fundación El Otro, 2007), plus more than 15,000 in Greater Buenos 
Aires (Clarín, 25/4/06). Once again the sweating system, emerged as a response to an 
economic crisis, is healthier than ever in the midst of an economic recovery (2002-2010). 
 
Daniel, a senior officer at the CDM (interviewed on 28/1/08), explains with clarity what 
was ‘the real problem’ when fashion consumption recovered in late 2002. In his view, the 
rapid increase in demand for producers and workers could only be met by sweatshops 
because they were in the best position to supply the industry with a large pool of cheap 
workers quickly. Certainly, the devastating experience of those with medium or large 
apparel factories  during the 1990s, discouraged those who went bankrupt and any 
potential newcomers to come back or to set up their own factories after the 2001-2002 
debacle. The country, in a broader sense, had lost the industrial capacity to cover the 
increasing demand for industrial goods. In Daniel’s words, “the dismantling of the 
industrial thread in the country with the economic policies applied from the dictatorship to 
Menem [1976-1999] had its impact in the clothing industry.” As already said, the few large 
enterprises that had existed in the city shut down.  
 
6.1. Who do sweatshops work for? 
 
Augusto (a leader from the Argentine Industrial Chamber of Clothing, henceforth CIAI, 
4/3/08) pointed out in the interview that the Ministry of Labour calculates that informality 
in clothing production in the country reaches 75 percent. He recognised that this estimation 
might be true and that informality is indeed one of the three priorities of the Chamber. Also 
Alberto (a union leader from the SOIVA – the official union – quoted above) said in the 
interview that “all the firms work with sweatshops”. This is to say that informal workshops 
(of which many are sweatshops in virtue of the fierce competition among them) produce 
virtually all kinds of clothing. However, in analysing the information from the interviews 
two broadly defined markets can be identified. Firstly, there are a number of illegal 
outdoor markets, of which the largest is called La Salada. Secondly, there are the brands 
and retailers, both the well-known ones as well as the medium and small ones, the majority 
of them being national firms (despite a few multinational sportswear brands – e.g. Puma 
and Adidas – and the recently arrived Zara). There also exists a third circuit, said to be 
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rather marginal according to my three interviewees in the CMD; it is that of the apparel 
produced for designer markets, which is a new fashion in Buenos Aires and is spreading to 
some other cities in the country (Mar del Plata, La Plata, etc.). This circuit is central in the 
introduction of young designers into their professional practise, but according to 
interviewees in the CDM and to a young designer who has a stand in one of these markets 
(Mariana, interviewed on 8/2/08), garments sold at these markets are overwhelmingly 
produced in sweatshops.74 
 
6.1.1. La Salada 
 
A significant part of apparel commercialisation in the city takes place in unregistered 
stores and outdoor markets. In these, low and medium quality garments, at times fake 
duplicates of larger brands, are sold in a completely illegal circuit. These garments are 
produced in sweatshops, and in many cases the owner of the stand is the tallerista him or 
herself. Nano (an officer from the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial [henceforth 
INTI], interviewed on 7/3/08) explained to me that since the commercialisation of the 
garment is much more profitable and less risky than producing for contractors, several 
talleristas are rather interested in having their own stands in the markets and subcontract 
production. The largest of these markets is called ‘La Salada’ and is said to be the largest 
outdoor market in Latin America. People from all around the country come to La Salada, 
load the merchandise and bring it back to their cities, to sell it – according to Nano – in 
small and medium stores in medium and large cities country-wide.  
 
According to CIAI, in Buenos Aires and its surroundings alone illegal markets have a 
turnover of U$S 700 million yearly, representing 30 to 35 percent of the whole business 
nationally. However, there exist no official statistics with this regard, and indeed those 
provided by the CIAI are suspect given their vested interest in apportioning blame  on such 
informal commercial circuits for the totality of the informality in the sector. Indeed, the 
chambers promoted this discourse quickly after the tragedy in Viale, and in the interviews 
with the leaders of CIAI (Augusto) and the chamber CAIByN (Beto)  blamed La Salada 
and other illegal markets for the sweating system. When I pointed out that there are also 
                                                 
74 Indeed, despite having a module on professional practise in the undergraduate course, professional 
designers are not taught the legal framework regulating subcontracting, even if they might end up in prison 
for subcontracting to sweatshops. I asked young designers and students in the high stage of their course about 
this, and checked the outline of those modules in which this should be taught, but the Law of Homework 
(12713/41, see section 8 in this chapter) is definitely not taught. 
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brands being taken to court for the use of sweatshops, Augusto denied the responsibility of 
the brands stating that “that’s a political move to damage the reputation of certain brands”. 
When asked for details, he refrained from further developing his statement by telling me to 
“just read the newspapers”. This position was also held by Ramiro (15/02/08), a leader of 
SOIVA, who in the interview emphasised several times the role of the “unscrupulous 
entrepreneurs”, i.e. – in his view – those of ‘La Salada’.  
 
6.1.2. Brands 
 
By linking the sweating system exclusively to these illegal commercial circuits, the 
chambers attempt to separate brands from sweatshops. However, the thorough dedication 
of La Alameda and of the City’s Public Defender to campaigning against sweatshop labour 
exposed the clear links between small as well as renowned brands and sweatshops. The 
pressure from both La Alameda and the City’s Public Defender, as well as from the City’s 
Deputy-Secretariat of Labour (Armando), led the City’s government to carry out numerous 
inspections. In many of these, labels and other documents (like informal receipts) showing 
links with the brands were found systematically in sweatshops. The wave of inspections 
post-Viale quickly revealed that sweatshops were working for La Salada but also for 
dozens of registered brands, some of them well-known ones in the local market (e.g. 
Kosiuko, Soho, Zara, Mimo, Cheeky, etc.). 
 
Garments made in sweatshops for brands can be commercialised in three different circuits. 
Small and medium brands may sell their products either in illegal markets, on the one 
hand, or in semi-formal places geographically concentrated in the same neighbourhoods as 
the sweatshops (Once, Caballito, Flores and Bajo Flores) on the other hand. Thirdly, there 
are the medium-large and large renowned brands that sell in high street stores and in 
shopping malls (Lieutier, 2010: 82). 
 
According to Nano from the INTI, brands do not only use sweatshops but are also majorly 
responsible for the emergence of the illegal circuits; given that the pay they get from the 
brands is extremely low, talleristas search for an alternative circuit, and having a closer 
connection to the market – through these outdoor markets – offers a better economic 
alternative. As said by Gustavo, “La Salada is the rebellion of the talleristas.”  
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6.2. New actors: the ‘agencias’ 
 
Some brands commission the organisation of production to agencias, which in the years 
after the 2001-2002 crisis multiplied and became important actors in the industry. The 
agencias have been critical in the implementation and organisation of the sweating system 
since 2002. I interviewed the co-owners of two of these firms (one of each type). Natalia 
(quoted above) and Claudia (interviewed on 28/2/08) explained to me that there are two 
types of agencias: (a) those that are simply intermediaries between the brands and the 
direct producers (they take the pieces of cloth already cut from the former, take them to the 
workshops and bring them back to the brand ‘finished’); and (b) companies that bring 
clothing catalogues to stores and brands and produce them to order. Fernanda (from the 
CMD) noted that these agencies are amongst the most important winners in the current 
boom of the industry. Finally, it is worth noting that Natalia confessed to producing the 
garments  in sweatshops,75 while despite Claudia saying that they subcontract production 
to registered workshops, the prices she said she was paying to subcontractors (e.g. $A3.50 
for a blouse) are actually sweatshop prices. In her case, in 2007 the agencia produced less 
because, according to her, imports from China increased steadily. Surprisingly enough, 
despite this drop the situation of the company continued to be very favourable. The 
explanation is clear: this is only a logistics firm; as a mere intermediary, it does not have to 
pay for the crisis, because it has very low fixed costs. The fluctuations from one year to the 
other are instead faced by the talleristas, or more precisely by the workers.  
 
7. Strategies of the entrepreneurs: the ethics of Capitalism 
 
 
Augusto, a manager of CIAI, pointed out in the interview that the main concerns of CIAI 
are: (a) the control of imports; (b) the high level of informality; and (c) developing export 
capacity.76 Entrepreneurs argue that given the present conditions it is impossible for the 
sector to overcome the high level of informality. The argument can be summarised as 
follows: ‘if we ask all the domestic companies in the sector to fully register their activities, 
paying all the corresponding taxes and salaries and maintaining the long term compromises 
                                                 
75 She said that “these Bolivians of the workshops are silly, you have to explain them a hundred times what 
do you need them to do; so I send someone else to talk to them.” 
76 These issues were raised by the chambers in a series of working groups between entrepreneurs, union 
leaders and officers from the ministries of economy and labour that were launched by the hitherto minister of 
economy (Lousteau) in early 2008. Campaigners against sweatshops were excluded from these. 
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with subcontractors – as established by Law – we will have to increase our prices to levels 
which make it impossible to compete with the cheap imported garments from China’. Both 
the ‘Chinese threat’ (accounting for the way in which entrepreneurs refer to the ‘threat’ of 
a ‘flooding’ of the domestic market by imports from China) and the high level of 
informality are further developed below.77 
 
7.1. The ‘Chinese shadow’ 
 
According to a report from the Ministry of Economy (CEP, 2008) the 1996-2002 drop in 
production can be partly explained by the higher level of cheap imports. As already said, 
further to the trade liberalisation during the beginning of the 1990s the strong exchange 
rate facilitated the importation of garments. However, these imports are said to have 
affected the internal market by driving down prices, rather than in terms of their relative 
participation in the domestic market, which, according to the Ministry of Economy 
“reached about 11 percent of the total market at the end of the 1990s” (CEP, 2008; see also 
Kestelboim, 2008; Lieutier, 2010). Nowadays, entrepreneurial associations fear that if the 
high level of inflation continues without strong trade protection, the industry may 
experience a crisis similar to that of the 1990s. According to CIAI, in 2007 imports from 
China grew 30.5 percent with respect to the previous year, as the rising costs made it 
worthwhile for some companies to produce in China or to simply import finished 
garments.  
 
Matías, an experienced officer at the Ministry of Economy since 1990, who participated in 
the negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the GATT (interviewed on 11/3/08), argued that 
the high dependence of Argentina on soybean and soy oil exports to China makes it 
difficult to lift trade barriers to its industrial goods. Indeed, in May (2010) Argentina lifted 
the top-down importing reference price on footwear and this led to non-tariff measures 
from the Chinese government to soy oil coming from Argentina. Two years ago Matías 
had said to me that every time the country attempts to protect its market from Chinese 
imports, the Foreign Affairs Ministry gets a letter from the Chinese ambassador 
threatening to adopt counter-measures. However, Matías also pointed out that the 
entrepreneurial clothing associations “complain too much about imports [and that] they use 
                                                 
77 It is worth noting that exports and sweatshops do not have strong links, as they do have in the case of 
international sweatshops. 
120 
 
 
it to justify their dreadful labour practices.” This vision is  shared by several officers, by La 
Alameda and by a union leader. Indeed, both chambers and the Fundación ProTejer are 
actively promoting the discourse of the threat of a ‘flooding’ of cheap imported garment 
and textiles. Fundación ProTejer (which brings together both clothing as well as textile 
producers) is the most active organisation in demanding trade protection. Its statistics 
indicate that while industrial production is growing at 5 percent a year, textile and clothing 
imports are growing at 20 or 30 percent (Karagozian, interview in Radio 10, 15/2/08). 
However, there exist divergences among actors with regards to the real dimension of this 
issue; the statistics reveal that the level of relative participation of imported clothing 
reached only 8.7 in 2006 (CEP, 2008), but the entrepreneurial associations argue that these 
garments have a strong impact in ‘disciplining’ prices, i.e. they set  lower  prices across the 
whole internal market.  
 
The lack of reliable statistics makes it difficult to determine whether this perception is 
accurate. Nevertheless, Aldo Karagozian, the head of Fundación ProTejer, asserted that it 
is false that imports from China drive prices down, because no matter the cost of the 
garment, the price is set according to which segment of the market the company selling it 
is focused on; in his own words, “imagine that I have sold a t-shirt at A$ 39; whether I get 
it for A$ 18 made in Argentina or A$ 14 made in China, I will sell it anyway at 39 pesos; 
because of this, it is incorrect to say that imported goods discipline prices in the internal 
market” (interview in Radio 10, 15/2/08).78 Indeed, one of the questions I made to 
entrepreneurs was whether they fixed their prices according to those of their competitors. 
The result is astonishing: none of them assured that competition is a major concern. As 
said by Martín (an entrepreneur, interviewed on 29/2/08) “sometimes I might have a look 
at the prices of my competitors, but very rarely; instead I always set my prices according to 
the segment of the market in which I want to sell.” Furthermore, even Augusto from the 
CIAI recognises that internal competition is not significant as a factor determining prices. 
Nowadays, the fact that some of the most expensive brands (e.g. Legacy and UFO) import 
some of their garments from China may be signalling an important shift from what 
happened during the 1990s: garments imported from China during the 1990s were 
invariably of poor quality and low priced, but today China has broadened up the range in 
the quality of its exports. According to Gloria (the professor at the UBA referred to 
earlier), today China produces a vast range of garments in terms of  quality – including 
                                                 
78 Translated from Spanish. 
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cheap women’s underwear and men’s suits for Gucci – and the quality of what is imported 
into Argentina varies every year. Hence, the idea that clothing from China has a direct 
effect on driving prices down may seem to be influenced by what happened in the 1990s, 
when apparel from this country was cheap and of low-quality.  
 
This is to say that evidence supporting CIAI’s and CAIByN’s point of view that imports 
have a strong impact over prices in the internal market is rather poor. While this impact is 
still to be studied, the worrying lack of official statistics helps entrepreneurial associations 
to promote this vision and allows them to use the ‘Chinese threat’ to keep salaries and 
working standards at the lowest level in the whole manufacturing industry. In the 
interviews, while recognising the importance of imports, workers and some trade unionists 
and officials downplayed their importance, highlighting that it is simply a discursive tool 
used by entrepreneurs to push down working standards in the negotiations of the collective 
bargaining contracts. The threat of a foreign common enemy seems to be more about a 
“scalar narrative” (Swyngedouw, 1997) than about a real limitation to the better 
organisation of the industry.  
 
In other words, the ‘Chinese threat’ is actively used by entrepreneurs to avoid discussions 
about the distribution of wealth within the industry. Despite the entrepreneurs’ constant 
complaints, the manager of an agencia admitted that brands multiply the total production 
costs they have by at least three or four to set the price: “they make immense profits”. 
Indeed, earlier this year (2010) the chambers announced in the news magazine ‘Noticias’ 
the profits made by the industry during 2009, which amounted to nothing less than A$6 
billion (£1 billion). Not even the Ministry of Economy has had access to the cost structures 
of the firms, as they have repeatedly refused to disclose this information to the authorities. 
However, the numbers were finally exposed by one of the former Deputy-Secretaries of 
Labour of the City of Buenos Aires, and these were published in one of the main 
newspapers (Página/12, 3/2/08). Today, the value of a t-shirt sold in a store for 100 
Argentine pesos (A$), is distributed as follows: the brand pays, for the finished product, 
A$20, including inputs (mainly the fabric), internal costs (design, marketing, etc) and 
payments to the agencia. In the case of selling it in its own stores, the brand gets A$80: 
A$22 to pay the VAT, and A$10 for store rent and employees’ salaries; thus the brand’s 
net profit is A$48.79 The agencia charges the brand A$7 for the T-shirt, and the sweatshop 
                                                 
79 In case of selling the T-shirt to a retailer, the brands gets a net profit of A$19 and the retailer gets A$29. 
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is paid A$3.80. At the bottom of the chain, the worker gets A$1.90 (Pagina/12, 3/2/08). In 
sum, the brand makes a profit that is 25 times that of the worker. This is why Gustavo from 
La Alameda asserts that it is here, in the debate about the distribution of wealth within the 
sector, where the answer to stopping sweatshops lies. In his view, entrepreneurs “want to 
live like in Denmark paying salaries of Ethiopia”. 
 
7.2. Informality 
 
When asked why informality in the sector reaches 75 percent, interviewees at the two 
chambers and at ProTejer (Omar, interviewed on 20/2/08) asserted that it is because of the 
lack of support from the state (although CAIByN also blamed “illegal immigrants”). In 
their view, SMEs – which represent 84.5 percent of total employment in the sector (CEP, 
2008: 65)80 – find it hard to afford the complete registration of their businesses, because 
the tax structure is set up in such a way as to favour big businesses. There is a strong 
feeling in the sector that “if you have to pay all the taxes, you must live for the state”, as 
Natalia asserted. Although complaints about the tax structure are widespread in SMEs’ 
organisations (like APyME), Jorge (an officer at the Factory Inspections Office of the 
Province of Buenos Aires, interviewed on 7/3/08) said that “if you can’t afford to pay the 
taxes, then your business plan is not good enough and you have to invest your money in 
other business.”  
 
Contradicting entrepreneurs, Nano from the INTI pointed out that the lack of serious, long 
term and effective management of the business is an endemic problem of the whole sector. 
Indeed, the four talleristas I interviewed stated that contractors do not ask for any kind of 
receipts; one of them (Marcelo) said that “the brands and the intermediaries only ask us for 
lower prices and to meet the deadlines.” The complete informality of the production 
process is the norm, despite the words of Beto (CAIByN) who maintained that “the brands 
are not informal; it is the Bolivians who are informal”. In Nano’s view, there is a complete 
lack of knowledge of the management of the business; even if the physical production of 
the garment is subcontracted, starting businesses requires designing a long term business 
plan, a good management and marketing strategy and so on. Contrary to the general belief, 
running an efficient workshop requires significant investments in machinery; there exist 
special machines for each of the sewing processes; some of these are not cheap, but if a 
                                                 
80 The definition of SME used by CEP in this report involves companies with up to 150 workers. 
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company plans its business in the medium term, it must subcontract to a workshop that has 
these machines in order to achieve a lower cost per unit, and it should even help its 
subcontractors to invest in what is needed to improve productivity (see 8 in this chapter). 
Julieta (an employee at the Textiles Division of the INTI, interviewed on 21/2/08) stated 
that, at present, the huge majority of the garment is produced with the most basic 
machines, and at the end of the day this represents an incalculable inefficiency cost for the 
industry: millions of working hours lost due to the use of improper machinery. Currently, 
she asserted, “the enormous cost of this inefficient management of the business is being 
paid by the workers.”  
 
In conclusion, officials maintain that, if run properly, a clothing company can be a good 
business even paying all the corresponding taxes, but the short term business planning and 
the complete informality are the rule.  
 
8. The legal framework  
 
By subcontracting the labour intensive processes of their products, brands seek to transfer 
responsibility for working conditions to contractors, passing onto them the risks of the 
economic downturns as well. Indeed, in some countries (like Italy, the UK and the US) the 
legislation establishes that the boundary of the responsibility of the brand is restricted to 
the activities performed by their direct workers. However, in Argentina things are 
different.  
 
Two laws regulate subcontracting activities: the Law of the Labour Contract (22744/74) 
and the Law of Homework (12713/41). Both establish that enterprises, intermediaries and 
factory and/or workshops’ owners are co-responsible in solidarity for the working 
conditions in the whole chain. On the one hand, the relationship between the worker and 
the tallerista is regulated by the first of these, which is a very progressive law that was 
passed in 1974, and according to José (from the Asociación Obrera Textil, cited above) its 
approval signalled the height of the previous four decades of strong union power. On the 
other hand, Law 12713 regulates the link between brands, intermediaries and talleristas, 
stating that the latter two are both employees and work givers: while intermediaries are 
employees of the brands and work givers to the talleristas, the latter are employees of the 
intermediaries and work givers to workers; meanwhile, the brands are, of course, work 
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givers to both. In sum, what this means is that if a conflict between a worker and a 
tallerista arises, the brands are as much responsible as the intermediaries and the tallerista, 
because according to the legal interpretation the latter is viewed as a mere boss in the 
production chain.  
 
This Law, which is especially important as a protection to the tallerista – mostly when he 
or she is a small or medium entrepreneur – is the main legal element being used by La 
Alameda and by the City’s Public Defender to take 113 national and multinational brands 
(including Adidas and Puma) to court, accused of making profits out of the use of 
trafficked labour working under conditions of servitude.81 These legal processes are taking 
place at the present moment. In September 2008 the first court decision was made in the 
case of an allegation against a Korean citizen who was an intermediary working 
systematically with a sweatshop owned by a Bolivian immigrant. The court decision 
established that workers were “subjected to servitude” (sic) because its bosses took 
advantage of their vulnerability as illegal immigrants in order to make a profit, affecting 
their very dignity (Lieutier, 2010). The decision consisted not only of a concrete financial 
punishment, but it also ordered the confiscation of the machinery and granted it to “some 
organisation that in one way or the other [will use] it to continue with the textile activity, 
providing jobs to a number of workers and contributing to their development…” (extract 
from the court decision, quoted in Lieutier, 2010: 67) This is when members of La 
Alameda (which owns a workers’ cooperative) started conversations with the INTI (a 
public but highly independent institution) to open a model textile factory for workers’ 
cooperatives (see 12.2 in this chapter). Furthermore, the decision set jurisprudence and 
some months later a second case followed this path. Certainly, this court decision showed 
that the pressure from the bottom (i.e. the struggle of La Alameda) was highly influential 
in leading a federal judge to take such a progressive decision. 
 
Despite the said court decisions, allegations against large brands are not progressing. 
Indeed, the first court decision absolved the large domestic brand Cheeky from any 
responsibility, despite the large amount of evidence that the prosecution had presented 
(which, according to Mario, included nothing less than a former manager willing to report 
the brand for labour exploitation, an administrative worker who had given La Alameda a 
list of sweatshops working for the brand, and a sweatshop worker). In the second most 
                                                 
81 According to Lieutier, the government of the City of Buenos Aires is the first and the only government in 
the world, so far, that has legally demanded brands for using sweatshop labour. 
125 
 
 
advanced trial against a brand (Soho), a first instance decision from the judge also 
acquitted it, despite the fact that according to Nestor (a worker of Soho, interviewed on 
10/3/08) this brand subcontracts the totality of the physical production of the apparel 
(except the cutting), to sweatshop subcontractors. In this case, the judge’s decision stated 
that working conditions in sweatshops are the result of ‘cultural features’ of the people of 
the Altiplano (Northern Argentinean and Bolivian Andes), whose long term culture 
legitimises certain work practices which, despite being punished by Argentinian Law, 
belong to the people in charge of the sweatshops and their workers. This highly racist 
vision is indeed shared by several of the interviewees, including an officer at the national 
Ministry of Labour (Eduardo, interviewed on 10/10/08) and a union leader (Alberto, from 
SOIVA). The idea is summarised by Eduardo’s statement:  
 
they exploit each other. The worker keeps his head down until he gets enough funds to start up 
with his own workshop in order to reproduce the system. 
 
Given the unacceptable nature of the court decision, the prosecutors (La Alameda and the 
Public Defender) took the trial to a superior court, inviting the Bolivian Council and the 
Department of Anthropology of the Universidad de Buenos Aires – which participated 
through a presentation by a specialist in Altiplano culture. The Court upheld the claim of 
the denunciators, ordered the judge to revise his sentence, and ordered an investigation to 
analyse La Alameda’s claims of corruption.  
 
In virtue of how dangerous the current Law of Homework is for the entrepreneurs’ 
interests, quickly after the tragedy in Viale they expressed a strong interest in pushing 
forward a change in it. CAIByN (2008) (main proponent of the modification) argued that 
the current law “is an anachronistic law that distorts subcontracting and leads to further 
labour casualisation”, while Augusto from CIAI asserted that “the legislation is too 
complex [and] it must be simplified.” Beto from CAIByN explained to me that the 
chambers stress two main structural difficulties for the firms to comply with the current 
law. On the one hand, they argue that it is impossible for brands to control all the circuits 
their clothes follow when they subcontract, given that the production of each garment can 
involve many work places. However, using the example of the auto-makers, which invest 
millions of dollars in teams of lawyers who deal with subcontracting, Nano from the INTI 
stated that brands should assume the financial responsibilities that complying with the law 
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implies. In the same vein, Jorge, from the factory inspections office of the Province of 
Buenos Aires, said it clearly:  
 
entrepreneurs have to control working conditions in their own factories, and in case of 
preferring to subcontract it is exactly the same. They can by no means pass the responsibility 
onto a weaker actor in the chain. If they choose to subcontract, they have to assume the risks of 
their own decisions. 
 
The second typical complaint from entrepreneurs is the lack of registered workshops. 
Indeed, some of those entrepreneurs who were subcontracting the production of garments 
in the interviews pointed out that finding a good and cheap workshop is extremely 
difficult. Mariana (a young designer, quoted above) said that “when you find one good 
workshop you have to stick to it; the information about which workshops are good really is 
valuable. With the one I use now I feel like finally I found a good one!”  
 
Information from the interviews is nevertheless contradictory. Fernanda, working at the 
CMD, said that they have a long list of workshops in the CMD that is available for 
everyone, and that people at the CMD can actually suggest the best options to those who 
approach the Centre. Regarding this issue, Nano once again expressed his indignation 
against “these cheeky entrepreneurs” who pretend to have good workshops while sweating 
all their talleristas and workers. Certainly, paying extremely low prices, not requiring 
formal documents and not maintaining a constant flux of orders is an inadequate policy to 
develop good contractors. In his words,  
 
if they had a policy to develop contractors this would not be a problem; they should sign in 
contracts committed to ensuring stable prices, a continuous flow of orders, financial support 
and so on. Only in this way they would have good quality workshops working in completely 
legal conditions.82 
 
CAIByN, together with CIAI and other entrepreneurial groups, designed an alternative text 
and met with the authorities of the ministries of labour and economy to push forward their 
proposal for a modification of the law. As said above, one of the few points that their law 
proposal changes is the issue of the responsibility in solidarity, seeking to relieve the 
brands from any responsibility over working conditions outside their direct sphere of 
control. In this proposal, the talleristas would become SMEs, which means that the links 
between the brand, the intermediaries and the talleristas would now be merely commercial, 
                                                 
82 As said above he said this using the example of the significant investments of auto-makers to develop 
subcontractors. Just as an example, in 2006 Ford Motors dedicated the main part of its investments in 
Argentina to develop subcontractors (totalising 12.5 million US Dollars) (Página/12, 1/10/06). 
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i.e. ruled by market forces and not by labour legislation (Fundación Alameda, 2008). In 
August 2008 the president Cristina Fernández announced that her administration was ready 
to send the proposal to the Parliament. In her words, this Law “will stop the indignity of 
servitude” (Pagina/12, 21/8/08). The main reason for the official support of this proposal 
was expressed by the minister of labour: “homework is currently regulated by a law of 
1941, from the prehistory of labour legislation, even previous to Peron” (Pagina/12, 
24/8/08). However, the proposal is currently stuck after a meeting of La Alameda and its 
lawyers with the minister of labour, in which the lawyers argued that the proposal to make 
brands not accountable would lead to a more severe disaster in the industry.83 
 
9. The role of the state 
 
The dimensions of the sweating system pose several questions about the role of the state at 
the national, provincial, and local level. Almost all of the interviewees, including certain 
officials from the three tiers, blamed the national government for the situation. This is 
because for several years the state did not take serious action to stop human trafficking and 
forced labour. Indeed, Mario contended that following the first allegations of the existence 
of conditions of servitude in sweatshops made by the city’s Public Defender in 1999, a 
series of inspections took place, but they stopped soon after following pressure from CIAI. 
However, the tragedy in Viale Street triggered demands for the state to get involved in 
these matters, and the anti-sweatshop struggle proved partially successful in achieving this 
goal. 
 
Key elements in the official supervision and control of sweatshops are the factory and the 
homework inspection divisions. Thorough and proper inspections are exceptionally 
important to prevent sweatshops from operating. Indeed, the tighter inspection pressure 
applied by the City after Viale led to a moderate but important improvement in the living 
conditions of the sweatshops. As said by Gustavo from La Alameda, many talleristas have 
for example rented a space for the workers to live outside the workshops, which represents 
an important step forward. The strategies adopted by several entrepreneurs to avoid the 
inspections of the City are also vital to assess the significance of inspections: the tighter 
controls made several talleristas relocate to shantytowns where inspections are more 
                                                 
83 Besides, La Alameda stressed to the minister its deep concerns about how an allegedly liberal government 
could support a proposal lobbied by an industry that enslaves thousands of its workers and that reaches a 
level of informality as high as 75 percent (and which is thus one of the minister’s everyday ‘headaches’). 
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difficult. Meanwhile, companies started searching for subcontractors in Greater Buenos 
Aires, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Province of Buenos Aires and, compared to 
the City, allocates fewer resources to factory inspections. In this way, entrepreneurs 
jumped scales to avoid being discovered. Claudia, who works in an agencia (cited above), 
made a statement which shows not only the importance of inspections, but also the dangers 
of having weak inspections:  
 
apart from being expensive, registered manufacturers have the disadvantage of receiving 
inspections once in a while, which is very rare in informal workshops.  
 
According to Mario and to Luis (a labour lawyer who collaborates with La Alameda, 
interviewed on 25/1/08), the offices of factory inspections were systematically dismantled 
during the 1990s. Indeed, this is confirmed by the current minister Tomada, who told the 
newspaper Página/12 (24/8/08) that when he started (2003) there were only 20 inspectors, 
i.e. not even 1 per province. Today he has 400 inspectors and believes that many more are 
needed. According to Jorge (the head of the Factory Inspections Division of the Province 
of Buenos Aires, cited above), the Province also has a strong deficit of inspectors: whilst 
according to Armando the City of Buenos Aires has 105 inspectors for a city of about 3 
million inhabitants, the Province has only 200 inspectors for a territory in which almost 16 
million people live.84  
 
In line with this, when in 2000 the national Ministry of Labour transferred the factory 
inspections to the provinces (and to the City of Buenos Aires) it did not transfer the 
homework inspections division to the City. It was alleged that these inspections have 
several specificities which require special training to apply. In the sweatshop in Viale 
Street, the relations with contractors were meant to be regulated by this division, but by the 
time the tragedy took place, the division had been reduced to a mere office with only one 
employee. With regards to this, Armando asked in the interview that “if the reason to keep 
this division under the domain of the Ministry was the ‘very important’ particularities that 
homework inspections have, why did they dissolve the specific body?” The answer 
remains a mystery, but the fact that this was an important advantage for the garment 
companies and that the national state was responsible for this, is unquestionable.  
 
                                                 
84 For example, in the district of La Matanza, where more than a million people live (and where La Salada is 
located), there are only 3 inspectors. 
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Other duties that the state has failed to fulfil are evident in both national and local 
administrations. The Office of Supervision and Control of the City, for instance, should 
have shut down all the unregistered workshops, and those which did not comply with 
health and safety regulations. Indeed, as mentioned above, the Office did shut down dozens 
of sweatshops, but this only happened in the week post-Viale. Also, the national Ministry 
of Labour is responsible for controlling the existence of unregistered labour. Besides, the 
Ministry of Justice and the Home Ministry should also take action against the sweating 
system, for it involves several serious violations of human rights and of migration 
regulations. However, these dependencies have taken little action in this regard, consisting 
only of a series of workshops about Bolivian immigration and their working conditions, 
which was organised in 2007 by an employee of the Secretary of Human Rights. Similarly, 
the complicity of the Federal Police (the only Police force in the City until 2010, a division 
belonging to the Home Ministry) complicates progress on this issue. According to the 
activists of La Alameda, Police stations have something called the ‘cash box of the 
commissary’: the money in the box comes from the many bribes collected by policemen in 
the operational area  of the station. In return, the Police would turn a blind eye to those 
who contribute to the box. Sweatshops are said to be one of the sources: every month, 
policemen would come to the sweatshops to collect the monthly pay.85 
 
All of these events challenge the vision of a ‘passive’ or ‘absent’ state, since some of these 
phenomena took place as a direct result of political decisions. Mario (an experienced 
lawyer with a broad knowledge of workers’ rights and international protocols on human 
rights) explained that these events were the result of the “parallel class interests of those in 
the higher arenas of the state apparatus and the brands’ owners.” In the interview, he 
explained that there exists a strong tendency in the discipline of Law that is one of the keys 
to understand the responsibility of the state: “officials who fail to fulfil their 
responsibilities with regard to certain workers’ and human rights violations, tend to be held 
accountable for these crimes when there is broad awareness of them in the wider society.” 
This tendency suggests that in these cases, with wider society cognizant of the thousands 
of sweatshops and dozens of thousands of trafficked migrants, officials should be charged 
as active participants in the economic activities being favoured by such illegal practices 
(see chapter 7). 
                                                 
85 Both activists from La Alameda and Armando maintain that on several occasions police patrols have been 
seen in the surroundings of the sweatshops prior to inspections. When the inspectors arrived, no workers, and 
sometimes no machines, were to be found. 
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When asked about the origin of the sweating system, Mario explained to me that when the 
City’s autonomy from the national government was agreed in 1996, the first administration 
distributed significant financial resources to several poor neighbourhoods by means of 
political ‘punteros’ (neighbourhood brokers). Some of the resources were invested by 
these people to buy properties that they would rent to talleristas, or even to start up sewing 
workshops themselves. Indeed, in his studies on the everyday practices of the state, Auyero 
(2001) analyses how political parties (especially the peronist parties) exercise political 
control in specific territories in working class and poor neighbourhoods in the City, as well 
as in the rest of the country. He focuses on Greater Buenos Aires, where more than 25 
percent of the country’s 40 million inhabitants live, and where the struggles for the 
elections take a particularly fierce stance.86 According to this author, the punteros provide 
people not only with medicines, food, toys for the children, social events and the like, but 
they also provide jobs, mostly in the local administrations, but also in “subcontracting 
activities for industrial companies” (see Auyero, 2001: 133).  
 
An extension of these ideas also manifests itself as a ‘conspiracy vision’ supported by the 
members of La Alameda. In their view, there exists a clear interest of the state in letting 
these highly profitable activities based on the over-exploitation of migrant labour (notably 
including women’s sexual exploitation) develop. These businesses represent perhaps the 
most profitable economic activities in the country. Based on his political activity and 
contacts, and on the information collected during La Alameda’s investigations into human 
trafficking,87 Gustavo asserts that the distribution of the wealth created by these activities 
is, to a high degree, governed by the national state, and notably includes the ruling party, as 
well as other political parties. In his view, these processes are similar to those referred to as 
‘primitive accumulation’ by Marx (1970 [1818-1883];88 see Volume I, chapter 26), and are 
giving rise to a handful of new powerful capitalists protected by the ruling party; this 
                                                 
86 Peronist movements – with the different factions of the Partido Justicialista – are particularly important and 
skilled in these practices.  
87 These investigations include visits to the sweatshops, brothels and rural areas where these crimes take 
place. On several occasions La Alameda used undercover workers and customers with hidden cameras in 
these places, and used it as a main element of its campaigns. 
88 Marx (1970 [1818-1883]; see Vol I chapter XXVI) identified a series of processes of ‘primitive’ or 
‘original accumulation’ that, in “the prehistory of capital” gave birth to the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and 
the proletariat, on the other hand. These processes consisted on the separation of workers and (mostly) 
peasants from the means of production, processes in which the state had a major role. According to Harvey 
(2003, 2006), processes similar to these are at work today, mostly through privatisation of state enterprises 
and public debt, which do not require investments and entail plainly a redistribution of wealth in favour of 
the elites. 
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handful of men, one of whom was a taxi driver only ten years ago, would be the main 
financers of the political campaigns.89 However, this new group of powerful bourgeoisie 
protected by the Party would dispute the power of the dominant capitalistic (and 
oligarchic) groups, who are historically anti-Peronist.  
 
In virtue of the similarities with the case of Prato, I will come back to this issue in chapter 
7. 
 
10. The anti-sweatshop struggle 
 
The aforementioned tragedy in Viale Street revealed the existence of thousands of 
sweatshops in the city. In only a couple of days, a society that had believed itself to live in 
the First World and that considered itself more European than Latin American, understood 
that sweatshops are not a feature of South East Asia, Northern Mexico or Central America.  
Instead, those practices which had been thought of as resigned to the past were exposed as 
being very real and present in densely populated neighbourhoods of contemporary Buenos 
Aires.  
 
According to Gustavo, the accusations in 1999 about the existence of sweatshops in 
Buenos Aires were soon forgotten after a week because of a lack of pressure from workers. 
However, since Viale the issue does occupy a major space in the national media, and 
continues to do so after many years. Authorities are thus constantly forced to take action. 
In sum, things were different this time; notably, Argentina was not the same country at the 
end of the 1990s than it is at the beginning of the 21st century. Rising unemployment, 
poverty and inequality led to deep social unrest with long term consequences. After the 
rebellion which overthrew two presidents in a matter of days in January 2001, hundreds of 
social movements continue to arise and to struggle for a multitude of causes; there is a new 
impulse to engage in social life, protesting or organising alternatives to what the state and 
capital may offer. In this case, the Popular Neighbourhood Assembly of Parque 
Avellaneda, also called La Alameda, engaged in the struggle against sweatshops. It seems 
fair to assert that without the incessant activities and pressure of La Alameda, the issue 
                                                 
89 This would mean that these campaigns are being partially financed with the sweat of trafficked 
immigrants. 
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would have lost importance in the media and the problem would have been forgotten, just 
as in 1999. 
 
10.1. A main actor in the struggle: La Alameda 
 
La Alameda is a neighbourhood assembly formed during the 2001 popular uprisings. At 
that time, and during the whole of 2002, more than a hundred neighbourhood assemblies 
arose in Buenos Aires as a consequence of both the economic crisis and as a result of the 
loss of legitimacy of the public institutions and the traditional political parties. People in 
Buenos Aires felt the necessity to engage in public life and to try and solve the  problems 
in their own neighbourhoods. Events in the neighbourhood of Parque Avellaneda resulted 
in the emergence of La Alameda.  
 
La Alameda works as a popular dining hall in an occupied building. The presence of 
sweatshops in its neighbourhood is notable, and several garment workers used to have 
lunch in La Alameda’s dining hall. In this way, these workers who used to visit the place 
entered into contact with the activists and told them about their working conditions and 
about those people who could not even leave the sweatshops to have lunch. Little by little, 
workers escaping from sweatshops and therefore losing work and shelter, went to La 
Alameda to ask for support. It was at this time that the activists decided to get in touch 
with the City’s government (reaching through this process Mario who had been involved in 
the denunciations in 1999). In October 2005, six months before Viale, a joint denuncia 
(denunciation) was made, but at that time the national and local administrations did not 
take action. Finally, in March 2006 the tragedy occurred and the whole issue took a 
different turn. In only one week, the City’s government shut down more than a hundred 
sweatshops (Página/12, 10/4/06). The tragedy upheld La Alameda’s claims and in 
response, they engaged in a more active campaign against sweatshops – and also against 
brands benefiting from them. Nowadays, the pressure from the bottom is constant; dozens 
of demonstrations take place and La Alameda has managed to maintain a strong presence 
in the media. As Gustavo says, “we provide free information to all the media, without any 
distinction, and thus they find themselves obligated to inform the people about it.” More 
recently La Alameda has engaged in the issue of child labour and human trafficking more 
broadly, and, as said above, it has produced several media reports with hidden cameras in 
sweatshops, places where women are subjected to sexual exploitation, and places where 
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child labour occurs. This material was given to all the main TV channels for free, and thus 
the news achieved major media coverage. La Alameda’s struggle against sweatshops was 
indeed the kernel of these strategies. 
 
As mentioned in section 5, the comprehensive closure of sweatshops by the City’s 
administration in the aftermath of Viale resulted in several sweatshop workers – generally 
led by talleristas – reacting against La Alameda. Faced with these demonstrations, this 
organisation started to broaden its activities and to develop responses and even concrete 
economic alternatives for the newly unemployed. It is partly in virtue of this that La 
Alameda is today much more than a dining hall; it is indeed a community centre with 
several activities available to the neighbourhood. With regards to sweatshops, its 
achievements have gone further than the legal actions and the permanent public exposure 
of sweatshop labour. For example, they have created the Cooperativa 20 de Diciembre,90 
in which women formerly working in sweatshops are associates. The list of activities 
includes a long series of achievements:  
 
• Provision of free legal support for garment workers (they have set more than a hundred 
labour demands against registered and unregistered factories);  
• Job Centre; 
• Temporary shelter and assistance to apply for government support for those escaping 
from sweatshops; 
• Assistance to immigrants asking for regularisation of their immigration status, which 
includes coordination with the International Organization of Migration of the UN);91 
• Creation of an alternative (not recognised) union (the ‘Unión de Trabajadores 
Costureros’ or UTC); 
• Organisation of union’s factory commissions and participation on the election of 
authorities in the official union;  
• Edition of a monthly newspaper and of a bulletin that they distribute in the main 
factories; 
• Participation in international forums on trafficking in humans; and 
• International coordination through the launch of a slave-free clothing brand joined to a 
workers’ cooperative in Thailand.92 
 
Finally, La Alameda is one of the founders of another of the most promising responses and 
one of the best examples of a way out of the sweating system: the Polo Textil (Textile 
Pole). The importance of this initiative merits further attention.  
                                                 
90 20 December, 2001, was the date in which the popular rebellions led to the resignation of the hitherto 
president De la Rua.  
91 Today, almost 5,000 immigrants have applied for residence permit in the office run by unpaid activists of 
La Alameda. 
92 The brand is called No Chains (www.nochains.org) and it was launched in 4 June 2010. 
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10.2. ‘Polo Textil’: The workers providing the good example 
 
On 1 July 2008, INTI, La Alameda, the NGO ‘Corporación del Sur’ and the City 
inaugurated the ‘Centro Demostrativo de Indumentaria’’ in Buenos Aires (known as ‘Polo 
Textil’ or just ‘Polo’). It is a large garment factory with room for nine cooperatives of 10 
people to work in it. Three professionals of INTI provide management, training and at 
times orders from contractors. The division of labour within the Polo is planned to work as 
follows: each cooperative will carry out specific stages of the production process, from the 
cutting of fabrics to finishing of the garment.  
 
The Polo is mostly a result of the anti-sweatshop struggle led by La Alameda. The 
machinery being used was taken from a large sweatshop owner and granted by a judge in a 
trial initiated by La Alameda. In addition, some other machinery was provided by the 
national Social Development Ministry, and the property was bought by the City. 
 
Despite having room for nine cooperatives, only 5 cooperatives with an average of 8 
workers each are currently working in the Polo. The project is facing a number of severe 
problems. Chela, a member of La Alameda and a worker in one of the cooperatives 
(interviewed on 15/4/10), identified two main problems. On the one hand, the Polo asks for 
much higher prices than those that the brands use to pay to their subcontractors; its prices 
are three times those of the sweatshops, not only because workers are registered and taxes 
are paid, but also because to set its prices the polo takes into account the final price of the 
garment being produced, to ensure a proper redistribution of wealth within the chain. This 
is why only a few brands and designers actually place orders from the Polo. In return, they 
get a certification of INTI stating that the garment was made under proper working 
conditions. 
 
On the other hand, one of the main problems the Polo has is the habits of the workers 
in the sector. The original idea was to provide an alternative workplace to workers 
escaping from sweatshops. However, as Chela said, only 20 percent of the workers in 
the Polo come from sweatshops. 'There were more, but some of them left.” Instead, 
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the great majority of them come from factories or failed cooperatives. Chela explains 
the reasons for this with the following words (sic):93 
 
Working in the Polo implies a new way of working for them, that is, the cooperative way to 
manage the companies and to distribute profits. But when they get here, workers expect to 
comply with their working day and to get their salary at the end of the month, or every 15 days. 
But cooperatives do not work like that; the workers must understand that they are their own 
bosses, that they are responsible for getting the orders and the resources to pay for their own 
salaries… Also, working in these cooperatives implies as well dedicating time to the 
management of the firm, instead of just sitting in the machine and sewing… and that’s a very 
hard task. They have too many years of experience under a wage relation, both registered and 
not: this is as difficult to understand for formerly registered workers as it is for former 
sweatshop workers. Sometimes they just don’t come to work; some have even left without 
previous notification…. This makes it very difficult to maintain a stable group of workers and 
cooperatives, and to achieve a proper way to organise production in the whole Polo that would 
make production smooth and much more efficient. 
 
The difficulties the Polo is facing are revealing in terms of the complexities that the 
struggles against sweatshops entail. Even if class politics are essential in this sense, 
issues more broadly connected to the workers’ personal stories must also be taken 
into consideration. I will come back to this issue in chapter 7, when analysing the 
‘long and uncertain road to freedom.’ 
 
11. Conclusions 
 
Since 2003 the Argentinean economy has been growing at a rate of more than 7 percent a 
year. According to official statistics, unemployment dropped from 21.5 to 8.4 percent in 
the same period (INDEC, 2010).94 However, a large proportion of the jobs created during 
these years are informal, and informal employment accounts for 37.3 percent of total 
employment (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2010). The income of these workers is on average 
48.3 percent lower than that of the formal workers, and even worse: their average salary 
does not reach the poverty line. As a result, while the real salary of registered workers 
increased since 2002, that of the informal labourers decreased. Once again, Argentina 
provides a good example of the incapacity of orthodox economists to explain the real 
economic facts: the theory of the spill over is a myth; in times of economic recovery, 
workers sustain the economic growth of firms and nations working harder, but in real 
terms their income drops. In other words, in times of economic recovery inequality 
                                                 
93 The reader might need to be reminded that statements from my interviewees marked as ‘sic’ are transcripts 
of interviews I recorded. 
94 Official statistics on unemployment underestimate it, since they consider beneficiaries of social plans (a 
broad scope of subsidies that start from a pay of only 15 percent of the poverty line) as employed. 
136 
 
 
deepens. The thousands of migrants subject to trafficking and to servitude or forced labour 
in brothels, intensive agriculture, the building trades and sweatshops, represent the most 
severe manifestation of this inequality. 
 
The high level of unemployment generated during the 1990s by the privatisation of state-
owned enterprises, by deindustrialisation and by a higher labour productivity (partly 
resulting from the increasing presence of multinational companies) pushed labour 
standards down, generating a new level of tolerance which even today, after eight years of 
uninterrupted economic growth, continue to be accepted de facto by the state and by 
workers themselves. In other words, unemployment was used as a device to justify the 
driving down of labour standards, but when employment levels subsequently rose again 
there was not a concomitant increase in labour standards. In this chapter I have quoted a 
lawyer of the textile workers’ union (José) stating precisely this, and showing that despite a 
few exceptions, it was unemployment rather than labour legislation that created a high 
level of flexibility and a lower level of demands from the unions (whose priority is still, 
according to José, to “keep the jobs”).  
 
A marked process of deconstruction of the formal labourers and of growth of ‘flexible 
jobs’ started with the imposition of policies aimed at redistributing wealth away from 
labour, which were introduced through state terrorism (1976-1983). Garment workers in 
Argentina are amongst the most affected by the political and economic changes the country 
has undergone since then, particularly by the policies aimed at dismantling the industrial 
thread that had developed with certain success during the imports substitution era (1945-
1974). A model of financial valorisation was imposed in order to end the industrialisation 
of the country’s economy and in order to deconstruct the hitherto highly mobilised 
mainstream labour movement, so that wealth could be redistributed in an allegedly more 
effective way. In these years when financial capital provides higher and safer returns than 
large capital investments, industrial production can only provide significant returns if 
carried out under as much informality as possible, including flexibilising labour 
relationships so that investors avoid paying for the costs of economic downturns and 
mistaken decisions made by managers. 
 
In the clothing industry, the shutting down of several companies (mostly during the 1990s) 
rendered thousands of workers  unemployed, while others were given machines to continue 
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working for the companies from home, having to shoulder the risks of someone else’s 
investments. Today, despite the front pages of women’s magazines showing successful 
fashion entrepreneurs, garment workers in factories receive the lowest salary in the whole 
manufacturing industry. This is the result of what economists call ‘labour productivity’: in 
ten years (1993-2003) labour productivity in the sector grew by 45 percent (MECON, 
2005); in an economic activity where there have not been highly significant technological 
advances, this increase has a single cause: further exploitation of the labour force.95 But of 
even greater concern, nothing less than 75 percent of the workers in the sector are 
informally employed, and many of them work as slaves for both illegal markets and for a 
myriad of brands, be they small, medium-sized or renowned brands; be they local or 
multinational firms. 
 
The strategies followed by old and new clothing entrepreneurs made – and continue to 
make – these matters worse. It is undoubtedly true that thousands of clothing firms have 
been highly affected by the economic policies applied since the 1970s, and that the sector 
is particularly vulnerable to economic downturns. In virtue of these facts, and owing to the 
high labour-intensive nature of the industry, the state should pay special attention to the 
sector. However, once again the firms in the sector, with the chambers taking the lead, 
show a worrying lack of professionalism in the management of their businesses. 
Entrepreneurial associations in a sector with 75 percent informality are demanding that the 
state  subsidise them in order  to formalise their businesses, and to release them from being 
accountable for in their subcontractors’ factories and sweatshops. Instead of applying 
policies to develop contractors (i.e. helping contractors grow) in times of economic 
growth, companies push down prices to manufacturers and workshops. There exists no 
planning of the businesses, no contracts and not even invoices or receipts of any kind. 
According to some entrepreneurs I interviewed, the few good registered manufacturers that 
exist in the city are “too expensive”, and they have a key disadvantage: labour and health 
& safety inspections. Irregularity is the rule of the companies: the more irregular, the 
better. The case of Natalia (the co-owner of an agencia) is illustrative enough: in 2007, 
after nine years of having started her business, she decided to register it. According to her, 
her friends in the industry told her that she was “crazy” for doing so.  
 
                                                 
95 In this case, it also means further use of informal labourers, since the increase in the companies’ revenues 
is registered but the use of more informal labourers is obviously not. 
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The extent to which certain commercial exchanges affect the industry is not being 
measured by the state, nor is it being addressed with intelligent strategies to counter the 
possible social-dumping that imports may be causing. However, a pervasive and 
amorphous (Moby Dick-like) foreign threat cannot justify the exploitation of labour until 
the point of forced labour. In this sense, the improvement of the working conditions clearly 
depends upon the sector itself, i.e. in the redistribution of wealth within the industry, and 
not in further public benefits for businessmen that have shown to be capable of the worst 
labour rights violations, in times of significant success. 
 
The process of deregulation of the mainstream workforce started by the dictatorship 
through open repression of the labour movement in March 1976, was deepened during the 
1990s by further policies of deindustrialisation and its consequent unemployment, and by 
means of the dismantling of the bodies in charge of enforcing labour rights (labour 
inspections divisions). Despite the efforts of the current administration, the events during 
the 1990s seem to have imposed a minimum standard of acceptability too low to be rolled 
back to the years of the welfare state. Instead, the economic domination of state 
management (Jessop, 2002) has permeated the current administration to the point of basing 
a large part of its economic policy on the allowance of a high level of informality, which 
implies, as already said, an effective way to subsidise the private sector. As shown by the 
statements of a high authority at the labour inspections division of the Ministry of Labour 
in the interview (10/10/07), authorities consider that they cannot ‘suddenly’ enforce labour 
legislation over enterprises because they would be strongly affected and possibly they 
would shut down, causing further unemployment. But the relaxation of controls over the 
compliance with labour legislation resulting from such an approach is having devastating 
consequences for workers. This tolerance of the violation of workers’ rights certainly 
reaches its highest level in terms of enforcing the rights of migrant workers, involving the 
human rights violations described in this thesis, even in a country with a strong tradition of 
human rights movements (associated with the crimes of the dictatorship).  
 
Nevertheless, the dimensions of the sweating system pose further questions about the role 
of the state at the national, provincial, and local levels. Trafficking in humans has grown 
exponentially in the country during the 1990s, and after the crisis (1998-2002) it was 
reactivated. The current administration shows no interest in containing this matter, and 
indeed high authorities in the government are said to be involved in networks controlling 
139 
 
 
human trafficking. Members of La Alameda argue that the development of these processes 
is allowed and even partly controlled by the state. Certainly, these provide accumulation 
rates that no other activity can ensure, and such accumulation is seen as a business 
opportunity that the state, when managed under the belief that the market mechanisms will 
finally ensure an effective redistribution of wealth, can by no means oppose. Instead, 
political parties in power seem to engage with these businesses in order to only allow 
individuals that are close to their interests to benefit, sewing their own mafia-like 
agreements with traffickers, a fact that is becoming more and more clear in the trafficking 
of women for sexual exploitation and that has not been contested by evidence to the 
contrary.  
 
Faced with this reality, workers have organised throughout the solidarity of a 
neighbourhood assembly which is now at the frontline of the anti-sweatshop struggle in 
Buenos Aires. They hardly count on the support from the government, and the main union 
sees La Alameda as a threat. However, by means of thorough and intelligent strategies of 
networking with lawyers, with the media and with anti-sweatshop organisations world-
wide, La Alameda has achieved to install the issue of sweatshops and of trafficking in 
humans in the public agenda. Unfortunately, a tragedy had to occur for their struggle to 
reach the national media, and to lead a few progressive authorities to take action in defence 
of the weakest. 
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Chapter 6: 
Sweatshops in Prato: Between Zhejiang and Tuscany 
 
The Chinese in Prato are a problem for the European manufacturing industry (…) They 
must adjust to our economic categories and to our model, because if not we are 
importing foreign economic models and destroying ours.  (…) Economic enclaves [like 
this one] are the end of the European manufacturing economic model. 
 (Franco, former official of the Department for Multiculturality, Prato’s City Council) 
 
They have completely reshaped the city’s industrial zone with this invention (…) Prato 
used to be a textile city. Today it’s a low-cost fashion district. 
(A. Ceccagno, quoted in Spiegel, 9/7/06) 
 
1. Introduction  
 
It is Monday 5pm in Prato’s Central railway station. During a whole hour, thousands of 
workers step out of the trains coming from Florence and its surroundings. They work in the 
services and public administration sectors. Years ago, my neighbour Loris notes, it was the 
other way round: in flourishing post-war Prato, hundreds of workers arrived at Prato 
Centrale railway station in the morning to work in the thousands of factories that populated 
the city, and to leave after their day’s work.  
 
During the 1960s and the 1970s, Prato, the third largest city of the Centre-North of Italy 
with 185,000 inhabitants (2008), was a rich and flourishing city, perhaps the best example 
of the success of the Third Italy’s industrial districts (see below). Indeed, in 2001 it was the 
largest textile district, amounting for 6.1 percent of total T&C employment in districts 
(trumping Milan’s 5.1 percent) (Dunford, 2006: 34). Thousands of hyper-specialised 
textile micro-enterprises populated this factory-city in which, for example today, 30 
percent of the total amount of enterprises is industrial, compared to an Italian median of 
12.2 percent (Camera di Commercio di Prato, 2008: 26). However, since the mid-1990s 
Prato’s textile industry has been experiencing a complete collapse: between 1996 and 
2007, 3,300 companies ran out of business, leading to a loss of approximately 30,000 jobs 
(Camera di Commercio di Prato, 2008: 26).  
 
Simultaneously, the city witnessed the development of a strong circuit of clothing and 
clothing accessories manufacturing. Between 1981 and 2001, while textile companies 
dropped from 14,593 to 6,180, clothing companies rose from 771 to 1,900 (ISTAT 2001 
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Census, cited in ORT Artigianato, 2007). In relative terms, while in 1981 only 5 percent of 
the T&C companies produced clothing, in 2001 they represented 23.5 percent.  
 
Looking at the statistics, one could say that the downfall of Prato’s textile industry was 
balanced by the development of a strong clothing industry. Certainly, the clothing sector 
brings into the city a trade surplus of nearly €200 million (Camera di Commercio, 2008). 
However, as discussed in this chapter, the two circuits are hardly interconnected. Today, 
with very few exceptions, clothing companies do not even buy fabrics from local textile 
companies. Instead, they have developed what locals call a “parallel district”. In this 
district, the overwhelming majority of the companies are small and medium clothing 
manufacturing workshops owned by Chinese immigrants. Indeed, the activity was brought 
by Chinese entrepreneurs, some of them previously established around neighbouring 
Florence, but the majority of them were brought to the city by the increasing demand of 
labour from clothing manufacturers. Today, official statistics indicate that 13,840 Asian 
people live in the city of Prato (2008), but Police (Questura) estimates point to another 
5,000 irregular migrants (cited in Il Sole 24 Ore, 22/7/08). Franco, from the Department for 
Multiculturality (interviewed on 1/10/08), even asserted that during the high season for 
clothing manufacturing, there are 25,000 Chinese citizens in the Province of Prato. The 
difference is made up of more than 10,000 clandestini (irregular immigrants) that go 
around Italy and Europe following job orders. The majority of them, and some of today’s 
legal residents, were brought to Europe through an international trafficking network. 
Besides this, according to the Chamber of Commerce (2008) there exist circa 3,500 
enterprises owned by Chinese nationals in the Province of Prato; about 70 percent of them 
– that is, 2,500 – specialise in clothing.  
 
While at the beginning they worked exclusively as subcontractors for Italian firms, many 
have become entrepreneurs since the early 2000s and have developed their own successful 
business circuit. Today, according to a book published by the business newspaper ‘Il Sole 
24 Ore’ and supported by the Unione Industriale Pratese (Pieraccini, 2008), the sweating 
system in Prato produces one million garments a day, generating an annual revenue of €1.8 
billion (£1.5 billion).96 This circuit is what in Prato is called ‘the parallel district of the 
Pronto Moda’ and is said to be ‘a Chinese invention.’ The contrast of such successful 
activity to the collapsing textile industry has led the newspaper ‘La Repubblica’ (29/7/09) 
                                                 
96 It should be noticed that Il Sole 24 Ore is a newspaper that has strong links with Confindustria, the main 
entrepreneurial organisation in Italy. In other words, it is the voice of the largest businessmen in the country. 
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to talk about “a two-speed district”: “Prato is two cities, side A and side B, one inside the 
other, two circles that touch each other but do not interact other than at very few points.” 
 
The same source also states that at least €1 billion of the €1.8 billion is off the books. 
Indeed, officials in the labour inspectorate of the Province of Prato point out that in the 
inspections to companies under Chinese ownership they regularly find serious 
irregularities, like unregistered labour (very often labour under irregular immigration 
condition), poor health and safety conditions, lack of reporting of work accidents, and 
fiscal evasion, among others. In fact, in December 2007, a Sunday evening programme in 
the official TV channel (RAI 1, 2/12/07) revealed some of these irregularities. Some of 
these companies were found to be assembling purses and other leather goods for large 
high-end fashion houses like Dolce & Gabbana, Prada, Chanel and others. Indeed, these 
widespread practices among clothing companies owned by Chinese immigrants have been 
the object of attention of ‘Business Week’ (22/10/01), ‘Le Monde’ (10/11/05), ‘Der 
Spiegel’ (9/7/06), the ‘BBC’ (2/8/07) and ‘France’s Channel 4’ (22/7/2008), amongst other 
media.  
 
These companies qualify as ‘local sweatshops’, according to the description laid out in 
Chapter 2. Although not all Chinese owned clothing companies are sweatshops, it is fair to 
conclude, at least for methodological purposes, on the basis of media and labour inspector 
reports, that the sweating system in Prato is currently comprised of 2,500 sweatshops.  
 
In this chapter I start by setting the general historical and geographical context in which 
such an astonishing phenomenon takes place. Three main elements are emphasised: a 
context of industrial decay resulting from increasing international competition of goods 
and products from low-wage countries (itself made worse by the free-trade policies of the 
EU and the European Monetary Union of which Italy is a signatory); a turn from Welfare 
to Neoliberal State (i.e., a state managed by a political and technocratic class closely linked 
to capital’s interests), with some workfare state elements (Jessop, 2002); and a decisive 
shift in the balance of power between capital and labour since the early 1980s, which has 
led to increasing labour casualisation. The latter in particular has made even worse the – 
otherwise historically high – level of informal labour, linked to the development of 
submerged economies like the sweating system in Prato.  
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The origin of the sweating system in Prato is analysed in the following section. My 
findings are based on interview results and partly on Ceccagno’s (2003) work on Chinese 
immigration into Prato. Four main causes are found: (a) the pre-existence of several 
Chinese fashion-firm subcontractors in the Province of Florence; (b) the textile industry’s 
deep crisis, on which the city’s economy had been overwhelmingly based; (c) the urban 
morphology of the city centre and its immediate surroundings; and (d) the ‘entrepreneurial 
culture’ of the city, whose backbone was partially made of SMEs and informal sectors. 
Following from this, I put forward a thorough description of the sweating system in Prato, 
typing sweatshops according to output destination, and focusing in particular on their ties 
to high-end fashion houses and the development of the parallel Pronto Moda district. An 
analysis of the reasons for the sweating system’s success follows, with a focus on the great 
capacity of sweatshops to provide the industry with the increasing requirements of 
flexibility, record times and low prices, and on the semi-legal and illegal practices used by 
the ‘Chinese entrepreneurial class’ to maximise its profits. Of these practices, human 
trafficking is addressed separately, in order to describe in depth the mechanisms of the 
trafficking network/s that operate and its/their possible links with the Chinese authorities in 
Italy, and the appalling situation of thousands of migrants in the very heart of historically 
‘red’ Tuscany.  
 
Following these descriptions, I discuss the importance of the state as the main institution 
responsible for guaranteeing the well-being of its citizens and respect towards ethnic 
minorities, as established by international conventions signed by the country. The long-
standing policy of ‘letting this happen’ through a lack of political action has (more or less) 
concrete reasons. The main one is the success of a handful of local entrepreneurs in light of 
the availability of a large pool of sweatshop labourers and of the huge money inflow that 
this system brings into the city. In my understanding, these prominent local entrepreneurs 
are slated to become the new rich of the city, the face of the successful recovery of a 
Southern European city ruined by industrial decay. For them to actually become so, the 
state is allowing the development of this underground economy. Such policy is certainly an 
indication of the lack of alternative policies from public authorities, and a sign of the 
increasing penetration of capital’s interests and logic into the state’s policy-making that 
Jessop identifies for this post-Fordist era.97 
                                                 
97 Officials and entrepreneurs also mention the fear of a violent response from the Chinese community in the 
city as a reason to not stop with the sweatshop crisis, recalling the Chinese community’s revolt in Milan in 
April 2007 (see La Repubblica, 4/4/07). In 2007 the BBC (2/8/07) quoted the chairman of the Unione 
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Finally, before the concluding remarks, I address the role of the unions. I emphasise their 
difficulties in a context of increasing labour flexibility – to which the three main unions 
have largely subscribed – and industrial decline, and their lack of proactive policies to 
counter the negative effects of economic developments and the state and capital’s attempts 
to make the working classes pay for the crises. Based on the interview responses, I 
conclude that the penetration of capital’s logic is not limited to state politics. It is also 
internalised in union politics.  
 
2. Neoliberalising Italy 
 
Since the post-war economic boom – itself strongly based on industrial production 
exported to the newly created European Economic Community (1957) – Italy’s economy 
has followed a downward slope (despite the success of the 1983-1987 period) and its GDP 
actually shrank in 2008. Its industrial firms proved unable to face increasing international 
competition, in a context in which the EU has rather condemned manufacturing firms 
(mostly based in Southern European countries) to the competition of cheap imports from 
Southeast and East Asia into the EU market. Since the early 1980s, this process was 
paralleled by the increasing pressure of entrepreneurs for the flexibilisation of the labour 
market. Legislation furthering the casualisation of labour relations, generally agreed 
between capital, the state and the main unions, was applied little by little until present day. 
At the same time, informal labour experienced renewed growth, and today it reaches a 20 
percent (excluding agriculture, where informality is known to be rife) (OECD, 2000; 
quoted in Gallin, 2001). Finally, the increasing penetration of capitalist logic into the state 
apparatus, justified in terms of removing politics from state management, led to less social 
expenditure and to an increasing participation of entrepreneurial associations like 
Confindustria into policy-making. 
 
The state played a major role in implementing these measures and in creating the political 
environment that served these plans. Similarly to the case of Argentina, labour 
flexibilisation and cuts on social welfare expenditures were introduced also by means of 
                                                                                                                                                    
Industriale Pratese as saying that “I fear that what happened in Milan could happen here in Prato.” However, 
he failed to explain how this is related to a possible reaction of this kind in Prato, which leads me to discard 
this as a reason. 
145 
 
 
“state terrorism” (Balestrini and Moroni, 2006 [1988]).98 The murders of workers in the 
hands of police forces, which between 1947 and 1969 had reached 91 workers (Virno, 
2006 [1988]: 340), escalated to more than one hundred only between 1975 and 1977. 
Besides, thousands of workers, students and scholars were imprisoned (and in some cases 
tortured) under martial laws99 or even without charges. Specifically in this sense, the 
Italian case is not a less clear example of neoliberalisation than that of Argentina. Indeed, 
the relevance of the Italian case for Harvey’s analysis of the origins of neoliberalism is 
noticeable: the tensions that had built up since the large strikes of the mid-1950s and 
throughout the 1960s, exploded in the early 1970s with the economic stagnation (Balestrini 
and Moroni, 2006 [1988]). With decreasing profit margins, entrepreneurs understood that 
the moment to break up with the “accords” that tied up “big labour, big capital, and big 
government” were to be written off. The balance between capital and labour was to be 
turned into capital’s favour by means of state terrorism. 
 
2.1. Italy’s broken heart: producing industrial goods in today’s Europe 
 
During the post-war period, alongside the growth of manufacturing production, the Italian 
economy was said to be experiencing an economic miracle.  
 
In the twenty years from 1950 to 1970 per capita income in Italy grew more rapidly than in any 
other European country: from a base of 100 in 1950 to 234.1 in 1970, compared to France’s 
increase from 100 to 136 in the same period, and Britain’s 100 to 132. By 1970 Italian per 
capita income, which in 1945 had lagged far behind that of the Northern European countries, 
had reached 60 percent of that in France and 82 percent of that in Britain (Ginsborg, 1990: 
239). 
 
Duggan (1994) attributes this ‘economic miracle’ partly to the favourable conditions in 
which Italy’s industry found itself when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957: “between 
1958 and 1963 Italian exports increased on average by 14.4 percent per annum, with the 
percentage going to EEC countries nearly doubling” (Duggan, 1994:263). During the 
1970s the average annual growth of the GDP reached 3.8 percent, only surpassed by Japan 
and Canada among the G8 countries (4.2 and 4.1 percent respectively) (UNCTAD, 2010). 
Trigiglia and Burroni (2009) assert that this ‘miracle’ was mostly sustained by the 
industrial growth of the North West of the country (the so-called ‘industrial triangle’ which 
                                                 
98 La strage di stato (State terrorism) is also the name of an anonymous book edited in 1970 that sold more 
than one million copies and became popular amongst activists. 
99 Indeed, some of these laws had been adopted during Mussolini’s dictatorship and were still in force. 
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includes the cities of Milan, Turin and Genoa), and that the state-owned companies IRI and 
ENI (created during the fascist period and in the early 1950s, respectively) played a key 
role in cheapening energy and other industrial products, notably steel. However, towards 
the end of the decade, the country suffered the consequences of the international crisis. 
Inflation grew and trade got stuck. From then on, average annual growth did not recover: 
2.5 between 1980 and 1989, 1.7 between 1992 and 2000, and 0.8 between 2000 and 2007, 
when it was the lowest level amongst G8 countries. This is despite the more successful 
1983-1987 period, which according to Ginsborg (1990) was associated with industrial 
export-led growth. In 2008, partly in virtue of the financial crisis started in October, Italian 
GDP dropped (UNCTAD, 2008).  
 
These trends are at least partially explainable by the way in which Italy’s economy was 
affected by the European Union. The introduction of the European Monetary Union in 
1992, and notably the introduction of the Euro in 2002, implied the impossibility of 
devaluing the Lira to gain competitive advantages in exports (mainly industrial goods): 
“without the escape valve of devaluation, firms open to foreign competition have been hit 
particularly hard” (Trigilia, 2009: 635). Increasing trade liberalisation – negotiated by the 
EU in the WTO – also affected industrial production. The result was a downward trend in 
output. In 2007 total industrial production was 1.6 percent lower than in 2000, mostly in 
manufactures (which have seen a drop of 3.6 percent in the same period) (ISTAT, 2008: 
374). The textiles and clothing industries provide a clear example of these developments: 
between 2000 and 2007, total output dropped 15.6 percent100 (see 2.4 in this chapter). 
 
2.2. Good-bye Welfare State 
 
The above mentioned changes at the European Union and international levels have 
strongly influenced Italy’s politics. In this sense, the 1990s are identified by Ferrera and 
Gualmini (2000) as “the Italian transition”. Towards the beginning of the 1990s, 
government debt was already surpassing GDP, and debt services were increasing rapidly 
along with the interest rate. Besides this, the European Monetary Union put further 
constraints over budgetary policies (Della Sala, 1997). It was in those years that policies to 
restrict public expenditures, as well as the privatisation of state-owned companies, were 
carried out. 
                                                 
100 These numbers might be misleading because statistics include both textile and clothing production. 
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Italy embarked on major plans for privatisation and restructuring of the welfare state relatively 
later than other industrialised states. It is only now in the 1990s, with the blunt instrument of 
the convergence criteria [the concertazione] to marginalise resistance, that governments have 
put through major reforms that have introduced greater market forces to many parts of the 
economy, and put into private hands major state holdings (Della Sala, 1997: 27-8). 
 
This same author notes that the 1992 corruption scandals, when one-third of the Chamber 
of Deputies being accused of corruption, opened the field to a new generation of 
politicians, while traditional parties “[took] a back seat” (Graziano, 2007). The right-wing 
parties Lega Nord and Forza Italia were born in those years. The first of these led the 
voices of tougher fiscal control, i.e. less social spending and greater labour flexibilisation.  
 
The emergence of new political forces, such as the Northern League, put fiscal responsibility 
and tax reduction firmly on the political agenda. The new political forces were able to combine 
anti-tax sentiments with public reaction to the corruption scandals of the 1990s, which led to 
greater questioning of the utility of public expenditure and state intervention in the economy 
(Graziano, 2007: 28). 
 
2.3. Trickle down versus shouldering the costs 
 
According to Ginsborg (1990), the late 1970s marked a political economic shift in Italian 
contemporary history. Several centre-left-wing governments since 1962 had helped 
maintain some balance of power between capital and labour. The more ‘consensual’ 
approach adopted by certain leaders of the Italian Communist Party (henceforth PCI) and 
its closest trade union (CGIL) in reaction to the economic slowdown of the late 1970s 
helped attenuate worker protest (Ginsborg, 1990). In Ginsborg’s view, central to this was 
the cooperation of the CGIL leader (Luciano Lama), who in a famous interview in the 
newspaper ‘La Repubblica’ was “in favour of wage restraint, increased productivity and 
workers’ mobility” (24/1/78; quoted in Ginsborg, 1990: 389). The logics of the CGIL’s 
approach were explained by the CGIL’s economist Labini: 
 
the Left must help the reconstitution of private profit margins – which today are extremely low 
– deliberately and without fake consciousness. This has to be done even putting forward 
measures that are onerous for workers (quoted in Balestrini and Moroni, 2006 [1988]: 668).101 
 
According to Balestrini and Moroni (2006 [1988]), the PCI – with its famous leader 
Berlinguer – had a key role in driving the unions in this direction. Indeed, Balestrini and 
Moroni (2006 [1988]: 665) stress that the cooperation of the PCI in the repression of 
                                                 
101 Translated from Spanish. 
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independently organised workers was deliberate and very active, and involved an 
ideological campaign favouring the establishment of martial laws (like the Legge Reale, 
which entailed “an authentic ‘license to kill’ for the police forces (and) that provoked 350 
victims in its first 10 years in force”).102  
 
Under such circumstances, “as never before in the history of the Republic, employers, 
unions and government sat down” to agree on a plan for economic recovery (Ginsborg, 
1990: 389). In Ginsborg’s view, the plan succeeded in creating some economic recovery, 
although the outcome of the concertazione (tripartite negotiations) was unfavourable to 
workers. “The mechanisms of wage indexing were made less favourable to the workers, 
strikes were discouraged and agreements over mobility and productivity were signed with 
the employers” (:389). Ginsborg concludes that 
 
once again, as in 1945-47, the PCI was unable and unwilling to use its considerable powers of 
mass mobilisation to force the [Christian Democrats] into making real concessions. Once 
again, they accepted the internal logic of the capitalist plea to salvage the economy without 
having an alternative economic strategy of their own (:390). 
 
The new consensual approach of the institutional left was both cause and consequence of 
the conditions that laid the ground for weaker labour power. In this context, Ginsborg 
(1990) and Duggan (1994) point out that events like the 1980 capitulation of a strike at the 
largest FIAT factory103 had tremendous consequences for workers, but most of all for those 
remaining in the informal sector and, with the subsequent labour flexibility, for young 
people entering the labour market under precarious contracts. However, this event appears 
as little more than irrelevant when confronted with the hundreds of murders and 
imprisonments of workers and students since the mid 1970s. In 1977, a group of renowned 
French intellectuals (including Foucault, Sartre, Guattari, Deleuze and Barthes) condemned 
the situation in Italy in a public statement, exposing the responsibility and the complicity 
of the Christian Democrats – the main political force in Italy between 1946 and 1992 –, the 
police forces, and the PCI in “the banning of demonstrations in Rome, the siege in 
                                                 
102 Translated from Spanish. 
103 According to Ginsborg (1990) and Graziano (2007), the historical turning point was the capitulation of the 
35-day-long strike at the largest FIAT factory in the surroundings of Turin, September-October 1980. The 
strike ended with a large counter-demonstration by 40,000 white-collar workers willing to go back to work. 
An agreement with FIAT was signed by the union leaders the day after the counter-demonstration. In 
Ginsborg’s understanding, with this agreement the owner of FIAT and at that time president of 
Confindustria, Giovanni Agnelli, “won a famous victory and set the pattern of industrial relations for the 
coming decade” (1990: 404). 
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Bologna… and the plain shootings to the crowds in demonstrations” (Lotta Continua, 
5/7/77; quoted in Balestrini and Moroni, 2006 [1988]: 614).104  
 
Capital’s need to control the labour movement in Italy was successfully carried out by the 
state during the process of neoliberalisation of the country. Despite the concessions to 
ensure the acquiescence of the institutional Left and the largest unions – which included 
limited labour flexibilisation in the public sector, where the unions are still strong – the 
defeat of the extra-parliamentary Left and its grassroots organisations (like the 
Confederazione dei Committati di Base [COBAS]) was significant, and laid the ground for 
important shifts in the Italian labour markets. 
 
2.4. The complexities of the Italian labour markets: of insiders, 
outsiders and mid-siders  
 
Madama, Jessoula and Graziano (2009: 389) note that the Italian labour market has 
historically been divided into two main groups of workers: the insiders and the outsiders. 
These “have traditionally enjoyed differential levels of protection against social risks, and 
notably against the risk of unemployment.”105 In the first group there are public 
administration and large and medium-sized company employees, among which 
unionisation is high and protection against firing and benefits for unemployment are 
significant. The second group encompasses those who work in the informal sector and who 
have no social benefits and protection against unemployment at all. Furthermore, 
according to these authors, there is a third category; the mid-siders. These include 
employees in micro and small enterprises, on the one hand, and the “multiform universe” 
of atypical labourers, on the other hand.106 This group represents workers who have much 
lesser job security and protection against unemployment than the insiders, but can at least 
have some (poor) benefits in case of unemployment (unlike the outsiders).  
 
The mid-siders are those who have been most affected by increasing labour flexibilisation 
that, in the view of Manuele (a labour lawyer of the Sindacato Italiano Autonomo 
Lavoratori Poste, interviewed on 29/9/08), started in the mid-1980s with the introduction 
                                                 
104 Translated from Spanish. 
105 Translated from Italian. 
106 Quoting Ministero del Lavoro (2008), the authors note that atypical labourers (a sub-group within the 
mid-siders) today reach 20 percent of the labour market, compared to being a rather marginal group in the 
late 1980s (cited in Madama, Jessoula and Graziano, 2009: 390). 
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of part-time contracts. Still, according to Manuele, the first big push in this direction was 
the introduction of Law 196 in 1997 (the so-called Treu Package on behalf of the then 
Minister of Labour), and more importantly the Biagi Law (Law 30) in 2003. The latter 
introduced 32 labour contract types and corresponding sub-types, leading, in the view of 
Manuele, to “an almost unlimited number of contracts.” It was passed with the usual 
argument that it would create jobs because it eased the hiring of workers. However, 
according to studies by the Ministero del Lavoro (2006; cited in Regione Toscana, 2007: 
29) and of Veneto Lavoro (2006; cited in Regione Toscana, 2007: 29), “it has been 
unanimously seen that the numerous forms of contracts introduced by the Law 30/2003 
(job on call, occasional job, staff leasing, etc.) have had a very modest impact on 
occupation.” It is important to note that Law 30 was opposed by about three million people 
in street demonstrations in Rome, Milan and other large cities in April 2002. Still, only one 
of the main unions (CGIL) opposed it, while the other two ‘signed in’. Its adoption was a 
“big collapse” for labour rights (Manuele), and it represented, most probably, the biggest 
capitulation of the labour movements in Italy in the last decade. These two laws affected 
mostly those who entered the labour market since then. They are the ‘precari’.  
 
2.4.1. I precari, a labour fashion 
 
Several years ago, the Italian word ‘precari’ (plural for precarious) was only an adjective; 
but today, after several years and laws on labour flexibilisation, precari is the noun 
denoting persons working on a flexible contract. A front page of the ‘Corriere Fiorentino’ 
(29/7/08) puts it like this: “The precari from our own home: there is always more, and it 
increasingly involves elder people. Fixed-term contracts: a rule”.107 The news referred to a 
report of the Istituto Regionale per la Programmazione Economica della Toscana (2008) 
about labour flexibilisation in Tuscany. The report showed that while in 1993 the precari 
accounted for 4.5 percent of Tuscany’s workforce, in 2006 they represented 12.5 percent, 
which is almost tripled, but still below the national and European rates (13.1 and 14.4 
percent respectively). Indeed, recent data cited by Regione Toscana (2008) indicates that 
more than half of the job posts created nowadays in Italy are ‘fixed term’ jobs, whereas in 
Tuscany, over 70 percent of new jobs are under fixed-term contracts (IRPET, 2008: 2). 
 
                                                 
107 Translated from Italian. 
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Madama, Jessoula and Graziano (2009) note how these shifts have led to a “more 
European” labour policy in Italy, as a response of Italian administrations to increasing 
pressures from the EU to adopt the strategy of flexicurity (on which, according to a report 
of Regione Toscana [2008], the Biagi law was inspired).  
 
The notion of flexicutiry is based on three main pillars. The first one consists of the adoption of 
measures that increase flexibility in the labour market by means of new regulations that tend to 
make the employment of new workers less rigid, on the one hand, and to disseminate non-
standard (or ‘atypical’) labour contracts. The consequence is lower job security in exchange of 
more jobs. However, greater flexibility has to be coupled  – and somehow compensated – with 
a higher income security and the strengthening of active plans to promote employment 
security, which represent the other two pillars of flexicurity (Madama, Jessoula and Graziano 
(2007: 388; emphasis in original).108 
 
Graziano (2007) points to certain state employment policies (like requiring the 
unemployed under income security to take training courses) and employment agencies 
deregulation (which until the Treu Package of 1997 where only public) as some of the 
workfare elements introduced in the country. However, as stated by Manuele, “in Italy, the 
process of deregulating labour guarantees did not take place along with the development of 
minimum social assistance plans, like laws of support for the unemployed and so on.”109 
Graziano agrees on this point and indeed notes that  
 
if Italy wants to fully adapt to Europe, it has to move in a new direction, with the reform of 
safety-net measures, an increase in unemployment benefits to make them more generous (in 
line with EU standards, at least with Southern European standards), and greater attention to the 
needs of atypical workers (i.e. offering employment protection to non-standard workers). 
 
These events, which led to a greater segmentation in the labour market (Madama, Jessoula 
and Graziano, 2009), have had tremendous consequences for union politics. In fact, 
unionisation among the precari is extremely low, because 
 
while working under a certain contract, they are already thinking about their next job, and also 
because many of them are looking forward to getting another contract with the same boss, and 
then they do not engage in union actions, they do not show up or speak in assemblies and so on 
(interview with Manuele).  
                                                 
108 Translated from Italian. 
109 When I asked Manuele to compare Italy’s labour legislation to that of other European countries, he argued 
the following (sic): “I would say that we are somehow in an average situation, but there is a problem: that is 
only true until 2003! I am not able to state where we are now, after this collapse… I mean, considering all 
this, I would even say that we are in the group of those who are worse off than the European average, 
because the workers have lost guarantees of job stability (…) One good indicator of this is that in the 
demands we take from workers, when Italian regulations are worse than the EU norms on labour issues, then 
we refer to the latter to raise Italian standards, since EU’s norms prevail. Until some years ago we rarely had 
to refer to EU norms because we were at a higher level than what was established through them, but today we 
have to refer to these more and more, meaning that we really are in the midst of a downfall.” 
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2.4.2. Outsiders of Italian history 
 
Referring to the outsiders, Madama, Jessoula and Graziano (2009: 390-91) quote official 
statistics (CNEL, 2009) to argue that there exists “a high level of informal economy, which 
in 2008 it was estimated to involve one out of five workers in the South and the Islands 
[Mezzogiorno] and slightly less than one in ten workers in the regions of the Centre-
North.” Other statistics are quoted by Hadjimichalis (2006: 88), who, though not quoting 
his source, asserts that informal employment represents between 16-17 percent of Italy’s 
GDP, only surpassed in the EU by Greece (19-22 percent). However, the US State 
Department points out that the informal economy in Italy reaches 27 percent of GDP, 
which would most likely raise the level of informal employment. 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4033.htm, accessed on 25/5/10).110 
 
Several authors (Dunford, 2006; Ginsborg, 1990; Hadjimichalis, 2006; Ross, 2002) stress 
the importance that the informal economy has had historically in the country. 
Hadjimichalis (2006: 88) quotes Mingione, who argued that “tax evasion, multiple job 
holding, moonlighting etc., are issues that form part of any description of how Italian (and 
in general Southern European) economy and society works” (Mingione, 1983). This has 
been the case for the Mezzogiorno but also the industrial North during the first years of the 
‘economic miracle’111 and in the industrial districts of the Third Italy (where there is a 
strong culture of “family-as-business” which involves self-exploitation and child-labour 
[Ginsborg, 1990]). Regarding the latter, Ginsborg (1990: 235) says that during the 
economic miracle “central government seems to have taken a permissive rather than 
propulsive role. Taxation on new firms was kept to a minimum and casually enforced. 
Bureaucratic norms governing firms’ activities were widely ignored, as were the social 
insurance contributions which they were supposed to pay.” 
                                                 
110 Which statistics are more reliable is a matter of speculation, but in any case it should be noted that in the 
Ministry of Finance’s latest annual General Report on the Economic Situation of the Country 
(http://www.tesoro.it/doc-finanza-pubblica/dfp.rgse.asp, accessed on 24/5/10), despite the detailed statistical 
information it contains, informality (or black, unregistered, clandestine, or submerged economy or jobs) is 
not even mentioned once.  
111 Ginsborg (1990) notes that in the industrial North, in the 1950s, newcomers found it hard to find a job 
straightaway in a large factory; instead, many of them specialised in construction, where “hours were long, 
turnover extremely high, and safety precautions minimal.” In the second half of the 1950s a new semi-legal 
figure was created, generally managed by Southern immigrants already established in the North; these were 
known as ‘the cooperatives’. These small companies “provided the Northern factories with cheap labour”; 
workers had to pay a fee and they would start working “without any proper contract, pension provisions or 
employer’s insurance payment” (Ginsborg, 1990: 223). 
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As already noted, micro and small enterprises make up a large portion of the labour market 
in Italy. According to Madama, Jessoula and Graziano (2009: 394) 38 percent of the Italian 
workforce is employed in companies with up to 20 employees, a widespread phenomenon 
in the industrial districts of the Third Italy. In their critiques on the industrial districts 
literature, Ross (2004) and Hadjimichalis (2006) note that the special provisions for artisan 
companies (those with less than 16 employees) have traditionally fostered informal 
employment in the industrial districts. Indeed, workers in these firms are not entitled to 
have union representatives, and their salaries and working standards are lower than those 
of the industrial workers because their bargaining contracts are negotiated under different 
(less favourable) conditions (see 7.1 in this chapter).112 
 
As I will note below (see 2.3.2 in this chapter), informal employment and exploitation and 
self-exploitation of employers and their relatives are essential to Prato’s ‘entrepreneurial 
culture’, which according to my interviewees has helped the development of the sweating 
system. 
 
2.4. Producing textiles and clothing against liberalisation interests 
 
In the clothing industry, all the elements above identified as major structural facts affecting 
industrial production and working conditions, as well as the existence of a significant 
portion of informal labour, reach perhaps their zenith: a framework of permanent economic 
instability that strongly affects a sector with such volatile demand; trade liberalisation – 
mostly through the EU – and unfair competition of cheap imported garments; and since 
some years ago the availability of thousands of cheap sweatshop workers for whose 
working conditions manufacturers are not legally bonded, and regarding which the state 
seems especially tolerant. 
 
The end of the MFA, negotiated by the EU in the Uruguay Round of the GATT (despite 
complaints by the Italian government) left domestic manufacturers unprotected when 
                                                 
112 There exist three types of bargain contracts per sector: (a) the contract with Confindustria, which applies 
to large companies (i.e. those with more than 50 workers); (b) the one with CONFAPI, which applies to 
SMEs (between 16 and 50 workers); (c) and the one with the artisan companies’ representatives (CNA and 
Confartigianato), which applies to companies with 15 or less workers. Generally, working conditions and pay 
are better in larger companies, where it is also more likely that such conditions can improve through factory-
based contracts. In addition to these, territory-based contracts by region can also be formulated. 
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having to face the increasing competition of cheap imports from SE Asia – less due to 
imports into Italy than to imports into the Northern European countries (traditional buyers 
of ‘Made in Italy’ fashion goods). In this regard, Simone (from the Department of 
Economic Development of the Tuscany Region, interviewed on 9/6/08) asserted that “the 
trade norms that until a certain moment had helped us today penalise us.” In his view, with 
the end of trade protection and increasing international competition  
 
the market has changed [and] the contradictions have exploded. The conditions that guaranteed 
our economic development during the 1960s and the 1970s cannot guarantee our development 
today, much less in sectors in which we compete with Asian countries. 
 
The EU’s trade policy concerning textiles and clothing industries illustrates the differences 
of interests within the Union. As Maurizio (from one of the two artisan entrepreneurs’ 
organisations [Confartigianato], interviewed on 4/6/08) explained to me, trade 
liberalisation was mainly fostered by large variety chains and retailers from Northern 
Europe, in order to be able to import and offer cheap garments in their stores. Besides, 
according to him the lack of legislation on rules of origin for textile and clothing products 
allows Northern retailers to import cheap garment and change the label to a ‘Made in Italy’ 
label, damaging the image of Italian products. The complaints of the Italian government to 
the EU are thus based on two main issues: reciprocity in the terms of trade (mostly with 
China), and the establishment of rules of origin (tracciabilitá). Regarding the former 
Massimo (an officer at the Department of Economic Development of the Province of Prato, 
interviewed on 18/6/08), explained to me that the claim is that “China’s accession to the 
WTO should have had certain conditions”, because “globalisation can lead to a fall in 
prices and to higher quality goods only if the conditions of competition are the same for 
everyone.”113 On the other hand, the Italian government has put forward a proposal to the 
European Commission to set up rules of origin for textile and clothing products. However, 
it has been rejected by the Council of Ministers several times. According to Simone, “the 
proposal sleeps in the drawer of an EU bureaucrat, and it will never be passed”, because 
Northern countries have more voting power.114 In sum, the following statement by Simone 
summarises these points (sic):  
                                                 
113 None of my interviewees want protectionism. Indeed, Diana (member of the textile and clothing 
federation of the CGIL-Toscana, interviewed on 5/8/08 and 12/8/08) pointed out that trade liberalisation has 
opened new markets for Italian firms, Russia and China being particularly attractive (mostly for large fashion 
brands; for example, according to her, Gucci has over a hundred stores in China). 
114 In Simone’s words, for the proposal to be passed, Italy – and other Southern Europe countries pushing the 
proposal – needs “the qualified majority of the countries that represent the majority of the population in the 
Council of Ministers, and the countries representing the majority of the population are the Northern ones, but 
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Our traditional productive model has gone in crisis in front of the goods from strong 
competitors in the international markets. The new competitors have placed themselves in 
textiles and clothing in particular and have developed a competitive capacity which makes it 
difficult for our companies to survive (…) In the negotiations about liberalisation in the Doha 
Round, the interests of the European producers have not been considered sufficiently. The 
strategy is that of exporting products with high value-added in terms of innovation, so it makes 
sense that they have disregarded the interests of producers in certain countries of Southern 
Europe that are smaller and politically less and less powerful everyday.  
 
However, my interviewees in Prato seemed to stress the importance of these differences 
with the EU trade policy to a point at which, similarly to the ‘Chinese threat’ (i.e. cheap 
imports invading the domestic market) used by entrepreneurs in Buenos Aires, it somehow 
becomes a rhetorical tool to avoid the issue of the redistribution of wealth within the chain, 
and to justify the use of trafficked and forced labour. Indeed, despite the fact that between 
1970 and 2000 the value added in the textiles and clothing industries almost doubled 
(Dunford, 2006: 33; based on OECD, 2003), workers in these sectors remain, similarly in 
the case of Buenos Aires, amongst the worst paid in the whole economy. This holds true 
particularly for the case of workers in artisan companies, which according to Dunford 
(2006: 34) make up more than 70 percent of the firms in these sectors. Besides, official 
statistics stating that 385,000 jobs were lost between 1970 and 2002 (Dunford, 2006: 33; 
based on OECD, 2003) do not show the reality, since these have partially been transferred 
to the thousands of sweatshops arising in the last 25 years around the country (Naples and 
Prato being major cases). This allowed domestic entrepreneurs to keep production at home 
at lower prices.  
 
The existence of a cascading chain of subcontractors plays a significant role in putting 
downward pressure on costs. One reason why is that the buyer sets the price of products. 
Another is the reductions in costs that are made possible by subsidies and, until they were 
scrapped, special social security provisions for less developed areas. Still another is that the 
avoidance of taxes and the employment of high shares of clandestine/undeclared labor 
(including family members, undeclared nationals, and illegal immigrants) permit cost-based 
producers to implement labor-intensive phases of production at a low price. At the end of the 
1990s, FILTA-CISL estimates put the clandestine workforce at 30 percent to 90 percent of the 
southern total, depending on the district (cited in Aniello 2001, 520–21) (Dunford, 2006: 53). 
 
3. The sweating system in Prato: its origin and causes 
 
The information collected from the interviews reveals that some of the sweatshop owners 
today established in Prato started up in the Province of Florence, where a large pool of 
                                                                                                                                                    
they are contrary to the proposal.” In his view, this illustrates that in the EU, a few Northern countries are 
more ‘equal’ than the rest. 
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workshops grew since the early 1980s, mostly producing leather goods for large brands. 
Their origin must be seen in the strategies of vertical disintegration followed by the large 
brands, which according to Diana (a leader of the textile and clothing federation of the 
CGIL at Tuscany, interviewed on 12/8/08 and 26/8/08) started in the late 1970s and 
strengthened during the following decade. With this strategy, the companies shut down 
their own production facilities and subcontracted firstly to workshops within the area, and 
soon later to low wage countries. Further on, once the prices back home were low enough 
to be competitive with low wage countries, they started subcontracting again to workshops 
in the area. Many of the latter were the first clothing sweatshops in Tuscany, largely 
managed by some members of the Chinese community.  
 
A similar case is that of the district of Carpi (in the region of Emilia-Romagna), in which 
according to Bigarelli (2003, cited in Osservatorio Regionale Toscano sull’Artigianato, 
2007: 15), 
 
the increasing vertical disintegration of the fashion houses along the 1990s came hand in hand 
with the launching of extra-area subcontracting circuits, and at the end of the period of study 
[1992-2002] half of the new subcontractors were established abroad (66 percent outside the 
district). Apart from the triggering of foreign subcontracting circuits in low wage countries, the 
use of Chinese subcontractors which established themselves in the district during this period is 
also widespread (:15).115 
 
The strategy of cutting labour costs by subcontracting the physical production of garments; 
the huge investments in image and brand building; and the fast-growing fashion 
advertising launched by the industry as a response to the stagnation of the mid-1970s, were 
all strategies that strongly favoured the fashion businesses. It was precisely during the 
1980s that some of today’s large fashion brands consolidated their businesses. According 
to Diana, Gucci’s example portrays to a great extent the way the sector developed in Italy: 
while Gucci was an artisan at the beginning of the 1980s, by the end of the decade it was 
already a renowned fashion house. In the early 1990s a large portion of it was sold on the 
stock exchange. Today, Gucci is present in the most exclusive shopping malls of the world; 
it has 1,100 employees in its headquarters plus 600 hundred in its own stores in Italy, and 
only in the Florence area about 5,000 workshops work for it (information provided by 
Diana from the CGIL-Toscana).  
 
                                                 
115 Translated from Italian. 
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With increasing fashion marketing and with at least a partial overcoming of the 1970s 
economic stagnation, demand for fashion goods grew, creating demand for clothing 
workshops. This fashion propaganda also created demand for clothing in general, more 
specifically for fashion-sensitive clothing (or fashionwear). As Carlo (the owner of an 
artisan firm, interviewed on 29/7/08) explained, in the mid-1980s there was a large pulling 
market for better quality garments, but of lower prices than those of large brands: “that 
meant a great opportunity for us; we covered that market by copying the designs of the 
large brands, using lower quality fabrics and selling basically the same product but more 
cheaply (…) There were also subcontractors in the area who could work for us.” These 
trends in the Italian clothing industry created a great demand for labour which at the 
beginning was partially supplied by Chinese-owned workshops. Soon these would 
monopolise clothing manufacturing.  
 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, some Chinese immigrants started moving to Prato and 
its surroundings with their small enterprises. Renting out industrial facilities of formerly 
textile factories, these workshops continued to produce leather accessories and some 
clothes for large brands based in Florence, and for Italian clothing SMEs dedicated mostly 
to produce medium quality garments for large variety chains (e.g. the British Marks & 
Spencer and the Italian Oviesse).  
 
3.1. Why Prato? 
 
Both the economic history and the resulting morphology of Prato’s landscape were 
particularly attractive for the development of a new economic activity based in hundreds or 
thousands of small enterprises (Ceccagno, 2003). Based on Ceccagno’s work and on the 
findings of my own empirical work, I identify four mains reasons why a sweating system 
emerged in Prato: (a) the previous existence of several Chinese subcontractors of fashion 
firms in the Province of Florence; (b) the deep crisis of the industry in which the city’s 
economy had been overwhelmingly based (textile industry); (c) the urban morphology of 
the city centre and its immediate surroundings; and (d) the ‘entrepreneurial culture’ of the 
city, of which both SMEs and informality were some of its backbones. Certainly, all the 
four are intermingled and altogether they laid the ground on which this sweatshop 
economy developed. 
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Firstly, with 8 out of 10 manufacturing companies producing textiles, the deep crisis of the 
textile industry meant a complete disaster for the city’s economy: as asserted by Massimo 
from the Department of Economic Development of the Province of Prato, in just the last 10 
years, 6,000 textiles companies went out of business, leading to the loss of approximately 
30,000 jobs. This also affected the whole thread of businesses linked to the functioning of 
the textile industry, notably the mechanics industry which had developed to supply the 
demand for new machinery and for repairs and so on. In sum, from a flourishing city 
presented as the perfect example of the Italian industrial districts model (Dei Ottati, 1994), 
Prato went to be marked with a cross in the banks and credit institutions’ map (interview 
with Luca, an employee of the statistics department of Prato’s Chamber of Commerce, 
interviewed on 11/4/08 and 1/10/08). This context of general decay paved the way for the 
development of new economic activities.  
 
Secondly, as already said some of today’s sweatshop owners in Prato had started their 
business as subcontractors of fashion firms during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the 
Florence area. The move of these Chinese subcontractors to Prato was explained in a very 
particular way by the Chinese council in Florence. In July 2008, having to deal with a 
renewed wave of accusations about Chinese entrepreneurs’ labour and fiscal practices in 
Prato, which included the launch of a book about ‘The Chinese siege’ by the Unione 
Industriale Pratese (henceforth UIP) and by the newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore, the council 
stated that “faced with the crisis of the textile industry, the hitherto Mayor of Prato came to 
Florence to talk with the Chinese. He has made the Chinese go to Prato, offering them 
highly favourable conditions.”116 Consulted by the media, the former mayor denied having 
done so (Il Sole 24 Ore, 22/7/08), and no other sources reinforced this view. However 
controversial, this version seems to be sensible enough for some, since faced with a strong 
crisis in the city’s economy given to the crisis of the textile industry, the city’s main 
authority may have planned to bring in new economic activities. Indeed, Claudio (an 
officer at the Labour Inspectorate of the Province of Prato, interviewed on 25/7/08) 
asserted in the interview that “someone has called the Chinese to Tuscany; at some 
meeting I have heard about the idea of bringing them to cut labour costs to maintain 
domestic production.” In its early exposé of Prato’s sweatshops, the magazine Business 
Week (22/11/01) pointed out that “Prato's officials say the huge Chinese influx has been a 
                                                 
116 Full video available at 
http://video.ilsole24ore.com/SoleOnLine4/Video/Economia%20e%20Lavoro/2008/v_italia_cina_abc_immig
razione1.php  
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godsend for the city's garment-assembly and knitwear industry, whose annual sales of $1.3 
billion are growing at a nearly 20 percent annual clip.” The evidence was provided by the 
statements of Silvano Gori, then the president of the Prato’s Chamber of Commerce, who 
as quoted by this publication, said that these numbers represented “an extraordinary boost 
to [Prato’s] local economy”. In sum, in case of being true, as Pratoblog (2008) suggests, 
then “Chinese immigration into Prato is a political fact, politically wanted and planned by 
Prato’s administrations, so local politicians have a historical responsibility for which they 
cannot blame anyone else.”  
 
Thirdly, the architecture and urban morphology of Prato resulted greatly functional for the 
kind of activity the newcomers needed to develop. As Ceccagno (2003) explains it, 
Chinese entrepreneurs rented former textile factories which were closed down owing to the 
crisis in the sector. A large estate market in the hands of formerly local textile 
entrepreneurs developed subsequently. These factories had the perfect architecture for the 
kind of activity they wanted to develop: medium factories with an upper floor where the 
sweatshop’s owner, his family and the workers can live, and a ground floor where 
production takes place. On the other hand, it must be considered that Prato is a factory-city, 
in which there exist factories in the very centre of the city (within the limits of the 
medieval Wall and its immediate surroundings). The area of Via Pistoiese (just beyond the 
Wall), along which the Chinese community has recreated a little Chinatown, is a very 
functional area for the development of such a manufacturing activity, since there exists a 
mix between houses and factories, all concentrated in the same area. As Salvatore (a 
member of the clothing and textiles federation of the CGIL at Prato, interviewed on 
27/5/08) said, “Via Pistoiese is perfect for what they want to do; there is a factory and right 
besides it a house, then a factory, a house, a house, a factory and so on…”   
 
Finally, some of the characteristics of the ‘entrepreneurial culture’ that had developed in 
Prato since the post-war (see Dei Ottati, 1994) helped the development of a production 
system based on several SMEs. According to two interviewees (Salvatore [quoted above] 
and Antonio [from the clothing and textiles federation of the UIL at Prato, interviewed on 
6/6/08]) Prato was a particularly attractive city for the settlement of thousands of small 
manufacturing companies, because “in here there was the humus for the development of 
this phenomenon.” The fact that the textile industry was based in thousands of tiny 
companies is particularly relevant, for not only did it provide workplaces that were highly 
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adaptable to the spatial needs of the newcomers (the third factor mentioned above) but it 
also shared some sort of ‘entrepreneurial culture’ of the city, in which SMEs were a trade 
mark of Prato and other industrial districts from the Third Italy. Within this 
‘entrepreneurial culture’ the referred interviewees pointed at the fact that, in the words of 
Antonio, “Prato’s entrepreneurs were never famous for working in fully legal terms.” 
Indeed, Simone (from Tuscany’s Department of Economic Development, mentioned 
above) stated that among the several things he has heard from gossips in corridors and 
meetings in his many years into politics, one of the most astonishing ones came from an 
official from Prato who had told him that “i cinesi eravamo noi” (we were the Chinese), 
referring to informality, i.e. tax-evasion, unregistered labour and exploitation of workers 
(and self-exploitation of workshops’ owners and their own families). Similarly, Ross 
(2006: 213) asserts that 
 
Prato’s dual economy is exacerbated by the immigrant flow, but its combination of a legal, 
high-wage core and a periphery of low-wage, sweatshop suppliers is not a ‘Chinese’ import. 
This kind of structure has a long history in the international garment industry, and… some 
version of it was apparent even in the heyday of the so-called economic miracle that occurred 
in regional centres like Prato in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
In 2001 the magazine ‘Business Week’ (22/11/01) quoted a union leader in Prato and 
pointed out that  
 
Prato’s Chinese entrepreneurs have meshed seamlessly into the Italian economy, which itself is 
powered by thousands of small, family-owned businesses, many of which operate off the tax 
rolls. “The mentality of the Chinese is not far from the mentality of an Italian,” says Giovanni 
Cortese, general secretary of Italian labor union CISL in Prato. “Our family-owned companies 
also work 11 hours a day when necessary.” 
 
Referring precisely to informal work and exploitation of workers in Industrial Districts, 
Ross (2002: 212) asserts that  
 
it is impossible to know how much of Italy’s impressive growth in fashion and design is 
dependent on the sweatshops of the black economy. The true estimate is buried somewhere 
between the sommerso statistico – or lost information, which the state does not collect – and 
the sommerso economico – or submerged economy, which employers will not disclose (…) 
Without its sprawling off-the-books economy, involving multifarious forms of irregular, 
informal, and illegal work, the oft-proclaimed ‘miracles’ of Italian manufacturing would look 
more like mirages.  
 
In the end, all these factors came together to lay the ground for the settlement of the several 
Chinese immigrants who saw the opportunity of starting up their own business, doing what 
they had learnt as subcontractors in the Florence area during the 1980s. But this 
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phenomenon is common to many of those areas identified by ISTAT (the Italian official 
statistics agency) as Industrial Districts. In his excellent critique of the IDs literature, 
Hadjimichalis (2006: 91) points to a number of restructuring processes that are affecting 
them; among them is the “extensive replacement of Italian craft-workers by non-EU 
immigrants, to compensate [for] increasing local labour costs and/or the lack of skilled 
labour.” He goes further to assert that  
 
the structure of the labour market, with its many ‘holes’ for informal work, present a ‘window 
of opportunity’ for thousands of immigrants arriving via the sea to work and stay in Italy 
without documentation (as in all Southern European countries) (:97). 
 
But the similarities of other cases with Prato’s go beyond informality to include the very 
physical replacement of formerly Italian firms by firms managed by immigrant 
entrepreneurs. In this vein, Hadjimichalis (2006: 97) quotes Lanzani (2003: 15-16) as 
stating that  
 
in the North and the Centre [of Italy] immigrant populations re-use small depopulated 
historical centres for both housing and work… in small historical towns in the pre-Alpic zone, 
in the Padana valley and in Veneto as well as in the hill towns of the Marche, where industrial 
districts face a crisis, immigrants became the solution for many SMEs especially where 
restructuring was synonymous with cheap and semi-skilled labour. 
 
4. Characteristics of the sweating system 
 
In December 2007 (2/12/07) a report in a Sunday evening programme in the official TV 
channel (RAI) revealed the presence of thousands of sweatshops in Prato. The report was 
broadcasted in the prestigious programme ‘Report’. Only five months later (18/5/08), the 
same TV programme showed a second report about sweatshops in Prato, suggesting that 
nothing had changed since the first one. Marco (who is in charge of the development 
projects division at the Confederazzione Nazionale dell’Artiggianato – CNA-Prato – 
interviewed on 22/5/08) told me in the interview that this time the second report had 
caused mounting tensions within the corridors of the City Council, and many of my 
interviewees mentioned the report and attributed a certain importance to it. Some of them 
also pointed out that while the Pratesi (people from Prato) used to underestimate the 
Chinese immigration when it started, the reality seems to have suddenly exploded in their 
eyes when they saw it on national television.  
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As already indicated, today there are circa 2,500 sweatshops in Prato. According to a study 
published by the economics newspaper ‘Il Sole 24 Ore’, and supported by the UIP 
(Pieraccini, 2008), the sweating system in Prato (which the author calls the “parallel 
district of the pronto moda” [see below]) produces, in the whole, one million garments a 
day, which in terms of money represents an annual revenue of €1.8 billion (£1.5 billion). 
The same author assures that nothing less than €1 billion (£800 million) is not declared. 
 
In the analysis of who these sweatshops work for, there exists contradictory information. 
The complexity of the system in the midst of an all-encompassing informality leads to a 
worrying lack of information. Neither the UIP nor the Chamber of Commerce have 
statistics and reliable data about the destiny of what is produced within the sweating 
system.117 My understanding of this issue in particular is based on the information 
provided by the TV reports and the interviews I carried out. Some interviewees asserted 
that all that is produced in sweatshops in Prato ends up in “those illegal outdoor markets 
that you can see in several Italian cities, like the market of San Lorenzo here in Florence” 
(interview with Venere, from the Department of Fashion at Tuscany Region, on 26/9/08). 
However, the information shown in the TV report referred to above is clear enough and 
contradicts this statement. In here, some interviewees clearly have the interest of defending 
the high-end fashion houses from accusations of sweatshop practices, since they are part of 
the essence of the ‘made in Italy’.  
 
Bringing together all the information I consider as the most reliable – owing to the overall 
argumentative strength of the interviewee and to visual proof like the TV – I identify four 
main types of sweatshops according to the destination of what they produce: (a) those that 
work as subcontractors of high-end fashion houses producing mainly leather goods 
(pelleteria); (b) those who work as subcontractors of Italian SMEs that export the majority 
of their products (mostly to variety chains based in Northern Europe); (c) those that 
produce cheap low-medium quality garments which they market through their own 
channels (what is called, as we will see, the parallel district of the ‘pronto moda’); and (d) 
those that work as subcontractors of the latter, which are the majority of the sweatshops.  
 
                                                 
117 Better said, if this information exists, I did not have access to it. Indeed, I was told by a secretary at the 
Province of Prato that a report that is being kept secret was prepared by the ASL, the office that generates 
and manages the statistics of the Province of Prato.  
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According to Luca (from the Chamber of Commerce of Prato), the latter group makes up 
the majority of the sweatshops; they are at the bottom of the pyramid of this parallel 
district. In other words, it is in these companies that the worst living and working 
conditions are found. On the other hand, the first and the third group are of particular 
importance. The first one because of the fact that these workshops reveal the labour 
practices that lie behind the elegant and glossy world of fashion businesses, and the third 
one because of its originality and stubborn growth during recent years and its present 
importance in terms of the organisation of the system and of possible future developments.  
 
4.1. When time and space meet: the dirty ethics of the high-end 
fashion houses 
 
For generations Gucci, Dolce & Gabbana and Prada have been the essence of haute 
couture, and ‘Made in Italy’ meant just that - the chicest handbags from Milan, heels 
from Rome and gowns from Florence, handcrafted by Italian craftsmen. Not any more... 
Italy’s finest fashion houses are leaning increasingly on an army of cheap Chinese 
immigrants who have turned Tuscany’s textile powerhouse into Italy’s Little China. 
(Sunday Mirror, 2/12/07) 
 
The TV reports mentioned above showed that there are purses of renowned brands as 
Prada, Channel and Dolce & Gabbana being sewn at these sweatshops.118 Vittorio (a 
former worker in the industry and a member of the CGIL at Tuscany, interviewed on 
3/10/08) told me that in a series of investigations that the CGIL carried out to identify 
small workshops and encourage their workers to join the union, they found a few 
sweatshops which were Gucci’s subcontractors. In his words, “these were tiny places with 
conditions similar to those you see in the Chinese sweatshops there in Prato.” According to 
Venere (from the Department of Fashion of the Tuscany Region, mentioned above) about 
50 percent of the leather clothing accessories (pelleteria) produced in Italy are produced in 
Tuscany, mostly in the Provinces of Florence and Prato. The evidence suggests that these 
accessories are partly produced in sweatshops. Indeed, all the three people I interviewed at 
the Labour Inspectorate of the Province of Prato (Maria [20/6/08], Andrea [25/7/08] and 
Claudio [25/7/08]) asserted that in the inspections they have seen goods being produced for 
the griffes119, “and not only once!” (as Claudio said). On the other side, while the Sunday 
Mirror (3/12/07) states that the fashion firms refused to make comments about the first 
                                                 
118 The second report interviewed a Chinese entrepreneur who said that the high-end fashion houses pay them 
€30 (£25) for purses sold at about €1,000 (£800) in Florence’s Viale Tornabuoni. 
119 This is what Italians call the high-end fashion houses. It is derived from the French griffe, which means 
claw. 
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report in the TV, the second report (18/5/08) showed a Prada representative implicitly 
accepting that some of its products are produced in sweatshops, and saying that 
 
We have two different kinds of inspectors, those who check quality and those who check the 
working conditions of the suppliers. But we’re not the police and our inspectors do not have 
unlimited access to all areas and documents. Regrettably, situations like the one described in 
the show, which we agree are unacceptable, may occasionally occur notwithstanding our 
checks, but they are unusual and the show did not bother to mention what the overwhelming 
reality is.  
 
Several of the large worldwide renowned fashion brands have important design and 
marketing offices in Tuscany; these include Bvlgari, Calvin Klein, Christian Dior, Dolce & 
Gabbana, Ferragamo, Hugo Boss, Prada, Valentino, Yves Saint Laurent, and Gucci and 
Fendi (the latter two from Florence). These companies have their headquarters in Florence 
and its surroundings. In these, they typically employ designers, modelling and prototyping 
specialists (particularly important in the production of high-end fashion goods), marketing 
personnel, and a small amount of workers that produce the samples of the collections. The 
actual physical production of their goods is, according to Vittorio, either subcontracted to 
workshops by themselves or commissioned to large intermediary companies (of which 
there would be 10 to 12) that arrange the logistics of production. The latter subcontract to 
thousands of SMEs and artisan companies in the surroundings of Florence, mostly in the 
Northern districts of the Province (Campi Bisenzio and Calenzano) and in the Province of 
Prato.  
 
Several of the fashion houses named above came to set up large offices in the Florence 
area during the 1980s. When asked about why fashion brands came to Florence, Diana (the 
union member from CGIL-Toscana mentioned above) asserted that “in here there is the 
know-how, and there are also thousands of small companies which can provide them with 
the labour they need.” While, as mentioned above, some interviewees asserted that Prato’s 
sweatshops produce only what is sold in illegal outdoor markets, Fabrizio (the owner of a 
consultancy agency that provides academic support for textile and clothing companies in 
Tuscany, interviewed on 22/5/08) directly linked the large fashion brands with the very 
origin of the sweating system in Prato. Whether there exist direct links between the vertical 
disintegration of high-end fashion houses settled during the 1980s and the development of 
the sweating system in Prato, is a matter of further inquiry. Nevertheless, as I will stress in 
chapter 7, there is at least a direct relation between certain trends triggered by these 
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companies’ strategies (like vertical disintegration coupled with growing fashion 
advertisement) and the emergence of sweatshops.  
 
4.2. Fast-fashion: the real explosion of the sweating system 
 
Over the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s the extension of the sweating system in 
Prato was already significant. Competition between sweatshops had reached a point in 
which the profit margins had been reduced to the limit (Osservatorio Regionale Toscano 
sull’Artigianato, 2007). Some sweatshops’ owners started to realise that pushing down 
labour costs even more was not enough to compete. Diversifying their production and 
reaching the market in order to be able to set their own prices were the responses of those 
who had the financial capacity to do so. As the Osservatorio Regionale Toscano 
sull’Artigianato notes,  
 
the need for firms to develop strategies to differentiate themselves from their competitors has 
gained growing importance (...) the intensification of competition has inevitably eroded the 
profit rates, not only for the Italian competitors but also for the Chinese ones […] Today the 
Chinese enterprises must focus on the quality upgrading of their products if they still want to 
make profits in the clothing sector (:177-78).120 
 
According to Fabrizio (the owner of a consultancy firm mentioned above), by that time 
several sweatshops had acquired the know-how of producing quality garment – including 
design and modelling – and they had also gained knowledge of the business (e.g. how to 
know what fashion will be in next season; how to sell clothing in the European market; 
etc.). Daniele (who owns a retail store in which – according to him – he sells cheap 
garment entirely imported from China [interviewed on 23/6/08]) explained to me that  
 
we Italians have taught them how to produce, and what to produce. When they arrived to Italy, 
their stuff, which was being imported from China, was horrible: shiny blouses with strong and 
bright colours which nobody would buy, but then some of them came and started working for 
us. Little by little they learnt from us and now they took their own way, they sell their own 
garment at the prices they set. 
 
Hence, with the financial assistance of the few financial agents of the community (see 
issue 5 in this chapter), those companies with these skills, the contacts and the experience 
needed stopped working exclusively for Italian contractors and started selling their own 
products and setting their own prices. Their success is illustrated by the astonishing growth 
                                                 
120 Translated from Italian. 
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of the sweating system since then: from 2003 to 2007 sweatshops doubled (information 
provided by Luca from the Chamber of Commerce of Prato).  
 
This breaking point in immigrants’ entrepreneurship allowed the sweating system to 
develop to unimagined levels. Today, interviewees and the media in general talk about ‘the 
parallel district of the pronto moda’ (fast-fashion), since it has reached the dimensions of a 
district but it is not the traditional district of the city (textile) and it has only weak 
connections to it. According to Ceccagno (2006, quoted in ‘Der Spiegel’, 9/7/06), an 
academic who works on Chinese immigration in Prato, pronto moda is a Chinese 
invention. The garments sold in this circuit are of a medium-low quality, almost all for 
young women – that is, they have a certain fashion component – and they are slightly more 
expensive than imported garments; for instance, on a visit to the district in which several of 
these companies are settled (Macrolotto) a 95 percent cotton women’s top may cost only 
€1.60 and a cotton dress might be between €6 or €7121. In sum, pronto moda companies 
produce and sell cheap and trendy short-life garments. The newspaper ‘La Repubblica’ 
(29/7/08) puts it in an ingenious way: “go, buy it and look at the ‘best before’ stamp in the 
label.” 
 
Luca from the Chamber of Commerce stated that pronto moda companies are about 400 to 
500. They are located in the surroundings of Prato, mostly in the industrial zone 
Macrolotto 1 and in Iolo. Their customers are chiefly wholesalers from other parts of Italy, 
and also from the rest of the EU, who then sell these clothes in shops in cities like Florence 
and Milan. A media report following the publication of the book above referred (‘Il Sole 
24 Ore’, 22/7/08) showed that sales in Macrolotto and Iolo are, by rule, unregistered; 
customers pay cash, load the merchandise in their cars, and head back to their cities; no 
registration of the operation exists. Besides this, the subcontractors sewing clothes for 
pronto moda companies are, as evidenced by the prices they have, sweatshops. As already 
said, the worst working conditions in the whole sweating system are found in 
subcontractors of these companies.  
 
                                                 
121 To give an idea of how low these costs are, Francesco (an artisan entrepreneur, interviewed on 24/9/08) 
stated that sometimes just the quality control of the garment he produces can reach a unit cost of €1. Indeed, 
prices are so low that since 2007 there exists a big market (Euro-Ingro) in which the large majority of the 
garment is imported, but both the results of a visit to the place and the statements by Franco suggest that the 
market seems to have failed, since the price difference is so small that importing it is not worth it. 
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With the rapid growth of this parallel district, the original plan of the clothing Italian firms 
to use the cheap labour provided by sweatshops took a different turn: the sweating system 
would, along the years, develop a separate market (Pieraccini, 2008). In this sense, 
Massimo (from the Department of Economic Development at the Province of Prato) and 
Antonella (an academic working on the sweating system in Prato, interviewed on 29/9/08) 
asserted that originally the Chinese immigration was seen as an opportunity for the city’s 
sinking economy because it brought chances to make of Prato a ‘fashion pole’: the 
development of a strong clothing industry would couple with the textile industry to allow 
the whole production process to take place within the city under collaborative relations 
among companies, making of it an integrated and unique system (like the IDs). However, 
as the interviewees also acknowledge, this integration is not at all happening; not even 
fabrics from local companies are bought today by the sweatshops, because they are rather 
imported from China. Consequently, only when this parallel district reached a considerable 
dimension local authorities started realising about the potentialities of this system once the 
companies do not depend on local firms’ orders anymore. According to ‘Der Spiegel’ 
(9/7/06) “the first Chinese in Prato were virtually invisible. They worked at home, making 
woollens and leather goods for Italian subcontractors who then sold the merchandise to 
big-name designers like Gucci and Versace.” In this sense, while in 2001 ‘Business Week’ 
had quoted the president of Prato’s Chamber of Commerce as deeming the presence of 
Chinese subcontractors as “a blessing” for the city’s economy, in December 2007 the 
‘Sunday Mirror’ (2/12/07) quoted the president of the very same institution stating that  
 
we underestimated them. What they’re doing here is called unfair competition. We need an 
operation like the one in Iraq to keep them under control. 
 
4.2.1 Community logics 
 
When asked about his main preoccupations, Franco (who worked at the Department for 
Multiculturality of the City Council, interviewed on 1/10/08) told me that it is the dreadful 
attitude of the leaders of the Chinese community towards local authorities and citizens, 
which creates an ominous relationship between the Chinese community and the locals: “it 
is an economic enclave with its own rules and with complete ignorance of Italian norms.” 
His experience dealing with immigration issues in the city led him to assert that the leaders 
of each community create a whole set of rules and services which makes it unnecessary for 
their co-nationals to get in touch with local institutions or groups. “When they need for 
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example a doctor, they go talk to one of the big bosses and he sorts this problem out for 
them.” The strongest sign of this was pointed out by Luca (Chamber of Commerce). In the 
first interview with him, he told me about a report prepared by Confartigianato (2005) 
which showed that the level of indebtedness of the 3,000 plus enterprises owned by 
Chinese migrants with the banks was zero, which, according to Luca, means that there 
exist some members within the community that act as financial agents.122 In other words, 
the sweating system has its own financial system. Following from this, Franco explained to 
me that  
 
this is why we provide a series of services that these people need for free, so they break up 
with the logics of the community and come to us to ask for assistance. Along the years we have 
seen that this is the only way in which they approach us, and when they do so we get to know 
them. Otherwise they just stay within the usual spaces of the community and we can’t know 
their problems and work with them to sort things out. 
 
Again, like in Buenos Aires the nationalist discourse is reproduced by the leaders of the 
community in events held along the year. In here I would suggest – from the experience of 
the Buenos Aires’ case – that in line with fostering the nationalist feelings, the leaders call 
everyone to defend the rules of their own district as a means to reinforce the national 
feelings in the midst of a supposedly hostile local society. Although I have no evidence 
about this, it seems to me – also from what Franco said in the interview – that they create 
and reproduce the ethnic logics, and demand the Italian state to respect these rules.  
 
5. Why is the sweating system so successful? 
 
 
Time, flexibility and low price are the keys to success for companies selling medium-low 
to medium-high quality garments. It is precisely in providing the industry with these three 
issues that the success of the sweating system resides. Sweatshops allow Italian companies 
to respond to the market’s shifts in record times, and to be flexible enough to avoid 
shouldering the costs of crisis, that is, to have more effective control over labour costs – by 
paying only for the labour they actually use – and avoid stocking up garments that they 
might not be able to sell.  
 
                                                 
122 These financial agents could possibly have links with the Bank of China’s branch in Florence, which is 
said to be bigger than the one in Rome.  
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As already said, flexibility is also a key demand of buyers. The final document of a special 
working group created to put forward policy and other recommendations to officials and 
entrepreneurs (Tavolo della Moda, 2007) followed the paths of these new trends in Textile 
& Clothing, assuming that 
 
the future challenge of competition will not only reside in quality, which will be surely 
produced also in developing countries; rather, it will chiefly reside in the variety of products, in 
the great capacity of firms to produce strongly personalised and innovative small batches, in 
the just in time and in the good commercial networks.123 
 
Mario from the UIP explained in detail the high importance of being flexible in order to 
keep risks down (sic): 
 
The challenge for firms producing clothing is to assume low risks, because demand for 
garments is highly volatile; if I stock up my store with stuff I cannot sell, I run out of business; 
therefore I must produce only what I am sure I will sell. Before, the seasons were much more 
clearly defined, so I could stock up the store with stuff because I knew I would sell it little by 
little throughout the season. But today fashion is spreading along diverse types of garments and 
it is more and more variable and uncertain; then I must always reduce the risks… I have to 
produce during the season, when I understand what garments are being sold, which is it that 
consumers are demanding … This leads to a situation in which the continuous stocking up of 
the stores triggers the need for a production chain that is coherent with the sales I do during the 
season, which means both small orders and quick times (...) This is the path that the fashion 
world is following. 
 
The story of Daniele (the said owner of a wholesale store) illustrates these matters quite 
fairly. During the first half of the 1990s he used to sell the remainders of large 
manufacturers, but today these are too little: “in those years, the stores and the 
manufacturers used to stock up more than they needed; they knew they would finally sell 
everything. If they had an order to make 500 men’s shirts they would make 800, so at the 
end of the season they would call me and sell me those shirts that they couldn’t sell. But 
today stocking up is over. Today they produce 490 shirts. The recurrent crises have led to 
think more thoroughly the issue of the offer of garments.” The experience of Carlo (one of 
the artisan entrepreneurs I interviewed, mentioned above) is certainly in line with Mario’s 
statements. As explained by him, “today we need to produce a more specialised product, 
with more design and image, with a continuous change of designs (we change them every 
week)… This is what retailers are asking for; they do not ask us to continue the order but 
to constantly propose new things.”  
 
                                                 
123 Translated from Italian. 
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If clothing was produced in this manner under legal terms and proper working and 
environmental conditions, such demand from retailers and branded manufacturers would 
translate into extremely high prices, undermining their sales. Instead, all these demands 
from the fashion industry are partially (perhaps mostly) covered – at least at present – by 
sweatshops. Apart from being flexible and fast, the workshops’ owners must accept 
miserable rates of pay and highly unfair conditions. This is why for an entrepreneur faced 
with such necessities, the sweating system in Prato is the nearly-perfect solution: it 
provides local firms with the necessary goods in record times, at low prices and with very 
low risks.  
 
The explanation of the very low price of what is produced in sweatshops in Prato resides to 
a large extent in several illegal practices used to avoid paying taxes and benefits, which are 
possible also due to a lack of state inspections. As outlined by Pieraccini (2008), it is  
 
a black economy that Liechtenstein and San Marino would envy, and that is able to guarantee 
very low prices, unattainable by its competitors, with the only brand capable of attracting 
international customers: the ‘made in Italy’ brand. Because of this, apart from being easier, 
using suppliers in Prato has become a better and sometimes cheaper option than to buy in 
China, Turkey, Tunisia, Laos, Morocco, Vietnam or Bangladesh (:2).124 
 
The entrepreneurs involved in the sweating system adopt some illegal and some semi-legal 
strategies in order to cut costs and offer very low prices. Of these, a key one is carried by 
the importers of the fabric; some of these under-declare the volumes of what they import 
(to pay lower import duties) and in this way they can offer much cheaper fabrics than those 
offered by many textile companies in Prato.125 Secondly, and most importantly for the 
purposes of this thesis, there is the dreadful pay and working conditions, and the way the 
system provides itself with the large pool of workforce needed during the high seasons: 
human trafficking. Thirdly, according to the labour inspectors I interviewed, several of the 
sweatshops’ owners are impossible to identify and track: when they are found violating the 
law in inspections, they declare fake addresses and names. Inspectors assure that “it is 
impossible to track them back”, and that some of these entrepreneurs have been found 
some months later having started another factory somewhere else in Italy (or in Europe) or 
as workers in other factories in Prato (which indicates that the real boss is actually another 
person). 
                                                 
124 Translated from Italian. 
125 Today, only a small portion of the fabric is provided by the thousands of textile companies in Prato. Some 
of them produce special – cheaper – lines for sweatshops, for example eliminating the quality control stage.  
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On the other hand, regarding semi-legal strategies, turnover (changes in the names of the 
companies) is a main one: it reaches 60 percent a year – i.e. 60 of every 100 companies are 
less than one year old, while the average turnover in Prato and in Italy is 20.4 percent and 
15.7 percent respectively – so more than half of the firms owned by Chinese entrepreneurs 
in Prato are less than 2 years old (Pieraccini, 2008).  
 
6. The price of freedom: trafficking in persons in today’s Europe 
 
According to the City Council (2010) in 2008 there were 24,153 immigrants in the city, 
accounting for 13 percent of the city’s 185,000 inhabitants; of these, 13,840 are Asian (and 
of them, the overwhelming majority is Chinese). However, the Chinese community in 
Prato is very unstable in terms of its numbers; according to unofficial estimations made by 
the Department for Multiculturality of Prato’s City Council (interview with Franco), during 
times of high seasons for clothing production there is about 25,000 Chinese migrants, that 
is, more than 10 percent of the Province’s population. A large proportion of them moves 
around Italy and Europe, according to job demands (e.g. if there is a big order to make 
shoes in Veneto they might follow it). In stores in Via Pistoiese it is common to see adverts 
for jobs in regions all around Europe. As Franco asserted in the interview, there is a 
European labour market of the Chinese migrants; “they move around Europe as if it was a 
province.” 
 
Workers are overwhelmingly from the industrial region of Zhejiang – mostly from the city 
of Wenzhou, a city with 7.6 million inhabitants [including the Great Wenzhou] – while 
some others are from the Fujian region. These two regions are not certainly poor regions. 
Indeed, Zhejiang is located within the powerful industrial triangle of SE China. This is to 
say that workers in these sweatshops are not the poorest in China. Indeed, the magazine 
Business Week (22/10/01) quotes a Chinese entrepreneur in Prato as stating that “those 
Chinese citizens who have some money go out to explore the world.” According to Maria 
and Andrea (labour inspectors)126, the majority of these immigrants arrive in Prato, be it 
through Eastern Europe or through large Western European cities, and are brought to the 
city by train. In the overwhelming majority of the cases they arrive to Europe through a 
                                                 
126 I had not heard voices contradicting the version I present in here, owing to the denial (one of them a rather 
violent denial) to my interviews from three sweatshop owners and two managers of Italian-Chinese 
associations. 
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traffickers’ network, and come in with a tourist visa. The move costs them between €5,000 
and €30,000. They may pay a little part of it in advance. In many cases, when they arrive in 
Europe their passports are taken out and thrown away. In this way workers are in a more 
vulnerable position to denounce the traffickers and so on, which obviously helps their 
traffickers and bosses to keep them under control. Once they arrive to Prato, they are told 
where to work. From there on, they are told not to leave the workshop under the threat of 
retaliation with them or with their families back in China. Furthermore, sometimes workers 
are kept silent with the promise of a ‘sanatoria’; that is, a plan by the Italian government to 
regularise all the ‘illegal’ migrant workers (as it occurred in the early 1990s): since it is 
their boss who has to apply for their sanatoria, many of the workers behave in a way that 
ensures a good relation with their bosses.  
 
Andrea, who interviews the workers in the very sweatshop when the Inspectorate carries a 
raid of inspections (with the help of a Chinese translator), pointed out that once in the 
workshops, the workers live and work for long hours in dreadful conditions and are paid 
between €300 and €400 a month, that is, between 30 and 40 percent the minimum salary 
set in the collective bargain contract for artisan companies. Saving shelter and food, they 
use their salary to pay off the debt with their traffickers, that is, literally, to buy their 
freedom. In the end, in the worst cases buying their freedom might take them up to 4 years 
living and working under conditions of slavery. Only once they are free they move out and 
generally get a better job (like a registered job). 
 
Luigi (30), a Chinese entrepreneur in Prato, told ‘Der Spiegel’ (9/7/06) that his goal is “to 
become as rich as possible”. Franco, who has close contact with the Chinese community 
due to his duties in the Department for Multiculturalism, stated that “they are not 
necessarily poor back in China when they decide to come; their goal is to come here, make 
as much money as they can, and come back to China to set up their own companies. And 
they might leave their children in Italy.” The first step in their social upgrading is generally 
to become laoban (boss). This is generally achieved by means of having certain qualities 
as workers: if a worker shows to be highly skilled to manage production and to make good 
contacts, he or she might be given a workshop to keep under his or her control, with 
machines and workers, being told who to work for, how to do it and at what prices. Once a 
laoban, workers have a much better pay. After saving some money, some of them might 
set up their own sweatshop and then reproduce the mechanism of having trafficked 
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workers and subjecting them to servitude. However, addressing the case of sweatshops in 
Paris, Morokvasic (1986) points out that studies show that only 5 percent of the workers 
make it to set up their own sweatshops. Indeed, Franco asserted that “those that you see 
driving nice cars – which is the first sign of welfare for those of them who are laoban – 
and having dinner in expensive restaurants are about 200 or 300.” 
 
The story of Luigi, which in here I borrow from ‘Der Spiegel’ (9/7/06) is rich enough to 
illustrate some of the features just described: 
 
It was the summer of 1993 and Luigi was 17 (…) He went to Italy illegally, as a ‘clandestino’. 
His parents, a teacher and an office worker, put him on a ship in Shanghai. A ‘snakehead’, a 
term used to describe a middleman working for a human trafficking operation, met him in 
Singapore (…) After a two-month odyssey, Luigi finally made it to Italy (…) [He] spent the 
next two years working as a forced labourer, hemming pants 18 hours a day and earning €500 
[£400] a month under the table […] His new life began after he had sent €10,000 to his family, 
allowing them to pay off the human trafficking operation that had brought him to Italy. He 
wrote himself a five-year plan and drew up a list of Chinese contacts in Italy who would 
eventually lend him money, which he used to start an ironing service for an Italian textile 
manufacturer […] Today Luigi owns an import-export business (…) Like his friends in Prato, 
Luigi is a member of a new generation of overseas Chinese, a sort of transnational elite that 
thrives on guanxi, or relationships, and lives by an unwritten code whereby Chinese help each 
other anywhere in the world and never deceive one other. To them Europe is a chessboard. 
They jet back and forth, visiting old friends in Budapest, Greece and Spain, and treating 
Europeans as little more than extras in their lives. The Chinese have a term for self-made 
businessmen like Luigi, xia hai, or those who jump into the open sea. Viewed as traitors until a 
few years ago, they are now China’s vanguard. They send know-how and money back to the 
mother country, are courted and are treated as models. 
 
Chinese migrants like Luigi are much more visible to locals than the thousands of workers 
who never achieve to be their own bosses. It is my impression that locals in Prato 
commonly express highly racist ideas against “these Chinese [who] come here, use our 
hospitals, and then they drive a Mercedes, an Audi or a BMW while we hardly make it to 
the end of the month”. But when I asked Franco about why this is the case, he accepted 
that this is certainly common but, again, “those who drive such cars are not more than 
300.” Such a racist view hides the thousands of stories that many do not know and that 
quite probably they will never know, like the story of Meng, which reveals that not all 
sweatshop workers have a destiny of glory: 
 
like many others here in Prato, Meng, whose name translates as ‘Dream’, grew up in Wenzhou. 
Because her older sister was already married and her younger sister was still in school, the 
mother decided that Meng would be sent to Prato to prospect for Italian gold. She hided in her 
grandparents' house, but that didn't help. Her mother had already paid for the airline ticket and 
had hired a trafficker. Three years ago Meng flew to Rome and then went to Prato, where the 
usual torture began: working 15 or 16-hour shifts in the factory, occasionally even 30 hours 
during the high season. “Gold?” Meng said to her mother in their first phone conversation, 
“there isn't any gold here!” Last summer, after two-thirds of the €15,000 she owed the 
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traffickers had already been paid off, Meng had an accident that changed everything (Der 
Spiegel, 9/7/06).  
 
The story continues, and today Meng still needs €2,000 to finish buying her freedom, while 
she continues working as an unregistered labourer in a sweatshop, but at least she lives 
outside the workplace. Her story is certainly the story of thousands of sweatshop workers 
around the world, despite common assumptions that they work as slaves until they open 
their own sweatshop to exploit their nationals (as said by Venere from the Fashion 
Department of Tuscany, and Dario [leader of the textiles and clothing federation of the 
CISL-Toscana, interviewed on 7/8/08]). 
 
In comparison to the case of Buenos Aires, in Prato the trafficking network is much better 
organised, since it implies a much more complex travel, and tougher immigration rules. 
Franco said that the traffickers do not necessarily have sweatshops themselves: the network 
has its own bosses and employees, and up to a certain point it is independent from 
sweatshops themselves.127 Naturally, there is a strong link between sweatshops’ owners 
and the traffickers: they both work in accordance to regulate trafficked labour demand and 
offer.  
 
According to one of my interviewees (Antonella), there exist strong suspicions among 
Italian authorities that the Consulate of China in Florence (which is said to be more 
important than the Embassy in Rome) is linked to the traffickers’ network. For example, 
the Consulate is said, according to Antonella, to stamp the passports of Chinese nationals 
so that their tourist visa in Italy does not expire. Despite the lack of proof to accuse the 
Consulate, the consul does not certainly help alleviate the trafficking into Florence of its 
own nationals. An interesting element to analyse this is the reaction that he had when faced 
with accusations of trafficking reported twice on national TV. His immediate response was 
to deny that enterprises owned by Chinese immigrants in Prato are engaged in such illegal 
practices. Indeed, he even stated that “[he is] afraid that if Chinese entrepreneurs continue 
to experience these kinds of attacks, they will leave Prato to move somewhere else, and 
that would have a terrible effect over Prato’s economy” (quoted in ‘Il Sole 24 Ore’, 
23/7/08),128 a statement containing a clear political message: a threat. Again, although such 
an attitude is not at all enough to accuse the consul of having links with the traffickers 
networks, it is, at the very least, far from helping to stop with the situation of slavery of 
                                                 
127 According to Andrea, a labour inspector, there exist people that talk directly about “my clandestines”. 
128 Translated from Italian. 
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thousands of its nationals. Moreover, Claudio from the Labour Inspectorate asserted that 
neither the Consulate nor the Embassy collaborate in the identification tasks of those who 
are condemned to deportation by the Italian authorities, and since China does not accept 
deported individuals without identification, this rises concerns over the link of Chinese 
authorities with the traffickers, since – beyond the existence or not of such link – this 
facilitates the permanence of Chinese nationals in Italian land. 
 
7. The response of the state: Leviathan? 
 
The national government’s tolerance of the employment of clandestine labour is an 
instrument of its support for the (textile and clothing) sector.  
(Dunford, 2006: 53). 
 
In Prato Province the long standing policy of ‘letting this happen’, or of not showing clear 
attempts to take these matters into its hands, had tremendous consequences for the previous 
government: in June 2009, the centre-right-wing party PdL (il Partito della Libertà) won 
the elections, ending 63 years of left-wing administration. The incapacity to manage the 
issue of the “dreadful attitude of the Chinese entrepreneurial class towards the local 
authorities and citizens” (as said by Franco) seems to have been the key issue dividing both 
candidates’ campaigns, as mentioned by the Prato’s edition of the newspaper ‘La Nazione’ 
(22/6/09). The current mayor based his campaign in statements like this:  
 
The Chinese constitute a problem, not an advantage for our city. The Chinese community 
sends home more than €500 million a year, but in here they do not pay taxes, employ 
unregistered labour and undermine the structure of the City Council (quoted in ‘La 
Repubblica’, 17/11/09).  
 
After the first report shown in national TV inspections for sweatshops increased 
significantly. Certainly, Maria and Andrea (labour inspectors) confirmed that these 
increased in the first half of 2008 (precisely after the report), and also that their quality 
improved, because now many other institutions are involved in these. When an inspection 
is arranged, a series of public institutions participate. When a factory is found to be 
violating health and safety, labour and migration regulations, the factory owners and 
bosses can receive both monetary and criminal penalties. Regarding the former, the 
approach of the Province’s Labour Inspectorate – which is gaining ground – is that of 
giving the entrepreneur the possibility to regularise its activities before actually applying 
the penalty. Under the view of officials of the Inspectorate, being flexible in this regard 
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allows to improve working conditions, which is in the end the very goal of the office. 
According to Andrea, in about 80 percent of the cases no penalties are finally applied. 
However, there is no sign of improvement: none of the interviewees thinks that concrete 
steps towards the regularisation of sweatshops have been made.   
 
On the other hand, the criminal charges are: labour exploitation and abetting irregular 
labour in the country. Both of these charges are penalised with prison, which means that 
the sweatshop owners should be sent to prison instantly after an inspection. However, no 
entrepreneurs have ever been imprisoned as a result of inspections, even when inspectors 
have actually witnessed and heard from the workers themselves the practices of forced 
labour. Unlike the case of Buenos Aires, no allegations against sweatshop owners or 
brands have been taken to court. Indeed, the labour inspectors I interviewed recognised the 
existence of forced labour on these sweatshops (journeys up to 18 hours, poor H&S 
conditions, insufficient toilet facilities, lack of ventilation, a pay of only €300 or €400 a 
month, etc.) and the existence of what he called a “sweatshop mafia”. Furthermore, one of 
them (Maria), as well as Franco, stated that several of the sweatshop owners do not even 
know Italian rules; they apply their own logics according to what allows them to maximise 
their profit, completely ignoring Italian rules. Franco actually suggested that “they should 
only be given permission to stay within the country and to start up their own business after 
being trained on Italian legislation regulating the activities of entrepreneurs.”  
 
In sum, there has not been a clear political decision to stop the development of the 
sweating system and with human trafficking and slavery taking place in the very centre of 
the historically ‘red’ Tuscany. Despite the difficulties of ‘reach’ that the state surely has to 
identify these places (Allen, 2003), to track and prosecute its organisers and to effectively 
punish them (see issue 5 in this chapter), Manuele (the labour lawyer referred to above) 
said that stopping with sweatshops in Prato “is a matter of how resources are used and of 
where do resources go, and that is the product of a political decision.”  
 
In this context, it is important to understand what has stopped governments from taking the 
necessary political decision to controlling the sweating system and to try to overcome its 
difficulties of reach. In here, two main reasons contributing to such policy are identified: 
(1) the rigidities of bureaucracy; and (2) the businesses created by the inflow of money that 
the sweatshops bring to the city’s economy. These causes are further developed below. 
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7.1. The legal framework and the rigidities of bureaucracy 
 
The insufficient capacities of the offices in charge of controlling these matters, and 
rigidities of bureaucracy, are major obstacles for checking for sweatshops. Since its very 
origin the Province’s Labour Inspectorate has been under-developed. During its first 8 
years (from the creation of the Province of Prato in 1996 to 2004) there were only 3 
inspectors, while according to Andrea there should have been about 20 of them. In 2006 
another 7 inspectors were incorporated, but the number is still way below the needs of the 
office (information provided by Maria, labour inspector). The bureaucratic and political 
way to incorporate new inspectors is extremely complicated, as explained by Maria: 
“demanding resources to have more inspectors? It is not worth it, the decision has to be 
made by Law, and that will simply not happen.”  
 
Several public offices are now involved in controlling sweatshops; these are: the INAIL 
(which controls accidents at work); the INPS (registration of workers and payment of the 
social contributions of work); the Guardia Finanziaria (tax office); the firemen (workplace 
safety conditions); the ASL (certain aspects of the health issues); the Labour Inspectorate 
(which together with its Nucleo Carabinieri – one of Italy’s security forces – controls 
labour conditions and payment of extra hours); and the Preffetura (immigration status of 
workers). However, this does not necessarily mean that the quality of inspections has 
improved. Coordinating actions among five or six offices where none of these have a 
coordinating role, is all-too-often more intricate than effective.129 Indeed, an official stated 
that it is easy to note in the Territorial Council of Immigration (a special space for public 
institutions for discussion about immigration issues) that officials do not really know what 
their role is. “They discuss permanently about each other’s roles.” This official assured that 
“what is needed in here is a legislation establishing with clarity what does each institution 
do”, while others (like Luca from the Chamber of Commerce) recommended that there has 
to be one single office coordinating the diverse offices. Antonio (a union leader mentioned 
above) and Franco suggested in the interviews that both the insufficient capacities of the 
Inspectorate and the impossibility to make the most of the union between several public 
offices are due to the lack of political decision to overcome the sweating system.  
                                                 
129 One of the institutions intervening, the Azienda Sanitaria Locale (ASL), has its own jurisdictions which 
do not even correspond to the region, the Province or the City Council’s territories. 
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On the other hand, the Inspectorate is studying the possibility of reporting the 
entrepreneurs for subjection to servitude, but so far they have not been successful. Even 
having seen several of the elements which according to the definition of the ILO would 
suffice to define the practices by the sweatshops’ owners as forced labour (which I prefer 
to call ‘practices of slavery’ [see chapter 2]), in Italy “the legal framework does not really 
help to punish such actions”. As already said, sweatshops’ owners are instead charged for 
labour exploitation and for abetting the presence of ‘clandestine’ labour, but despite the 
fact that these practices have been exposed on national TV and have been indeed checked 
by labour inspectors, no one has yet been imprisoned.  
 
Contrary to the case of Argentina, brands and retailers are not legally accountable for the 
working conditions in sweatshops that work for them. Despite their miserable pay to 
sweatshop subcontractors, and despite their high profit margins, the companies (some of 
them SMEs but others corporations traded at the stock exchange, like Gucci) can make use 
of trafficked and slave labour without any legal limitations. Diana (from CGIL-Toscana) 
explained to me that the only binding arrangement for brands is a social clause included in 
all the bargaining contracts since 2002, in which they commit with the unions to not 
subcontract to sweatshops and to control working conditions in the whole chain.130 Today, 
as the manager of Prada told RAI (see above), the large brands have inspectors to control 
both quality and working conditions in the suppliers, but once and again the media has 
shown the existence of sweatshops working for these brands, and the unions cannot take 
any actions when these denunciations occur even if it clearly is a failure to respect the 
contract. While Diana asserted that this clause has been put forward by the unions given to 
their concern towards sweatshop workers, Dario from the CISL-Toscana stated that the 
clause has been included due to the dumping that sweatshops are doing to Italian 
manufacturers and because it damages the image of the ‘Made in Italy’: “this clause is a 
key element to certify that the Italian goods are in fact of cutting-edge quality”. When 
asked about whether they think that a law introducing corporate accountability would help, 
Diana said that it would be impossible to introduce it, while Dario said that it would not be 
fair towards the brands to do so. In the end, none of the 40 interviewees in Tuscany blamed 
the brands and retailers for the working conditions in sweatshops, which in my view shows 
how far the solutions are from reaching the city. Instead, many systematically blamed the 
                                                 
130 The clause emphasises the fact that brands must avoid child labour. 
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“Chinese culture” for the exploitation in these; as Giovanni (from the Department of 
Economic Development of the City Council) asserted, “those workers do not even feel that 
they are being exploited, it’s part of their long-term culture”.  
 
On the other hand, the support provided historically to artisan companies in Tuscany and in 
the rest of the Third Italy favours subcontracting arrangements. This support consists 
basically in allowing entrepreneurs to reduce labour costs by a number of means. First of 
all, artisan companies (i.e. those companies with up to 15 workers) are excepted from the 
application of the Statuto dei Lavoratori (labour charter), which provides strong defence to 
workers’ rights and was signed in 1970 (in the heyday of the workers’ struggles, according 
to Manuele). This means for example that workers in artisan companies do not have the 
right to have union delegates. Besides this, the minimum salary for these workers set in the 
bargain contract is lower than that of workers in SMEs and in large companies. According 
to Vittorio (a former worker) “this has always been like this”; he – who worked in the 
sector between 1966 and 2004 – always preferred to work in a factory because the salary 
was higher and the working hours per week were 40, against 50 hours in artisan 
companies. When he was 13 he started as an apprentice at an artisan workshop and worked 
in it until he was 18. According to him, when workers where younger than 18 their bosses 
did not have to make any social contributions. When he started working at an artisan 
workshop who produced for a large firm (Nannini) he earned what in today’s money would 
be £400, that is half of today’s minimum salary for artisan workers. This is to say that 
artisan companies seem to have always been protected by the legislation, but not from 
abuses in the part of their contractors; quite the contrary, they have been protected from 
their workers’ organisation. Indeed, Ross (2004) and Hadjimichalis (2006) point this out as 
an element that presents a less glossy picture that the typical image that a consumer of 
‘made in Italy’ goods has.131 
 
The number of 15 workers is a key borderline in a small company’s organisation and costs. 
The three small entrepreneurs that I interviewed in Prato (Carlo, Silvia e Francesco) have 
precisely 15 employees. The three of them recognised that their companies are undergoing 
a good moment132, and despite the fact that two of them enlarge the premises of their 
                                                 
131 Ross (2004) and Hadjimichalis (2006) point at informality as a main feature of Italian Industrial Districts, 
a fact that has been systematically left aside – or at least downplayed – in both Italian and Anglophone 
literature on IDs and on flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1985). 
132 The reader should note that the interviews were carried out right before the financial crisis of October 
2008. 
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companies every five years (on average), none of them plans to hire more employees. The 
three of them subcontract the physical production of the garment to Chinese workshops. 
For example, Silvia said that “hiring one more employee would mean a whole series of 
changes in the organisation of my workers and of my structure of costs. I don’t need to, 
because I only employ the designers, the seamstress that makes the prototypes, the cutter, 
those that work in quality control and that’s it.”133 She actually confessed that every six 
months she has to go to the Chamber of Commerce to make sure that her suppliers are 
indeed registered and working, since they change their names quite often (which is a sign 
of that her suppliers work as sweatshops). 
 
Finally, the incredibly high level of the turnover of companies owned by Chinese 
nationals, which reaches a 60 percent, is indeed ‘suggested’ by the legislation. Luca (from 
the Chamber of Commerce) explained to me that to open a company might take as little as 
one day; for the first two years companies are excepted from presenting any declarations to 
the tax offices, and no inspections to these new companies take place until their third year 
of life. It is easy then for the sweatshops’ owners to set up a company and shut it down and 
re-open it under another name after two years. This can be easily seen in Macrolotto, 
where the names of the companies are ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘3’, ‘2’ and the like. This shows that they 
have no interest in setting up serious companies; instead, they register they activities in 
order to be given a residence permit and to have a store in the area where they sell directly 
to the customers.134 
 
7.2. The winners 
 
As above said, the UIP calculates that the sweating system generates about €1.8 billion 
yearly. Since the majority of their goods are sold to companies from outside Prato, some of 
this money comes into the city as the inflow generated by the sweating system. In the 
midst of a terrible crisis in the city’s traditional district (textile), this inflow of money was 
originally seen as “a blessing” by the UIP and by the City’s authorities. Certainly, it is fair 
to believe that those who participate in the circuits of this money are not interested in any 
thorough changes. The few very successful Chinese entrepreneurs in Prato (between 200 
and 300, according to Franco) are certainly not the only group highly benefited from the 
                                                 
133 Translated from Italian. 
134 Indeed, the process of finally closing down the firm might take up to 3 years; in virtue of this, the number 
of companies registered in the Chamber of Commerce is surely above the real one. 
181 
 
 
development of the sweating system. Apart from some clothing companies based in the 
area, and beside some former textile industrialists that rent their tenements to Chinese 
entrepreneurs, estate agents, cars sellers, banks, money transfers and some trade operators 
are the real beneficiaries from this phenomenon.  
 
As already said, the UIP calculates that about €1 billion of the total €1.8 billion that the 
‘Chinese district’ brings into the city is not declared. It is known that some of this money is 
used by the most successful Chinese migrants to buy properties, what has created a huge 
real estate market. “The Chinese” pay cash, and if they have decided to buy a specific 
property, the price is not a problem: they can beat any offer. These entrepreneurs are also 
those who ride the most expensive cars like Audi, BMW, Porsche and Mercedes, but they 
are not alone in this: according to Franco, a good car means progress and social upgrading 
for the Chinese immigrant; even if he or she is not rich, an expensive car is a necessary 
investment. Therefore, this has also created a significant market for car sellers. One other 
small group of beneficiaries is that of the trade operators: in order to import anything from 
China (mostly fabric, but also finished garments and many other kinds of goods to be 
consumed by either the Chinese or the ‘Pratesi’), immigrants join an Italian trade partner 
and create Chinese-Italian associations. This is certainly a highly profitable business for 
both. Finally, Franco argues that banks and money transfer companies are especially 
interested in the creation of such large amounts of capital being produced beyond the reach 
of the state (and of tax-payment), be it in Prato or in the rest of Europe. Indeed, according 
to an estimation of Bankitalia (2008; cited in Pieraccini, 2008: 34), in 2007 €600 million 
were sent to China from Prato.  
 
But despite the growing development of the “parallel district of the pronto moda”, the 
sweating system is also a blessing for the large fashion houses and other fashion companies 
that use them. In this sense it is necessary to identify two main types of fashion companies 
based in Prato which have benefited during recent years. On the one hand there is those 
artisan or SME companies (e.g. the three I interviewed) producing mostly for variety 
chains like Mark & Spencer’s, Oviesse (Italy) and others. On the other hand there is a 
handful of companies that during recent years have achieved to develop their own brand 
and distribution channels, like Sonia Fortuna, Cavalli, Sage, Castellani and Patrizia Pepe 
(the latter being the largest clothing company in Prato). Beyond the complaints of the 
Unione Industriale Pratese about “the Chinese” and its considerate view on the role of 
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Italian firms, these clothing companies, together with large fashion houses and companies 
in the sectors referred to above, are precisely the most benefited actors from the emergence 
of a sweating system. They all are, together with the ‘bosses’ of the Chinese community, 
the winners of this story. 
 
The three medium-quality clothing artisan companies I interviewed in Prato started up in 
the early 1980s. Beyond specific and rather short moments of stagnation, these firms did 
very well and today are amongst the most successful companies in the district. According 
to an official of the Unione Industriale Pratese (Luca, mentioned above), they account for 
an important part of the explosive growth of Prato’s clothing exports, with a trade surplus 
of €200 million only in clothing. One of these entrepreneurs (Carlo, interviewed on 
29/7/08) emphasised that 
 
in the end we are lucky to be in Prato, because it is the textiles companies that are suffering, 
but we are doing well.  
 
These, and the new flourishing brands based in the Province, are meant to become the new 
rich of the city, the faces of the successful recovery of a Southern European city ruined by 
industrial decadence. For them to actually become so, the state is allowing the underground 
economy to develop, which is “an efficient vehicle for channelling money from the public 
to the private sector” (Ross, 2004: 212). Such policy is certainly an indication of the lack 
of alternative policies from public authorities, and a sign of the increasing penetration of 
capital’s interests and logics into the state’s policy-making in these neoliberal times. 
 
8. A country in contradiction: In Italy, the victims of fashion are 
guilty 
 
In Italy, condemning ‘clandestine’ labour to deportation is as usual as easing the financial 
punishments for the entrepreneurs – not to mention criminal charges to them. International 
conventions like the Palermo Protocol and the Convention of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers are systematically violated by Italian authorities. When a sweatshop is identified 
and shut down by the authorities, the workers under irregular immigration status are sent to 
Centres of Identification (because many of them do not have their passports) and then they 
are released and told to leave the country in no more than five days. In no cases they are 
treated as victims of human trafficking as stated in the respective United Nations’ protocol 
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signed in by Italy: ironically, in the very nation where it was born, the Palermo Protocol is 
systematically violated by the Italian authorities.135 Indeed, none of my interviewees even 
mentioned it. 
 
It is partly in virtue of this that the ILO has called the attention of the Italian authorities for 
not complying with its Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(ACFC). In the 2009 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, the experts of the ILO dedicate a specific section of to 
Italy, arguing that   
 
despite the existence of human rights and anti-discrimination legislation and the creation of 
administrative and advisory bodies, the Committee notes the apparent high incidence of 
discrimination and violations of basic human rights of the immigrant population in the country 
(…) racism and xenophobia affecting immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees – including 
Roma – persists in the country creating a negative climate concerning these persons” (:644).136  
 
Only 2 months before that, the EU’s Commission for Human Rights had put forward 
similar concerns about policies towards immigrants in the country. As I will stress in 
chapter 7, this shows that the Italian state is the main responsible for guaranteeing the 
respect of human rights towards migrant workers in the country. The current government is 
clearly failing to do so.  
 
9. The unions: of workers, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs 
 
The lack of a socially concerned approach towards sweatshop work seems to affect the 
large majority of those who could be central for fighting sweatshops. At this point, it is fair 
to ask what the unions are doing about sweatshop labour in Prato. For this research I have 
interviewed all the six union leaders of the T&C divisions within the three main unions 
(FILTEA-CGIL, FEMCA-CISL and UILTA-UIL) both at the level of Prato and the region.  
                                                 
135
 Paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Palermo Protocol states that “each State Party shall consider implementing 
measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of trafficking in persons, 
including, in appropriate cases, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, other relevant 
organizations and other elements of civil society, and, in particular, the provision of: (a) Appropriate housing; 
(b) Counselling and information, in particular as regards their legal rights, in a language that the victims of 
trafficking in persons can understand; (c) Medical, psychological and material assistance; and (d) 
Employment, educational and training opportunities.” 
136 The Report actually placed Italy at the same level as Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Uganda, among others, 
what triggered a fierce response from officials from the Ministry of Welfare that stated that the report was 
“unfair” towards the country (Repubblica, 12/6/09). Indeed, I was told by an official at the Department of 
Economic Development on Tuscany about the broad repercussions that the report had within the national 
government. 
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The nature of the sweating system certainly complicates unionisation and union activism. 
The ethnic logics created by the Chinese entrepreneurial class, and the mechanisms 
mentioned above to keep their workers under complete silence, leads the workers not to 
report their situation to the authorities. Indeed, Andrea (a labour inspector) pointed out that 
in his seven years at the Inspectorate he only remembers two reports from Chinese 
workers. Besides, all the unions in Prato stated that there have been attempts to unionise 
workers in Chinese companies, but they have failed: “they only come to the union when 
they have a specific problem – like underpayment or a delay in the pay – and see the 
opportunity to solve it by means of the union” (interview with Cristina from the CISL-
Prato, on 5/8/08 and 12/8/08). However, this does not apply to sweatshop workers, with 
which there have not been attempts of regularisation or unionisation.137   
 
Similarly to the case of Buenos Aires, the vision of all the six interviewees is – albeit to 
different extents – astonishingly similar to that of the entrepreneurs, including a series of 
arguments that justify capital’s practices in the sector. Many of these arguments lie under 
the broad idea that Dario (CISL-Tuscany) put forward in the interview:  
 
until some decades ago, companies controlled the market; but today it is the way round, and 
working conditions are determined by the market. If the market helps Italian firms, then we 
will be benefited. So, firstly we must make sure that our enterprises do well, because only 
when they are in a good situation we can push to get more benefits. 
 
One of the problems with this vision is – in my view – that none of the union leaders had a 
critical stance on the subcontracting practises of the high end fashion houses, like their 
miserable pay to the subcontractors (which leads to dreadful working conditions). Diana 
(CGIL-Tuscany) acknowledged that the pay to subcontractors is very low, but she argued 
that large brands “save in production to invest in image; that might affect working 
conditions, but if they do not do so then they run out of business, and for us to save the 
jobs and to be able to demand better conditions, companies must remain competitive.” 
What the unions are not acknowledging is that beyond the international and European 
economic trends affecting Italy’s manufacturing production, the companies with which 
they negotiate the bargaining contracts every four years (and the salary scale every two 
years) are making these matters worse. Other sectors are also affected by similar trends 
happening beyond the reach of individual companies, but their workers’ salaries are not 
                                                 
137 Workers must have a passport, a residence permit and a payslip to be allowed to join a union. 
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just above the poverty line, much less in periods of high sales. In other words, ‘the market’ 
is also (actually mostly) made up by names; ‘the market’ is also called Gucci, Dolce & 
Gabbana, Channel, Marks & Spencer’s,  Zara, H&M… 
 
Manuele (the labour lawyer from an independent union cited above) noted that large 
factories are an easy target for unionisation, whereas the much larger army of workers of 
the thousands of artisan firms and tiny inner-city workshops requires too much dedication, 
and perhaps a complete reformulation of the union’s strategies (see chapter 7). In this 
sense, he asserts that unions prefer to keep their usual targets (the insiders) instead of 
paying attention to the (deteriorating) conditions that mid-siders and outsiders face day 
after day. 
 
The justification of the companies’ practices and the disregarding view towards workers 
are embedded in several statements from the interviews. The mention to cheap imports 
(what I have called ‘the Chinese shadow’ for the case of Buenos Aires) and to 
delocalisation was much more frequent in interviews with unions than with entrepreneurs: 
“the unfair competition of imported goods is tremendous. There exist studies by the EU 
showing that the price of some imported garments is even lower that the price of the raw 
materials for those garments in here” (Cristina, CISL-Prato). It is my understanding that 
statements like this one show not only the lack of a thorough strategy of their own, but also 
the fact that capital’s ideology has not only entered state politics but also union politics 
(see chapter 7).  
 
It must be considered, however, that unions are not to be fully blamed for their current 
limitations. Both the general frame of crisis of the domestic manufacturing industries, and 
the strong trend towards labour flexibilisation, have created and strengthened the shift in 
the balance of power between capital and labour in Italy. However, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 7, it seems fair to conclude that the unions are not developing intelligent and 
proactive strategies to retake power. Rather, they seem to be assuming the comfortable role 
of ‘doing what they can’, that meaning ‘pushing to get what might be more easily 
achieved’. In sum, the rigidities of bureaucracy might not be only applicable to the state 
institutions.  
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10. Conclusions 
 
 
Prato’s economic changes in the last two decades depict in a single ‘space-time fix’ 
(Jessop, 2000) some of the effects that neoliberalisation and international trade 
liberalisation have had on industrial production in Europe. The former workshops on 
which the most successful textile industry in Europe was based, are now occupied by 
sweatshop workers producing for Italian and Chinese clothing entrepreneurs. Both 
globalisation and the EU’s commercial policy have hurt Italy’s economy in the very heart 
of its ‘economic miracle’: manufactures production in industrial districts. The policies that 
until the end of the MFA (see chapter 3) had helped Italy’s textile and clothing production 
have changed, and they gave way to the introduction of new competitors into the European 
markets. These changes benefited, on the one hand, clothing retailers which import cheap 
products from SE Asia (without even needing to state the origin of what they sell); on the 
other hand, they also benefited high-end fashion houses, since free trade opened up new 
markets for them in large countries like Russia and China. Industrial firms based on large 
factories with well paid and stable workers are the losers of such policies.  
 
However, by means of the reorganisation of production (delocalisation and subcontracting 
to homeworkers and low-paid workshop-based labourers) and by the active participation 
into the design of labour legislation towards the beginning of the 1980s, the strongest 
industrial companies succeeded in deconstructing the strongly unionised mainstream 
labourers. Labour flexibility spanned progressively to the whole spectrum of workers, 
pushing labour standards down. In line with this, the increasing economic domination of 
state-politics and the historical tolerance of the Italian state towards informal labour, led to 
a race to the bottom in the strongly affected manufacturing sector. Again, as in the case of 
Buenos Aires, when it comes to enforce migrant workers’ rights this tolerance has no 
limits, and the absolute lack of socially concerned politicians and citizens condemns 
sweatshop workers to an everyday life of slavery into hellholes, half an hour away from the 
fashionable Florence’s Viale Tornabuoni. 
 
A handful of clothing firms understood international economic trends on time, and when 
clothing sales dropped and international competition increased, they shut down their 
factories and subcontracted the physical production of their garment. They shifted to the 
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knowledge-based and the commercialisation activities, achieving great success.138 But by 
this reorganisation the firms transferred the risks to their workers (now subcontractors), 
generating a deep labour casualisation. Besides, this reorganisation triggered a series of 
events that, coupled with the availability of a large migrant community and with weak state 
control, finished generating the rise of the sweatshop in cities like Florence and its 
surroundings. The phenomenon of the ‘Pronto Moda’, with its epicentre in Prato, is the 
best manifestation of these developments: these sweatshops provide retailers and brands 
with the need for hyper-flexible and cheap labour in record times. In this way, the winners 
of the fashion businesses can offer rich and poor consumers constantly changing styles at 
cheaper prices than those of their competitors. This is likely to go on. As the referred 
phrase of the Tavolo de la Moda puts it, the production of small personalised batches is 
what will secure the success of firms, but since this must also be coherent with the need for 
keeping prices low, someone has to pay for the price. So far the uncertainty that this 
creates and all of the costs of such an ineffective economic activity are being paid by 
workers. 
 
Henceforth, these processes that can be easily visualised in the fashion industry affected 
small and medium manufacturing companies, on the one hand, and the working standards 
in the industry, on the other hand. The availability of a large pool of informal and 
extremely cheap workforce pushes working standards down in the formal sector as well. If 
unions demand higher pay, retailers and brands will cut costs by an increasing use of 
sweatshop workers (as they do in Buenos Aires as well).  
 
As argued in this research, as a consequence of the increasing penetration of cheap 
imports, delocalisation and deconstruction of the labour movement, during recent years 
some sweatshop-like systems have emerged in Europe, worsening the crisis of domestic 
manufactures based on large factories. The latter cannot face the costs and the increasing 
risks that a business subject to international competition and to such an unstable demand 
(due to the recurrent economic crises) entail. This is precisely the danger that the sweating 
system in Prato portrays with clarity: in the near future, the only manufacturing activities 
which will be possible to take place in Europe will perhaps be those of this nature. Indeed, 
the proposal of the ministers of labour to extend the working week from 48 to 60 hours 
was a sign in this way: slaves producing manufactures for the middle classes and for the 
                                                 
138 Indeed Gucci became the high-end fashion house it is today after adopting such strategic reorganisation.  
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rich in the very territory where human rights are said to be sacred. Franco, from the 
Department for the Multiculturality of Prato’s City Council, said it this way:  
 
The Chinese in Prato are a problem for the European manufacturing industry. They cannot 
come here and apply their own logics, because in this way they are creating ethnic economies, 
and the ethnic economies are the end of the European manufacturing economic model and of 
the European economic model in general (…) We must combat ethnic economies. They must 
have practices adequate to our economic categories and models, because if not we are therefore 
importing foreign economic models and destroying ours. In Europe, the T&C is managed by 
the Chinese, the construction industry is in the hands of communities from the Balkans, 
childcare is managed by women from Eastern Europe, etc… That is: we are importing 
economic models that end up being prevalent in specific areas and destroying our economic 
logics. These are all economic enclaves that portray the end of Europe. 
 
On the other hand, the pervasive naturalisation of the market logics in which according to 
Peck and Tickell (2002) neoliberalism rests, can be witnessed in the increasing economic 
domination of policy-making. This trend has also affected unions, who have adopted 
certain neoliberal principles like the idea that first of all the markets must do well, and only 
then they can demand better conditions. Neoliberal ideas permeated the whole spectrum of 
the actors involved in the design of the economic life, and this allowed the concertazione 
to take place in the early 1980s and afterwards (despite the refusal of the largest union 
[CGIL] to the latest labour reform). The unions lacked alternative strategies and pro-active 
attitudes to get a better redistribution of wealth during and after the end of the ‘economic 
miracle’, and they accepted the very plans of labour flexibilisation that are now a major 
structural limitation for their own activities.  
 
The existence of thousands of sweatshops in the city of Prato is shameful for the local, 
provincial, regional and national authorities. In less than 6 months the official TV channel 
(RAI 1) exposed the extent of the problem, but no concrete measures to stop the growth of 
sweatshops were taken at a public administration level. In Prato, the extreme negligence 
with which the previous administration managed these matters led the voters to finish with 
63 years of centre-left-wing administration. Indeed, these events might also be showing the 
incapacity of the centre-left administrations to deal with immigration issues amid 
neoliberal times. On the one hand, putting an end to immigration would not fit the human 
rights politics of such political view; on the other hand, allowing immigration should mean 
strong efforts to enforce the immigrants’ human rights, but this is not compatible with 
allowing the development of economic activities that ensure extraordinarily high 
accumulation rates. The development of the sweating system in Prato entailed such a good 
opportunity for some local companies to grow up keeping production at home, that the 
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local administration, permeated by the market logics, could not – rather, did not – regulate 
it. Now that ‘the Chinese’ managed to create their own circuit and that the entrepreneurial 
association sees them as a threat rather than as an opportunity, a centre-right wing 
administration is in charge of putting pressure over the masters of the sweating system, in 
order to either stop with it, or to get a better deal for local entrepreneurs from these 
businesses. 
 
As I have argued in this chapter, there exist serious limitations to the (still very weak) 
attempts to overcome the sweating system in Prato. The racism and the lack of a socially 
concerned vision on the part of the actors involved is one of the most important obstacles 
that a struggle against sweatshops would have to face in Prato.139 The fact that the workers 
are Chinese and are part of the ethnic logics, makes it difficult even for union leaders and 
for progressive politicians and activists to see human trafficking and slavery at least as a 
problem – if not as the very first priority – or as something which should be addressed with 
urgency. Certainly, the ‘despicable attitude’ of the entrepreneurial class of the Chinese 
community is extremely successful in this sense, but it is in the hands of local groups, be 
them politicians or citizens, to adopt concrete steps to overcome such a shameful 
phenomenon happening in their very city. 
 
 
                                                 
139 I even met a group of left-wing activists in the University of Florence, and when I told them about this 
research they said instantly “yes, these Chinese are terrible, they are everywhere.” 
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Chapter 7 
 
The myths of the sweatshop economy 
and the state as the nanny of capital 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The results from this research suggest that the rise of sweatshops in the last 30 years is 
broadly linked to the rise of neoliberal policies. The big picture, historically speaking, 
shows that despite the fact that sweatshops existed at the turn of the 20th Century and that 
homeworking remained a major practice in the industry, sweatshops had been at least left 
to the margins of the garment industry by the 1950s. However, they returned to New York, 
London and Paris since the early 1980s, and they even emerged in several cities where they 
had never existed.  
 
In this chapter I explore the links between the rise of the sweatshop and that of 
neoliberalism, in light of the findings of my own empirical research. I start by addressing 
the problems that neoliberalism has caused for workers all around the world, and in the 
garment industry in particular. The trends towards subcontracting and delocalisation that 
large firms in several sectors have followed during recent decades have strongly affected 
workers. Meanwhile, the state has played a major role in supporting the private sector, 
notably through deregulation (the dismantling of labour inspections divisions being 
especially important). These trends have led to “the deconstruction of the formal sector 
[and to] the deregulation of the labour markets” (Gallin, 2001: 535). Workers then face 
greater flexibility and informality, and a general pauperisation of their working conditions.  
 
On the other hand, these changes took place hand in hand with the financialisation of the 
economy and its consequent discouragement of large industrial investments in core and in 
certain peripheral economies. They have led to the lack of locally-based industrial capacity 
to respond to increasing demand in times of quick economic recovery. In the garment 
industry in particular, owing to its (at least partial) dependence on local production and its 
vulnerability to international competition, informal circuits like sweatshops are activated in 
response to this growing demand, but owing to the fabulous benefits that they offer to the 
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garment industry (low prices, flexibility and quick response to the demands of brands and 
retailers) they finish consolidating as mainstream manufacturing systems.  
 
Having set the broader context in which the sweatshop has returned, I address a series of 
widespread justifications for the existence of sweatshop labour that mislead our 
understanding of the sweatshop crisis: (1) “sweatshop work is the best job opportunity that 
can be taken by sweatshop workers”; (2) “exploitation in national sweatshops is due to 
cultural habits of the immigrant communities in which the sweatshop economies are 
based”; and (3) “controlling working conditions in sweatshops is impossible”. The former 
of these has been broadly used by the defenders of sweatshops; despite its persuasiveness, 
in this chapter I point out that this realistic approach to the sweatshop crisis can only lead 
to a continuation of sweatshop labour, clearly serving the interests of corporations, and at 
the same time it diverts the debate from the core problem: the redistribution of wealth 
within the production chain. The remaining two justifications can be deemed as myths in 
virtue of the intrinsic falseness they hide. The first of these applies rather to the case of 
national sweatshops; it was expressed by some interviewees (mostly in Prato) and in a 
court decision in Buenos Aires. According to this perspective, sweatshop work is seen as a 
normal method of production within the communities in which it takes place. These 
communities would have their own rules. Thus, class divisions are ignored and exploitation 
is seen as self-exploitation. Finally, the second myth was pointed out by entrepreneurs in 
the interviews, and it is their main argument against corporate accountability. Each of these 
myths is addressed in depth and contested analytically with the inputs of this research, 
themselves improved with previous academic (or policy-advocacy) work. 
 
Next, I address the current role of the state, considering that stopping with sweatshops is 
also in the hands of national states. Despite the differences that can be identified in the case 
studies in this thesis, the lack of enforcement of workers’ rights is widespread in both 
places. The strength with which public administrations prompt public policies aimed at 
minimising the impacts of flexibility and informality over workers is quite generally less 
significant than the adoption of policies aimed at lowering the punishments to employers 
found guilty of labour violations. Such policy is a result of the policies of deregulation put 
forward by the advocates of neoliberalism, itself embedded in state politics owing to the 
closer engagement of the state with capital’s logics in these neoliberal times (Jessop, 1993; 
Arceo and Basualdo, 2006). In this context, while I understand that in Italy the state may 
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be ‘letting human trafficking and slavery happen’ owing to the business opportunities that 
these highly profitable businesses ventures provide to prominent local capitalists, in the 
case of Buenos Aires there are indications of active participation of the ruling party in 
these businesses. The idea would be to allow the growth of these circuits but under the 
strict control of allies of the party who would in turn act as a main financial supporting 
group of the party.  
 
In the next section I stress the importance of the efforts to organise workers under 
precarious and informal labour relationships. In here I point at the challenges that unions 
are facing and to their limitations to develop proactive plans to overcome the attack on 
their power that the deconstruction of the formal sector and the corresponding growth of 
non-standard labour relationships imply. Finally, in point 7 I argue that the sweatshop 
crisis was triggered by strategies followed by high-end fashion houses during neoliberal 
times, stressing the ties between the current demands of the fashion businesses and their 
dreadful consequences over the direct manufacturers and their workers. In the concluding 
remarks I point once again at the importance of workers’ organisation in order to gain 
strength in their conflictive relationship with capital. Besides, I point at the necessity to 
push corporate accountability in those places where it has not been applied (like Italy and 
many other European countries). 
 
2. Neoliberalism, a war against labour 
 
 
The results from this research suggest that the rise of sweatshops in the last 30 years is 
broadly linked to the rise of neoliberal policies. The big picture, historically speaking, 
shows that despite the fact that sweatshops existed at the turn of the 20th Century and that 
homeworking remained a major practise in the industry, sweatshops had been at least left 
to the margins of the garment industry by the 1950s, but they returned to New York, 
London and Paris since the early 1980s, and they even emerged in several cities where they 
had never existed. 
 
The passage from Fordism to Neoliberalism entailed several political, economic and social 
transformations. Among the first, in line with Harvey (2005) I have pointed at the decisive 
shift in the balance of power between capital and labour as the main one. Besides, this shift 
took place in a context of changing social regulation regimes, since it was partially 
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operated by means of proactive policies in the hands of think-tanks in order to influence 
state policy-making. In this sense, pointing at the “historical shifts in the constitution of the 
neoliberal project in [its] transnational space”, Peck and Tickell (2002: 388) stress that  
 
the first of these shifts occurred in the late 1970s, as neoliberalism underwent a transformation 
from the abstract intellectualism of Hayek and Friedman to the state-authored restructuring 
projects of Thatcher and Reagan. This can be characterized as a movement from ‘proto’ to 
‘roll-back’ neoliberalism: a shift from the philosophical project of the early 1970s (when the 
primary focus was on the restoration of a form of free-market thinking within the economics 
profession and its subsequent [re]constitution as the theoretical high ground) to the era of 
neoliberal conviction politics during the 1980s (when state power was mobilized behind 
marketisation and deregulation projects, aimed particularly at the central institutions of the 
Keynesian-welfarist settlement). 
 
These transformations came hand in hand with the increasingly closer relationship between 
capital and the state, leading to thorough changes in the priorities of the states and its 
economic and social regulation policies (Jessop, 2002). In this context, “the backdrop to 
this shift [from intellectual neoliberalism to its concrete state-politics forms] was provided 
by the macroeconomic crisis conditions of the 1970s, the blame for which was 
unambiguously laid at the door of Keynesian financial regulation, unions, corporatist 
planning, state ownership, and ‘overregulated’ labour markets” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 
388). Henceforth, state priorities shifted from granting full employment and other social 
protection in order to foster demand, to creating the ideal conditions for the well-being of 
the markets, since it is considered that the markets self-regulate demand and supply, and 
that by fostering demand the states were distorting the market mechanisms – thus leading 
to decreasing efficiency. In the end, this encompassed the progressive dismantling (or the 
‘roll-back’) of the Welfare State and the deregulation of labour markets (casualisation and 
informality) (see Harvey, 2005; Herod, 2001; Jessop, 1993, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
 
In this passage from one model of accumulation to other, the end of the Bretton Woods 
order (i.e. the end of fixed-exchange rates) and the burst of fresh money into the hands of 
oil companies and the OPEC countries during the first oil crisis (1971-73) were essential, 
since they triggered financial business (Basualdo, 2006; Harvey, 2005; Lipietz, 1987; 
Merrifield, 2000). Henceforth, speculation, the management of risks, share prices, and 
compound growth became more important than the ‘real’ economy. The economic 
instability that every once in a while affects both Northern and, more often, Southern 
countries is mostly due to the rise of financial businesses to the current levels, and 
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discourages large capital investments. Instead, speculation and ‘pure gambling’ appear as 
the more profitable businesses (Merrifield, 2000).  
 
Subcontracting, delocalisation and deregulation are all trends that have affected workers. 
In this sense, Chomsky (1999) notes the importance that delocalisation of manufacturing 
production has had in the core economies as a way to introduce labour deregulation by 
means of the constant threat of closure.140 Miller (2004: 325; citing Bonacich and 
Appelbaum, 2000) calls it “the chilling effect that the threat of apparel producers moving 
offshore has on the enforcement of labour law and organizing efforts” in the US. In the 
same vein, according to Gallin (2001: 535) it was not general unemployment created by 
delocalisations that led to a decline in union membership, but rather the dismantling of the 
formal sector. 
 
The decline of trade union density in most industrialised countries in the 1980s and 1990s is 
less due to transfers of production and relocations to the South and to the East than has been 
often assumed, although such transfers have of course played a significant part. More 
important has been the deconstruction of the formal sector and the deregulation of the labour 
market in the heartland of industrial trade unionism. 
 
As noted above, one of the strategies used to deregulate the labour markets is vertical 
disintegration. In both Italy and Argentina it has strongly affected garment workers. 
Gloria’s (from CGIL-Tuscany) statement summarises this point: 
 
vertical disintegration strongly complicated our work. Before, we used to have strong battles in 
large factories (and victories used to be significant), while today the average fashion company 
only has 9 employees. In this way unionisation is more difficult. Even homeworkers, which we 
used to organise and even achieved to set minimum prices for them, cannot compete anymore 
with small companies.  
 
While in Italy labour flexibilisation took place mainly in the form of changes in legislation, 
in Argentina as well as in peripheral economies in general, the deregulation of the formal 
sector was not de jure but it was rather de facto. As explained by Jose from the Asociación 
Obrera Textil,  
 
when you talk about labour flexibilisation [in Argentina] you do not only talk about laws but 
also about unemployment (which pushes workers to accept unfair labour practices by their 
bosses, even if they know that those practices are unfair]) and the lack of ‘work culture’ of the 
workers; by this I mean that there has been a process of disinformation which drove people 
                                                 
140 Indeed he talks about the “Thirdworldisation of the First World”, meaning the growing introduction in the 
core economies of labour standards which are common in the periphery, over which process delocalisation 
has a central effect. 
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under 40 to ignore their rights as workers, and this also generates flexibilisation, because they 
only ask for assistance from the union or the labour authorities when they have already run out 
of jobs. 
 
Besides, the growth of flexibilisation and the informal sector lead to greater pauperisation 
of the formal jobs. This is not only illustrated in what I said above (since sweatshop labour 
somehow ‘competes’ with formal workers, therefore dragging working conditions down) 
but it can also be seen in the case of Italy, where in the view of Manuele “little by little, 
many of the provisions included in fixed-term contracts (notably flexibility in the time 
schedules) are being included in the contracts of [the mainstream labourers].” 
 
2.1. Deindustrialisation: Moving with the wind 
 
The crisis of large industrial production of garment in core countries and in large cities in 
the periphery, in the mentioned context of general deindustrialisation in these countries and 
cities, is having long-term consequences. The bad experience of thousands of firms 
discourages large investments, while the personal stories of former workers and SMEs 
keep away working-class men and women from pursuing a career in this industry. In the 
existing factories, there is no need for more than a few highly skilled workers, and the jobs 
available are those which do not even guarantee a standard of life above the poverty line 
for an average family. In both the cases addressed in this thesis, entrepreneurs assured that 
it is very hard – even impossible – to find workshops where all workers are registered and 
work under appropriate health and safety conditions and so on. Even if entrepreneurs often 
use this argument to justify their use of sweatshops, it is true that there exists a lack of 
industrial capacity to supply the market in periods of economic expansion. Henceforth, 
when there is an economic boom, the response is the rise of small informal businesses that 
cover the demands of commercial firms in record times, and that may most probably 
disappear when the economy cools down. The case of Argentina, as revealed by the words 
of an official from the Metropolitan Centre for Fashion, shows that the dismantling of the – 
albeit weak in international terms – industrial thread during neoliberal times was a main 
cause of the raise of sweatshops and of the lack of proper subcontractors after the 2001-
2002 crisis. In the same vein, in Italy an SME entrepreneur (Gianfranco) stated that “today 
it is impossible to have 20 employees sewing in your own factory; we have even reached a 
point in which you would not find 20 Italian seamstresses who could do the job properly. 
This is why you have to either subcontract to the Chinese or produce abroad.” 
 
196 
 
 
Despite these general trends, the largest clothing firms are also to be blamed for the rise of 
the sweating system. Interviewees agree in stating that spoken agreements and ‘under the 
table’ payments to subcontractors are the rule, leaving the workshop (or sweatshop) owner 
unprotected in case the companies do not comply with their responsibilities. In chapter 5 I 
have quoted Nano (from the National Institute of Industrial Technology in Buenos Aires) 
stating that in the majority of the cases companies do not plan seriously their businesses 
and do not adopt policies to develop good suppliers, for which reason he wonders “how 
could they have good suppliers under such irresponsible practices?!” Besides, and more 
importantly, the demands are increasingly tending to concentrate on small personalised 
batches, in contrast to mass produced standardised garments. This kind of production is 
anti-economical, that is, it is very expensive, but since the brands need garments to be 
cheap, someone has to pay for the economic inefficiency of the demands of the buyers. As 
usual in these neoliberal times, it is the workers who seem to be paying the highest price. 
 
In this sense, the Italian case illustrates more complex processes than the discouragement 
of industrial production. During Fordism the high flexibility of artisan businesses in Prato 
assured their quick adaptation to supply the markets in fast times. While the success of 
these businesses was partly based on informality, today the increasing international 
competition puts enormous pressures over costs, and subcontractors must not only be 
flexible and fast, but they also must produce cheaply. This is especially difficult today, for 
their costs are tied to the Euro. In sum, what the case of Prato might most probably 
illustrate is that in the contemporary period, for manufacturing production to take place in 
Europe, it seems that it needs to take place under sweatshop-like conditions, with not only 
informal businesses but also with vulnerable labour always ready to produce what the 
‘buyers’ demand.  
 
3. Justifications and the myths about sweatshops 
 
It is easy to write 
something calling for action 
against tyrants, against murderers 
against the Cross and the divine power 
Something that’s always handy 
from the shopping window and the living room. 
(Canción en Harapos, 1987; Silvio 
Rodríguez; translated from Spanish) 
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Faced with the growing importance of anti-sweatshop movements, based mostly in US 
universities, a number of academics and journalists developed responses in defence of the 
use of sweatshops by corporations. In this context they asked people to “campaign in 
favour of sweatshops” and to “cheers for sweatshops” if they cared about fighting poverty 
(Kristof and Wudunn, 2000). Summarising some of the lessons from this research, in this 
section I identify three main arguments used by sweatshop advocates. The first of these is 
the most broadly used: “sweatshop work is the best job opportunity available to sweatshop 
workers.” In line with this, it is said that anti-sweatshops campaigns actually damage those 
workers who are meant to be the beneficiaries of the campaigns. In here I contest this idea 
stating that it diverts the centre of the discussion from the real problem: the unfair 
redistribution of wealth within the industry. The other two arguments are: (a) “exploitation 
in national sweatshops is an intrinsic cultural feature of the immigrant communities within 
which the sweatshop economy develops”; and (b) “controlling working conditions in 
sweatshops is impossible.” Since the latter two are based on fake premises, I deem them as 
‘the myths about sweatshops’. Also, I show how their result is to release retailers and 
brands from responsibility. 
 
3.1. Justifying sweatshop work  
 
The most prominent action of sweatshop advocates was the Academic Consortium on 
International Trade (ACIT), “a group of advocates of globalisation and free trade made up 
mostly of economists” and of lawyers (Miller, 2004). In the year 2000 this group wrote a 
letter which they sent to university managers around the US, expressing their concern 
about the process by which these institutions were making decisions on establishing codes 
of conduct to US apparel brands subcontracting to low-wage countries for the acquisition 
of college clothing. One of the key concerns raised in the letter was that demanding a 
better pay and establishing certain codes of conduct to manufacturers could cost workers in 
the sweatshops their jobs. This is why the way working standards are enforced must be 
carefully thought because “cutting off the perpetrator (of labour violations) penalises the 
workers he exploited by taking away their jobs (…) [and] we don’t know if an alternate 
supplier would be any better (probably not)” (Lim, 2000). The argument was presented in 
the letter as follows: 
 
multinational corporations (MNCs) commonly pay their workers more on average in 
comparison to the prevailing market wage for similar workers employed elsewhere in the 
198 
 
 
economy. In cases where subcontracting is involved, workers are generally paid no less than 
the prevailing market wage. We are concerned therefore that if MNCs are persuaded to pay 
even more to their apparel workers in response to what the ongoing studies by the anti-
sweatshop organisations may conclude are appropriate wage levels, the net result would be 
shifts in employment that will worsen the collective welfare of the very workers in poor 
countries who are supposed to be helped (ACIT, 2000). 
 
In a similar vein, Kristof and WuDunn (2000) put it more simply: “for all the misery they 
can engender, sweatshops at least offer a precarious escape from the poverty.” Taking the 
argument even further, the Nobel prize winning economist, Paul Krugman (1997), argued 
in The New York Times that sweatshops can move thousands of people “from abject 
poverty to something still awful but nonetheless significantly better.” At this point, the 
reader should note that he is certainly not saying that sweatshops can even solve poverty 
but just “abject poverty”, despite the long journeys to which they are subjected. But even 
so, corporations that make use of them should be publicly defended.  
 
These arguments can be very persuasive, as recognised by Miller, the author of an article 
on ‘why economists are wrong about sweatshops?’ (2003).141 However, the reality in 
sweatshops is more complex than what can be seen when analysing a problem to simply 
write a letter or a few journalistic articles. Addressing these issues, a year after the ACIT’s 
letter was sent, the group Scholars Against Sweatshop Labor replied to it welcoming the 
“legitimate concerns” of the ACIT, and taking on each of the concerns raised in their letter. 
Addressing the point above, these scholars (led by the sociologist Robert Pollin) pointed 
that  
 
the recent university-sponsored studies as well as an October 2000 report by the International 
Labor Organization consistently [found] that serious workplace abuses and violations of 
workers’ rights are occurring in the garment industry throughout the world. Considering simply 
the ‘prevailing market wage’ in various countries thus tells us little about the working and 
living conditions of the workers who receive these wages. 
 
As revealed in Chapters 1 and 3, beyond the issue of the pay, working conditions in 
sweatshops are dreadful. Indeed, the situation within small and medium inner-city 
sweatshops producing fashionwear for the local and/or national markets (that is, national 
sweatshops) is even worse: apart from the usual long journeys, under or lack of payment of 
extra hours, impossibility to unionise, beatings, and lack of job security, national 
sweatshops can involve practices of forced labour and servitude, like trafficked labour, 
                                                 
141 Indeed, in a debate on sweatshops in a British university, I was told by an economics postgraduate student 
that if a child who is living in the streets of Namibia is offered a job in a sweatshop, including shelter and 
food, “at least she would have a place where to live.” 
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limitations to people’s free will to move and change their workplace, threats, debt-bondage 
and/or several kinds of coercions to keep workers under full control, among others. This 
fact has been largely disregarded in the debates on sweatshops, which are focused on 
issues of wage and living and working conditions in international sweatshops exclusively 
(in which for example workers can at least come back home every evening). However, 
whether sweatshops are desirable or not; whether they provide better job opportunities than 
those available to sweatshop workers in and from peripheral countries (both migrating to 
Export Promotion Zones in their countries, or to industrialised economies); and whether 
workers are better off if working in sweatshops – it all must be discussed considering the 
existence of subjection to servitude, and of child and trafficked labour.  
 
This said, it is difficult to imagine any academics stating that however dreadful working in 
a sweatshop may be, sweatshops provide better job opportunities than those available to its 
workers. But these academics and journalists prefer to disregard this side of the story; their 
arguments simply focus on a plain comparison of what is true today to these workers and 
what sweatshops can offer to them. In this sense, if the alternative is starvation, of course 
sweatshops are better, but the key question might be better put differently: why should we 
compare working conditions of sweatshop workers with the current job opportunities 
available to them, and not with the earnings of those who benefit from their work (i.e. 
CEOs and share holders)? In any case, the kernel of the question is not whether sweatshop 
work is better than starvation. Limiting the debate to this is nothing less than a smart 
argument to avoid the necessary broader and more complex perspective. To overcome this 
argument it is necessary to look at the policy-making consequences that can derive from 
keeping the debate in this field, i.e. to analyse the arguments politically. Whose interests do 
such arguments favour? Can the option of ‘taking the least bad jobs’ lead by itself to the 
improvement of the workers’ lives? An example helps to clarify whose interests the 
sweatshop advocates are favouring: Lim (2000) argues that higher wages in sweatshops 
“may lead highly-educated professionals with scarce skills [to] be attracted away from 
their professions to these jobs.” By insisting on this very limited side of the story (which in 
the case of Lim reaches a sort of obsession for the defence of the current pay and working 
conditions in sweatshops worldwide) the author is only providing arguments for the 
companies to pay low wages.  
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Besides, the defenders of sweatshops generally argue that sweatshops are a first step 
towards the upgrading of the conditions of life for those workers, and it is following from 
this belief that Kristof and Wudunn (2000) quote a Chinese proverb that states that “first 
comes the bitterness, then there is sweetness and wealth and honour for 10,000 years.” For 
these authors, abuse and sexual harassment, slavery, beatings and many other kinds of 
violence which have been repeatedly reported even in mainstream media are a sort of side-
effect of a better future. To put it simply, the argument is this: “this is not good nor bad, it 
is just inevitable.” It is not a minor issue that such arguments are put forward by people 
who do not have direct contact with sweatshop workers, and who did not interview them 
according to a scientific methodology.142 Instead, the strength of their arguments is based 
on the fact that they favour powerful interests and get published in renowned newspapers 
and magazines (in this case, in The New York Times Magazine). 
 
Trying to put forward this same argument of the upgrading of working and living 
conditions as being the natural result of the present suffering, Goldberg (2001) appeals to 
the soap opera-like personal story of Rose Freedman, the last survivor of the Triangle 
Shirtwaist fire: “[Rose] died in February [2001] at the age of 107. Mrs. Freedman, a 
tireless advocate for labour reforms, was a remarkable woman who saw a lot in her 
lifetime. But what was barely mentioned in her obituaries was that she lived to see her 
granddaughter become the president of 20th Century Fox Television.” Such a persuasive 
but simplistic argument is barely coherent (what is the connection between sweatshops and 
20th Century Fox Television?) and it can hardly resist a single collective historical lesson. 
Instead, the historical lesson of the successful struggles against garment sweatshops in the 
US contradicts this evolutionist approach. At least in the history of Capitalism, 
improvements in working conditions have been rather a consequence of workers’ 
organisation and struggles, and not a result of a presumed ‘natural development’ of the 
production forces. In this sense, addressing the several strikes that took place in Europe, 
the US and other countries in the early and mid-1990s as a response to the negative 
consequences of lean production and increasing international competition on working 
peoples, Moody (1997: 58) notes that 
 
the demand for the eight-hour day in the 1880s; workplace organization and shop stewards in 
1914–21; industrial unionism in the 1930s; the forty-hour work week in the 1930s (...) these 
                                                 
142 In the article by Kristof and Wudunn that I am quoting here, they stress that they met a sweatshop labourer 
in Thailand who assured to be happy about her job. Their arguments are actually based on such limited 
experiences, as said by themselves. 
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ideas motivated millions across the world in earlier times and gave focus to the strike 
movements, political fights, and new organizations that arose in those times. 
 
In Moody’s understanding, it is these demands from organised labour that lead to better 
working conditions. Indeed, if the upgrading of working conditions in sweatshops were 
natural (i.e. inevitable), a thesis on the return of slavery in the early 21st century to the US, 
the UK, France, Italy and other countries North and South of the world, would not be 
feasible.   
 
In sum, the realistic approach to the debate on sweatshops hides the strong political 
commitment of its proponents with the creation of discourses aimed at justifying whatever 
labour practices in the hands of large corporations. These think-tanks take for granted the 
current unprecedented levels of precarious employment and of unemployment in several 
places around the world to stress the purported inevitability of the situation and to limit the 
debate to what is true today. The message is clear: ‘this is what you get; take it or go back 
to your miserable life.’ No interest for stopping this reality is noticed; no alternative is 
proposed or imagined.  
 
Even if sweatshops were a blessing for its workers, these authors would find it hard to 
justify the usually high security standards of the large garment sweatshops in peripheral 
countries (i.e. international sweatshops). This is illustrated in the excellent documentary 
‘The Corporation’, when the interviewer and his crew enter a factory in Honduras which is 
tightly controlled by security agents.143 Also, Cravey (2001) reports on an anti-sweatshop 
campaign in a Phillips Van-Heusen (PVH) factory in Guatemala. The campaign led to the 
creation of the first collective bargaining contract in the garment industry in the country. 
However, soon after the agreement the factory shifted location and “the spatial isolation of 
the individual factory was further reinforced in an urban and regional environment that is 
decidedly hostile to union organising. The historical involvement of US agents (e.g. 
military troops and advisors) in producing a hostile climate in the region is an additional 
obstacle” (Cravey, 2001: 205-06). This militarisation (which is said not to be rare along 
Central America) is way too expensive to be paid for to stopping sporadic visits from 
Northern anti-sweatshop activists. Rather, it is mostly aimed at avoiding strikes and other 
factory-based boycott actions in the hands of workers and other locally-based groups.  
 
                                                 
143 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H3m5lq9FHDo  
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Some citizens and even economists and officials in cities where national sweatshops are 
settled also argue that the control over sweatshops should not be too tight, since they can 
always move out of the city. This argument was common in interviews for both case 
studies. In the case of Prato it was even stronger, since there is the fear that the Chinese 
entrepreneurs move out from the city – with their workers – and cause a significant 
problem for Prato’s economy.144 Certainly, some local entrepreneurs are being benefited 
by this phenomenon, but this should not be taken to the extreme of not taking action, since 
the social costs of having thousands of workers living and working under the situations 
described is certainly too high for the whole city to just live with it. If supported in the 
hands of officials, these arguments show the lack of social concern and of alternative plans. 
 
Yes, the consequence of demanding better jobs can be relocation of the factories. Yes, 
sweatshops allow workers to have some shelter. Yes, workers come from rural areas with 
no electricity, fresh water and other services. But supporting such labour rights violations 
and asking for more of that, while writing from a very comfortable office in a rich 
American university, is at the very least very easy, and morally outrageous. No bottom line 
is envisioned. Instead, as the quote by Zunini in Chapter 2 states, if tomorrow Mozambique 
(or Haiti, or Bangladesh) decided to legalise slavery, the world’s markets would soon be 
invaded with goods produced in that country.  
 
3.2. Myth 1: Exploitation in national sweatshops is an intrinsic cultural 
feature of the immigrant communities within which the sweatshop 
economy develops 
 
All-too-often exploitation of immigrants by immigrants in national sweatshops is seen by 
locals as an intrinsically cultural issue among the particular migrant community in 
question. Bolivians in Buenos Aires, Chinese in Prato, Pakistanis in Manchester, Latinos in 
Los Angeles… In my four years of involvement with the issue of sweatshops I have heard 
several times – and I even had to hear liberal friends stating this – that these communities 
are like a stranger phenomena coming into the cities with their own rules, one of which 
rules is a particular mode of exploitation (seen as self-exploitation). In Prato, two union 
leaders (Antonio [UIL] and Cristina [CISL]) stated that exploitation within the “Chinese 
enterprises” is due to their millennial culture of self-exploitation, whereas the judge’s 
                                                 
144 Mind once again the words of the Chinese council in Prato, telling the press that if “attacks” on the 
Chinese community continued they would have to leave the city. 
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decision cited in Chapter 5 for the case of Buenos Aires is perhaps a clear example: this 
decision stated that long journeys and other labour abuses are a cultural habit of the 
indigenous populations of the ‘Altiplano’.  
 
As witnessed in the case of Prato (and as put forward by Franco from the Department for 
Multiculturality), the leaders of the immigrant communities foster this belief in the locals 
since they are amongst the ones who benefit most from it. They avoid integration of 
migrants with locals by creating and financing the whole set of services that their workers 
and their families need, from doctors and everyday needs, to financial agents for petty 
entrepreneurs. In this way there is no need for the immigrants to get in touch at all with the 
locals or even with the local institutions, since the community leaders can provide all that 
they need. A good example is that of the previous administration of the Bolivian Consulate 
in Buenos Aires: in 2006, La Alameda discovered and reported that the Consulate had 
developed a kind of parallel Ministry of Labour where problems between workers and 
sweatshop owners were ‘solved within the community.’ 
 
The exaltation of nationalism by its leaders is a key feature of the ethnic economies. In this 
way, any kind of ‘intromission’ by the public local administrations or by any local group is 
seen as an external force trying to break up with its rules. A raid of nationalism and fierce 
accusations of racism from the whole of the immigrant community follows such 
‘intromissions’ (as it did in Milan in April 2007 or in Buenos Aires in April 2006, when 
sweatshops’ owners led a march against La Alameda).  
 
In the end this strategy contributes to foster in the locals the view of the immigrant 
community as a single entity, without any class divisions. Even officials are permeated by 
these beliefs. In both Buenos Aires and Prato they refer to sweatshops as “the Bolivian” or 
“the Chinese” workshops, and not as sweatshops in which workers are subject to the worst 
labour (and human) rights violations. I have stressed the limitations that the lack of a 
socially concerned approach to the issue implies for the struggle against sweatshops in 
Prato. Although no major acts of violence have taken place so far, racism towards “the 
Chinese” from locals is said to be rife. This was revealed during many of the interviews 
undertaken for this research and discussed in the previous chapter; statements like “they 
don’t pay taxes and then they use our hospitals” and “while we struggle everyday to make 
the month, they ride their BMW and Mercedes, and all this in our very city” are not 
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unusual. Franco asked me “if officials in the City Council are saying nonsense things, then 
what can you expect from the citizens?” Indeed, as already said, a book published by the 
economics newspaper ‘Il Sole 24 Ore’ and supported by the UIP (Pieraccini, 2008) has the 
unfriendly name ‘The Chinese siege’ (L’assedio cinese).145 
 
Under these beliefs, class divisions within the communities are blurred; thus, exploitation 
is seen as self-exploitation. Such a belief has profound political consequences, as it leads 
local citizens – potential allies in the struggle against sweatshops – to assume that 
exploitation will continue to take place as long as “the Chinese” and “the Bolivians” stay 
in the cities, because it is a cultural issue.  
 
Finally, building on this cultural misinterpretation, some defenders of sweatshops 
(Goldberg, 2001; Jacobs, 2001) argue that in many countries sweatshop work is considered 
as a normal job. In their view, despite the (broadly) anti-imperialistic nature of the anti-
sweatshop movements, opposing sweatshop labour would be patronising over those whose 
values indicate that there is nothing wrong with sweatshops. However, going beyond the 
moral side of the story, and focusing on the material aspects, it can be seen that within the 
workshops there are many working as slaves for the few. That has little to do with cultural 
issues and a lot to do with exploitation. Still, even if we, for the purposes of going deep 
inside the arguments, assume the relativist position and accept that considering these 
practices as exploitation is culturally patronising, then the problem arises as soon as 
corporations belonging to countries where these practices are seen as outrageous make 
fabulous profits from that – not to mention what happens if this is done in their home 
countries, where slavery is thought to be part of a shaming past in human history. Thus, 
this is not only a moral but chiefly a material issue. Besides, it should be a legal issue as 
well, through enforceable corporate accountability. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 The current political environment taking place in Italy, with a right-wing government (Berlusconi) and an 
escalating public campaign against immigrants (led by the Home Affairs Minister [Maroni] and fostered 
through the three TV channels and several newspapers and radios owned by the Premier), makes these 
matters even worse. 
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3.2.1. Nationalism versus class (and class versus class) 
 
In Prato, a union leader I interviewed raised an issue which brings the attention to a key 
aspect of this thesis. Referring to the complete lack of organisation of sweatshop workers, 
this interviewee said that   
 
a Marxist theorist would never understand why so many thousand workers living under such 
conditions in an Occidental country with full labour rights do not get organised.  
 
Certainly, approaching this issue from an orthodox Marxist point of view would lead to 
only limited explanations. As Castree et al (2004) note, beyond the Marxist broad 
distinction between working class and bourgeoisie, there exist several other social 
divisions which do place “real barriers” between workers. In their own words, 
 
the classic Marxist idea is that all those who labour within a capitalist system have a common 
class interest in not simply demanding better pay and conditions but ultimately in creating a 
post-capitalist system where the many do not have to work for the few. However (…) the 
political interests of wage-workers are necessarily more complex than this because of the 
multiple social divisions in play (:60). 
 
In furthering their causes, the political agendas of workers are thus more complex than just 
the class struggle. In this sense, Castree et al (2004) put forward an interesting (although, 
as acknowledged by the authors themselves, rather simplistic) typology of the political 
agendas workers might have. The authors identify five of these: (1) Class politics; (2) 
occupational politics (like teachers demanding higher wages); (3) Identity politics (like 
gays and lesbians demanding equality of civil rights); (4) reproduction politics (like the 
unemployed claiming for their right to work and have a living wage); and (5) life politics 
(like workers and other groups of the civil society coming together regarding issues of 
‘quality of life’). Besides, these sets of political issues can interact to a great extent. 
 
Throughout this research I have found that class politics operate individually, while 
identity politics is what mobilises – or indeed what immobilises – sweatshop workers 
collectively. Individually, these workers left their countries because they were promised a 
good pay and were also told about the possibility of accumulating some capital to become 
their own bosses. Their priority is not, at least not in their original plan, to work in a 
collective project like a cooperative, but rather, to accumulate capital as soon as possible. 
Indeed, in Buenos Aires the opportunity to organise their own cooperatives in the textile 
pole of the INTI, where they are given machinery, contracts with the manufacturers and the 
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assessment and training they need, did only appeal to a limited group of workers (see 
chapter 5). The case of Prato also illustrates this. According to the three union leaders I 
interviewed, sweatshop workers only approach the unions occasionally when they have 
specific problems with their bosses, like a delay in the pay or lack of payment of the extra 
hours and so on. Once the problems are solved –or not – they do not come back to the 
unions and they do not even unionise. What this shows is that while many workers can be 
threatened to refrain from demanding better pay and conditions through collective action, 
the majority of those who have the possibility of doing so do not do it, and none of them is 
unionised.  
 
Besides, none of the former sweatshop workers I interviewed for this research said that 
they had been living in “abject poverty” in their home countries.146 They stressed that they 
were unemployed, informal workers or, in the majority of the cases, self-account workers. 
This aspect is particularly important to analyse the reasons why workers decide to migrate. 
Indeed, migrating is chosen to the detriment of the option to organise and struggle for 
better conditions in their own countries. This is surely a fair option, but those people 
interested in fostering the organisation of workers to struggle against sweatshops should 
take this into account, instead of idealising the workers as if they all were potentially 
willing to fight for their cause collectively.  
 
This evidence suggest that rather than considering themselves as workers, they identify 
themselves with their bosses, since that is what many of them want to be: entrepreneurs. 
According to these happenings, it is fair to assume that what mobilises many of them 
individually is the will to become their own bosses, and, as a sweatshop worker in Prato 
told the BBC (2/8/07), “to become rich as soon as possible.” However, only a few of them 
achieve the status of having their own workshop, and only a tiny portion becomes rich 
(remember the statistics for France quoted by Morokvasic, see chapter 5). Indeed, 
unofficial estimates of the Department of Multiculturality of Prato’s City Council (quoted 
by Franco) state that less than 2% of the Chinese immigrants in the city are rich.  
 
On the other hand, the collective defence of the system is based on the ethnic logics 
fostered by the sweatshop masters and the community’s leaders. As discussed above, these 
                                                 
146 I did not interview any current or former workers of sweatshops in Prato. However, the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of them come from the wealthy region of Zhejiang, and that in many cases they must 
pay at least 2,000 euros in advance, makes the argument be likely to hold true for them as well. In the end, in 
both cases people in “abject poverty” do not even have the possibility of leaving their countries.  
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individual and collective interests come together under the façade of nationalism to face 
the threat of a foreign enemy (i.e. local institutions and groups). This ideological backdrop 
of the community leaders’ strategy is illustrated by the following event: in the latest attack 
to members of La Alameda (in July 2009), a prominent leader of the community organised 
a counter-demonstration in order to defend a sweatshop lord being denunciated.147 In less 
than one hour about a hundred Bolivians (sweatshop owners, their families and their 
workers) gathered and participated attacking the members of La Alameda while chanting 
the popular – generally left-wing – song “people united will never be defeated.” “People”, 
in this case, is the Bolivian community, struggling against the racist Argentineans who do 
not understand that they have their own rules. The Chinese council in Florence also 
responded to the report on the RAI in a similar vein, stating that if attacked periodically, 
the Chinese community would move away from Prato, causing severe economic problems 
to the city. In other words, the community leaders foster nationalism to try to amalgamate 
and mobilise workers collectively.148 
 
These particular class and identity politics are then fostered by the sweatshop lords and are 
aimed at driving workers to identify themselves as Bolivians or Chinese, and sometimes as 
future bosses, rather than as workers. This then acts as a “real barrier” that divides 
sweatshop workers from local workers and local anti-sweatshop organisations. In this way, 
the workers are more easily convinced about not seeing the sweatshop owner as the middle 
man in charge of ‘making them sweat’, but they may rather join him or her in demanding a 
better pay from the brands.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that beyond these political and/or ideological reasons, there exist 
material conditions limiting workers’ organisation, and they may indeed be more 
important. This is to say that the most important single reason for the lack of workers’ 
organisation seems to be their vulnerability. The experience of Armando at the Deputy-
Secretariat of Labour of the City of Buenos Aires is highly valuable in this sense. In an 
informal meeting on 30/4/10, he asserted to me that the most important problem they found 
systematically was the workers’ complete lack of means to sustain their own (and their 
families’) survival: their vulnerability many times leads them to get back to the 
                                                 
147 This ‘lord’ currently faces charges of human trafficking.  
148 Chela from La Alameda explained to me that the capacity of talleristas to mobilise their workers has 
weakened strongly in recent years, even if some workers are compelled to participate in the demonstrations. 
In other cases, “workers are convinced [to participate] through the clandestine radios of the leaders of the 
community, because that voice in the radio is the only thing they may get from outside the sweatshop.” 
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sweatshops. This is precisely where the importance of the application of international 
conventions defending the rights of trafficked and exploited migrant workers resides: only 
if they are offered proper and instant assistance, and if they have access to this information, 
they can think of leaving the sweatshops.  
 
3.2.2. The long and uncertain road to freedom 
 
Emancipate yourself from mental slavery 
none but ourselves can free our mind 
(Redemption Song, 1980; Bob Marley) 
 
The fragmentation of workers to which Castree et al (2004) refer is basically due to 
ideological conditions that place “real barriers” between workers. As said above, the 
collective defence of sweatshops under nationalist feelings, and the individual interest in 
becoming entrepreneurs, are the main ideological barriers to sweatshops’ workers’ 
organisation. The experience of the Textile Pole of the INTI (see chapter 5) is strongly 
marked by this: even if given legal and financial assessment, machinery, and workplace, 
sweatshops’ workers, or those who move from one sweatshop to another following orders, 
are not interested in setting up cooperatives, or alternatives that can assure their survival – 
and nothing less than that – but not capital accumulation or enough money to send 
remittances to their families. This is why Chela says that “everyday I see less and less 
chances to make the Polo [of the INTI] work as it was originally planned, with workers 
coming from the sweatshops and getting organised collectively into a production unit of 
their own.” Workers do certainly have good reasons not to engage into a risky business 
which, they know, implies very low pay and hard work during several months. Still, their 
overwhelmingly marginal participation, and the fact that they only make a 20 percent of 
the workforce, illustrates the lack of political or ideological conviction to try to solve 
problems collectively in their side. In sum, the workers are being given the means of 
production into their hands, but the ideological barriers and the individual (economic) 
interests that drive them, lead them to stay away from such an option.  
 
This lack of class-struggle politics – which is indeed one of the most important barriers to 
the struggle against sweatshops – can only be understood if the workers’ personal stories 
and the analysis of what it is that currently mobilises them towards a better future are 
properly studied. Certainly, it is impossible to look at personal cases; instead, a general 
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pattern in the given social group must be found for the purposes of policy-making, and 
personal stories are also ‘collective stories’.  
 
3.3. Myth 2: Controlling working conditions in sweatshops is 
impossible 
 
One of the arguments used by retailers and brands to contest denunciations of sweatshop 
practices is that it is impossible for them to control the whole of the production chain. 
Once they subcontract to factories, workshops or intermediary agencies, the control over 
stages in the subcontracting chain is certainly more difficult. In virtue of this, the 
companies argue that it is impossible for them to control working conditions. An 
Argentinean entrepreneur (Martin) argued that he cannot go and ask his subcontractors to 
show him the list of workers and whether they are all properly registered and so on. 
Likewise, in the case of Prato I have quoted Prada’s spokesperson asserting that “we’re not 
the police and our inspectors do not have an unlimited access to all areas and documents” 
(RAI, 3/12/07; translated from Italian). 
 
There exist important technological developments for managing logistics and for tracking 
back the production chain in the fashion industry. The availability of this technology 
suggests that controlling that their products are made in proper working conditions, rather 
than impossible is expensive and, more importantly, not desirable. Companies that count 
on the highly sophisticated Point of Sale technology, which connects in real time the point 
of sale directly with the factories abroad and generates instantly the order of production of 
the items being sold thousands of miles away, also use sweatshop labour while arguing that 
they cannot control the whole of the circuits followed by their products. In the same way as 
they are able to calculate every cost and plan thoroughly their decisions on investments and 
so on, they also could be able to inspect their subcontractors, that is, they must check that 
the human, technological and logistical resources available to their subcontractors are 
adequate for meeting the orders they place in form, price and time. Besides, the significant 
punishments applied to subcontractors when they fail to meet the deadlines – which 
sometimes reach a 50 percent of the order – are not applied to those who fail to comply 
with the labour legislation.  
 
As above said, controlling the circuit followed by their garments to secure that they are 
produced under proper working conditions may imply important investments. For example, 
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as said by Nano from the INTI (quoted in chapter 5) auto-makers invest immense resources 
in teams of lawyers who deal with subcontractors. They sign in medium-term contracts 
involving compromises from both sides (e.g. financial help from the company; respecting 
labour rights and meeting deadlines from the subcontractor). They do so not only where 
they are compelled by the law (through corporate accountability) but also elsewhere, 
because it is part of their necessity to develop good providers, in which they can trust. 
Instead, as this research reveals, in the sweatshop economy items as basic as written 
agreements are extremely rare, a fact that makes sweatshop owners more vulnerable to 
sudden changes in the agreements. This is why Luis (a lawyer of La Alameda, interviewed 
on 25/1/08) argued that “the problem is not the fact that they subcontract but that it’s 
cheaper to do it!” 
 
Legislation avoiding corporate accountability implies an unfair benefit for corporations 
who lead an industry largely based on sweatshop work. In this way the state – that is, the 
taxpayers – pays for the decisions taken by capital (because capital is not compelled to 
control working conditions). Indeed, this benefit is one of the main elements driving to the 
sweatshop crisis worldwide. This is why the US-based organisation Sweatshop Watch 
assures that one of the main reasons for the existence of sweatshops in the State of 
California is that branded manufacturers and retailers are not made accountable for 
working conditions in the whole of the chain. The same goes for Prato, Manchester, 
Barcelona, Mexico City and so on. If made accountable by law, and if the law is properly 
enforced, then branded manufacturers and retailers would be more likely to invest what is 
needed to avoid sweatshop practices in their production chain.  
 
4. Codes of conduct: Turning into pounds our ethical concerns 
 
The codes of conduct and the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) mantra were born in 
the very heart of the industry. They constitute, according to Naomi Klein (2000), the 
response of the industry to the mounting accusations of sweatshop practices by the anti-
sweatshop movements. Despite their proliferation around the globe, during recent years 
there have been several exposés of sweatshop practices by retailers and branded 
manufacturers which participate in diverse kinds of certifications. (Primark, Nike, The 
Gap, C&A, Levi’s Co, H&M among others). However, beyond the public damage to the 
image of the brands and retailers, no punishment has been applied, since codes of conduct 
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are not enforceable; indeed, it is generally the subcontractor who faces the end of the 
contract in such case.  
 
Codes of conduct systematically marginalise workers from their design. In several cases 
not even subcontractors participate. Instead, they are designed by the public relations 
offices of the corporations. Merrifield (2000: 30) points at the case of The Gap, which “has 
a code of conduct for its suppliers, although no worker has actually seen it. Nor, in Central 
America, has The Gap bothered to translate it into Spanish! The Gap, meantime, does not 
allow independent monitoring at any of its contract factories in over 50 countries around 
the world.” The result of this could have been expected: recently (December 2010), at least 
27 workers died in a fire in the Hameem factory in Bangladesh that works for The Gap 
(which has been confirmed by its spokesperson).149 
 
Quoting existing literature, Merk (2009: 605) points at some reasons why the lack of 
participation of workers or even of workers’ unions is worrying:  
 
as Braun and Gearhart (2005) have noted, ‘without [the workers’] active participation, codes of 
conduct run the danger of becoming tools for corporate interests rather than workers’ interests’. 
This is a serious problem in light of the increasing number of self-assigned experts (law firms, 
accountants, consultants, ethics officers, etc) who have jumped onto the CSR bandwagon in 
order to extract ‘business’ out of it. Activists and critical scholars worry that this has helped to 
‘domesticate the CSR space as a docile, auditable, and management friendly arena that is 
inhabited by professionals’, as Sum (2005) puts it. By appropriating these topics, these 
professionals seek to turn workers into passive objects to be audited, instead of active subjects 
that need to be involved in the regulation of their own working conditions. This ‘economising 
[of] the ethical’ might result in a domestication of social responsibility through management 
techniques. As such, it is not a process that prioritises the needs of workers. 
 
Participating in codes of conduct provides companies with the possibility to take distance 
from those who are found to be using sweatshop labour. But it is impossible for social 
movements to trace the whole production chain of huge corporations. For example, Bill 
Clinton’s Fair Labor Association, the favourite CSR programme of many of the clothing 
giants, requires that only 5 percent of the factories be inspected. The risks that such 
alternatives carry are immense: all companies may be deemed ‘clean’ even if more than 
                                                 
149 There also exist a number of prizes and rankings of ethical trade companies. A list of The Gap’s 
achievements can be seen in fashiongear.fibre2fashion.com/brand-story/gap/Awards-Accolades.asp It 
remains to see how the company and those who had awarded it with prizes react. Besides, it is worth noting 
that less than one week before the fire in the Hameem factory, garment workers in an industrial zone in 
Southeast Bangladesh had organised a demonstration asking for a higher minimum wage: they were met by 
police forces, and at least 3 of them died as a result of police repression (The Guardian, 14/12/10).  
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half their workers are unregistered, or even enslaved. The best example to illustrate this is 
that of today’s largest clothing companies in the world: Inditex (and its brand Zara).  
 
Inditex works together with the International Textile, Leather and Garment Workers’ 
Union (ITLGWU) promoting fair labour practices. Recently, the ITLGWU and Inditex 
presented a model factory in Bangladesh (BBC Radio 4, 21/1/10). However, as indicated 
by an official in Prato’s Labour Inspectorate, and by members of La Alameda, there are 
sweatshops in Prato and in Buenos Aires sewing for Inditex. Indeed, as argued in Chapter 
3, the very commercial model that Zara is imposing to the industry is contributing 
decisively to the worsening of the sweatshop problem. Despite mass production of some 
items, its demands for small runs, cheap prices and prompt despatching to market are 
pressures that force the need to produce part of its items in sweatshops (i.e. hyper-flexible 
workshops producing in record times and at very low prices). 
 
Being hurt by ethical consumers and activists in Northern Universities, the fashion industry 
has smartly used this criticism to turn the arguments round and develop marketing 
strategies. The codes of conduct are the element through which they implemented this 
policy. However, codes of conduct have done little if anything for alleviating the 
sweatshop crisis worldwide.  
 
5. The role of the state and the sweatshop economy 
 
Despite the differences that can be identified in the case studies in this thesis, the lack of 
enforcement of workers’ rights is widespread in both places. The strength with which 
public administrations prompt public policies aimed at minimising the impacts of 
flexibility and informality over workers, is quite generally less significant than the 
adoption of policies aimed at lowering – and in fact eliminating – the punishments to 
employers found guilty of labour violations. Officials in the labour inspectorate in both 
cases state that there exists flexibility with entrepreneurs that rely on informal labour 
(among them the sweatshops’ owners) in order to help them ‘clean up’ their activities and 
thus to progressively register their workers. However, all-too-often no significant 
punishments are finally applied, as recognised by officials, while sweatshops actually 
continue to reproduce. In political terms, this can be seen as an incentive for employers to 
avoid registering their employees.  
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Such policy is a result of the ideas of deregulation put forward by the pundits of 
neoliberalism, itself embedded in state politics owing to the closer engagement of the state 
with capital’s logics in neoliberal times (Jessop, 1993; Arceo and Basualdo, 2006). This 
trend was operated in different ways in Argentina and in Italy. In this sense, Jessop (2003: 
32-3) helps to understand why:  
 
[globalisation] does not generate a single, uniform set of pressures on all states but affects them 
in different ways. Indeed, it is not the State as such (sovereign or otherwise) that is pressured 
by globalisation (or other challenges). For the many social forces and mechanisms that 
generate globalisation can only exert pressure on – or, indeed, strengthen – particular forms of 
state with particular state capacities and liabilities. Moreover, in so doing, they modify the 
balance of forces within states and create space for, and prompt, struggles to reorganise state 
forms and capacities in order to meet these challenges. 
 
These differential pressures and trends can be identified in the statements made by my 
interviewees. In Buenos Aires the majority of them argued that the national state is the 
main agent responsible for the current sweatshop crisis, mostly given to the fact that it is 
the principal guarantor of the compliance of workers’ rights. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs 
blamed the state for the high taxes and the lack of support for the sector. On the other hand, 
in Italy the European Union was pointed out by the majority as the most important 
institution responsible for this crisis150, and the national state was second in importance. 
The former was blamed for its trade policies which encourage cheap imports over 
production of consumption goods, and the latter given that it has not been successful in 
defending the interests of its manufacturing industries in the EU’s and the WTO’s tables. 
Certainly, as noted in the first section of chapter 5, in Argentina it was the IMF and the 
World Bank which exercised the strongest pressure towards the implementation of 
neoliberal policies, but despite the broad criticism towards these institutions, at least since 
the popular uprisings in 2001 political demands are mostly focused on the state. 
Meanwhile, in Italy, as well as in many European countries, it is the EU which leads the 
pressures over individual countries to apply policies like labour market flexibility, lesser 
social expenditures and free trade, for which reason it is generally blamed by many as the 
main responsible for the crisis of the Italian economy. 
 
                                                 
150 I must make it clear, however, that many interviewees did not understand the question properly and 
instead of referring to the sweatshop crisis, they replied to the question about who holds responsibility 
thinking of the general framework of crisis of the Italian manufacturing industry.  
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Perhaps contradicting the opinion of the majority of my interviewees in Prato, in here I 
argue that in both cases stopping with the sweatshop crisis and with human trafficking and 
slavery is mostly in the hands of the national state. This is mainly because I understand that 
defeating the sweatshop is also an issue of setting the battle against it at the highest policy-
making levels. Even if this is made at the EU level, the enforcement of such a potential 
policy would be in the hands of the Italian state, same as the enforcement of national laws 
on labour contracts, minimum pay, immigration policy and the like. This holds true with 
particular strength when it comes to organised crime like human trafficking; it is under 
these conceptions that, according to Mario (from the Public Defender of the City of 
Buenos Aires, interviewed on 9/10/2008) in recent years in the field of law there has been 
a growing development of the idea of granting responsibility to public authorities for the 
lack of control over organised crime (see Bacigalupo and Bacigalupo, 1987; Hammurabi, 
1987). This is to say that there is a tendency to see officials as active participants in these 
businesses rather than as passive and negligent public agents when these phenomena are 
highly visible, and when the lack of control cannot be justified convincingly. In the 
interviews for this research, explanations about the absence of political decision to defeat 
the sweatshop range from the lethargy and the incapacity of officials to accusations of 
corruption. Moreover, while incapacity and corruption are not a minor part of the story, the 
latter can also be approached from a different – less simplistic – point of view. In this 
sense, as asserted by some interviewees (like Gustavo from La Alameda) while corruption 
is only beneficial for the individual in question, there is evidence suggesting that these 
processes are generally more complex, collective and rather planned. The section below 
focuses on this specific issue. 
 
5.1. State as the nanny of Capital 
 
The crisis of Prato’s economy led to a general decline of the exciting and glamorous city it 
once was. While during the 1960s and 1970s the banks rarely had any doubts about lending 
money to Pratesi businesses, and its nation-wide powerful Unione Industriale Pratese (UIP) 
used to be a prominent partner at Confindustria’s table, today Prato is marked with a cross 
in the banks’ lending map. According to five interviewees (two union leaders, two officials 
and one entrepreneur) its entrepreneurs are known for even having abused public 
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programmes of financial aid (like the Cassa Integrazzione)151 once and again. The fact of 
having their businesses based in the city gives its businessmen lesser chances of getting 
credit to re-launch the city’s economy. The alternative is to bring in public resources, 
particularly at the level of the Region, from which permanent financial aid is available and, 
more importantly, European resources are brought in owing to the framework of crisis of 
Tuscany’s industry – which makes it qualify for the European Fund for Regional 
Development. But for these resources to reach Prato, the city’s institutions and 
entrepreneurs must work to overcome its negative image.  
 
In this complex context, Prato’s upper classes are undergoing a deep process of 
reconfiguration. Looking at the statistics on the decay of textile production, it can be said 
that the entrepreneurial class of the city (those ‘new rich’ of the 1970s’ flourishing 
industrial districts to which Duggan [1994] refers) is less and less dedicated to industrial 
production. Its Unione Industriale continues to be a major actor in the city’s economic 
scenario, but the crisis, which “still has not reached its bottom” (as indicated by Dario from 
the union UIL-Toscana), is discouraging new investments in the sector. Rather, the 
services sector, like brand-building (Patrizia Pepe, Sonia Fortuna, Cavalli, etc.), and more 
specifically those services directly linked to the businesses created or fostered by the 
inflow of capital from the sweating system (i.e. real estate, selling expensive cars and 
commercialisation of the most varied items from China), seem to be the arenas of the new 
investments.152 This is to say that today Prato’s powerful businessmen depend to a great 
extent on the money that the “Chinese sweatshops” and trafficking lords bring into the 
city’s economy. A process of social and economic reconfiguration of the elites is 
underway. The accumulation rates that human trafficking and the sweating system allow 
are giving way to a group of prominent capitalists with which locals expect – or expected 
until recently – to form a new class agreement. The statement of the UIP’s president in 
2001 shows that some saw the possibility of transforming Prato into a fashion pole as an 
alternative to the textile industry’s crisis. This seems to be the reason that explains why the 
local administrations were determined to ‘let this happen’ until recently,153 probably 
because they saw this possible coalition as the only way to take Prato’s economy back to 
                                                 
151 The Cassa Integrazzione is a subsidy to which SMEs and large companies can apply in moments of crisis. 
If granted, the state pays for part of the workers’ salaries until the companies recover. 
152 Indeed, Italian authorities are investigating the possibility of the existence of drugs trafficking through 
these networks: the illegality surrounding the whole sweating system is an incentive for the development of 
illegal activities that assure accumulation rates that no other activities do. 
153 According to an entrepreneur with whom I had an informal meeting in 2008, local officials are often seen 
sharing coffee or lunch with prominent members of the Chinese community. 
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its most glorious times. The dreadful attitude towards local authorities that the sweatshop 
entrepreneurs have, and the fact that they have taken an independent commercial path (the 
Pronto Moda – see chapter 6), pose major challenges for the near future, and it explains, at 
least partly, the complete shift in the UIP’s opinion about the sweating system, embodied 
in the publication of the book ‘The Chinese siege’ (Pieraccini, 2008). 
 
There are a few similarities between Prato’s case and that of Buenos Aires in what 
concerns to the role of the state in the sweatshop economy. However, in the case of the 
latter there exist indications of active participation of the ruling political party into these 
and other illegal businesses. In this sense, in the view of members of La Alameda the 
sweating system in Buenos Aires seems to be only one part of a whole process of 
consolidation of new capitalists linked to the government. Gustavo explains it as follows: 
 
in his inaugural speech [in May 2003], Kirchner assured that his administration would 
reconstitute the national bourgeoisie that would lead the country’s economy and defend the 
nation’s interests in international forums. What he did not say is where the capital would come 
from! But now we know it: it is organised crime (drugs trafficking; human trafficking for 
labour and sexual exploitation; clandestine game; and so on) what is allowing some of his old 
friends to reach astonishingly high accumulation rates. And then you see these three or four 
friends of him that suddenly became super-entrepreneurs. One of them was a taxi driver only 
10 years ago! Now these good friends of him are disputing the economic primacy to the 
oligarchy and the right-wing entrepreneurs that have historically controlled the Argentinean 
economy (and consequently the policy-making). 
 
All these processes are certainly not random economic activities. Instead, they have 
concrete political causes and consequences. In this sense, it must be taken into account that 
these illegal activities ensure accumulation rates that no other activities can provide. 
Henceforth, when managed under the premise of prioritising the good functioning of the 
markets, states may allow their development, assuming that this accumulation of capital 
will finally result in more well-being. This is why some consider such policy as ‘active 
participation’ of the public administrations, because it means the allowance of labour (and 
human) rights violations. But suspicions of active participation of the administrations 
increase when considering that in case of public exposition of these matters, they have to 
face the political cost. Henceforth, it may well be the case that they actually get concrete 
economic benefits. In such case, the administrations would let these businesses develop 
and in this way they would make sure to have a powerful economic group attached to their 
parties. These groups would then be, for example, the financial source of political 
campaigns.  
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An example of state apparatus participation in these networks surely illustrates this point. 
As a response to an accusation of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in the city of 
Mar del Plata by La Alameda (in January 2010), a judge ordered an inspection to 15 
brothels. 38 immigrant women were rescued by the justice and put under the assessment of 
the Office of Assistance to Victims of Trafficking. However, only one month later, the 
public prosecutor of the city claimed that only one of the girls (who was as well a minor) 
was receiving assistance. The rest of them had disappeared from his sight; the Office does 
not inform him about their destiny, and there are high suspicions that they have gone back 
to the brothels. La Alameda’s investigation goes on now following unofficial information 
about members of three major political parties in the city that would be owners of some 
brothels where women – mostly from Paraguay – are virtually enslaved. Suspicions on the 
political protection of brothels (which since 1938 are banned) are certainly high. If 
confirmed, this would mean that the political campaigns are partly paid with the sweat of 
trafficked, slave and child labour. 
 
In sum, not only the interviewees but also the news often state that all-too-often these 
matters involve public officials like policemen and immigration agents at a high level 
(mostly in the case of Buenos Aires).154 Sometimes political parties themselves control 
these circuits, as the existence of punteros (neighbourhood brokers) who own sweatshops 
shows (see chapter 5). This suggests that in the case of Buenos Aires, rather than 
corruption, these matters encompass more or less active participation in processes of 
accumulation that give birth to powerful – although reduced – groups of capitalists 
attached to certain political groups or parties. 
 
5.2. Factory inspections and law enforcement: Letting labour rights 
vanish 
 
The statements in the previous section do not mean that this is always the case, or that the 
state should be taken as a mere ally of traffickers and sweatshop lords. In this sense, 
political mobilisation can lead to progressive legislation addressing the sweatshop crisis. 
Indeed, the most urgent steps forward in this struggle are those demanding corporate 
                                                 
154 Another accusation by La Alameda involved a woman who left the Human Trafficking Division of the 
Federal Police to accuse her bosses of participating in the business of sexual exploitation of women. The 
woman actually asserted that her bosses owned brothels in the City. The news was in the front-page of the 
renowned newspaper Página/12 (14/5/2010). However, no officials have been removed.  
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accountability and other beneficial legislation. “The anti-sweatshop movement has created 
a favourable climate of public opinion, forcing the world’s largest corporations to respond. 
But given the nature of that response, it is time to explore government-based solutions 
through reforms in our public policy” (Hayden, 2003: 4). The first step in this sense is to 
identify the current limitations of the administrations, and the poor quality of factory 
inspections is an alarming one.   
 
The necessity to control working conditions in thousands of hidden sweatshops scattered 
all around the territory certainly complicates the task of the factory inspections divisions. 
However, this can hardly be taken by officials as a justification for the existence of 
thousands of sweatshops which are easily perceived by citizens. The fact that a social 
movement, as well as TV channels and other media, have exposed hundreds of sweatshops 
and over a hundred brands is shaming for the responsible public officials. In this sense, the 
quality of factory inspections is very poor. The divisions in charge in both cases are 
understaffed and their training and human resources needs are not being properly 
addressed. The mechanisms to incorporate new inspectors are complicated, and there are 
reduced resources to train them. Besides, the participation in the inspections of several 
agencies in charge of a number of specific aspects – like health and safety, labour 
registration, policemen, tax offices, immigration agents, etc.  – entails a bureaucratic mix 
that makes it difficult to maximise the scarce resources. 
 
State institutions are proving to be incapable of adapting the regulatory frameworks to the 
new economic conditions. Better said, legislation is certainly acknowledging the 
prominence of short term economic planning, recurrent economic downturns, and lean 
production, for which reason labour flexibilisation, the relaxation of the punishments to 
those violating workers’ rights and, more importantly, the lack of corporate accountability, 
are surely taking place. However, when it comes to ensuring the enforcement of labour 
rights the state strategies are not being updated accordingly, which is illustrated by the very 
return (or in some places the surge) of human trafficking and forced labour. Likewise, the 
high geographical mobility of sweatshops is not being properly taken into account. Capital 
can make use of the uneven political and economic contexts between cities and regions 
largely owing to the organisation of space into putatively fixed territories administered by 
different – and sometimes opposed – political groups. This is what allows companies to 
compare all the available contexts and choose the most convenient one (e.g. that with the 
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least organised and most deregulated labour, lower wages, tax exemptions, ‘market-
friendly’ administrations, etc.). To put it into concrete facts, this is precisely what 
happened in the case of Buenos Aires: when factory inspections increased in the City, the 
sweatshops’ owners and the brands moved to the Greater Buenos Aires, where it is the 
weaker Province state that controls sweatshops. This is only possible due to the lack of 
coordination among different jurisdictions.  
 
In sum, employers are shifting place and subcontractors day after day, and relying on a mix 
of formal and informal employees and on other illegal tricks – chiefly tax evasion. All this 
takes place with the more or less often complicity of state members, but the state is not 
coping with the expansion of these phenomena when it comes to defend workers’ rights. 
The bureaucratic organisation of the state divisions that assured an appropriate regulation 
of the more or less harmonic relations between capital and labour during Fordism, are not 
working today under neoliberalism. In the end, complicity and genuine incapability are 
both driving to very similar results.  
 
6. Workers’ organisation: From Triangle to Viale 
 
Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressors; it must be demanded by the oppressed. 
(Martin Luther King, 1963) 
 
The one argument underlying the convictions of sweatshop advocates is the simplistic – a-
historical and a-geographical – belief that the current sweatshops will some day resort to 
something better through the progressive upgrading of the sweatshop economies. This 
biological approach to socio-economic processes is shown to be incorrect by the simple 
fact of the return of the sweatshop to the very same cities from which they had been almost 
wiped out decades ago. The idea underlying the argument is also that of portraying 
workers as passive agents in the organisation of economic life. However, scholars 
addressing the upgrading of working conditions in factories in New York agree in stating 
that it was the strong labour organisation and mobilisation of the first half of the 20th 
century that lead to thorough improvements, in a context of general labour mobilisation 
(Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000; A. Ross, 1997; R. Ross, 2004). 
 
However uneven the balance of power between capital and labour may be, the production 
process takes place under a certain temporary and more or less stable agreement between 
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capital and labour. The terms of that agreement are constantly renegotiated, under the 
framework conditions set partly by the state (Hudson, 2001; quoted in Castree et al, 2004: 
43). Indeed, highlighting workers’ agency has been one of the major contributions of the 
labour geography (Castree, 2007; Castree, et al, 2004; Herod, 1997, 2000, 2001). Though 
for some the fact that workers have agency may be obvious, portraying workers as a 
passive factor of production has been a powerful tool of the discourse of globalisation, and 
it allowed its advocates to present the negative consequences of neoliberalism as inevitable 
side-effects of the general progress of societies. Castree et al (2004) point out this issue as 
one of the myths of globalisation. However, “the fact that employers need workers (as 
much as the other way round) gives the latter a degree of potential control over the terms 
and conditions of their labour” (Castree et al, 2004: 32). In sum, working conditions 
depend on the constantly changing relations between capital and labour.  
 
The empirical evidence provided in this comparative research illustrates precisely the 
importance of workers’ organisation for both empowering themselves when having to face 
the instances of negotiations with employers, and as a major tool to drive the state to act in 
their defence. Indeed, the level of compromise of the public administrations in the control 
over working conditions is proportionate to the strength of workers’ organisation. In Prato 
– where there exists a complete lack of workers’ organisation – the authorities have only 
taken spectacular (highly visible) action against sweatshops, targeting workers rather than 
entrepreneurs, and aiming to show political will in this sense to those who voted the centre-
right national and local administrations. Instead, in Buenos Aires, faced with the existence 
of a strong well-organised group like La Alameda, the authorities did respond with several 
(albeit timid) actions to stop sweatshops. La Alameda even stopped the project of law 
designed by the clothing chambers aimed at releasing the companies from accountability. 
Besides, it led the allegation against a judge who pretended to release a brand under the 
argument that sweatshop-like labour practices are typical of Bolivian people (see the first 
myth in this Chapter). This shows that workers’ organisation can in the worst case limit the 
attacks on their rights. Besides, it is the job done by this social movement that has 
contributed to maintain the issue of sweatshops in the public agenda, and to reveal that the 
sweating system does not only produce for illegal outdoor markets, but also for large 
national fashion brands and for multinational sports brands. Moreover, La Alameda also 
provides sweatshop workers with an alternative place from where to denunciate their 
situation and get proper assistance, while in Prato migrant sweatshop workers can only 
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refer to the state, running the risk of being deported. Also factory workers have been 
benefitting from the launching of an informal union by La Alameda’s members, which has 
helped workers to press the official union – by means of demonstrations – to get a better 
deal from the negotiations with employers. Finally, the arrangement of a model garment 
factory with a state agency (the ‘Textile Pole’ of the National Institute of Industrial 
Technology) provides sweatshop workers with an alternative place to work when running 
away from sweatshops.  
 
Innumerable examples of how workers’ organisation in Buenos Aires is helping to defend 
sweatshop and factory workers can be mentioned. In contrast, however, there appears to be 
little evidence of progressive approaches for sweatshop workers in Prato. Although the 
linear comparison put as simply as this provides only one example, it makes it clear that 
workers’ organisation not only assures improvement in the long run, but also it may have 
immediate and concrete consequences for the improvement of their lives. As I said above 
(see 3.1 in this chapter), the history of workers’ struggles in the garment industry shows 
that the upgrading of working conditions is not a natural outcome of the development of 
the productive forces in Capitalism. Rather, improvements in working conditions only 
come when workers get organised to struggle for it.  
 
In the first half of the Century, the sweatshop was mostly wiped out owing to strong 
workers’ organisation, including the emergence of unions and their participation in the 
making of labour legislation. Several authors (Miller, 2003; A Ross, 1997; R Ross, 2004) 
agree in pointing at the reactions to the fire in the Triangle Shirtwaist factory as the starting 
point of this fight. In the view of one commentator: 
 
the Triangle fire led to a burst of city, state, and federal laws regulating the garment industry 
and dealing with workers' safety. For instance, by just two years later, the state of New York 
had passed into law eight new factory safety acts (McClymer 1998, 88). Following another 
burst of union organising during the Great Depression, the legislation-reform movement 
culminated in 1938 with the passage of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act under the 
Roosevelt administration. That act established the national minimum wage, required premium 
pay for overtime, and limited child labour (Miller, 2003: 93-122).  
 
But workers’ struggles have an even stronger role in moments of crises like the one that 
emerged following October 2008. “In the same way that neoliberalism emerged as a 
response to the crisis of the 1970s, so the path being chosen today will define the character 
of capitalism’s further evolution” (Harvey, 2010a: 11). This is why to further their causes 
workers must take an active role in the negotiations of the terms in which the current crisis 
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is resolved, and engage in the struggle towards a “transformative shift in inherited 
macroinstitutional rules of the game” (Peck, Tickell and Brenner, 2010: 112). However, 
this seems not to be the case. Despite the fact that the late 2000s have been particularly 
damaging for the institutional and ideological pillars of globalisation – see the bad 
reputation and the internal disagreements in the IMF and the WTO – “current policies 
propose to exit this crisis with a further consolidation and centralisation of capitalist class 
power” (Harvey, 2010a: 11). Right-wing governments claiming for more labour 
flexibilisation and cuts on state (social) expenditures are on the rise in Europe, while states 
continue to “privatise profits and socialise risks” through the bailing out of banks – the 
“same old story” (Harvey, 2010a: 11). In this path, following European directives Spain 
has recently eased – and made cheaper – ‘redundancy plans’ (i.e. massive firings), despite 
the opposition of the two main unions (CCOO and CNT) (Televisión Española, 
18/6/10),155 and the Socialist administration is currently working on a labour reform which 
will “modernise” its labour market: “flexibilisation” has been highlighted by the Minister 
of Labour as the key to the reform (Televisión Española, 12/02/2010). If such are the 
perspectives, the path towards more flexible and informal employment might most 
probably not come to an end.  
 
In this context, following Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000), it seems more sensible to 
assume that instead of diminishing, sweatshops might rather be portrayers of future 
developments in other industries.  
 
We believe that the way apparel production is organised is a predictor of things to come in 
many industries and portends the expansion of the sweatshop (:14).  
 
This is where the importance of the case in Prato partly relies: sweatshops in the heart of 
the Italian manufacturing industry should be understood as one of the possible paths to be 
followed by manufacturing producers in the EU. The attempt to extend the maximum of 48 
hours per working week to 60 hours, can be interpreted as a sign in this way, rather than a 
step to defending the alleged right of the workers to "[benefit] from freedom of choice on 
working hours” (Mandelson, 2008; quoted in The Guardian, 31/3/09). The European 
Parliament finally rejected this proposal of modification of the Working Time Directive, 
                                                 
155 Interestingly, this labour reform was adopted during the World Cup of football, in which Spain finally 
resulted champion. Besides, Televisión Española (18/6/10) showed the 180 degrees shift in the right-wing 
leaders of Germany and France’s support to the Spanish Socialist administration when these labour market 
plans were passed (bypassing the Parliament). 
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although the project had been approved by nothing less than all the European Ministers of 
Labour, with the only exception of the Spanish one (El País, 10/6/08). 
 
7. Fashion and slavery: The chicest marriage in Neoliberal times 
 
Fashion is thus not just fantasy or social-signifier; it is a specific production problem. 
(Green, 1997: 20) 
 
Illegal outdoor markets selling fake items and diverse kinds of clothing and clothing 
accessories are usually blamed for the sweatshop crisis. Both Macrolotto in Prato and La 
Salada in Buenos Aires emerged in recent years, quickly reaching significant sales. 
Medium-large and petty entrepreneurs come from other cities to buy products in these 
markets and re-sell them in their own cities in outdoor markets and small stores. In 
Argentina and in the rest of Latin America; in Italy; in India; in Cameroon; in the US and 
in many other countries, thousands of people, many of them lower class, live from this 
trade. Certainly, it is the sweatshop economy that makes this possible, because of the low 
prices offered in these markets. These illegal circuits account for a significant part of the 
sweatshop crisis. 
 
However, these markets are not the origin of the sweating system, nor can their unfair 
competition be taken by large entrepreneurs as a justification of their dreadful labour 
practices (as it usually is the case). Indeed, these markets constitute one of the responses of 
the sweatshop owners to the low prices and unstable orders that they get from large 
contractors. Along the years they have learnt that in what clothing concerns, the closer a 
company is to the market, the higher its profits and the lesser its risks. Hence, little by little 
those with the financial and the lobbying capacity to reach the market organised their own 
commercial circuits beyond the law. These large markets based on sweatshop labour are 
the consequence. 
 
But the return of the sweatshop and its geographical extension around the globe is 
principally a consequence of the marketing strategies adopted by large high-end fashion 
houses to face the economic stagnation of the 1970s. It is true that they are not to be fully 
blamed for the sweatshop crisis: once taken, their decisions were subject to myriad social 
and economic processes that ultimately led to the situation described in here; the context of 
the decisive shift in the balance of power between capital and labour, which goes beyond 
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this industry in particular, certainly played a decisive role. Nevertheless, contingency does 
not release fashion brands from their responsibility into these matters, mostly because they 
do use sweatshops today, not only to remain competitive but also to increase their vast 
profits. More specifically, increasing subcontracting arrangements (which constituted one 
of the first steps towards the deconstruction of the mainstream labourers under 
neoliberalism), and the growing importance of fashion in the industry, directly influenced 
the organisation of production and led it to the current developments. Notably, the 
shortening of fashion trends implies the demand of small runs from brands and retailers to 
the manufacturers, what means fast rotation in the production line, raising significantly the 
production costs and therefore making production highly anti-economic. Coupled with the 
tight competitive pressures over prices, and with the high elasticity demand of fashion-
sensitive garments, these demands mean low paid hyper-flexible jobs in the physical 
production stages. In other words, under the current situation it seems that only using a 
significant portion of unregulated and sweatshop labour (which allow transferring the risk 
on to the individual worker) brands and retailers can remain competitive.  
 
Finally, the extreme that the obsession for fashion has reached in recent decades is having 
negative consequences over the production of garment. Today the quality and durability of 
the product in itself is devaluated; the value added resides, instead, in the brand’s image. 
Investments in the superfluous side of the fashion industry are exceeding imagination, 
while workers in the other end of the chain are paid but a pittance, if paid at all. The 
economic result of this speaks for itself, as illustrated by the extreme inequality that 
characterises this industry (see chapter 3).  
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter I have explored the links between the rise of the sweatshop and that of 
neoliberalism. In light of the empirical findings of this research, I found that these links are 
strong. Indeed, some of the developments in this industry can be taken as the epitome of 
the shifts that the world economy, the state and the labour markets have experienced 
during recent decades, in a general move from Fordism and the welfare state to a post-
fordist (Jessop, 1993, 2002) or neoliberal order (Castree et al, 2004; Chomsky, 1995; 
Harvey, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2010). This industry 
was at the very front of subcontracting and vertical disintegration timely with the pressure 
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over large capital to adapt to increasing international competition. The consequent 
deregulation (or re-regulation [Jessop, 2002; Coe, Johns and Ward, 2007]) of the formal 
sector (with a strongly unionised workforce) and the financialisation of the world economy 
(which discourages large capital investments) led to a rise of flexible and informal jobs 
which in the garment industry, owing to some of its structural features (low initial 
investment, the facility to produce virtually anywhere, and highly fragmented production 
process), reach the extreme of the working conditions that are witnessed in sweatshops. 
Besides, these processes were possible owing to the deregulation of the labour markets, 
notably the lack of state control over corporations. This is because it is considered that the 
state must only ‘interfere’ in processes of capital accumulation in order to further the 
markets’ mechanisms, which are in the end those that will bring progress and redistribute 
the resulting wealth efficiently. As Jessop (2002) has pointed out, this has led to a closer 
re-articulation between capital and state. 
 
The increasing financialisation of the world economy encouraged speculative investments 
to the detriment of long-term investments and planning. The organisation of industrial 
production was adapted accordingly: in this context of permanent economic instability and 
high investment risks (which are a highly profitable financial products and opportunities), 
having large factories and numerous direct workers is today a problem for corporate 
profitability. For such developments to take place, deregulating the labour markets to break 
up with its rigidities was a main necessity for capital: no more full employment, no more 
long-term contracts and no more relatively high salaries. The president of the International 
Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (Biller, 2005; quoted in Coe, Johns and 
Ward, 2007: 503) put it starkly clear: 
 
Globalization means competition, and competition means productivity, and productivity means 
using labour as efficiently as possible—the right worker in the right job at the right time. 
 
Translated into concrete labour-market policy, this led to the rise of precarious and 
informal employment, and to the consequent general pauperisation of working standards in 
the formal sector as well.  
 
For these paths to take place, a thorough reorganisation of the modes of social regulation 
had to take place. In this sense, neoliberal ideas that had been put forward since the 1930s 
and that were further developed during the 1970s within think-tanks, gained increasing 
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terrain in policy-making in the midst of the stagflation of the 1970s (Peck, 2008; Peck, 
Theodore and Brenner, 2010). The macroeconomic conditions of crisis laid the ground for 
the actual application of the hitherto highly theoretical and abstract ideas of neoliberalists 
into state-politics, until becoming its mainstream backdrop. Considered as major causes of 
the crisis, state interventionism and strong union power were “unambiguously blamed” for 
the crisis (Peck and Tickell, 2002; see also Harvey, 2005). With the shift from Fordism to 
neoliberalism a further articulation between capital and the state has taken place, a fact that 
in many countries around the world could be witnessed from the 1990s with the active 
participation of entrepreneurs into politics. State ‘interventionism’ had to be kept to the 
minimum and aimed at creating good businesses environments. This is also why union 
power was specially targeted, in order to allow a thorough deregulation of the labour 
markets. Dictatorships in several peripheral countries (notably in Latin America) were in 
charge of eliminating the radical trade union movements (even torturing, killing and 
disappearing their leaders when deemed necessary), whereas in core countries unions were 
also subject to plain state violence and ruthless public administrators. In Italy, this 
encompassed hundreds of murders and thousands of illegitimate arrests. Students and 
workers organised into independent unions were specially targetted (Balestrini and 
Moroni, 1997). Here, the role of the mainstream unions is particularly controversial. 
According to Ginsborg (1994), they proved incapable of developing alternative strategies 
to cope with the economic stagnation, and its leaders were co-opted with the cooperation 
of the PCI, leading mainstream unions to participate in the application of plans designed by 
capital itself (in the famous concertazione). Stressing the importance of non-institutional 
workers’ organisation and their joint activism with students and radical scholars, Balestrini 
and Moroni (2006 [1988]) go further in this line, emphasising the active role of the PCI 
and the main union confederations (most notably the CGIL) in “(elaborating) a political 
line aimed at… the resolute elimination of any kind of uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
workers’ opposition” (:540).156 
 
On the other hand, the deregulation of the labour markets and the consequent increase of 
flexible and informal employment have further complicated the process of unionisation. 
Since the mid-1980 unions have lost astonishing amounts of members. However, despite 
this rise of non-standard employment and the decreasing mass of workers on formal jobs, 
unions still have not been able to cope with these changes and reorganise and rethink their 
                                                 
156 Translated from Spanish. 
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strategies and governing structures in order to strengthen their bargaining power. They 
have historically seen informal and part-time workers as ‘competitors’ of their ‘labour 
citizenship’, and the same goes for migrant workers (Gordon, 2009). But for the times to 
come, immigration and non-standard jobs will not stop, and the evidence so far suggests 
that unless an inclusive strategy is thought and militated by either current or new union 
leaders, their availability will certainly continue to be an element for capitalists to push 
working standards down (Gallin, 2001; Gordon, 2009).  
 
As mentioned above, the clothing industry is a paramount example of these trends. Beyond 
the policy advocacy plans of capital, firms themselves also applied their own 
reorganizational strategies to deconstruct the mainstream labour movement. Vertical 
disintegration and delocalisation were at the centre of these strategies. Both of them reach 
their clearest manifestation in the clothing industry. By relaying in the use of thousands of 
subcontractors involved in mutual cutthroat competition, the winners of the fashion 
businesses (brands and retailers) achieved to cut the labour costs that had always been a 
headache for the previous ‘bosses’ of the industry (i.e. direct manufacturers). Furthermore, 
the marketing strategies used by the largest fashion corporations, in the context of a fierce 
international competition that drives prices down, triggered developments that finished 
causing the emergence of sweatshops, on the one hand, and that allowed them to become 
the successful fashion houses that are seen today. The obsession for fashion that has been 
created permeates the whole range of the market, leading to the widespread use of flexible 
and cheap subcontractors (sweatshops) that may respond to the whims of the leaders of the 
industry, in order to dress up both the poor and the rich. 
 
The changes that this industry has experienced in the last four decades illustrate the ethics 
of capitalist companies: if they do not face opposition, they push labour costs down once 
and again until the very bottom; the result: trafficked labour and children working for 
them. This systematic violation of human rights has indeed been identified by some 
authors (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000; R. Ross, 2004) as a structural feature of the 
fashion industry. However, corporations survived to the damage to their image that the rise 
of anti-sweatshop campaigns caused in the late 1990s, firstly thanks to a series of 
arguments and beliefs (or myths) that justify their use of sweatshop labour, and later on to 
the development of codes of conduct which are, in the end, usually violated. These 
arguments illustrate the admirable capacity of neoliberalists to not only justify the practices 
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of large capital but also to portray transnational corporations as philanthropists helping the 
poor to cope with their situation ‘in a less painful way.’ As this research attempts to show, 
these myths are based on simplistic and evolutionist explanations about the economic well-
being of peoples around the world. But a thorough insight into the sweatshops and into the 
redistribution of wealth within the chain shows a quite different story: the inequality 
between workers and managers and owners (stock-holders) seen in this industry, can 
hardly be seen in other economic activities, and the possibility of workers or their children 
to progress under the current circumstances is minuscule. 
 
Unions and social organisations that work for the defence of workers’ rights are struggling 
to offer a significant challenge to the current state labour and social policies. The state in 
both cases has proved to be enforcing workers’ rights only weakly, following the demands 
for deregulation raised by the pundits of neoliberalism, and allowing high levels of 
informality in peripheral countries (a fact that is also widespread in Southern Europe 
[Hadjimichalis, 2006]). The same goes for labour legislation, which is systematically 
designed according to the exigencies of ‘the markets’ under the belief that the state must 
foster good investment environments. It is thus mainly ‘the markets’ that allocate resources 
in an allegedly more efficient manner. In this sense, it is worth recalling the statistics based 
on the US Census quoted above, which show that in 1999 only 3 percent of what US 
families spent in apparel went to the workers: this is what neoliberalists mean by 
‘efficiency’ and productivity. It is a war against labour in its purest sense.  
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Chapter 8 
Concluding remarks 
 
When the houses have become the common heritage of the citizens, and when each man has 
his daily supply of food, another forward step will have to be taken. The question of clothing 
will of course demand consideration next, and again the only possible solution will be to take 
possession, in the name of the people, of all the shops and warehouses where clothing is sold or 
stored, and to throw open the doors to all, so that each can take what he needs (P. Kropotkin, 
1906). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
If a worker in a garment factory in Florence or in Buenos Aires during the 1970s had to 
return to work in one of the contemporary factories, she would hardly believe how working 
conditions have deteriorated. Extra payments for productivity, dining halls and doctors in 
the factories are a thing of the past. Indeed, in Buenos Aires many of the workers that lost 
their jobs in the late 1990s did not come back to garment production after the crisis ended 
in late 2002. Despite the economic recovery, working conditions did not improve as much 
as the macroeconomic indicators would suggest. Even after seven years of uninterrupted 
economic growth, today the minimum salary in the industry remains just above the poverty 
level for an average family. The same goes for the majority of workers in Italy, despite the 
earnings of the successful Italian brands for whom they work in subcontractors’ artisanal 
companies. 
 
Since the introduction of the sewing machine in the mid 19th century, legions of 
unregistered homeworkers have produced garment, sometimes engaging in cutthroat 
competition between them. The availability of these unorganised and even confronted 
workers has since then dragged down working standards in the industry. Towards the mid 
20th century, a combination of strong union organisation and a political economic situation 
that made mass production in factories more suitable for clothing manufacturing (i.e. 
production of more standardised apparel and soldiers’ uniforms during World War II) 
limited the use of homeworking as a widespread practise. However, the responses of the 
clothing companies to the crisis of the 1970s fostered a return to homeworking and 
subcontracting to small and medium workshops, translating the risks of the market to the 
workers themselves. As a result, the firms of this industry have been at the forefront of the 
trends towards the deregulation of the labour markets and the rising inequality that 
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characterise neoliberalism. Indeed, increasing concentration of power and profits in a few 
corporations, on the one hand, and subcontracting and labour deregulation, on the other 
hand, are among the shifts that the industry has experienced over the last four decades. 
This is why the National Labour Committee takes this industry as the best case to illustrate 
“The Hidden Face of Globalisation” (see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Bhodyt4fmU). 
 
This chapter is aimed at summarising the main findings of this research, and to make a call 
for strong locally-based coalitions against sweatshops worldwide. Firstly I address the 
changes the industry has undergone during recent decades. The spatial reorganisation of 
production appears as a major transformation, with widespread subcontracting as a key 
element of garment production in present times. In analysing these trends I focus on the 
deregulation of the labour markets and the negative consequences this has had over 
workers engaged in this and other economic sectors.  
 
The role of the state is considered next. In here I stress once again the role of the state in 
paving the way for, and in applying and enforcing, neoliberal policies. The introduction of 
these policies in several Latin American countries took place by means of state terrorism, 
including dictatorships and massive killings of union and revolutionary leaders 
(CONADEP, 1985; Harvey, 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003); whereas in core countries 
the ideological battle was effective enough for the application of these unpopular policies, 
though state violence and anti-union policies were not absent (Harvey, 2005; Balestrini and 
Moroni, 1988). It is in this section that I argue that the states must set the combat against 
the sweatshop as a main priority (starting by the adoption of corporate accountability, and 
its enforcement) in order to stop the sweatshop. 
 
Also in this chapter, I address with particular depth what I understand as the limits to 
today’s unions, as well as the potentials and limitations of the cross-border anti-sweatshop 
campaigns. In addition, I focus on the need for workers’ organisation in the struggle 
against the sweatshop. There exists an urgent need for strong coalitions of workers, 
together with the civil society and liberal politicians, in order to put pressure on public 
officials to engage in these matters. Furthermore, beyond the need for the creation of a 
political macroinstitutional framework that may lay the way for more progressive policies, 
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I argue that workers’ organisation is also essential to achieve more thorough changes, 
particularly a more equal balance between capital and labour.  
 
As I point out in the conclusions, human and labour rights violations of the kind I have 
stressed in this thesis will always be latent as long as workers are divorced from the means 
of production. With the diagnosis to which I arrive in this research, entrepreneurs of the 
clothing industry have shown that if they do not face opposition they may roll back the 
labour and human rights’ conquests of the 20th century without major ethical concerns. 
But this industry has also seen the workers’ struggle against the sweatshop in the first half 
of the past century, which led to positive changes in legislation in the middle term. The 
clothing industry, then, could follow two confronted destinies (with their myriad 
variations): on the one hand, it may entail the start point of a future spread of sweatshops 
around the world; and on the other hand, it could embody the project of workers liberated 
from forced labour, spreading their conquests to workers in other industries, North and 
South. 
 
2. On neoliberalism and workers’ rights 
 
The paths followed by the international economy since the early 1970s (chiefly the high 
instability caused in part by the financialisation of the world economy, and the growing 
international trade), affected with particular strength the garment industry. The way in 
which leading fashion houses responded to these events has fostered a return to the 
widespread use of subcontracting in clothing production. Faced with the economic 
stagnation of the mid-1970s and with rising international competition, the high-end fashion 
houses and the largest clothing manufacturers were forced to cut costs and to reorganise 
their businesses in line with more flexible production strategies, in order to survive to 
intensifying competition. On the one hand they adopted vertical disintegration to cut labour 
costs and convey the risks to their subcontractors. Subsequently, they searched for 
subcontractors in low wage countries. On the other hand, they invested considerable 
resources in design, image and marketing; i.e. they became sellers of a brand rather than 
producers of apparel. But since in those years garment consumption had decreased 
(measured as percentage of family income spent on garment items) the industry itself had 
to think of a collective strategy to encourage consumption. Consequently fashion 
marketing expanded by means of fashion events and specialised magazines. By the mid-
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1980s this had created a growing popular demand for more fashion sensitive clothes, but at 
lower prices. According to the findings of this thesis, the kind of garment production 
developed to supply this demand is what led to the emergence of sweating systems in 
several large cities: this segment of the market, supplying mostly young women 
fashionwear, is led by the demand of small batches, fast production and cheap prices to the 
subcontractors. In the end, the increasing use of subcontracting, coupled with weakened 
labour power and with a relaxation of the state’s corporate control, led to the resurgence of 
small inner-city workshops, many of which rely on the use of trafficked and forced labour 
to provide the industry with its requirements for flexibility, rapidness and low costs. As I 
conclude, these demands necessitate the establishment of sweatshops. 
 
In virtue of these developments, today a large portion – if not the majority – of the physical 
production of garment in large cities, both in the core and the periphery, takes place in 
SMEs that often do not receive proper treatment from their contractors (e.g. medium or 
large term contracts, financial help and so on), and that compete against each other in what 
is referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’. The result is the rise of thousands of what I call 
‘national sweatshops’ in large cities in recent decades. Generally these sweatshops work as 
a system managed by transnational networks of prominent members of immigrant 
communities, who have access to a large pool of migrant workers in their home countries. 
They bring in migrants to the sweatshops under the promise of fair working conditions, but 
as shown by previous academic literature on the issue, through media reports and by this 
research, working conditions are far from fair and generally involve journeys of more than 
12 hours (sometimes even 18 hours, as in Argentina), poor health and safety conditions, 
mistreatment, retention of IDs and the restrictions to move freely (including doors locked, 
like in the fire in Viale Street), among other labour and human rights violations like plain 
subjection to servitude. 
 
The availability of a large pool of informal workers pushes down labour standards for 
formal workers. This adds up to the possibility to delocalise production of basic garments 
to low-wage countries (sometimes to ‘international sweatshops’). As a result, millions of 
registered garment workers have seen their working conditions get worse. Meanwhile 
increasing concentration takes place in the managerial arena, leading to more reduced and 
richer groups of stake-holders and managers. The economic result of this speaks for itself: 
the average salary in the industry (in the US) is behind the poverty level for an average 
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family, while in the other extreme of the chain, CEOs of large companies earn millions of 
pounds a year.  
 
These changes in the organisation of the clothing industry took place in a context of weak 
labour power and the end of the Welfare State. The priorities of the state shifted from 
granting full employment and strong social protection, to creating the ideal conditions for 
the wellbeing of the markets – as understood by the pundits of neoliberalism. One of the 
main results of the combination of these two processes was the deregulation of the labour 
markets, or, in other words, the rise of informal employment and casualisation of 
employment relationships. 
 
These deep and long-lasting transformations, which today are deemed ‘unavoidable’, were 
originally imposed by force in several countries. In Latin America, dictatorships trained by 
the US Department of State (in the School of the Americas situated in Panama), or the US 
military forces themselves (like in Central America), and funded by foreign and local 
capitalists, killed hundreds of thousands of activists, targeting in particular union and 
revolutionary leaders. Simultaneously, the foreign Debt of Latin American countries 
mounted to unprecedented levels. The Debt would be utilised years after to impose 
Structural Adjustment Plans in these countries and to privatise state enterprises, leading to 
the demolishment of the Welfare State – however weak it might have been in some 
countries of the region. 
 
Meanwhile, in core countries strongly anti-union leaders were appointed to chief positions 
in Reagan and Thatcher’s administrations (Harvey, 2005), whereas force was not absent, as 
shown by the repression of workers’ mobilisations in the early and mid-1980s, which 
encompassed murders as well (as in the case of the miners’ strike in 1982-84 in the UK). 
Although social protection is stronger than in peripheral countries, it is not possible 
anymore to speak of Welfare State neither in these countries (Jessop, 2002). The job was 
done throughout democratic regimes and a constant and admirable ideological battle 
against the ‘nanny-state’, which was further triggered by and timely associated to the failed 
socialist regime in the East.  
 
For many, the triumph of capitalism over socialism portrayed The end of History 
(Fukuyama, 1992), the triumph of the market over the distorting hand of the state. From 
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that moment onwards, the market, if appropriately helped by specific interventions from 
the state, would allocate resources efficiently. However, the recent financial crisis 
demonstrates that far from efficiency, what the deregulated financial market did is to create 
a highly fictitious market that increased the risks to unimaginable levels. In other words, 
deregulation did not work even in terms of what the pundits of the free market understand 
as ‘efficiency’ (see below; also see Harvey, 2010a; Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2010). 
 
The deregulation of the labour markets and the weaker controls over the private sector led 
to a series of developments that can hardly be interpreted as efficient, as illustrated by 
increasing concentration and the rise of oligopolies in the car makers industry, retail and 
the clothing industry among others. Regarding the latter, these trends are among the main 
causes for the unprecedented levels of concentration in an industry that had so far been 
considered as the epitome of competition. The efficiency of the market mechanisms in 
terms of the distribution of wealth within the industry is controversial. I have quoted in 
Chapter 7 statistics that show that only 3 percent of the money spent by the average US 
family on apparel in 1999 went to garment production workers. Some might nevertheless 
consider that these numbers do speak about the efficiency of the market: efficiency as a 
way to redistributing wealth in favour of those who control the market.  
 
Clothing production is a textbook example of these trends, and firms of the sector were 
indeed the precursors for some of the recent transformations in the spatial divisions of 
labour in other industries (Dicken, 2003). Increasing concentration of power and profits in 
a few corporations, on the one hand, and subcontracting and labour deregulation, on the 
other hand, are among the shifts that the industry has experienced along the last four 
decades. The development of international subcontracting, in which according to Bonacich 
and Appelbaum (2000) the industry is the most developed of all, drove labour standards 
down, pitting workers around the world against each other, and leading to the return of 
national sweatshops and the rise of international sweatshops. This is why Bonacich and 
Appelbaum conclude that “the textile and apparel industries are a showcase of horrors for 
the labour abuses sanctioned by the global free trade economy, where child labour, wage 
slavery, and employer cruelty are legion” (2000: 10), whereas Andy Merrifield (2000) also 
chooses this industry to illustrate “globalisation as class war.” 
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On the other hand, even if they do make use of the sweating systems to increase their 
astonishing profits, high-end fashion houses only hold a partial responsibility for the rise of 
the sweatshop. Their responsibility lies in both having triggered the attack on labour rights 
in the industry, and a type of marketing strategy that fosters flexibilisation and rapid 
response to market demand, which coupled with the lack of adequate technology, makes 
production anti-economical. Regarding the latter, it is the demands of the businesses of 
fashion that continue to exacerbate the sweatshop crisis. As I have shown in this thesis, the 
phenomenon of ‘pronto moda’ is the epitome of the trends triggered by the marketing 
strategies of the winners of the industry over the organisation of production. In sum, the 
largest corporations controlling fashion business managed to cut labour costs by means of 
transferring the risks of the markets (and the negative consequences of failed decisions of 
managers and CEOs) on to the individual worker, using informal employment, vulnerable 
– and sometimes trafficked – migrants, as well as avoiding tax payments in several stages 
of their activities.  
 
In virtue of all these developments, the sweating system, which was born as an alternative 
to cover a demand that could not be compensated by factories, continues to expand until a 
crisis hits back. Sweatshops in both cases discussed in this thesis have proliferated along 
the period of high demands in the mid 2000s; in the case of Prato, they have indeed 
doubled between 2003 and 2007 ((information provided by Luca from the Chamber of 
Commerce of Prato, interviewed on 11//4/08). 
 
But the garment industry has gone beyond that. From the beginning of mass-production of 
ready-to-wear garments in London and New York, working conditions were marked by 
long journeys, poor health and safety conditions and low (piece-rate) pay. Through union 
organisation and countless struggles, workers (mostly women workers) achieved to raise 
working conditions in the industry, in a general environment of raising workers struggles 
(see below), but the strategies of the main players of the fashion industry in the context of 
neoliberal shifts in international political economy have brought the sweatshop back to 
these and other cities in the core and in the periphery of the world economy.  
 
Still, advocates of the sweatshop argue that the poor should thank clothing corporations for 
allowing them to be better-off than without sweatshop jobs (see chapter 7). But the 
argument that the poor should thank capitalists for helping them escape starvation, despite 
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the extreme human rights violations (and despite the excessively uneven redistribution of 
wealth within the production chain) is the ideological corollary of the industrial reserve 
army, the starkest illustration of  the victory of capital over every other human value. 
 
3. On the state 
 
The shifts experienced by the fashion industry during the last decades are also a good 
example to illustrate the unavoidable relevance of the nation state in the economy. Firstly, 
the national laws, the lack of law enforcement and the corruption of officials (including 
those in the justice), protect retailers and branded manufacturers from being punished for 
the working conditions in their subcontractors’ factories. Secondly, the social regulation 
regimes and the distribution policies – notably the tax structure and social security policies, 
all of which determine to a large extent the political environment within which the 
economic relations must unfold – are mostly designed and are fully applied and enforced 
by the states. Thirdly, even in European countries individual states have a major role in 
setting the rules of the game for financial businesses, notably the interest rate.157 Finally, 
labour legislation is overwhelmingly designed and enforced – or not – by the state, as 
revealed in this thesis, and notably in the statements by the labour lawyers I have 
interviewed.  
 
The case study in Buenos Aires shows that the deficiencies of the state are not limited to 
the lack of supervision and control over the sweating system. The assassination of 
thousands of union leaders and activists during the latest dictatorship (1976-1983), and the 
consequent long-lasting ideological effect of state terrorism (fear to activism), facilitated 
the posterior deregulation of the labour market and the simultaneous – and also consequent 
– redistribution of wealth away from labour. During the 1990s a few laws introducing 
elements directly undermining labour rights were passed by the Parliament (see chapter 5). 
In addition, despite these direct attacks to labour rights the paths followed by economic 
policies applied by both authoritarian and democratic administrations since 1976 paved the 
way for the general pauperisation of workers’ rights. During the 1990s, state policies 
favoured a high exchange rate and a fierce trade liberalisation that, jointly with the 
encouragement of financial speculation, led to a marked deindustrialisation. Coupled with 
                                                 
157 The European Central Bank monitors the countries’ financial policies (chiefly in order to control 
inflation), but by virtue of the principle of independence (article 108 of the ECB’s constitution) it is not 
entitled to force any monetary policies into countries. 
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privatisation of state companies, these policies caused mounting unemployment, which led 
to the deregulation of the labour market and the rise of informal employment (and certainly 
of poverty). 
 
In recent decades, in both Italy and Argentina – what can certainly be extendable to Europe 
and Latin America – state labour policies have tended to ease employment under less 
stable contracts. Such policies were applied under the conviction that they would lead to 
higher employment rates, or that at least they would contain unemployment. However, the 
evidence provided in this research suggests that this was not the case. In Italy legislation 
favouring flexibilisation of the labour markets has not had the expected results on raising 
employment rates (Regione Toscana, 2007). By the same token, similar policies and the 
diminishing of the social contributions of labour in Argentina during the 1990s did not stop 
mounting unemployment. The current minister of labour stresses that  
 
there is no empirical evidence anywhere in the world that shows that cutting down the social 
contributions of work helps the creation of jobs or of formal employment. Not even marked-led 
research like that of the OECD could demonstrate such convictions (Página/12, 24/8/08).158  
 
In both countries, informality, labour deregulation and lesser public investment in welfare 
provisions, demonstrate instead the increasing inequalities between workers and managers 
and entrepreneurs, as well as how poverty and unemployment – in the case of Argentina – 
and stagnation of salaries – in the case of Italy – are possible in times of economic growth.  
 
In a similar vein to that of scholars calling for “more sweatshops”, the think-tanks of 
neoliberalism insist on the fact that the problem with these events is not neoliberalism but 
rather the fact that there is not enough neoliberalism yet. It is argued that “more 
flexibilisation is needed to start seeing its benefits,” as illustrated by the current plans of 
Spain’s socialist administration. However, beyond the more or less technical arguments, a 
progressive political reading of the long-term developments shows that these policies are 
among the package that led to the current high levels of poverty and inequality around the 
world. Furthermore, both in the periphery and in core economies thousands of union 
leaders and activists had to be repressed, jailed, tortured, executed and even disappeared in 
order to introduce these policies. It was the state, once again, the one actor in charge of 
securing the reproduction of capitalist social relations under these highly unpopular terms.  
 
                                                 
158 Translated from Spanish. 
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This is not to completely disregard the claims about the shrinkage of the state. Certainly, 
the increasing economic domination of state-politics that paralleled the strength of the 
doctrine of free market in these arenas, makes the state more vulnerable than ever to the 
lobby of foreign and national elites. Furthermore, the redistribution of the decision-making 
over key economic policies from the state towards market-led institutions – like free-trade 
agreements and the WTO – meant a direct transfer of power from the public to capital, as 
explained by Chomsky (1998) and Swyngedouw (2000).  
 
In addition, in Argentina and Italy, further to WTO’s disciplines, there exist further 
pressures over their commercial and economic policies. On the one hand, the high foreign 
debt of Argentina – and so is the case of most Latin American countries – allowed core 
capitalistic countries to push Structural Adjustment Plans and other policies of high social 
and economic relevance – like education policies – into the country. The complete 
liberalisation of the economy was a result of these pressures. On the other hand, Italy’s 
sovereignty over its commercial policy is strongly limited by the European Commission. 
As stated by several of my interviewees, the EU’s trade policy favours the interests of the 
Northern services companies (retailers) to the detriment of the Southern manufacturing 
sectors (clothing manufacturers among them).159 Moreover, in virtue of the introduction of 
the Euro, the country has lost one of the most important elements of its trade policy: the 
possibility of devaluing the Lira to make its goods cheaper to European neighbours (its 
main buyers). As I have suggested in this piece, the Italian case illustrates more complex 
processes than the discouragement of manufactures production. In current times, for 
manufacturing production to take place in Europe, it seems that it needs to be under 
sweatshop-like conditions, with informal businesses and vulnerable labour always ready to 
produce what the ‘buyers’ demand. 
 
But beyond the neoliberal discourse of the end of the ‘nanny-state’, the visible hand of the 
state is present in almost every aspect of the economy. For example, it is an illusion to 
think that the Structural Adjustment Plans and the WTO’s commercial disciplines could 
have been – or can be – applied by institutions other than the state. In sum, as shown by 
several Marxist scholars (Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 1993, 2000, 2002, 2003; Peck, Theodore 
and Brenner, 2010), beyond external and internal pressures, and beyond international 
treaties and supranational legal arrangements, the state continues to be the very actor 
                                                 
159 Italy is allowed to lift temporary antidumping barriers, but its limitations are determinant. 
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setting the concrete conditions for capital’s reproduction, and shaping to a large extent the 
boundaries of both labour’s and capital’s agency.  
 
For if there were any doubts about the importance of the state, the bail-out of banks during 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis illustrates the illusion of the shrinking state, as well as it 
illustrates its top priorities. Only in the first week of the crisis (early triggered by the 
collapse of the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merryl Lynch in the US) the New 
York Federal Reserve injected $50 billion (£33.3 billion) in the markets. The Bank of 
Japan did the same with $24 billion (£16 billion), while the Bank of England injected £25 
billion160 (Financial Times, 16/09/08). In the whole period, the NY Federal Reserve spent 
more than $100 billion (£66.6 billion) in rescuing the markets (The Economist, 31/03/10). 
In this way the states transferred public money to the hands of some of the largest 
corporations in the world to prevent the collapse in the price of their own assets. Now it is 
in the hands of the administrations to handle the highest levels of public debt in decades, 
and following from this, budget cuts are in agenda, as illustrated with astonishing clarity by 
the current plans of the UK’s government. Chris Giles, the economics editor of the 
conservative Financial Times, assures that greater inequality is likely to result from the 
crisis (Financial Times, 15/12/09). In other words, rather than the end of the nanny-state, 
neoliberal practice is much about the state as the nanny of capital, or in Harvey’s view, 
neoliberalism “amounts to a veritable form of communism for the capitalist class” (2010b: 
1).  
 
As far as sweatshop economies are concerned, states are also to be blamed. First of all, 
states are the principal guarantors of labour rights, and as such they are to be fully blamed 
for the labour and human rights violations happening in their territories. Furthermore, 
legislation releasing corporations from accountability for working conditions in their 
subcontractors factories implies an absurd benefit. Indeed, this benefit is one of the main 
elements driving to the sweatshop crisis worldwide. If they were made accountable by law, 
brands and retailers would be more likely to invest what is needed to avoid sweatshop 
practices in their production chains. In virtue of this, corporate accountability is the most 
important next step to be taken by national states. In addition, the enforcement of the law is 
as important as the law in itself; in fact, the law does exist in Argentina but so far it has not 
                                                 
160 The Presidential Campaign in the US was interrupted in order for the parties to negotiate financial aid 
packages to prevent the total collapse of the stock markets. A meeting took place in Washington and the 
outcome was an agreement among both candidates to request the Congress a 700 billion US dollars bail-out 
for the main players in the financial market.  
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been used against brands by the Justice. This is what allows Natalia (one of the 
entrepreneurs interviewed in Buenos Aires) to assure that “nothing happens with the legal 
reportings [by La Alameda], they appear in the media for a couple of days and then 
everyone forgets about it.” In addition, in the case of Prato existing laws propose concrete 
punishments towards the companies who exploit workers and facilitate the permanence of 
clandestini in Italian soil, but so far no sweatshop owners have been charged for the 
violation of these laws (despite the evidence collected by labour inspectors). In the end, the 
lack of enforcement of the law leads to its absence de facto.  
 
As stated by several interviewees (mostly in Buenos Aires), the weak control and the 
negligence of so many labour inspectorate offices are the result of the lack of political 
decision to terminate the development of sweatshop economies. In virtue of the 
responsibilities that officials hold with regards to sweatshops and to informal economy in 
general, I have analysed this fact looking at the interests and policies lying behind such 
approach. I have found that this lack of political decision seems to be the result of two 
main facts. On the one hand, under the precept that the state must help the market to create 
wealth, states allow a certain level of informality as a way to subsidise the private sector. 
Indeed, sweatshop economies allow an accumulation rate that can hardly be met by any 
legal activity; henceforth, officials understand the development of such businesses as a 
good opportunity to keep production at home, so that wealth can be then redistributed.161  
 
On the other hand, evidence provided in this research shows that sometimes this lack of 
political decision involves more or less well designed political plans at the highest spheres 
of the state, to ensure the processes of expanded accumulation that would give birth to 
powerful – although reduced – groups of capitalists.162 Even progressive administrations 
(like in both cases in this research) believe that this is a proper way to ensure the rise of a 
stronger national or local economy. Capitalist rules force them to accept certain social 
costs, and the fact that workers are immigrants is not minor. Instead, if the cost of a better 
– capitalistic – future is to be paid by them, their sweat and blood are worth it. They are not 
workers for whose interests liberal political leaders might risk their economic policy plans. 
Instead, they are ‘just immigrants’. 
 
                                                 
161 This is best illustrated in the case of Prato, where officials and the Unione Industriale Pratese recognized 
that at the beginning they saw the rise of “Chinese enterprises” as an opportunity for the development of joint 
businesses, particularly in the context of a strong crisis of the textile industry. 
162 Sometimes these are attached to certain political groups or parties (those in the administration).  
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4. On anti-sweatshop activism: A long way to go 
 
Economy connects us not just with sweatshop workers but with oppressed workers 
outside the factory gates as well. We need to make all these connections visible if we 
are to build a movement that would demand more for working people across the global 
economy. Campaigns to improve conditions in the world export factories should 
certainly be part of that movement. But that movement must also tackle the often worse 
conditions of low-wage agriculture workers, street vendors, domestic servants, small 
shop textile workers, and home-based workers. 
(Miller, 2009) 
 
In the early and mid-1990s the dreadful working conditions in factories and sweatshops in 
peripheral countries triggered resistance in many parts of the world. In just a few years, 
several organisations emerged in industrialised countries to counter working conditions in 
these factories. Movements and NGOs like United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), 
Behind the Label, Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), Sweat Free, Maquila Solidarity, 
Sweatshop Watch, No Sweat, Workers’ Rights Consortium, the National Labor Committee 
and many others, have exposed some of the main companies of the garment industry like 
The Gap, Nike, Reebok, and brands commercialised by retailers like Wal-mart stores 
(remember Kathy Lee Gilford’s scandal in the US)163, and Primark. These campaigns were 
highly successful in raising public awareness about working conditions in these factories 
and about US-based TNCs’ investments in peripheral economies and globalisation policies 
in general. They also exercised a strong pressure over universities’ managers to adopt 
codes of conduct for the purchase of college sports clothing. 
 
Along the years the anti-sweatshop organisations revised their strategies. At the beginning 
their campaigns were generally based on exposing branded manufacturers and retailers 
which are known to make use of these labour practices. This included pushing forward 
urgent appeals arrived from workers in factories producing for renowned corporations. 
Targeting renowned corporations assured these campaigns a high public recognition. 
According to Klein (2000: 486) these specific cases were taken as examples to denunciate 
not just one company but rather all American foreign investments in garment outsourcing 
to low-wage Asian and Latin American countries. I would add to Klein’s argument that 
this strategy of anti-sweatshop organisations was also partly aimed at gaining recognition. 
This is surely legitimate, but while these campaigns surely affected the firms’ image 
(particularly given the fact that image is precisely the very key of their businesses), the 
extent of their success in influencing worker’s rights after 15 years is still to be discussed. 
                                                 
163 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCszZ5lwAgA   
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Research on the issue is full of examples in which partial victories in specific factories 
were finally neutralised by the companies, mostly through the strategy of ‘cut-and-run’ 
(Cravey, 2001; Klein, 2000). 
 
Partly due to their limited achievements, anti-sweatshop movements evolved along the 
years. Some of them have made important progress in networking with unions in 
peripheral countries and engaging in living-wage campaigns (like Clean Clothes Campaign 
and its engagement in the Asia floor-wage campaign). Indeed, owing to the limitations of 
addressing case-to-case appeals, and recognising that “many of the conflicts or violations 
that occur in a particular production area are part of a more general pattern”, CCC “has 
increasingly begun focusing on core themes in urgent appeal work and addressed these as a 
series of collective cases with brands, retailers and possibly governments. (…) These 
thematic campaigns are rooted in a specific geographic area, and executed in direct 
collaboration with local organisations that define priorities, goals and targets” (Merk, 
2009: 611). This strategy of “launching thematic campaigns on multiple but geographically 
clustered workplaces” represents, in my view, the path towards a more mature anti-
sweatshop activism. It shows a certain progress in the political reading that these groups 
make of the sweatshop problem as a whole. They have finally recognised that addressing 
sweatshops from the side of ethical consumption is a gigantic task with rather poor 
concrete results, and they are now addressing the issue from the side of production, that is, 
they are now fostering workers’ organisation wherever these companies arrive in mass and 
push entire regions or countries to cut labour standards and forbid workers’ organisation. 
They have finally acknowledged that the conditions under which sweatshop workers 
undertake work are not solely determined by the practices of large companies based in 
central capitalistic states. Although the situation was certainly triggered by the practices 
and the lobby of these corporations, the organisation and continuation of the sweating 
system can only be explained addressing also state practices and institutional arrangements 
back in these countries. As noted by Castree et al (2004) and by Massey (1984), 
international political economic trends are embedded into specific places in specific 
manners, and anti-sweatshop movements seem to be only starting to consider this 
unavoidable fact.  
 
Still, several of the issues addressed in this thesis are being systematically ignored by many 
of the anti-sweatshop movements. In this sense the complete ignorance of these 
243 
 
 
movements regarding national sweatshops is at best worrying.164 An empirical example 
clarifies this point: in June 2009 the media published a raid of inspections in the 
department of Mataró in greater Barcelona, in which several sweatshops were discovered 
and shut down (El País, 24/6/09). In that opportunity, the Barcelona-based branch of Clean 
Clothes Campaign (called ‘Roba Neta’) did not publish anything about the report, despite 
its admirable compromise with workers in international sweatshops. When I asked them 
about the reason why they did not pay attention to the sweatshops in Mataró, one of them 
replied that, apart from having been busy with other issues at that time (mind that these 
activists are unpaid), those sweatshops are rare. Considering that in only one day the 
policemen shut down 72 sweatshops, and that El País (24/6/09) even talked about the 
existence of a ‘Chinese mafia’, it seems difficult to assume that the extension of the 
phenomena is marginal.165 
 
As previously argued anti-sweatshop movements have been highly successful in exposing 
the labour practices of the largest clothing corporations, and I would argue that they 
constitute one of the movements that have contributed to the rising opposition to neoliberal 
globalisation during the last 15 years. This notwithstanding, anti-sweatshop organisations 
seem not to acknowledged the fact that their struggle is only one particular struggle in the 
context of raising inequalities and decreasing workers’ power and crisis. Concrete victories 
can be achieved by focusing the struggle on stopping sweatshops, but a broader political 
reading of the big picture shows that the long-lasting and thorough transformations that 
will definitely lead to a radical change are necessarily tied up to decisive shifts in the 
balance of power between capital and labour. In the words of Gallin (2001: 534),  
 
these are not short term trends, nor trends that are reversible in the short term. Even if they are 
the results of policy decisions which are by their nature reversible, a reversal involving the 
adoption of different macroeconomic policies at a global scale depends on a fundamental shift 
in global power relations between labour and capital. 
 
                                                 
164 California-based activists (notably the National Labour Committee, Sweat Free Communities and 
Workers’ Rights Consortium) are a notable exception, owing to the campaigns to struggle for corporate 
accountability in Los Angeles.  
165 A similar case is that of the London-based Stop the Traffic. Faced with an attack suffered by activists of 
La Alameda, I started a campaign to collect letters of solidarity from anti-sweatshop movements and NGOs 
in core countries. La Alameda suffered the attack when they were trying to free-up a family that was hold 
into a small sweatshop, just meters away from its place. When I explained the issue to members of Stop the 
Traffic, they asked for further details because they were not aware of the existence of sweatshops in the form 
of small inner-city workshops in which workers were not allowed to leave. That is, not even an NGO mostly 
dedicated to human trafficking and slavery was aware of the way in which trafficked labour was being held 
within a sweatshop. 
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In sum, many anti-sweatshop NGOs and groups still have a way to go, partly in taking an 
active part in fighting national sweatshops, but also in becoming activists for a broader 
social change.   
 
5. On the importance of workers’ organisation 
 
In this thesis I have argued that the defeat of the sweatshop depends on two main shifts in 
the current state of affairs. Firstly, states must set the battle against sweatshop economies 
(and against trafficking, child labour and forced labour in other economic sectors as well) 
among their main priorities. Secondly, but more importantly in terms of the efficiency to 
bring about the first of these shifts, workers’ organisation is necessary to both demand the 
state to set this battle as a priority and to empower themselves in their dialectical 
relationship with capital. Peck and Tickell (2002, 401) put it starkly clear when stating that  
 
the strategic objectives for opponents of neoliberalism must include the reform of 
macroinstitutional priorities and the remaking of extralocal rule systems in fields like trade, 
finance, environmental, antipoverty, education, and labour policy. These may lack the radical 
edge of more direct forms of resistance, but as intermediate and facilitative objectives they 
would certainly help to tip the macroenvironment in favour of progressive possibilities. 
 
The members of La Alameda in Buenos Aires understood this from the beginning, and 
apart from their street demonstrations and their factory-based activities, they adopted an 
active policy towards searching for progressive officials within the state to work with 
them, using as well the media in order to put pressure over either conservative or liberal 
officials. It is partly due to their efforts that the macroenvironment in which a proposal to 
change the human trafficking law (which is only 2 years old) for a more progressive one 
has emerged. Indeed, the laws were not directly proposed by La Alameda but mainly by 
liberal MPs who are keen towards the organisation. These activists understand that the 
priorities of the state are set according to the political situations under which the 
administrations must govern. Whether the latter prioritise full employment and expanded 
social security, or, on the contrary, good businesses environments, is intrinsically political, 
that is, it is a result of several interests that drive capital, labour and the state, and of the 
interplay of interests within each of these groups. The political order resulting from this is 
temporary and constantly shifting, and it always supposes the exclusion of other possible 
orders: 
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Things could always be otherwise and therefore every order is predicated on the exclusion of 
other possibilities (…) What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ – jointly with the 
‘common sense’ that accompanies it – is the result of sedimented practices; it is never the 
manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being […] To 
summarize this point: every order is political and based on some form of exclusion. There are 
always other possibilities that have been repressed and that can be reactivated (Mouffe, 2005: 
18). 
 
For the state to adopt the political decision of setting the battle against the sweatshop as a 
priority, workers must organise and cooperate with groups in the civil society to push the 
agenda of the administrations towards emphasising the defence of the weakest. A political 
coalition to push the states to take action against sweatshops could involve progressive 
officials and entrepreneurs, grass-roots organisations, trade unions, religious leaders, artists 
and film-makers, journalists, human rights organisations and many other institutions and 
groups, and if managed properly, it would get broad international support. The eight hours 
day and holidays, health insurance, bargaining contracts and so many other workers’ 
conquests of the 20th century did not only materialise in virtue of the job done by well-
intentioned and progressive political leaders. They were certainly applied by liberal 
politicians, but mostly under the understanding that to save Western Capitalism it was 
necessary to listen to the workers and the civil society, and to redistribute wealth more 
fairly. These triumph cost the sweat and blood of millions of workers around the world, 
including garment workers’ struggles before and after Triangle.  
 
In order to engage groups within the civil society it is necessary to break with certain 
ideological barriers, notably racism towards migrants, which in both the cases addressed in 
here (but mostly in Prato) is a main obstacle. The centre-left administration in Prato paid 
the price for its policy towards the development of the sweating system, not for not 
fighting trafficking and forced labour, but for not fighting “the Chinese” (what can be 
witnessed by the fact that the winner of the local elections in 2008 had a strongly ‘anti-
Chinese’ discourse). But beyond the escalating open racism taking place in Italy, racism 
can adopt more subtle forms. In Argentina, where racist discourses are socially censored at 
the moment, many consider sweatshops as a problem of the Bolivian community and as 
self-exploitation (the first myth pointed out in chapter 7), and this contributes to ensuring 
the status quo. A socially concerned view would most probably allow citizens to identify 
class differences within the migrant community, and perhaps engage liberal individuals in 
defending the weakest within the sweating system.  
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Disputing the ideological barriers that divide workers is also essential. Certainly, I cannot 
disagree with Bonefeld (2001) when he states that “the struggle for human autonomy, and 
that is, self-determination, entails the transformation of the means of production into means 
of emancipation” (:13); but the experience of the textile pole in Buenos Aires shows that 
making the machines available to all workers is not enough to ensure their liberation. Apart 
from the material difficulties that engaging in a risky project like a cooperative may imply, 
many workers continue to be slaves of the wage-labour relationship. The ultimate step 
forward in the long way to defeat sweatshops is to break up with the sort of identity and 
class politics fostered by the sweatshop lords and the immigrant communities’ leaders, and 
to open up opportunities that show the several possibilities that lie beyond a life of daily 
subjection to capital for the mere subsistence. In other words, expropriating the bourgeoisie 
from the means of production is only one step in the way towards a society of free 
individuals. Creating the conscience of free individuals is as hard and necessary. In the 
end, both material and ideological conditions are equally necessary; none of them is 
necessarily prior to the other one, and none of them can be fully achieved in the long run in 
the absence of the other.   
 
6. On the limits to (today’s) trade unions 
 
Organising the informal sector serves the interests of the majority of workers worldwide. 
(Gallin, 2001) 
 
Clothing workers’ unions have suffered considerably from mounting unemployment 
caused by both increasing international competition, delocalisation, and higher labour 
productivity. Also, the extensive informalisation of the sector affects to a great extent the 
bargaining power of unions. Indeed, in Buenos Aires union leaders assured that 
entrepreneurs do mention the possibility of subcontracting to “the Bolivians” if union 
representatives demand higher salaries. In both cases, the availability of sweatshops is in 
fact an advantage for the entrepreneurs that unions do not report to the justice. The real 
trauma which clothing unions had to undergo during recent years, with an astonishing loss 
of membership (see below), have led several unions to join the entrepreneurs in the 
demand of special protection for the industry from the state, even setting aside to a large 
extent the demands for redistribution within the industry. This is shown by numerous 
statements made by union leaders in Italy, as well as in Buenos Aires, where the mention 
of ‘the Chinese shadow’ (i.e. the fear to the dumping of imports from China) was more 
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frequent in the interview with the head of the main union (SOIVA) than in that with the 
heads of both chambers. 
 
These paths are certainly not exclusive of the garment industry. Indeed, the trends towards 
precarious and informal employment have strongly affected unionisation. Several unions 
across the world have experienced significant losses in their membership, whereas today 
only a small portion of those entering the labour market unionise. Just to mention a few 
examples, between 1985 and 1995 unions lost 21.2 percent of their membership in the US; 
27.7 percent in the UK; 37.2 percent in France; 44.3 percent in Czech Republic; and 28.2 
percent in Mexico (ILO, 1999; quoted in Gallin, 2001). As seen in the previous chapters, 
the decline for the case of Argentina was of 42.6 percent (ILO, 1999; quoted in Gallin, 
2001). All the strategies followed by capital to deregulate labour markets affected union 
power and were indeed largely aimed at this specific goal. 
 
The deregulation of the labour market is also a strategy for eliminating the trade union 
movement. Sub-contracting is a well-travelled road to evading legal responsibilities and 
obligations. The fragmentation and dispersion of the labour force, its constant destabilization 
by the introduction of new components (women, youth, migrants of different origins) in sectors 
without trade union tradition (computerization, services), the pressure for maximum profits 
(productivity) together with management intimidation - all these are obstacles to trade union 
organisation (Gallin, 2001: 535). 
 
If flexible contracts and informal employment are on the rise, and if they are among the 
main causes of the decline in unions’ membership in recent decades, it seems sensible to 
assert that unions should engage in the organisation of these workers. This is why once and 
again the academics from the Global Labour Institute (Gallin, 2001, 2004) have urged 
unions to reconsider their strategies towards informal workers (as well as they have asked 
NGOs to avoid their usually derogative opinions about unions), because  
 
organising workers in informal employment needs to be a priority of the trade union movement 
at both national and international levels, because: (1) it is here to stay; (2) it is growing, whilst 
the formal sector is declining in terms of organisational potential; (3) these two trends are 
linked and are irreversible in the short and medium term; and (4) consequently, the stabilisation 
of the formal sector organisations and building trade union strength internationally depend on 
the organisation of the informal sector (Gallin, 2001: 532). 
 
This takes a further shift when considering that a full stop to the rise of non-standard jobs 
would only be achieved by macroeconomic changes which are indeed contrary to the 
current political economic paths witnessed in the international scenery.  
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The growth of the informal economy cannot be reversed in the short or medium term anywhere 
in the world. Formalising the informal economy on a world scale is an illusion. In the current 
global economic and political context, no State or regional grouping of States has the ability or 
the political will to set in motion the macroeconomic changes that would create universal full 
employment under regulated conditions. On the contrary, for the foreseeable future we can 
expect more deregulation and a further growth of the informal economy (Gallin, 2001: 532). 
 
Therefore, “the issue is (…) not ‘formalising’ the ‘informal’ but protecting the unprotected. 
That, of course, is also a way of ‘formalising’, but it implies a different approach: 
organising from below rather than regulating from above” (Global Labour Institute, 2010). 
 
Informal workers are indeed organising in several countries. In India, where statistics in 
1998 set informal employment at 92 percent (Gallin, 2001: 532), the union Women in 
Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) has 700,000 members. Gallin 
(2001: 539-40) quotes examples of similar developments in South Africa, Turkey, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan and the Phillipines, and he also mentions partnerships 
between NGOs and unions that have allowed the further organisation of self-employed and 
informal workers (like the European Homeworking Group).  
 
On the other hand, since informal employment affects with particular strength and 
extension migrant workers, unions also need to adopt specific strategies towards them. In 
this sense, Gordon (2009) analyses the way unions create their own ‘labour citizenship’, 
and focuses on the way they set the boundaries between those whose interests they protect, 
on the one hand, and those from the outside, who are basically seen as competitors to their 
‘citizens’, on the other hand. Under this policy migrant workers have historically been left 
aside from unions, because the majority of them accept to work under dire conditions, 
which drives down the union members’ working standards.  
 
Destination country unions may be reluctant to initiate campaigns with migrants because they 
see them as competitors rather than fellow workers, and are concerned that migrants are taking 
scarce jobs and undercutting union wages. They may press governments to exclude migrants 
from the country rather than seeking to organize them (:44). 
 
In other words, dual labour markets can place “real barriers” between workers, like the 
ones identified by Castree et al (2004). This is certainly the case of sweatshop workers, at 
least in Prato and in Buenos Aires, since unions are not engaging in their organisation; 
quite the contrary, the large majority of the leaders I interviewed only showed to have a 
derogative opinion towards sweatshop workers, and two of them even made racist 
comments. In this sense, Gordon (2009) argues that these strategies should be thoroughly 
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re-thought. In her view, migrant workers should be included, also because improving their 
working and pay conditions would alleviate their ‘competition’ to ‘mainstream’ labourers.  
 
This is to say that organising informal and migrant workers is a challenge that would imply 
thorough changes in unions’ governing structures and logistics, many of which may face 
resistance in the hands of old established union leaders. In this sense Gordon points at the 
example of a few American unions (like the Farm Labor Organizing Committee) who are 
engaging in such plans, including the opening of offices in foreign countries like Mexico in 
order to educate workers planning to migrate and work in the US about their rights (see 
Gordon, 2009).166 However, this is not the case in either Argentina or Italy.  
 
The rise of a non-institutionalised group aimed at fighting sweatshops and organising 
garment workers in Buenos Aires is precisely one of the most important differences 
between both case studies in this thesis. In this city, the failure of the official workers’ 
unions (or rather their lack of interest) in the organisation of sweatshop workers was 
contested by the creation of an alternative union by members of La Alameda. This social 
movement, which was born in December 2001 with the burst of social movements, is 
proving to be more or less effective in alleviating the sweatshop crisis, and even in 
organising formal workers. The lack of a socially concerned group of activists or 
politicians towards the dreadful human rights violations taking place in sweatshops was 
contested by a social movement in a context of broad social uprisings, while unions 
remained astonishingly passive, as they are doing in Italy in present times.  
 
Whether groups of informal workers should organise independently from unions or try to 
be included into these, is a controversial point which surely depends on the local and/or 
national conditions (i.e. the history of the trade union movement in that city or country; the 
level of organisation and the potential public recognition that informal workers may reach 
from such alliances; and so on). However, in either case it is clear that “it is impossible to 
conceive at the present time of organising a majority of workers at world scale without 
serious organising in the informal sector” (Gallin, 2001: 532). In this sense, the struggle of 
locally based groups against small inner-city sweatshops scattered around some urban 
                                                 
166 Recently Gordon’s work (2009) has focused in the interesting proposal for the creation of a new 
immigration status called “transnational labour citizenship”, which she bases in US-Mexico migrant workers 
but could be applied “in any migrant-sending country.” This status “would entitle the holder to come and go 
freely between the sending country and the United States, and to work in the United States without 
restriction” (:563). 
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areas cannot be carried out in the same way as the campaigns to defend registered garment 
workers. Although in the medium term (not to mention the long term) the political goals of 
such struggles are the same, the former requires of certain specificities. This is why 
innovative strategies are necessary, also because resistance from the very workers may 
arise. In many cases, workers are engaged in mutual competition (e.g. street vendors, 
homeworkers), while in the case of sweatshop workers they are immigrants tied up to their 
bosses by nationalist politics and/or by coercive mechanisms. All-too-often their lives 
depend on the pennies they can make day by day; they are tied up by the thin thread that 
allows their reproduction.167 They cannot even go on strike, due either to their low 
employment security or to the fact that they are (at least formally) self-employed workers. 
Therefore, any changes in their precarious condition must come along with alternatives to 
guarantee their survival, and for this to be achieved, networking with state agencies and 
other groups, be it locally, nationally and even internationally, might quite possibly be 
necessary.  
 
What this means is that engaging in the struggle for informal workers’ rights might quite 
often mean going against their own most immediate interests, and this confers this struggle 
certain particularities which cannot be addressed with the typical union strategies like 
strikes, boycotts and so on. Moody (1997) makes this point referring to the rise of 
interesting developments of this kind around the world: 
 
The vision appropriate to the era of globalization is social-movement unionism. It has already 
been born in South Africa, Brazil, South Korea, and elsewhere in the more industrialized parts 
of the Third World. Within the industrial North it is implied in many of the ideas put forth by 
oppositional groups within unions, national cross-union networks of union activists, 
international solidarity networks and committees, official and unofficial cross-border networks, 
and the only global grassroots industrially based network, TIE (Transnational Information 
Exchange). These forces are small, even marginal in some cases, but they speak with a clear 
voice and offer ideas pertinent to the epoch of capitalist globalisation (:58, my emphasis). 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
                                                 
167 Precisely the example of the difficulties that La Alameda faced when starting to report sweatshops is 
worth recalling: when sweatshops were shut down, workers that were getting food and shelter in these run 
out of their most immediate needs. They even participated in demonstrations against the very people who 
were trying to help them (i.e. La Alameda). In the end this social organisation was able to offer food, shelter, 
and legal, financial and job seeking assistance, and its members actually included workers in its cooperative. 
Further on, it arranged the textile pole for workers cooperatives joint to the INTI, in what has been a strong 
mark in this struggle and an international example.  
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This research has explored the links between neoliberalism and the rise of sweating 
systems in Argentina and Italy. The strongest similarities found between both cases are: the 
deregulation of the labour market; free trade; and weak state control and social protection. 
The findings of this research lead me to conclude, in line with critical literature about 
neoliberalism, that these policies underpinning the neoliberal project have caused labour 
casualisation and mounting informality; rising inequalities; human trafficking; forced 
labour and even the return of practices of slavery; state violence; and so on.  
 
From its very beginning, the clothing industry was a precursor of subcontracting and of 
sweatshops. However, in the early 20th century it was garment workers who organised the 
first women’s demonstrations in recent history, as well as they pushed forward the 
emergence of the first collective bargaining contracts. This struggle for the defeat of the 
sweatshop in New York took three decades between the fire in Triangle and the 1938 Fair 
Labour Standards Act that signalled its zenith. “Because these industries [textile and 
apparel] have seen some of the worst labour excesses, they have also been associated with 
historic victories of labour” like “the union’s role in forging pioneer labour-capital 
accords” (A. Ross, 1997: 11) and “the Protocols of Peace, the prototype of collective 
bargaining agreements and the first step on the road to elimination of the sweatshop” (:30). 
In this sense, the social importance of this highly labour-intensive industry, and the terrible 
abuses that characterise the industry today, are strong reasons to demand the adoption of 
renewed political strategies. Notably, progressive proposals which transform the way 
unions are organised and the way they address informal economy and migrant labour, 
could take place in this industry before expanding to other economic sectors. 
 
Beyond the indisputable importance of the demands on the state in order to set the 
macroinstitutional conditions that may lay the ground for more liberal politics, these 
demands would only be effective in the long-run as long as there is a general political 
environment that drives states to take the fight against the sweatshop as a priority. The 
changes that are needed are thorough ones and imply going against powerful interests. For 
public officials to engage in stopping the sweatshop, there needs to be workers’ 
organisation. There is where the kernel of the struggle lies. In the process of building a 
strong workers’ coalition, the backbones of neoliberalism must be targeted, and a different 
organisation of production and redistribution of wealth must be negotiated.  
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As long as civil society and workers’ mobilisation continue to be extremely weak, the only 
future we can predict is, no doubt, even darker. In line with this, Bonacich and Appelbaum 
(2000) insist that sweatshops are precursors of possible future developments in other 
industries. But if the struggle against sweatshops achieves important steps forward, the 
developments in the garment industry might once again be an example to be taken by other 
industries. In this context, more than ever the myth of the natural upgrading of living 
conditions for workers appears artificial. The developments addressed in this piece show 
that if employers do not face opposition, they put more and more pressure onto workers. If 
opposition is still week, they employ child and trafficked labour.  
 
Furthermore, I understand that the scope of all these struggles for empowering workers 
will be limited as long as capitalist social relations are not overthrown. As long as workers 
are not the owners of the means of production and, thus, of their working conditions, 
problems like sweatshops and trafficked and child labour will always be latent, ready to 
come to reality as soon as labour is defeated in any corner of the world.  
 
Many in the world have decided to liberate themselves and engage in self-management, in 
the past and in present times, and there will surely be those who follow this path in the 
future. Their painful struggle for survival in a capitalist market is an admirable example of 
the unlimited strength of women and men in search for their freedom. Someday capitalism 
will be overthrown, and whether what comes after it is beneficial for all, or not, depends to 
a large extent in the good health and the multiplication of these initiatives, and in their 
progressive organisation at larger scales.  
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APPENDIX I 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Interviews in Buenos Aires 
  
October 2007 to March 2008   
  CATEGORY 
FANTASY 
NAME 
ORGANISATION 
INTERVIEW 
DATE 
1 Official Arnaldo 
Deputy-Secretary of Labour 
(CABA) 
05/10/2007 & 
21/02/2008 
2 Official Mario Public Defender (CABA) 10/9/2008 
3 Official Francisco 
Labour Inspections Division 
(Ministry of Labour) 
10/10/2007 
4 Official Not quoted 
Deputy-Secretary of Labour 
(CABA) 
1/24/2008 
5 Official Not quoted 
Homework Division (Ministry 
of Labour) 
2/1/2008 
6 Official Pedro 
Deputy-Secretary of Labour 
(CABA) 
1/28/2008 
7 Official Daniel 
Metropolitan Centre for Design 
(CABA) 
1/28/2008 
8 Official Not quoted 
Metropolitan Centre for Design 
(CABA) 
1/31/2008 
9 Official Fernanda 
Metropolitan Centre for Design 
(CABA) 
2/11/2008 
10 Official Not quoted 
Human Rights Department 
(Ministry of Justice) 
3/27/2008 
11 Official Julieta 
National Institute of Industrial 
Technology 
2/21/2008 
12 Official Not quoted 
National Department of 
Migration (Home Ministry) 
2/22/2008 
13 Official Not quoted 
Centre for the Study of 
Production (Ministry of 
Economics) 
01/10/2007 & 
02/02/2008 
14 Official Jorge 
Department of Labour 
Inspections (Buenos Aires 
Province) 
3/7/2008 
15 Official Nano 
National Institute of Industrial 
Technology 
3/7/2008 
16 Official Matías Ministry of Economics 3/11/2008 
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17 Official Not quoted 
National Institute of Industrial 
Technology 
1/21/2008 
18 Worker Dionisio Alameda 1/18/2008 
19 Worker Not quoted Alameda 1/18/2008 
20 Worker Susana Alameda 1/19/2008 
21 Worker Not quoted Alameda 1/19/2008 
22 Worker Not quoted Brukman 1/23/2008 
23 Worker Not quoted Sportech 1/25/2008 
24 Worker Not quoted Ex-worker 1/25/2008 
25 Worker Not quoted Brukman 2/3/2008 
26 Worker Not quoted Sportech 3/8/2008 
27 Worker Nestor Soho 3/10/2008 
28 
Union 
representative 
Gustavo Alameda 10/8/2007 
29 
Union 
representative 
Not quoted Fundación El Otro 1/17/2008 
30 
Union 
representative 
Alberto 
SOIVA (main garment workers' 
union) 
1/21/2008 
31 
Union 
representative 
Esteban UCI 1/23/2008 
32 
Union 
representative 
Luis Alameda 1/25/2008 
33 
Union 
representative 
Ramiro 
SOIVA (main garment workers' 
union) 
2/15/2008 
34 
Union 
representative 
NN Alameda 3/11/2008 
35 
Union 
representative 
José AOT (Textile Workers' Union) 10/19/2009 
36 
Union 
representative 
Chela Polo Textil (INTI) 4/15/2010 
37 Entrepreneur Natalia Intermediary agency 2/6/2008 
38 Entrepreneur Mariana SME entrepreneur 2/8/2008 
39 Entrepreneur Omar Fundación Pro-Tejer 2/20/2008 
40 Entrepreneur Claudia Intermediary agency 2/28/2008 
41 Entrepreneur Martín Taverniti 2/29/2008 
42 Entrepreneur Augusto CIAI (main chamber) 3/4/2008 
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43 Entrepreneur Not quoted Punto Uno 3/5/2008 
44 Entrepreneur Not quoted Le Utthe 3/6/2008 
45 Entrepreneur Agustina Ay Not Dead (designer) 3/7/2008 
47 Entrepreneur Beto CAIBYN (chamber) 3/14/2008 
48 Entrepreneur Not quoted Caro Cuore 3/5/2008 
46 Academic Gloria 
Department of Design 
(University of Buenos Aires) 
05/02/2008 & 
11/03/2008 
49 
Workshop 
owner 
Not quoted   1/24/2008 
50 
Workshop 
owner 
Ana   1/26/2008 
51 
Workshop 
owner 
Not quoted   2/7/2008 
52 
Workshop 
owner 
Marcelo   2/9/2008 
53 
Workshop 
owner 
Not quoted 
STTAD (workshops' owners 
union) 
3/12/2008 
   
   
Interviews in Prato   
April to September, 2008   
  
CATEGORY 
FANTASY 
NAME 
ORGANISATION 
INTERVIEW 
DATE 
1 Official Luca 
Chamber of Commerce 
(Province of Prato) 
11/04/2008 & 
01/10/2008 
2 Official Giovanni 
Department of Economic 
Development (Prato City 
Council) 
5/19/2008 
3 Official Simone 
Department of Economic 
Development (Tuscany Region) 
6/9/2008 
4 Official Massimo 
Department of Economic 
Development (Province of 
Prato) 
6/18/2008 
5 Official Maria 
Labour Inspections Division 
(Province of Prato) 
6/20/2008 
6 Official Andrea 
Labour Inspections Division 
(Province of Prato) 
7/25/2008 
7 Official Claudio 
Labour Inspections Division 
(Province of Prato) 
7/25/2008 
8 Official Venere 
Department of Fashion (Tuscany 
Region) 
9/26/2008 
9 Official Not quoted 
Department of Labour (Tuscany 
Region) 
9/30/2008 
10 Official Franco 
Department of Multiculturality 
(Prato City Council) 
10/1/2008 
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11 
Union 
representative 
Cristina CISL-Prato 5/26/2008 
12 
Union 
representative 
Salvatore CGIL-Prato 5/27/2008 
13 
Union 
representative 
Antonio UIL-Prato 6/6/2008 
14 
Union 
representative 
Not quoted UIL-Toscana 8/4/2008 
15 
Union 
representative 
Diana CGIL-Toscana 
05/08/2008 & 
12/08/2008 
16 
Union 
representative 
Dario CISL-Toscana 8/7/2008 
17 
Union 
representative 
Manuele 
Sindacato Italiano Autonomo 
Lavoratori Poste 
9/29/2008 
18 
Union 
representative 
Gianluca CGIL-Toscana 10/3/2008 
19 Entrepreneur Daniele SME entrepreneur 6/23/2008 
20 Entrepreneur Not quoted SME entrepreneur 6/23/2008 
21 Entrepreneur Mario UIP 7/10/2008 
22 Entrepreneur Carlo Alido 7/29/2008 
23 Entrepreneur Not quoted SME entrepreneur 8/5/2008 
24 Entrepreneur Silvia Pholya 9/16/2008 
25 Entrepreneur Francesco Cunningham 9/24/2008 
26 Entrepreneur Fabrizio Free-lance Consultant 5/22/2008 
27 Entrepreneur Marco CNA-Prato 5/22/2008 
28 Entrepreneur Maurizio Confartigianato-Prato 6/4/2008 
29 Entrepreneur Not quoted SME entrepreneur 7/30/2008 
30 Entrepreneur Not quoted Clotilde 9/26/2008 
31 Academic Not quoted IRPET 6/3/2008 
33 Academic Not quoted Pratofutura 4/15/2008 
34 Academic Not quoted 
Department of Economics 
(Universita degli Studi di 
Firenze) 
4/17/2008 
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32 Academic Not quoted 
Dipartimento di Lingue e 
Letterature Straniere (UNIBO) 
9/9/2008 
35 Academic Antonella Il Sole 24 Ore 9/29/2008 
36 Worker Not quoted CGIL-Toscana 8/12/2008 
37 Worker Not quoted CGIL-Prato 5/29/2008 
38 Worker Vittorio CGIL-Toscana 10/3/2008 
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Sample questionnaires 
 
 
259 
 
 
Durham University 
Department of Geography 
 
Project Title: The Politics of Scale of Textile and Clothing Industry 
in Latin America and the European Union: A Comparative Approach 
 
Interview questionnaire 
 
PERSONAL DATA 
Name: _______________________________________________________   
Company and position: ______________________________________  Since: ______ 
Year of settlement of the company: ______ 
Approximate yearly revenues or quantity of employees: _______________________ 
 
 
1. How was the company born (regarding the reasons to settle it, its initial size and the 
market segment it targeted?  
 
2. At that time, was the economic and political situation in the country very good, good, 
regular or bad for the competitiveness of the company?  
 
3. How did the company change since 1980? Can you identify specific policies/events that 
influenced its performance (directly or indirectly)? 
 
4. What are your main preoccupations at present?  
 
5. How do the economic and labour policies of the government influence the activity of the 
company?  
 
6. What is the relation of the company to the external sector? Does it import/export? To 
what extent is imported clothing affecting the company?  
 
7. Regarding the domestic market, is competition important? What strategies does the 
company adopt to maximise benefits and enhance its competitiveness? 
 
8. When speaking about garment production, it seems unavoidable to address the issue of 
informality. There exists in the City and in Greater Buenos Aires a network of sweatshops. 
Several brands are blamed for subcontracting their production to these. Is it a common 
practice in the sector? Why? 
ENTREPRENEUR # 
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Durham University 
Department of Geography 
 
Project Title: The Politics of Scale of Textile and Clothing Industry 
in Latin America and the European Union: a Comparative Approach 
 
Interview questionnaire 
 
PERSONAL DATA 
Name: _______________________________________________   
Institution and position: ______________________________________ Since: ______ 
 
 
1. How would you describe current working conditions in the clothing sector?  
 
2. How many informal workers there exist in the sector? How many of them are 
immigrants? 
 
3. What does your department do regarding informality in the sector?  
 
4. Does your department coordinate activities with similar state agencies in other 
jurisdictions?  
 
5. Is the number of sweatshops diminishing? 
 
6. Are working conditions improving? 
 
7. Who (or what institutions) is/are responsible for the current working conditions in 
clothing manufacturing?  
 
8. Who (or what institutions) could help improve working conditions in the sector? How? 
 
OFFICIAL # 
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Durham University 
Department of Geography 
 
Project Title: The Politics of Scale of Textile and Clothing Industry 
in Latin America and the European Union: a Comparative Approach 
 
Interview questionnaire 
 
PERSONAL DATA 
Name: _______________________________________________   
Institution: ____________________________________________________________ 
Position: _________________________________________________ Since: ______ 
 
 
1. How would you describe current working conditions in the clothing sector?  
 
2. Have working conditions deteriorated if compared to those in 1980? What was the 
situation then? 
 
3. Can you identify specific events/policies that influenced working conditions (directly or 
indirectly) during the last 30 years? 
 
4. What do you (and/or your institution) do regarding working conditions? 
 
5. Who (or what institutions) is/are responsible for the current working conditions in 
clothing manufacturing?  
 
6. Who (or what institutions) could help improve working conditions in the sector? How? 
 
UNION # 
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Durham University 
Department of Geography 
 
Project Title: The Politics of Scale of Textile and Clothing Industry 
in Latin America and the European Union: a Comparative Approach 
 
Interview questionnaire 
 
PERSONAL DATA 
 
Name: __________________________________________ Age: _____  Sex: ____ 
Works in:   Home           Workshop           Other: _________________________ 
Produces clothing for:  
 Outdoor market 
 Small and medium stores/brands 
 Large stores/brands ( domestic    foreign) 
 NR 
 
1. When did you start working in the sector? ______ (year) 
1.1. Where? _______________________________ 
1.2. If not in Buenos Aires/Prato, why did you come to Buenos Aires/Prato? How? 
 
1.3. What did you use to do in your home country? 
 
2. How and why did you enter the sector? 
 
3. How where working conditions at that time (especially regarding payment, hours, 
premiums and infrastructure/health and safety?  
 
4. How did your working conditions change throughout the last 30 years? Can you identify 
specific policies/events that influenced them (directly or indirectly)? 
 
5. How would you describe your working conditions at present? 
 
6. Is it difficult to find a good job in the sector? 
 
7. When you were unemployed (if you did), did you look for assistance? Did anyone help 
you? 
 
8. Who (or what institutions) is/are responsible for the current working conditions in 
clothing manufacturing?  
WORKER # 
 Unemployed 
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9. Who (or what institutions) could help improve working conditions in the sector? How? 
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Durham University 
Department of Geography 
 
Project Title: The Politics of Scale of Textile and Clothing Industry 
in Latin America and the European Union: a Comparative Approach 
 
Interview questionnaire 
 
 
Name: __________________________________________ Age: _____  Gender: ____    
Works in:   Workshop    Home 
Produces clothing for:   Own brand/store 
 Contractors 
 Outdoor market 
 Small/medium stores/brands 
 Large brands  ( Domestic      Foreign)  
 NR 
Number of workers: ______ 
 
1. When did you start working in the sector? ______ (year) 
1.1. Where? _______________________________ 
1.2. If not in Buenos Aires/Prato, why did you come to Buenos Aires/Prato? How? 
 
1.3. What did you use to do in your home country? 
 
2. How and why did you enter the sector? 
 
3. When did you start employing others? ______ (year) 
 
4. How would you describe the conditions for garment manufacturing at that time (in 
relation to the economic context and to the performance of your own enterprise?  
 
5. How did these conditions change throughout the last 30 years? Can you identify specific 
policies/events that influenced them (directly or indirectly)? 
 
6. How would you describe the current conditions? Is your company doing well? 
 
7. How is the relationship with your work-givers? 
 
8. Does imported clothing affect your business? 
 
WORKSHOP OWNER # 
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9. Who (or what institutions) is/are responsible for the current conditions faced by 
workshops’ owners like you?  
 
10. Who (or what institutions) could help improve these conditions? How? 
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